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FOREWORD 
The study summarized in this report is a part of an ongoing analysis 
to ~~ ermine the feasibility and preferred approaches for disposal of selected 
hi'1:i level nuclear wastes in space. The Battelle Columbus laboratory (BCl) 
st~l.ly is an integral part of the ongoing Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation 
(ONWI) managed DOE/NASA program for study of nuclear waste disposal in space, 
and was conducted in parallel with efforts at NASA Marshall S;:>ace Fl ight 
Center (MSFC); Science Applications, Inc. (SAI--under subcontract to Battelle 
and reported here); Battelle's Human Affairs Research Centers (HARC); Bechtel 
National, Inc.; and Oak Ridge National laboratory (ORNl). The research effort 
reported here (Phase II 1) was performed by Battell e' s Col umbus Laboratories 
(wi th SAl being a subcontractor for Task 4) under NASA Contract NAS8-32391 
from June 1979 through March 1980. The study objective was to provide NASA 
and DOE with additional technical data and infonnation in specialized areas as 
a basis for developing space disposal c~ncept definitions, requirements, and 
program pl ans. 
The info nna t i on developed dur i ng the study peri cd is conta i ned in 
this tw~-volume final report. The title of each volume is listed below. 
Vo 1 ume I Execut i ve Summa ry 
Volume II iechnicaJ Report 
Inqui ries regardi ng thi s study shaul d be addressed to: 
c. C. (Pete) Priest, COR 
NASA/Marshall Space Fl ight Center 
Attention: PS04 
Huntsville, Alabama 35812 
Telephone: (205) 453-2769 
Eric E. Ri ce, Progran Manager 
Battelle's Columbus Laboratories 
505 King Avenue 
CollJT1bus, Ohio 43201 
Telephone: (614) 424-5103 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This volume (Volume II) sumnarizes the results of the 1979-1980 Phdse 
III Battelle COlllnbl!S Laboratory st.udy of nuclear waste disposal in spat.: .. 
The study Objective was to provide NASA and DOE with additional technical da'~;! 
and infonnat1on in specialized areas as a basis for developing space d1spostl 
concept definitions, requirements, and pro~ram plans. To accomplish th .. ob-
jective of the study, five basi,c tasks were defined: 
• Nuclear Waste Payload Characterization (Task I) 
• Safety Assessment (Task 2) 
• Health Effects Assessr..ent (Task 3) 
• Lon~-Term Risk Assessm~nt (Task 4) 
• Prcgram Planning Support Analysis (Task S) 
Tasks 1. 2. 3 and ~ ~ere conducted by Battelle. Task 4 was performed 
by Science Ap,lications, Inc. (SAl) under subcontract. During the study. a 
consideracl~ ~nount of intera~tion existed among the study tasks dnd with NASA 
dnd DOE. Fiyure 1-1 illustrates this interaction. Table 1-1 relates the 
study tasks to sections contained (also pa9~ number) in this Technic~l Report. 
The following pdrdyrdphs briefly describe the contents of this volume. Volu~e 
1 is the Executive SUm"dry of Volume II. 
Section 2 summarizes the current reference concept for nuclear waste 
.1isposal in sp"ce. and ;s based upon the Concept Definition Doclll1ent developed 
for NASA/~arsha)1 Space flight Center as a part of this study. AspeC'·;s 
covered in this section include: (l) major concept options; (2) a reference 
concept overview. (3) a refer'ence concept mission description; (4) ref~rence 
mission element characteristics; (S) system safety design requirements. (6) 
major co~dngency plans for accidents and/or malfunctions. (7) a reference 
. launch trMfic model t system har(.lware and propellant requirements; and (8) an 
advanced space disposal concept that employs a heavy 11ft launch vehicle. 
Section 3 reports the work accempl ished under the COlTlnercial and 
defens ... ';Idte payload ch.jraC!f!r~zation activity (Task 1). Th~ waste fonn 
evaluation and selection pro.-:e5~ is documented (Section 3.1) along with the 
physicaJ cha"4ctl!ristics of th~ cnos~n ref~rence waste fonn (iron/nickt'l-based 
cenn'.;!' mllt!"i:-:). The radiol'luciide inventories for the reference con.nereial 
wast\.' (8!\"," PW-4o) dnd defl!nsc waste (Hanford) are defined in detail (Section 
3.2). A dr',ft C)ntain:neflt !-!equirements Document was prepared durin\1 the study 
and is :w€!s!nte.1 In 5e("t~on 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the results of a para-
metric sl;';I.ildir,\~ ~d l:lol1ng analysis. data are presented for both cOlllllerc;al 
and defen~~ Wdst~. Section 3.S describes waste ~rocessing and payload fdDri-
cation for the reference space disposal concept. 
The safety assessment (Task 2) is summarized in Sec:;on 4.0. The re-
view of ~arious safety studies for space nuclear payloads was conducted. The 
docllnents reviewed. including safety aspects tJf ratioisotope thermal genera~ 
tors (RTGS), the G~neral Purpose ~eat Source (GPHS), and Lewis Research Center 
concept for space dis~osal ~ as well as s~ne other discussions of interest. dre 
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TASlE 1-1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STUDY TASKS AND SECTIONS OF THIS 
,HIS TECHNICAL REPORT FOR THE BCl ~ASE III STUDY 
Study Task Final Report Sectlor. 
Page 
Number 
Task 1 - Payload Characterization 3.0 3-1 
1.1 Waste Form Selection 3.1 3-2 
1.2 Waste Mix Definition 3.2 3-9 
1.3 Containment Requirements Definition 3.3 3-22 
1.4 Container/Shield n~ffnition 3.t, 3-33 
1.5 Processing a"1 ~ayload Fabrication 3.5 3-51 
Definit~on 
Task 2 - Saf/!cy Assessment 4.0 4-1 
2.1 Safety Study Review 4.1 4-2 
2.2 At:"cident Envi rorrnent Defi nit i on 4.2 4-13 
2.3 Payload Accident Response Analysi!>' 4.3 4-55 
2.4 Preliminary HlLV Safety Assessmert 4.4 4-82 
Task 3 - Health Effects A~:;essment 5.0 5-1 
3.1 Hazard Index Evaluation 5.1 5-2 
3.2 Resuspension Effects 5.2 5-8 
3.3 Burnup Accident Analysis 5.3 5-13 
Task 4 - long-Term Risk Assessment 
(conduct.~ by SAl) 6.0 6-1 
4.1 Rescue f4fssion Technology Assessment 6.2 6-26 
4.2 Payload Breakup Effects 6.1 6-3 
Task 5 - Program PI anning Support Ar.alysi s 7.0 7-1 
5.1 Concept Definition 7.1,2.0 7-2 
5.2 Concept Definition & ivaluation 
Program Plan 7.2'* 7-3 
5.3 licensing Re~uirene.lts Defil'lHion 7.3 7-6 
5.4 SR&T Requirements 7.4 7-15 
5.5 Safety Test Requi~'ements 7.5 7-24 
* Note: The maJoY" output for this act ivity resulted in the "Concept 
Definition and EVJlu!tion Program Plan for the Space Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste, 19rJO-1983," dated January 28, 1980 • 
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presented in Section 4.1. The on-\=Iad catastrophic accident environments for 
the Uprated Space Shuttle (see Section 2.4.8 for definition) and the heavy 
1 ift launch vehicle (HLLV--see Sect ion 2.8.5 for definition) are described in 
Section 4.2. These accident environments have been characterized in terms of 
blast overpressures and impulses, fragment sizes and velocities, liquid 
propellant fi reball temperatures and heat fl uxes, and res idual fire tempera-
tures and heat fluxes. This information will be useful in future payload 
response studies. The thermal accident enviro'1ments for on-pad booster 
failures formed the basis for: (1) a limited survivability analysis that is 
described in Section 4.3; and (2) the preliminary conclusions related to the 
HLLV safety assessment (Section 4.4). Section 4.3 also presents the analyses 
for the inadvertent reentry of the payload conta~ners. Design changes to the 
reference concept have also been recommended. Section 4.4 provides the 
results of a preliminary safety assessment for using the HLLV as the boost 
vehicle for the space disposal option. 
Section 5 summarizes the results of the health effects assessment. 
The ORIGEM dilution hazard index model was exercised in an attempt to aid in 
the determination of the radionuclides that contribute most to the long-term 
risk of terrestri al disposal. The results from an EP.A path\tay hazard model 
v!ere also evaluated. Discussions of these are presented in Section 5.1. The 
effects of resuspension of fallout particles from an accidental r~~lease of 
Vlaste material is discussed in Section 5.2. A resuspension model WilS chosen 
for use in the health effects model. A health effects assessment (upper 
atmospheric burnup) vias conducted (see .)ection 5.3) employing data developed 
in the payload response analysis (described in Section 4.3). Design changes 
to the reference concept have been mot ivated, based upon upon thi s health 
effects assessment (see Section 4.3). 
Section 6.0 presents th~ results of the payload breakup analysis 
(Task 4.2) and rescue technology assessment (Task 4.1) conducted by SAl, under 
subcontract. Section 6.1 describes the assumptions and considerations made in 
the deep space payload breakup analysis. The analysis was conrlucted for both 
calCine powder and cermet matrix waste forms and two solar orb~t disposal re-
gions were considered. Section 6.2 presents the results of a prel iminary 
rescue technology assessment for the nuclear waste disposal mission. Previous 
\torks have been reviewed and certain approaches have been recommended for 
further consideration. 
Section 7 describes the effort on the program planning support analy-
sis task. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 briefly diSCUSS the work performed to f.lrepare 
two documents: (1) the Concept Definition Docu~ent (COD); and (2) the Concept 
Definition and Evaluation Program Plan. A slightly modified version of the 
COO is presented in Section 2. A very brief discussion of the program plan is 
presented. Sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 describe thp. expected reqlJirem~nts for 
licensing, supporting research and technology (SR&T), and safety testing. 
Sections 8 and 9 present the conclusions and recomenat ions that 
have resulted from this Phase III study. Appendix A provides definitions of 
acronyms and abbreviations used in this volume. Appendix R contains appro-
rriate r.:etric to English unit conversion factors. Appendixes C through J, 
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supporting various dspects of the analys~s perforn~d her~, are located at the 
end of this volume. 
References indicated 1n the text are found at the end of each major 
section • 
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2.0 REFERENCE CONCEPT DEFINITION AND OPTIONS SUMMARY 
The purpose of this section is to summarize the various options, ref-
erence definitions and/or requirements cyrre(ltly envisioned for the total 
nuclear waste disposal in space mission.t 2- 1J* Many reference definitions 
and requirements defined in this section were employed in the study and arp. 
documented here, but due to the evolving nature of the space disposal option, 
especially with regard to requirements, many have not been used. It is 
expected that follow-on studies will use and update these reference 
definitions and requirements. 
Section 2.1 identifies major mission options available for the space 
disposal of nuclear waste (;ncluding alternative waste sources through to the 
alternate final space dest inations), notes the reference and primary alterna-
tives, and identifies options flO longer considered viable. Section 2.2 pro-
vides a brief overview of the reference space disposal concept by olltlining 
the "single thread" characteristics, all the way from the \'/aste source to the 
space destination. Section 2.3 defines the reference misSion, emphasiZing 
operational or procedural aspects. Definitions for specific reference mission 
elements (e.g., waste payload characteristics, space systems and facilities) 
are provided in Section 2.4; emphasiS is on hardl'/are and facilities. Section 
2.5 describes currently envisioned system safety design requirements. Section 
2.6 describes the major contingency plans and systems that have been defined 
for th~ overall reference mission to minimize effects caused by possible acci-
dents and/or malfunctions. General space system hardware and propellant re-
quirements for the early years (1990·5) of the \'/aste disposal activity are 
identified in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 defines an advanced disposal concept 
which employs the use of a Space Power System (SPS)-derived heavy lift launch 
vehicle for the space booster to low Earth orbit. This concept is believed to 
be possible in the 2000 to 2010 time pI'riod. References are listed in Section 
2.9. 
*Note: This section has been derived from the latest version of the C0ncept 
Definit ion Document, see Reference 2-1. The "reference concert is a 
srace disposal concept that has been defined and documented by the 
Concept Definition Working Group made up of NASA/Hq. NASA/MSFC, Bel, 
and SAl personnel. The reference concept is bel i eved to be represen-
tat ive of what could be done to rid the Earth of hazardous nuclear 
wastes and a11m'/s trade-off studies to be performed such that th~ 
concept can be properly improved. However, the reference concept is 
expected to change during the planned 4-year Concent D~finition anri 
Evaluation Program (1980-1983). 
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_2_.1.~oncept Opt ions 
The reference concept for the initial space disposal of nuclear waste 
has been developed from a considerable number of options available at each 
step along the way from the reactor to the ultimate space disposal destina-
tion. A sumr.1ary of the various options available is shown in Figure 2-1. The 
reference mission options are shown in the blocks; primary alternatives are 
indicated by an asterisk; and those options no lonqer considered viable have 
lines drawn through them. Discussions of many of these options are available 
in References 2-2 through 2-l3. 
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2.2 Reference Concept Overview 
This section provides a brief overview of th~ reference concept, frail 
the chosen waste source to the final space destination. Reference options for 
this concept, shown in Figure ~·2, are described in subsequent sections • 
t 
I WASTE SOURCE: DOMESTIC CIVILIAN 1 
I 
I REACTOR: COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR I 
I 
FUEL CYCLE: URANIUM AND PLUTONIUH RECYCLE 
r 
NUCLIDE MIX: PUREX HIGH-LEVEL WASTE (SNWL PW-4b) 
I I WASTE FORM: CERMET MATRIX I 
I I GROUND TRANSPORTATION: RAIL I 
I 
I LAUNCH SITE: KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FLORIDA 1 
I 
LAUNCH VEHlr.LE: UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE (LIQUID BOOSTERS) 
I 
PAYLOAD AND LAUNCH CONFlGURATION: SINGLE SHUTTLE 
LAUNC~, SHIELDS REMOVED AT ORBIT 
I 
ORB!T TRANSFER: CYROGENIC orv AND SOLAR 
ORBIT INSERTION STAGE 
I 
SPACE DESTINATION: SOLAR ORBIT 0.85 A.U. 
FIGURE 2-2. O~ERVIEW OF REFERENCE CONCEPT FOR INITIAL 
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL IN SPACE PROGRAM 
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~3_~verall Reference Mission 
The overall reference mission, described in this section and devel-
oped during the course of this study, represents the concept for which most of 
the analyses in this report and in the NASA/MSFC documentation were conducted. 
Because of the many possible variations within the space disposal option, one 
point of reference is necessary. The major aspects of the reference mission 
are illustrated in Figure 2-3. This mission profile has been divided into 
seven major activities. The first b/o are expected to be the responsibility 
of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the last five are expected to be NASA's. 
These are: 
(1) Nuclear Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication (DOE) 
(2) Nucl ear !~aste Ground Transport (DOE) 
(3) Payload Preparation at launch Site (NASA) 
(4) Prelaunch Activities (NASA) 
(5) Uprated Space Shuttle Operations (NASA) 
(6) Upper Stage Operations (NASA) 
(7) Payload Monitoring (NASA). 
Considerations of rescue and recovery systems are discussed in Sections 2.4 
and 2.6. Also, see Section 6.2 for a detailed discussion of rescue mission 
technology. More complete definitions for individual system elements are dis-
cussed in Section 2.4. The following paragraphs provide the reader with a 
general overview of the reference mision. 
2.3.1 Nuclear Waste Process)ng and Payload Fabrication (Oq£l 
Typically, spent fuel rods from r:iomestic pO\'Jer plants would be trans-
ported to the \'1aste processing and payload fabrication sites via conventional 
shipping casks. Using the Purex process, high-level waste containing fission 
products and actinides, including 0.1 percent plutoniulTl and 0.1 percent IJr~ni­
UIil, \'/ould be processed from these spent fuel ron_-. (see Section 3.2.1). The 
hi3h-level waste would be formed into a cermet matrix by a calcination and 
hydrogen reduction process (see Section 3.1.2). The ~/aste form would then be 
fabricated into a 5000 kg spherical payload (see Section 3.5). ~·Jithin a 
remote shielded cell, the waste payload is loaded into a container; the con-
tainer is then closed and sealed, inspected, decontaminated t and packaged into 
a fl ight-weight gamma radiation shi~ld asselTtly (see Section 3.4.2). During 
these operations and subsequent interim storage at the processing site, the 
I'IJste payload is cooled by an auxiliary cooling system. 
2.3.2 Nuclear Waste Ground Transport (DOE) 
The shielded waste container I'/ould then be loaded into a ground 
transportation shipping cask (see Figure 2-4). This cask, which provides 
additional shielding, thermal, and ifTlpact protection for the \'Iaste container 
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FIGURE 2-3. GROUND AND SPACE OPERATIONS fOR 
REFERENCE SPACE DISPOSAL MISSION 
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SPHERICAL RADIATION SHIELD 
AND WAITE CONTAINER 
FIGURE 2-4. REFERENCE CONCEPT FOR NUCLEAR WASTE PAYLOAD 
SHIPPING CASK FOR TERRESTRIAL TRANSPORT 
-- -, -
to comply with the Nuclear Reyulatory Commission/Department of Transportation 
regu1ations, 1S H.i:n loadec onto a specially designed rail car for trans-
\Jortiny the waste container from the waste payload fabrication site to the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida launch site. Once the cask reaches the 
launch site, it is offloaded into the Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility 
(NPPF). 
2.3.3 Payload Preparation at Launch Site (NASA) 
The NPPF is expected to provide interim storage capability for up to 
three shielded waste containers, which affords efficient preparation for 
launches plus capacity for unplanned delays. During storage, additional radi-
ation shielding, thermal control, monitoring and inspection of the Haste 
container would be provided. 
2.3.4 Prelaunch Activities (NASA) 
In \Jreparation for launch of the nuclear waste into space, the inte-
grated Space Shuttl e waste payload is prel aunch Checked in the NPPF. The 
inteyrated Siluttle payload consists of: the wast~ form; the container; the 
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radiation shield; the reentry vehicle (RV). which protects and structurally 
supports the waste in the Urbiter cargo bay (see Figure 2-5); the Solar Orbit 
Insertion Stage (SOlS). which circularizes the waste payload into the solar 
orbi t disposal dest i nat ion; and the Orbit Transfer Vehicl e (OTV). which pro-
vides escape from low Earth orbit and insertion into the helfocentric transfer 
trajectory. Inte~ration and checkout in the NPPF is typical of future ground 
flow planning at Kennedy Space Center and parallel to the c~~rrent use of the 
Vertical Processing Facility (VPF) by the Inertial Upper Sta~e (IUS). Pre-
launch checkout in the NPPF includes verification of the payload and the pay-
load to Orbiter interface syste;ns. The Orbiter interface would be simulated 
by standardized equipment. Typically. storable propellant loading would occur 
in the NPPF to minimize the hazard of propellant loading while the payload 1s 
in the Shuttle cargo bay on the launch pad. 
IIADlATlON 
'MilLO 
/ 
IIIINTIIV 
VlMICLI 
FIGURE 2-5. REFERENCE CONCEPT OF A LOADED REENTRY VEHICLE 
Transfer of the payload to the launch padls Rotating Service Struc-
ture (~SS). is accomplished by a special purpose transporter which maintains 
the :>hutti~ payload in the proper position for installation in the Orbiter 
carfJo uay (see r~yure 2-3). The payload is transferred from the NPPF to the 
pad after the Shuttle vehicle installation at the launch pad has been corn-
plet~~. The payload 1s then pOSitioned by the RSS and installed 1n the 
Orbiter cargo bay. After payload installation. propellant loading of the OTV, 
and final systens Checkout the decision to launCh is made. 
-
l 
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2.3.5 Uprated Space Shuttle Operations (NASA) 
One Upratt!d Space Shuttle vehicle would be readied for launch for a 
9i ven di spasal miss10n. The to-be-constructed Pad C at KSC Launch Campl ex 39 
would be ust!d for thl s mission. Pad A or B could be used to launch the 
Shuttle vehicle that carries the rescue OTV, should it be required. 
Tht! UjJrated Space Shuttle (45,400 ky payload to low Earth orbit), 
that is to perfonn the disposal lIIiss10n, is launched at a 108 degree south 
azimuth to a 300 km (160 n.mi.) circular orbit inclined 38 degrees to the 
equator. A small aegree of yaw steering is required such that early land 
overfliyht of various populated la~d masses (West Indies and South Africa) is 
avoided. Once on orbit, the loaded reentry vehicle (RV) in the Shuttle 
Orbiter cdrgo bay is remott!ly translated aft a short distance and structurally 
latched to the SOlS. Using the OTV payload bay rotation structure, the OTV, 
SOlS, and loaded RV are deployed from the Orbiter bay. Actual separation from 
the rotat10n structure is accomplished by a spring ~owered deployment systen. 
After the OTV, SOlS, and loaded RV configuration has been stabilized in a 
fixed attitude, the Orbiter will move to a safe distance away to limit the 
radiation dose to the crew from the unshielded payload. At this time, the 
waste p4yload would be mechanic311y transferred by remote control to the SOlS 
I-Iayload adapter, and the OTV/SOIS/waste payload i c "ric!nted for the Earth 
escape propulsive burn. The reentry vehicle would ,"ernain in orbit and be 
recovered and returned to KSC by the Shuttle Orbiter. 
The waste payload is cooled, while the payload is inside the reentry 
vehicle, bj an auxiliary c;ooliny system that has been inteyrated into the 
reentry vehicle. Passive radiative cool iny of the waste payload would be 
adequate after the waste payload has been removed from the reentry vehicle. 
After the OTV delivers the nuclear waste payload and SOLS to the desired 
t.rajectory and returns to a low Earth orbit, the Orbiter would rendezvous with 
the OTV and return it to the launch site for refurbi shment for use on a later 
fliyht. 
2.3.6 Upper Stage Operations {NASA} 
After the OTV/SOrS/waste payload system has passed final systems 
checkouts, the OTV propulsive burn would place the 5015 and its attached waste 
payload on the iJroper Earth escape trajectory. Control of the propulsive burn 
from low Earth orbit wOllld be from the aft deck payload control station on the 
Orbiter, with backup provided by a ground control station. After the burn ;s 
complete, the SOlS/waste payload is then released. In about 160 aays the 
payload and the storable liquid propellant SOlS would travel to its perihelion 
at 0.85 A.U. about the Sun. (One astronomical unit (A.U.) is equal to the 
average di stance from the Earth to the Sun.] The SOlS would then pI ace the 
paylodd in its final space disposal destination by reducing the aphelion froln 
1.0 to 0.85 A.U. To aid in obtainin!:! the desir~d orbital lifetimes, this 
orbit would be inclined to the ecliptic plane by 1 degree. The recovery burns 
of the UTV would use the rernaininy OTV propellant to rendezvous with the 
J 
L 
j 
I. 
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Shuttle Orbiter for its subsequent recovery. refurbistment, and reuse on a 
later mission. The reference OTV/SOIS mission profile is shown in Figure 2-6. 
OIS~AL ORIJT 
0.'5 A.U. C\atIn. ..... L 1 OECREE lNeLINATIUft 
HELlOC[NTR IC 
TRANS~E. TRAJECTORY 
1-2 Uprated Space Shuttle (45,400 kg payload) ascent from Earth to a 300 km 
circular orbit with a 38° incl~r.ation 
2-3 Prime OTV burn of approximately 10 r,lin for escape from low-Earth orbit crt 
a1liptic ~olar orbit transfer trajectory with perigee of 0.85 A.U. and 1° 
inclination to the ecliptic. The 6V for this maneuver is 3350 m/sec. 
3 OTV separation from the SOlS/nuclear waste payload and retro hurn to an 
elliptic Earth orbit. The 6V for this maneuver is 640 m/sec. The OTV 
lifetime for return to the Orbiter is approximately 50 hours. The apogee 
for this orbit is 61.000 km. 
4 OTV circularization into the 300 km. 38° inclination recovary orbit. The 
6V is 2770 m/sec. 
5 SOlS and payload circularization into 0.85 A.U •• 1° inclination to the 
ecliptic. solar orbit. The 6V is 1160 m/sec. 
fIGURE 2-6. REFERENCE OTV/SOIS MISSIO!j PROFILE 
2.3.7 Payload Monitoring (NP~ 
The Earth escape trd,;t:lcto"y of the SOlS/waste payload would be 
mOlli to red by ground-based radar systems dnd tel emetry from the SOlS and OTV. 
The final disposal orbit achieved would be monitored by NASA's Deep Space 
Network. Once the proper disposal orbit has been verifie,j. no additional 
monitoring is necessary. However., IT1Onitoring could be re-established in the 
future. if required. 
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2.4 R~ference System Element Def1nitions 
The definitions for reference mission system elements are described 
below. These definitions have been used in almost all cases for the work 
documented in this report. Twelve major system elements identified for this 
definition document are: 
(1) Waste Source 
(~) Waste Mix 
(3) Waste Fonn 
(4) Waste Processing and Fabrication Facilities 
(5) Payload Container. Shieldiny. and Reentry Vehicle 
(6) Ground Transport Vehicles and Casks 
(7) Launch Site Facilities 
(8) Uprated Space Shuttle Vehicle 
(9) Upper Stages 
(10) Payload Eject ion Systelll 
(11) Docking System 
(12) Space Destination. 
Definitions for the reference mission system elements follow. 
2.4.1 W~ste Source 
The primary waste source would be nuclear wdste generated by the 
operation of commercial nuclear jJower jJlants (see Section j.2.1). Table 2-1 
jJrovides the most real i st ic project ions of ~aste generat ion (assumi ny 200 GWe 
by the .year 2000) found in the literature.\2-14) By assuming that the waste 
must be at least 10 years old before it can bl: disposed of in space. and that 
rl.!processiny capacities should be able to process the waste according to the 
jJroposed schedule, the annual amount of waste availahle for disjJosal is given. 
Projections of the mass availlble for space disposal are also yi'lel~ as a 
function of year. The mass of waste available annually for space disposal. in 
cermet forfll. would increase to 310 metric tons (MT) by ttle yedr 200U. 
2.4.2 Waste Mix 
Waste generated using the Purex process (fission pruducts, actinides 
includin~ djJjjroxllnately 0.1 percent Pu, and 0.1 jJerctnt U) is considered tu be 
the r~ference waste mix cumposition. The specific reference waste used for 
the 1979-19(:10 SjJdce Option study activity was defined as the Bdttel1.~ 
Norttl\Jest Ldtloratory PW-4b waste nix (see Section 3.2.1 for details). \2-15) 
The t11~ental definition of this waste is \:jiven in Tdble 2-2; isotujJic 
~efinition is ~iven in Section 3.2.1. 
~ _. II '-
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Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
198~ 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
199fi 
19'37 
1998 
1999 
2000 
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TABLE 2-1. PROJECTED NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REPRUCESSING 
CAPACITY AND C()HRCIAL HH .. ;~-!.P'EL WASTE 
AVAILABLE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Annual Nuclear Annual H'~~-Level Purex 
Cumulative Waste Ava 11 ab 1 e Haste in I'ermet Fom 
Power, Waste, for 01 sposal , Available for Spacp. 
G\>:e MTHM r.rrHM/yr Disposal, ~T/yr 
61. 3 5890 (c) 0 0 
74.R 7690 0 n 
87.3 9790 0 0 
101.1 12,220 0 0 
115.4 14,990 0 0 
131.4 18,140 0 0 
144.3 21,600 0 a 
157.1 25,370 0 0 
164.9 29,330 0 r) 
174.0 33,510 0 0 
180.9 37,850 5890(C) 41n 
186.5 42,330 1801.' 125 
188.9 46,360 2100 146 
190.1 51,420 2430 169 
192.5 56,(140 2770 193 
194.0 60,700 3150 219 
195.0 65,380 3460 241 
196.0 70,080 3500 244 
197.0 74,RIO 3960 275 
198.0 79,560 4180 290 
199.0 84,340 4340 301 
200.0 89,140 1480 310 
(a) Fror.1: Yates, K. R., and Park, U. Y., "Projections of COll1merci.~l ~lllclear 
Capacity and Spent-Fuel Accumulation in the Unite~ States", Fu~l 
Reprocessing, pp. 350-352 (June 1979). 
(b) '.1Tf"!!~ ; s metric tOliS heavy metal. 
(c) InclUdes 4400 ~~THr.1 P~·J-4b existing as of 1978. 
(d) Assume~ 40.8 kg/Mi waste for space disposal and a ce~t \-/dste fom 
loadin9 of 58.7 percent. 
(e) Computed by r.1ultiplying 5890 ~~THM by 0.0408 rlT/fv4THt1 and dividing by 
D.S87. 
, 'l 
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TABLE 2-2. REFERENCE WASTE "IX COMPOSITION 
FOR SPACE DISPOSAL (BNWL PW-4b) 
Amount, Amount, 
Constituent k~!MTHM Constituent kg/MTHM 
1 nerts 
Fission 
Products 
NaZO 
Fez03 
CrZ03 
N10 
PZOS 
GdZ03 
RbOO Sr 
YZ03 
ZrOZ 
MoOd TC~ 7 
Ru 0 
RhZ 3 
Pd~ 
A~20 
CdO 
Source: Reference 2-15. 
2.4.3 Waste Fcrm 
1.511 
0.345 
0.141 
0.672 
0.354 
1.059 
0.598 
4.944 
5.176 
1.~91 
2.971. 
0.400 
1.483 
o.oes 
0.097 
Fission Teo~ 0.725 
Products cS6 2.880 ~eont I d.) 8a 1.567 
La~03 1.480 
Ce ~ 3.323 
Pr6 11 J..482 
NdZ03 4.522 
Prnz03 0.1Z3 
SmZ03 0.924 
EuZ03 0.200 
GdZ03 0.137 
Actinides U308 1.169 
NpOZ 0.865 
PuOZ 0.010 
Am20J 0.181 
Cm203 0.040 
TOTAL 40.8 
The reference wute fonl! for space disposal is the ORNL i ron/nickel-
based cermet. It has been chosen over may other wes ste forms (see Sect; on 
3.1.1)0 A cenilet is a dispersion of ceramic particles in a continuous metal-
lic phase. The reference cermet is formed by a prucess involving dissolution 
and precipitation from molten urec! followed by calcin~t;on and hydrogen reduc-
tion to produce a continuous metallic phase (see Section 3.1.2). Nonhydrogen 
reducible oxides fonn the ceraMic portion of the ceramic/lnetal matrix wast~ 
fOI"!II. Th; s waste fom has been shown to have superior ~ro~rt;es as cOOlpdred 
to otllt~r votential waste forms for spac! dis/losal. The ;rc'l/nickel-based cer-
lill~t heSS hi\jh wdste loc!ding (58.7 percent). ~ reliltively hiyh thermal conduc-
tivity (14 Watts/m-C at 300 C). a high density (6.7 y/cc). a good spec~fic 
heat (0.51:13 k.J/kg-C), and a high structural inteyrity. 
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2.4.4 Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication Facilities 
The waste processing and payload fabrication facilities are assumed 
tJ be collocated. The r~ference waste mix requires a waste processing facili-
ty ~tiliziny the Purex process. After separation and generation of the aque-
ous wast~ stream, approximately 5 years of storage would occur before further 
processiny. The wast~ would then be put into its final cenilet waste fono. 
The wdStt! payload fabrication facilities would provide a series of 
interconnected, shielded cells for loading the waste fonn into containers, 
closing, seal; ;~'I inspecting, decontaminating containers, and ultimate inser-
tion into the ,iyht-weight radiation shield assembly. Each cell would have 
provisions to COr;llelt the WCtste container to an auxil iary cooling system. 
Each facility w')uld provide interim storage for a nUHlber of shielded waste 
packages and equipment/systems for cask handling and rail car loading. 
2.4.5 Payload Container, Shielding, and Reentry Vehicle Systems 
The primary containment for the radioactive waste is a stainless 
steel spherical container (1.27 em thick -- see Figure 2-5). This container 
must provide high integrity containment for the waste during the variol!s de-
fine'J mechanical and thermal loads to which the total payload is subjected in 
anticipated normal and accident conditions. These loads would be mitigated in 
varying degrees by the waste form itself, the gamma radiation shield assem-
bly, by the shipping cask which provides additional yamma radiation shielding 
for ~round tran.sportation, and by the reentry vehicle (RV) system during the 
prelaunch and boost phase of tre disposal mission. The container would be 
desiyned to dissipate the heat generated within the waste form by passive 
cooliny to thE space environment during the orbital operations. During any 
nonnal operation, the maximum temperature of the waste form should not exceed 
the nonnal limiting temperature of 1200 C. During launch and on orbit while 
the waste is in the RV, the temperature is to be controlled with assistance of 
various auxiliary cooling systems located on the Shuttle Orbiter and the RV. 
If accidents occur, the temperature of the waste and container material may 
exceed the normal 1 imit but must not exceed that which would caUSE loss of 
containment. 
The container would be housed in d fl ight-weiyht radidtion shield 
asselilbly for the period prior to leaving the waste fabrication facility until 
attachea to the OTV in Earth orbit. This fl ight-weiyht shielding would be 
designed to limit the radiation level to 2 rem/hr at 1 meter from its surface 
(see Section 2.5.2.4). Additional shielding would need to be provided by 
temporCiry shielding at the NPPF and RSS, and possibly a shadow shield in the 
Shuttl~ Orbiter for the crew (see Section 2.5.1.1). The spherical radiation 
shield would be of depleted uranium sandwiched between two layers of stainless 
steel. 
The radiation shi~ldtd waste container would be enclosed in a protec-
tive reentry and impact shield prior to launch and during the boost phase (see 
Fi~ure 2-7). This system would be designed to minimize the probability of 
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FIGURE 2-7. REFERENCE REENTRY VEHICLE CONFIGURATION AND 
NOSE CROSS SECTION 
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conta i nillent breach as a resul t of accidents or mal functions which coul d occur 
duriny the ~relaunchJ launch, suborbital, orbital, or unpldnnp.d reentry phases 
of the mission. The protection shield would consist of an outer layer of car-
bon/carbon thennal protection and MIN-K insulation and a 61 cm thick steel 
honeycomb impact structure (at the nose point). The thenllal protection is 
completely j~ound the payload, whereas, the impact structure covers only the 
nose of the RV. The waste payload/reentry vehicle/SOIS/OTV configuration, as 
positioned in the Shuttle Orbiter, is shown in Figure 2-8. 
FIGURE 2-8. LOCATION OF PAYLOAD/RV/SOIS/OTV CONFIGURATION 
IN SHUTTLE ORBITER CARGO RAY 
2.4.6 Ground Transport Vehicles and Casks 
For transport from the waste fabrication facility to the launch site, 
the waste containers and associated flight-weight shielding would be housed in 
a shippiny cask affording additional shielding, thermal and impact prott~ction 
to ;neet the NJJ,c1ear Regulatory Commission/Department of Tt'ansportation 
regu1ations.(2-1bj The cask (see Fiyure 2-4) 1S expected to be licensed by 
the Nuclear Reyulatory Comll1ission. The cask woulJ be transported from the 
payload fabrication facilities to the KSC launch site on a specially designed 
rail car that adequately supports and distributes the weiyht of the cask and 
provides acceptable tie downs. In addition, the rail ear would carry an auxil-
iary cool ing system to reI iably cool the \'Idste package. 
2.4.7 Launch Site Facilities 
The reference launch site for launching nuclear waste payloads during 
the early phase of the program (early-1990' s) would be Launch Compl ex 39 at 
Kennedy Space Center Florida. New fdcil ity construction dnd equi pment 
expected during this fler;od ;5 notell belflw • 
• A secure, sealed, envirorunentally contr~ ;ed, Nuclear Payload 
Preparation Faeil ity (NPPF) to store, cool, :ilonitor, asselilble, and 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
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ch~ckout the waste f,Jayload systems from the time the shielded 
nuclear waste container arrives at KSC until the time the loaded 
payload reentry vehicle is moved to the launch pad. 
• A dedicated, special-purpost:! transporter to move the nuclear waste 
payload from the NPPF to the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) at 
the launch pad. This includes construction of a roadway or tracks 
for the transporter to use. 
The other currently planned Shuttle and upper stage launch facilities 
Inay or may not bt:! adequate to supPQr: the additional Shuttle launches required 
by a high launch rate (60 per year) nuclear waste disposal program. Further 
analysis of the nuclear wast~' disposal traffic model coupled with the Space 
Shuttl e traffic model and current turnaround time 1 i nes is needed. It ; s ex-
pected that additional facilities would likely be needed at the higher launch 
rates. Facilities envisioned are: 
• A d~dicated Space Shuttle launch Tad (Pad C) for launching nuclear 
waste payloads. The waste paj' oad would be insta;led in the 
Shuttle Orbiter at the pad. A specially desiyned RSS is required 
for this mission. 
• A third Mobile launch Platform (MlP) for transporting built-up 
Shuttles from the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAS) to the launch 
pads is required. 
• A third firing room in the Launch Control Center (lCe) would have 
to be act i vated to handl e the increased number of Space Shuttl e 
flights dedicated to the nuclear waste disposal program. This 
firing room would be used exclusively for the waste disposal 
missions. 
2.4.8 Uprated Space Shuttle Vehicle 
Duriny the early years of a space disposal program, the Uprated Space 
Shuttle (45,400 kg payload to low Earth orbit--see Figure 2-9) would represent 
an ideal vehicle to carry out the boost phase of the space transport. The 
National A~ronautics and Space Administration is now managing the development 
of the Space Shuttle (to be operational at Kennedy Space Center in 1981), a 
new class of space booster that is a highly reliable, reusable, low-cost vehi-
cle that can transport payloads to low Earth orbit and back. It is antici-
pated that the Space Shuttle vehicle expected to fly space rnissions will be 
uprated around 1990. This uprating involves the use of a higher perforiilance 
and environmentally cleaner Liquid Rocket Booster (lR8) as a repl acernent for 
the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). 
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-:5,I'ACE SHUTTLE 
MAIN ENGINE 
FIGURE 2-9. UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE 
The Uprated Space Shuttle consists of a piloted reusable orbiting 
vehicle (the Orbiter) mounted on an expendable External Tank (ET) containing 
hydrogen/oxyyen propellants and two recoverable and reusabl~ Liquid Rocket 
Boosters (lRB's). The propellants for the LRB's are RP-1 (kerosene) and liq-
uid oxygen (LOX), having an oxidizer to fuel ratio of 2.9. The Orbiter \"i11 
have three main hydrogen/oxygen liquid rocket engines and a cargo bay 18.29 m 
lony and 4.57 m in diameter. At launch, both the LRB's and the Orbiter's 
three liquid rocket engines would burn sirnultaneously. After about 140 
seconds and after the Space Shuttle vehicle attains an altitude of about 45 km 
(28 miles), the LRB's would be separated and subsequently recovered from the 
Atlantic Ocean. The ET is jettisoned before the Orbiter goes into orbit. The 
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) is then propel s the Orbiter into the desi red 
Earth orbit. The Orbiter with its crew and payload (weighing up to 45,400 kg) 
would rernain in orbit to carry out its mission, normally from 1 to 7 days, 
but, when required, as long as 30 days. When the mission is completed, the 
Orbiter would be deorbited and piloted back to the launch site for an unpow-
ered 1ancting on a runway. The Orbiter and LRB's would subsequently b~ refur-
bished and reflown on other space missions. Ref~rences 2-17, 2-18, and 2-19 
provide additional information about the standard Space Shuttle and its capd-
bilities. Reference 2-20 provides data on LRB's for the Uprated Space 
Shuttle. Table 2-3 provides a reference mass summary for the Uprated Space 
Shuttle Vehicle. 
Small changes to the Space Shuttle system may be required to provide 
a safer and more reliable launch vehicle. These modifica t ions have not yet 
been identifi~d. 
BATTELL.IE - COL.UMIIU8 
2-'(8 
TABLE 2-3. MASS SUMMARY FOR UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE 
Vehicle 
Component/Element Mass, kg Weight, 1 b 
Orbiter 
~ Dry (Less Engines) 63,875 140,821 Engines 9,063 19,980 Personnel and Equipment 1,197 2,640 
Residuals and Reserves 4,212 9,285 
Total Inert 78,347 172,726 
OMS/ReS Pro~ellants 12,322 27 ,166 
Total at Liftoff 90,669 199,892 
External Tank {ET~ 
Dry 32,757 72,217 
Residuals and Reserves 4,276 9,428 
Total Inert 37,034 81,645 
Usable Propellants (LOX/LH2) 711,196 1,567,918 
Total at Liftoff 748,230 1,649,5Q3 
Liguid Rocket Boosters (Both) 
, Dry 126,269 278,376 ~. Residuals 4,853 lOOO 
--
Total Inert 131,122 289,U76 
Usaole Propellants (LOX/RP-l) 1 ,080 ,480 2,382,050 
Total at Li ftoff 1,211,602 2,671,126 
Pa~load 45 ,360 100,000 
Total Vehicle at Liftoff 2,095,861 4,620,581 
-.-~---
Source: Reference 2-20. 
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2.4.9 Upper Stag@s 
Two different upper s~ayes have been defined for use for the nuciear 
waste disposal mission: (1) an Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV), and (2) a stor-
able iJropellant Solar Orbit Insertion Staye (SOlS). The OTV is (1 ~omplete1y 
reusable and recoverable stage. the SOlS is expendable. Orbital rescue capa-
bility would be performed by the OTV and SOlS systems. 
The UTV is defined as a reusable LOX/LH2 chemical propulsion stage 
similar to the cryogenic OTV defined in the past few years for possible deve1-
olXl1ent and use with the Space Shuttle. This vehicle would have separate pro-
pellant tanks, an oxidizer/fuel (OfF) mixture ratio of 6 and a delivered spe-
cific impulse (Isp) of 470 seconds. It would also have an advanced, redun-
dant, avionics and attitude control system. Figure 2-10 is a pictoral of the 
DTV. 
.- SOLlR tELLS 
~ STCR.e.OL£ sueE (SOISI 
REuSADLE CRYOGENIC STAGE (OTVI 
lCS 
\1-000---- 8.53 m ----------.., 
------ 11.50 m---------·-----' 
FIGURE 2-10. REFERENCE OTV/SOIS/WASTE PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION 
The storable-propellant, pressure-fed SOlS would be sized to provide 
a specific impul~e uf 289 sec. The NASA/MSFC scaling relation for the SOlS is 
given below: 
MB.O. = 810 + 0.0522 Mp 
where MB.O. and Mp dre the SOlS stage burnout mdSS (kg) and propell ant 
loading nlass (ky), respectively. The propellant loading includes a 15 percent 
fl ight reserve. Thi s stage would have three off-the-shelf (Space Shuttl e-
Reaction Control System) prtl!isure-fed engines at a thrust level of 3870 N (370 
1 b) each, Inonomethyl hydrazi ne/nitrogen tetroxide (MMH/NTO) propell ants, a 
guidance and control system, and a payload docking adapter system cOlllpatible 
with the dockin\;) system. The stage would be designed to adequately withstand 
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the adverse nuclear radiation, and space environments experienced while 
coasting 160 days before firiny. 
The rescue vehicle would be a Shuttle launched OTV/SOIS system. It 
would include appropriate provisions for targeting and docking with the 
nucl~ar waste container attached to an DTV/SOIS, the nuclear waste container 
attached to an SOlS only, a payload reentry vehicle assembly, or an un-
shi elded, separated waste contai nero It would be reusable or expendabl e 
<.1epending upon the rescue mission. This vehicle would be required to have an 
on-oroit stay time of at least 300 hours with little reduction expected in 
rel iabil ity or perfonnance. The rescue vehicle may be returned to Earth by 
the Shuttle Orbiter at the end of the cycle for refurbishment, if recoverable. 
Definition of other rescue requirements are expected as studies progress. 
2.4.10 Payload Ejection System 
A payload ejection system would be incorporated into the pallet which 
supports the reentry vehicle (see Figure 2-8). This system would employ 16 
small sol id propellant rocket motors which would be ignited to eject the 
loaded reentry vehicle from the Orbiter cargo bay in the event of a serious 
on-pad or ascent failure. The reentry vehicle would be deSigned to withstand 
the expected sea or yround impact envi ronment. 
2.4.11 Payload Docking and Transfer System 
The payload docking and transfer system would be launched into orbit 
attached to the reentry vehicle. The docking/transfer system would be used to 
transfer the waste payload container from the reentry vehicle to the SUIS 
payload adapter. The payload adapter would be designed to jettison the nucle-
ar payload duri ny the very low probabil ity occurrence of a grossly i rlaccurate 
OTV propulsive burn. This action wC'uld pr~vent possible reentry and allow 
5ubsequent recovery by a Shuttle or uTV rescue vehicle. 
2.4.12 Space Destination 
The reference space destination for the nuclear waste disposal mis-
sion is dn orbital region between the orbits of the Earth and Venus. The 
nominal circular orbit is defined as 0.85 + 0.01 A.U. The orbital inclination 
about t~u:~ Sun is specified as 1 degree from the eclif)tic plane. 
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2.5 System Safety Design Requirements for Reference Concept 
This section defines system safety design requirements for the 
reference nuclear waste disposal in space mission (also see Section 3.3 and 
Appendi~ C). These requirenents provide the guidelines against which nuclear 
waste payloads may be considered acceptable from a radiological safety point 
of view. These requirements should be used for future studies, and modified 
as changes in the concept occur. 
The general safety design objectives for the nuclear waste payload 
and/or its associated system components are: (1) to contain the solid radio-
active waste materials and (2) to limit the exposure of humans and the envi-
ronment to the radioactive waste materials. For normal operations, complete 
containment and minimum exposure are required; for potential accident situa-
tions, the degree of containment and degree of interaction shall result in an 
acceptable risk to humans and the environment. 
The following subsections describe the general and specifiC system 
design requirements for the nuclear waste disposal in space mission. 
2.5.1 General System Safety Design Requirements 
The general system safety design requirements for the nuclear waste 
disposal in space mission involve considering of the following: 
(1) Radiation Exposure 
(2) Containment 
(3) Accident Environments 
(4) Criticality 
(5) Postaccident Recovery 
(6) Monitoring Systems. 
The following par'agraphs define the requirements that should be followed for 
the reference sy~;tem concept design activity. 
2.5.1.1 Radiation Exposure 
Radiation exposure 1 imits for normal operations for the publ ic and 
ground crews will be those contai~ed in ERDA-MC-0524 and shown in Table 2-4. 
Radiation exposure I imits for Space Shuttle crew members during nonna1 opera-
tions will be those contained in the Space Shuttle Flight and Ground Specifi-
cation, JSC 077UU. Volume X. Revision A. Chapter 7.4 and shown in Table 2-5. 
The normal radiation exposure I imits for the current terrestrial 
transportation of nuclear waste materials would also apply to ~rouna 
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TABLE 2-4. NORMAL OPERATIO~S EXPOSURE LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
IN CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED AREAS 
INDIVIDUALS IN CONTROLLED AREAS: 
Dose Equivalent (Dose or 
Type of Exposure Exposure Period Dose Commitment •• ran) 
Whole bOdy. head and trunk. 
gonads. I ens of the eyeb, red 
bone marrow, dctive blood 
fonning organs. 
Year 5c 
Unlimited areas of the s~in 
(except h.\nds and forea rms). 
Other organs, t issues, and 
organ systems (except bone). 
Bone. 
Calendar Quarter 3 
Year 15 
Calendar Quarter 5 
Year 30 
Calendar Quarter 10 
Foreanns.d Year 30 
Calendar Quarter 10 
Handsd and feet. Year 75 
Calendar Quarter 25 
INDIVIDUALS IN UNCONTROLLED AREAS: 
An~\.Ial Dose Equivalent Or Dose Commitment (relu)e 
Type of 
Exposure 
Whole b00y, yonads, 
or bone '!lc1rrow 
OthEI' organs 
Based on dose to individuals 
at points of 
maximum probable exposure 
O.S 
1.5 
Based on an a~~rage dose 
to a suitable sample of 
exposed population 
0.17 
0.5 
(a) To meet the ~bove dose co~mitment standards, opp.rations must ~~ conducted 
in such a manner that it ~Iould be IJnlikely that an individual ",ould 
assimilate in a critical organ, by inhala',ion, ingestion, or absorption, 
a quantity of J -ac.Jionucl idees) that would cl)rnlnit the individual to an 
organ d(l~:: Plh ich exceeds the I imi ts speci fied 1n the above table. 
(b) A beta exposure ~elow an average ~nergy of 700 Kev wl11 not penetrate the 
lens of the eye; therefore, the appl icable limit for these energies would 
be that for the ski n (15 I'em/year). 
(c) In special cases with the approval of the Director, Division of Opera-
tional Safety, a worker miJy exceed 5 rem/year provided his average 
exposure per year sinc~ ag~ 13 will not exceed 5 rem per year. 
(d) All reasonable efforts shall be made to keep exposures of forearms and 
hands to the ~eneral li~it fo .. the o;kin. 
(e) In keeping with ERDA policy on lowest ~racticable exposure, exposures to 
the public shall be liniited to as small a fraction of the respective 
annual dose I irnits as ii practicable. 
Source: See Section 4.5, Reference 4-7. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
, .. ' .' trtff'mm a-ere-
r 
I 
· . 
L 
I ~ 
· . 
r 
i -
, 
i 
· . 
! 
2-23 
TABLE 2-5. RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS FOR SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT CREWs(a) 
Constraints, !)one Marrow. Ski n. Eye. 
Testes(c) rem 5 em 0.1 mm 3mm 
1 year average daily rate 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 
3D-day maximum 25 75 37 13 
Quarterly maximum(b) 35 105 52 18 
Yearly maximum 75 225 112 38 
Career limit 400 1200 600 200 
Notes: 
(a) These exposure limits and exposure rate constraints apply to all sources 
of radiation exposure. In making trade-offs between man-made and natural 
sources of r~diation. adequate allowance must be made for the contingency 
of unexpected expusure. These data are from Space Shuttle Flight and 
Gr~und Specification, JSC 07700, Volume X, Revision A, Chapter 7.4. 
(b) May be allowed for two consecutive quarters followed by six months of 
restriction from further exposure to maintain yearly limit. 
(c) These dose and dose rate limits are applicable only where the possibility 
of 01 igospennia and temporary infertility are to be avoided. For most 
manned space f1 ights, the allowable exposure accumulation to the Germinal 
Epithelium (3 em) will be the subject of a risk/gain decision for partic-
ular program. miSSion, and individuals concerned. 
transportation of nuclear waste payloads. 
173.393) are given as: 
The radi at i on 1 imits (49CFR 
• 1 In from external container surface ••• 1000 mrem/hour 
• External surface of transport vehic1e ••• 200 mrem/hour 
• 2m from external surface of transport vehicle ••• lOmrem/hour 
• Normally occupied position of transport vehicle ••• 2mrem/hour. 
For accident conditions of terrestrial transport, dose rates are limited to 
1000 mrem/hour at 1 meter from the external surface of the waste package. For 
1 aunch/reentry accidents, higher dose 1 imits are expected because of the 
anticipated lower probability for these accidents. 
2.5.1.2 Containment 
The containment requirements (also see Section 3.3) are different for 
the various portions of the disposal mission. For the current reference 
t 
I 
t 
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mission, four different types of containment configurations are used: (1) 
shipping cask/auxiliary shielding/flight-weight radiation shield/container/ 
waste, (2) aux1liary shieldin~/flight-weight radiation shield/container/waste, (3) reentry shield/impact shield/flight-weight radiation shield/container/ 
waste, and (4) container/waste. For all normal operations, the systems will 
be designed such that no release of rad10active material occurs. Configura-
tion (1) must survive probable shipping accidents w1thout major release. Con-
figuration (2) must survive probable handling accidents without major contain-
rnent breach. Configuration (3) must survive all handling, on-pad, booster 
ascent to orbit, and reentry accidents without major containment breach. Con-
figuration (4) must be designed to survive the two postulated reentry condi-
tions ~see Section 2.5.1.3.4) with only minimal release possible. The acci-
dent environments for which the designs of these generic configurations must 
survive are given below. 
2.5.1.3 Accident Environments 
The accident environments that need to be considered in the design of 
containment and other auxiliary systems are as follows: 
• Shipping accident 
• Ground handling accident in NPPF 
• On-pad or near-pad Uprated Space Shuttle vehicle failure 
• Reentry accidents. 
2.5.1.3.1 Shipping Accident Environments (for Configuration 1) 
. DOT and NRC regulations, as defined in 49 CFR 170 to 179 and 10 CFR 
71, will be assumed for the ground shipment of nuclear waste payloads from the 
waste payload fabrication facility to the launch site. The following 
seguential test environments for shipping cask accidents are given below. 
Irntial conditions are to be assumed the same as the normal condition. 
• A 9-m drop in worst orientation onto an unyielding surface 
• A I-m drop in the worst orientation onto the end of IS-cm-
diameter, 20-cm-high bar (mild steel, 
• A 3D-min. ground fire at 800 C followed by 3 hours of no 
artificial cooling; with a cask emissivity of 0.9 and cask 
absorbtivity of 0.8 
• An 8-hour emersion in 0.9 m of water. 
At the end of this test, surface radiation of the shipping cask should not 
exceed 1 rem/hour at 1 In from the surface. the con1:ents must ,'emain 
subcritical. and only minute radioactive material releases are allowed (see 10 
CFR 71). 
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2.5.1.3.2 Handling in NPPF (for Configuration 2) 
The payload systems, auxil1ary support equipment and facilities must 
be designed to minimize the occupational radiation exposure to \'lOrkers (see 
Table 2 .. 4). Care must also be taken to insure that if certain subsystem 
failures oecur during handing in the NPPF. radiation @xposure and contamina-
tion is kept to as low as reasonably aChievable. The hant11ing area in the 
NPPF \'/111 be designed to b@ a total containment vp.ssel. 
2.5.1.3.3 On .. or Near-Pad or Ascent Booster 
Accident {for Configuration 3} 
The payload package must be designed to withstand the following nomi-
nal accident environments (developed in Section 4.2) in seguence without a 
r.:ajor breach of primary conta; nment. Initial condit ions oIJre assumed to be ttl? 
nomal condition. 
• A blast side-on over.,pressure of 250 N/cm2• a reflected over .. 
;Jrlessure of 1700 N/cmZ and side-on and reflected impulses of Z.O 
and 15.0 N-s/cm2• respectively. in \'1orst orientation. (E,ased 
upon a 10 percent yi el d of the ET propellant s--see Table 4-9. 
Se~t ion 4.2.3) 
• A potertial edge-on penetration of 1 per m2 of ir.tpactirg frag-
ments. assumed to be discs 100 cr.t in diameter and 0.56 cm thick, 
having a mass of 12 kg. and moving at 500 meters per second. The 
worst orientation is assumed. (Based upon data in Section 4.3.4) 
• A heat flux of 3500 kW/m2 for 15 seconds from a liquid propel-
lant fireball. (Based upon results described in Section 4.2.1.3) 
• A ~O-min. ~round fire at 1100 C followed hy 2 hours of no artifi-
cial cooling. (Rased upon results descrihed in Section 4.2.2.3) 
• An impact in the worst orientation onto an unyieldinD surface at 
10 percent higher than the predictprl terminal velocity. 
• An impact in the \/orst orientation into 25 r: \'1ater at a velocity 
10 percent higher than the predicted terminal vp.iocity. 
f.~5.1.3.4 Reentry Accidents (for Configuration 4) 
The payload container and waste nu5C be able to vlithstand reentry 
into the Eartll's at!llOsphere and impact onto the Earth's surface \/ithout the 
dispersion "f si']nificant quantities of radioactiv~ naterial. The reentry 
enviro~ent~ are ~efined as follows: 
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• ,d, decaying reentry trajer.tory to provide maximum heating energy 
• A reentry trajectory \'lhich rrovides the maximum heat iog flux 
• An impact on an unyielding surface and in the ocean at a velocity 
10 percent higher than the predicted terminal velocity. 
The response of the container and \'Iaste to the reentry environments must be 
calculated after the specific r~cntry con(jitions have heen deterrnin~d by 
analysis. 
2.5.1.4 Criticalft~ 
The radioactive \'taste p~ckage shall be subcrit ical (K-effect iv~ < 
0.95) for normal operations or any possible credible accident ouring process:"" 
~ng, f~~rication, handling, storage, or transport to the space de~tination. 
2.s.1.S Postaccident Recover~ 
Postaccident recovery teams will be made part of the operational dis-
posal system. They will be responsible for all accident r~<.:overy ol='~rations. 
including accidents involving processing, payloac! fabrication and railroad 
shipment, payload prept'ration at the laL!'1ch Site, the launch and possible 
reentry. 
2.5.1.6 Monitor~ng Systems 
Monitoring systems \-/ill be developed for the overali syste", such that 
overall mission safety can he assured. Examples of such systpr1S inchrlp 
devices for measuring radiation, temperature and, possibly, pressure in the 
\-/aste p'::l"'ka']p., and instrur.lents to rrovide CHa for tracY.inn t"f' rayloarl dfter 
1t is rlaced into its solar orbit disposal re1;o". 
2.5.2 Specific System Safety Design Requirements 
The following paragraphs d~fine s;:Jecific dE'si!)n requirp.~p.nts estab-
1 istled for the elements of the .!:.efere~ce disoosal concert. (see Sect ions 2.3, 
2.4, 3.3 3nd Appendix C). As the reference concept changes, these reqtlir~­
nent: Jre also expectp.d to chanQe. 
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2.5.2.1 Waste Form 
For normal conditions, the cermet fabrication temperature of 1200 C 
shall not be exceeded. For accident conditions, the cermet decomposition 
temperature of 1450 C shall not be exceeded. 
2.5.2.2 Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication Facilities 
The design and operation of these facilities will follow current pro-! posed regulations, as specified for reprocessing plants • 
.. 
1- 2.5.2.3 Payload Primary Container 
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For normal conditions, the primary stainless ste~l container shall 
not exceed the creep 1 imit temperature of 427 C. No chemical and phYSical 
interaction will occur between the cermet waste form and the container. For 
accident conditions, the primary container must not exceed the melt 
temperature of 1450 C. 
2.5.2.4 Flight Radiation Shielding 
Radiation shielding for f1 ight systems will be designed to 1 imit 
radiation to no more than 2 rem per hour at 1 meter from the shield surface 
under normal conditions. Auxiliary shielding will be designed such that 
radiation exposure 1 imits {see Tables 2-4 and 2-5} for ground personnel and 
flight crews are not exceeded during handling or flight operations. 
For normal conditions, the temperature limit for the depleted 
uranium/stainless steel flight radiation shield is 427 C. For accident con-
ditions, the radiation shield must not exceed the uranium melt temperature of 
1130 C. 
2.5.2.5 Reentry Vehicle Systems 
The reentry vehicle systems must include provlslons to surVlve on-pad 
and reentry environments as stated in Sections 2.5.1.3.3 and 2.5.1.3.4. Also, 
the system must include: (l) an aerodynamic drag fin to minimize the terminal 
velocity during reentrj'; (2) provisions for absorbing the external impact 
loads; (3) a fire and reentry therma1 protection system; (4) provisions for 
flotation upon ccean entry; (5) a transmitter for recovery; ann (6) a 
redundant reaction ..:ontrol system for attitude control in space. 
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2.5.2.6 Shipping Casks and Ground Transport Vehicles 
Shipping casks and ground trans~ort vehicles will comply with DOi and 
NRC regulations (see Section 2.5.1.1}. The lIlaximum outside diameter of the 
shi~ping cask will be 3.05 meters (Ie f:;~t). When required for heat 
rejection, a redundant cooling system for thi:: shipping cask will be required. 
2.5.2.7 Launch Site Facilities 
The launch pad used for the reference nuclear waste disposal traffic 
model (see Table 2-6) will be a dedicated pad. 
2.5.2.8 Uprated Space Shuttle Launch Vehicle 
The U~rated Space Shuttle launch vehicl!:! desiyn will reflect con-
siderdtions of keeping on-pad accident environments dS low as possible. The 
overall vehicle launch reliability goal will be greater than 0.999 (meaning 
one chance in 1000 that the vehicl.~ will be catastrophically lost duriny 
ascent). The External Tank c;IO liqu:c rocket booster design will include 
destruct systems, properly loccted, which provide for a minimum explosive 
yield of the liquid propellants when a catastrophic event is expected. 
2.5.2.9 Earth Parking Orbits 
Intermediate Earth parking orbits shal1 be incorporated into the 
fliyht profiles of space transportation systems to allow a minimum of 6 months 
before orbital decay of the nuclear wdste payload could occur. 
2.5.2.10 Upper Stages 
All upper stages will have delivery reliabilities greater thdn 0.99. 
Achievement of delivery is defined as beiny within the bounds of the 
following: 0.85 + .01 A.U. and 1.00 + 0.20 deyrees in~l;nation. 
2.5.2.11 Payload Ejection System 
The reliaoility of this system must be established such that it is 
truly Jeneficial in keeping the radioloyical hazard to a min;muill. 
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2.5.2.12 Space Uestination 
The nominal space destination will insure, at a mini!llum, an expected 
isolation time of one million years. 
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2.6 Accident and Malfunction Contingency Plans for Reference Concept 
Accident and malfunction contingency plans for the reference space 
disposal concept have been developed over the last 2 Y£:3rs of study. The 
philosophy contai~ed in this section is important to the future development of 
the space option concepts. Accident and malfunction contingency plans for the 
general phases of the space disposal mission are listed and adrlressed below: 
• Ground transportation from the payload fabrication Sites to KSC 
• Prefl ight operations prior to ignition of the Shuttle's engines 
• Launch operations from the launch pad to achieving parking orbit 
• Orbital operations. 
2.6.1 Ground Transportation 
Ground transport (via rail) of the shipping cask will be assigned to 
the Department of Energy (DOE) which will supply the necessary accident recov-
ery plans and systems. At least two types of incidents must be considered: 
loss of cooling to the waste container and possible breach of the waste 
container with a loss of radioactive material. 
In case of cooling loss, provisions must be made to have 5elf-
contained, auxiliary cooling units available within 3 hours (see Section 
2.5.1.3.1). Monitoring equipment for both container temperature and radiation 
will be required during all ground transport operations. 
A continuous capability to cope with a container breach will be nec-
essary. A speCially trained accident recovery crew will always be ready to 
act, if necessa ry • 
2.6.2 Preflight Operations 
Contingency plans must be provided for potential malfunctions and 
accidents that could occur while the ~laste payload is in the :IPPF, being 
transported to the launch pad, being transferred from the pad RSS to the Space 
Shuttl e cargo bay, and awa i ti ng 1 iftoff in the Shutt1 e. Accidents and con-
tingency plans would be similar to those discllssed in Section 2.6.1, above. 
2.6.3 Launch Operations 
Contingency plans, prOCedlJreS and systems envisioned to fll1nlmlZe the 
hazard caused by on-or near-pad ':ailure are given below. These p1 ans, pro-
cedures and systems would rninirni,~e the effects of severe blast \vave, high 
velocity fragments, fire, and possible high velocity impact (see Section 
2.5.1.3.3). 
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I A system to eject the loaded reentry vehicle system (contains 
nuclear waste) from the Orbiter's cargo bay and away from ensuing 
adverse environments. 
I A destruct system on the External Tank and lRB's properly 
desi!.jned to minimize the blast wave and fragment environments 
caused by the exploding hydro~en/oxygen and RP-l/oxygen propel-
lants. This would aid in minimizing the effect on the containment 
systems. 
I Stringent containment systems designs (e.g., container, shielding 
and reentry vehicle systems) to lIIaximize the probability of sur-
viving tne possible hostile environments. The reentry vehicle 
will co~t3in flotation gear and locator beacons to assist in the 
recovery of the payload. 
I The use of a waste fonn not easily dispersed under adverse 
conditions • 
• The application of appropriate launch constraints (e.g., Wiild 
direction) to reduce human radiological exposure resulting from a 
potential contairunent breach. 
• The use of a recovery team ready to rescue the payload at SEa or 
.:In 1 and. 
I Engine shutdown is an important factor in total vehicle reI ia-
bility. For the Uprated Space Shuttle, all booster engines are 
liquid fueled, and as such, they can be shut down if a fallure 
occurs during the enyine start-up IJrocess, and prior to actual 
liftoff. This capabil ity would yreatly reduce the probabil ity of 
an on-pad catastrophic vehicle failure. 
Systems and procedures, in addition to some of those mentiolled above, 
which would IiJinilllize the hazard caused by subsystem failurt:!s during the boost 
phase are: 
I Intact aborts can be impl emented after d few seconds into the 
fl i~ht. Three types of intact aborts are possible for the Uprated 
Space Shuttle. These are: the return-to-launch-site (RTlS), 
abort-once-around (ADA) and dbort-to-orbit {ATO}. 
I Cont i ngency aborts cou 1 d 1 ead to either a return to 1 and or to 
ditching at sea. 
I Design of the boost trajectory to avoid 1 and overfl ight, for 
example the 38° inclination orbit, should help in reducing overall 
risk for the early portion of the fl iyht. 
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2.6.4 Orbital Operations 
The OT~ propulsion phase provides for transportation from low Earth 
orbit to the intermediate destination. In the initial years* of the disposal 
mission the OTV would be a high-thrust, chemical propulsion (liquid hydrogen/ 
liquid oxygen) stage (see Section 2.4.9). To minimize possible failures the 
follo\'1ing systems, procedures and design requirements are envisioned: 
• The use of command OTV engine shutdown in the event of a grossly 
inaccurate propulsive burn 
• The capability to separate the SOlS and attached payload from the 
OTV and the use of the SOlS to place the payload in a safe orbit 
for eventual recovery by a rescue vehicle or Shuttle Orbiter 
• A jettison system incorporated into the SOlS payload adapter to 
separate the ~/aste payload from the OTV/SOIS configuration when 
necessary to preclude a possible reentry 
I The use of a rescue vehicle to retrieve a waste payload stranded 
in any given orbit 
• The use of redundant systems where fedsible to ensure high 
rel i abil ity 
• On-orbit OTV launch crew to obtain instantaneous visual und 
telemetric status of the OTV propulsive burn (from the Orbiter) 
• The proper design of trajectories and propulsive burns of the QTV 
to reduce the probability for reentry if a failure occurs 
• A waste form which helps insure intact reen:ry of the waste 
container, should an unplanned reentry occur 
• The application of thermal protection material on the outside of 
the contdiner to reduce the risk of atmospheric dispersal. 
• The use of a high melting point container material to reduce the 
risk of atmospheric disposal. 
The SOlS provides for transportation from all intermediate to the 
final destination. For the reference concept, the SOlS is used to reduce the 
aphelion from 1.0 to 0.35 A.U. (see Section 2.4.9). Systems, procedures and 
design requirements envisioned to minimize hazards due to SOlS failures are: 
*Later on, low-thrust technology (e.g., solar electric propulsion) might be 
used. ~~ith 10v/-thrust systems, both the pr'obability and magnitude of an 
explosion are decreased. In addition, there is a much longer decision and 
response time available in case of a lilalfunction of thE' lOri-thrust propulsion 
sys tems. 
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• The use of a rescue vehicle to retrieve a cooperative or non-
cooperative payload stranded in any orbit in heliocentric space 
• The use of redundant SOlS systems where feasible to ensure high 
reliability 
• The proper use of trajectories and orbits inclined to the ecliptic 
plane that exhibit long-term orbital stability 
• The use of tracking systems on board the SOlS to aid in deep space 
:escue operations. 
2.6.5 Rescue Operations 
Provisions must be made to rescue the SOlS and the nuclear waste 
pdyload in Earth orbit in the event of a failure of the UTV during the Earth 
escape burn. The approach is to rendezvous and dock the rescue OTV with the 
SOlS and continue the mission from the failed orbit. The rescue mission is 
based on the premise that, with proper control of the orv launch, any failure 
of the OTV will result in an elliptic orbit about Earth. The mission profile 
for payload rescue, summarized in Figure 2-11, is to deliver a rescue OTV to 
low Earth orbit in the Shuttle, transfer by a burn of the OTV to a phase-
adjust orbit, and transfer from the phase-adjust orbit at the proper time for 
rendezvous and dock i ng wi th the fa i 1 ed system. The Ii fet ilne of the rescue 
OTV, considerin~ the coast time in the phase-adjust orbit, must be as much as 
300 hours, compared to the 50 hours for OTV 1 i fet ilne on the nomi nal reference 
IIlission. Locating failed systems and docking with noncooperative systems is 
discussed in Section 6.2. 
After injection into deep space, the nuclear waste payload could fail 
to achieve its stable destination orbit, because of a pr~nature shut-down of 
the orv engine beyond Earth-escape conditions or a failure of the SOlS to 
iynite at solar orbit conditions. Studies that address the probabil ity of 
Earth reentry under these failure r:onditions have recoflVilended the use of d 
d~ep space rescue mission cdpability as a way of further reducing the overall 
risk during this phase of the mission (see Section 6.2). A deep space rescue 
:nission capability is defined as the abili·~y to send another lJropulsion system 
(e.g., OTV and SOlS) to rendezvous with the failed payload in solar orbit and 
to place it into the desired stable orbit (circular O.85-A.U. solar orbit). 
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FIGURE 2-11. EARTH ORBITAL PAYLOAD RESCUE MISSION PROFILE 
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2.7 Reference Projected Traffic Model, Hardware, and Propellant Requirements 
The prOjected traffic model, hardware, and propellant requirements 
for major reference mission elements have been estimated for the period from 
1992 to 2003. 
Fer the reference mission definition, an upper bound of 580 Uprated 
Space Shuttle flights are required to dispose of all of the aval1able U.S. 
high-levei commercial nuclear wastes (PW-4B cermet) through the year 2000 (see 
Tab1e 2-1). One Uprated Space Shuttle flight would be required for each dis-
posal mission--5000 kg of cermet waste form per payload. Consideration of 
development flights and aborted missions would be expected to increase this 
number somewhat. Tabl e 2-6 provides the pr'ojected Uprated Space Shuttl e 
traffic model required to support the space disposal mission. 
TABLE 2-6. PROJECTED UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE TRAFFIC MODEL FOR 
COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 
MISSIONS (1992-2003) 
Uprated Space 
Shuttl e Fl ights 
Year 
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 Total 
10 20 50 50 50 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 580 
Table 2-7 shows the major mission elements, the hardware use factor 
assumed and the total hardware requirements. No impact is expected on the 
Space Shuttle traffic model for the decade of the 1980·5 (see Reference 2-2L 
as the nuclear waste disposal activity is not expected to be operational 
befo re 1992. 
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TABLE 2-7. MAJOR HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATES DURING 
1992-2003 TIME PERIOD FOR HIGH··lEVEL C(JKRCIAL 
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAl IN SPACE 
NUlnber 
H.rdw.re Element UI. F.ctor Required 
Upr.ted Space Shuttle lIardw.re 
100 6 • Orbiters 
• ET's 1 ~HU 
• LR8's (2 LR8's Per Fliyht) 20 S8 
Upper Staye Hardware 
20 29 • OTV's 
• SOlS's 1 58U 
waste Payl~.d Systems 
1 SHO • Containers 
• Ganma Radiation ShieldS 20 29 
• Paylo.d Reentry Vehlcles :!O 29 
• Crew ShieldS (fliyht) 100 6 
• CoolinV Systl!fl1s (fl ivht) 100 6 
- Rail Cars and Casks 200 3 
NOTE: Table usurnes 51:10 U",r.ted Space Shuttl!! 11 i9htS to uisllOS\! of hi!Jh. 
level cOIII:ll!rchl nuclear w,ste (P~1·4b cermet). on. Shuttle fl ight utI" 
miSSIon. 
The onboard propel1 ant requi ranents per Uprated Space Shuttl e 
disposal mission are given in Table 2-8. Total requirements can be estimated 
by multiplying these data by the number of flights/year as given in Table 2-6. 
Actual propellant requirements will be somewhat higher than she'"", due to 
los~es from propellant transfer and cryogenic propellant boil-off. 
TABLE 2-8. ON-BOARD, PER FLIGHT, PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS 
FOR REFERENCE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL MISSION 
Proe.ll.nts. metric tons 
Liquid LIquid RP·l Nitrogen 
HYdr:ren Oxygen (Kerosen.) Tetroxide 
Vehicle (LH2 (LOX) (RP) (NTO) 
Uprated Shut tIe 
External Tanl( (ET) 102 610 
Uprat.d Shuttle Liquid 
Rocket Boos:.r (LRD) 803 277 
Upr.ted Shuttle 
Orbiter 7.58 
Orbit Transfer 
Vehl cl It (OTV) 2.S9 15.6 
Solar Orbit 
nsertion Stage (SOlS) _. 1.74 
-
Tot.ls 104.59 1428.6 277 9.32 
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2.8 Advanced Concept for Space Disposal of Nuclear Waste 
The advanced concept for space disposal of nucl ear waste 1 s s imll ar 
in many respects to the reference concept defined in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
The advanced concept is based upon the avail abil ity of a heavy 1 itt launch 
vehicle (HLLV) that may be developed by NASA for future space missions beyond 
the year 2000. The major differences between the advanced and reference 
concepts are discussed in the paragraphs below that pertain to each major 
portion of the l'lission. The differences are summarized in Table 2-9. 
TABLE 2-9. COMPARISON OF REFERENCE AND ADVANCED SPACE DISPOSAL CONCEPTS 
Mission Elements 
Waste Mix 
Waste Form Mass/Payload, kg 
Number of Payloads/Mission 
Number of OTVs/Mission 
Nu~ber of SOIS's/Mission 
Ground Transportation 
Launch Site 
Launch Vehicle 
Launch Vehicle Payload, kg 
Reference Concept 
PW-4b 
5000 
1 
1 
1 
Rail 
KSC, Florida 
Uprated Space Shuttle 
45,400 
Advanced Concept 
~'odif1 ed PW-4b 
(90% and Cs Sr removed) 
9500 
3 
3 
3 
Ra il /Sea 
Remote Island 
HLLV 
231,000 
2.8.1 Nuclear Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication 
Spent fuel rods from domestic power plants would be transported to a 
"Iaste processing and payload fabrication facility via conventional shipping 
casks. Using a modified Purex process (Modified P~~-4b) high-level \'1aste 
containing fission f:'roducts (less 90 POerc~lnt of the Cs and sr~ and actinides, 
including 0.1 percent plutonium and .1 percent uranium, wi 1 be processed 
fran these spent fuel rods (see Sec'cion 3.4.4 and Appendix F). The 90 p~rcent 
of the Cs and Sr would be d1spos€:d of via terrestrial disposal. These two 
elements have been removed from the PW-4b mix to meet thermal requir~nents for 
the fabrication of 9500 kg sized spheres of cermet waste form (see Section 
2.3.1). Other activities are the c;ame as the reference concept (see Section 
2.3.1). 
2.8.2 Nuclear Waste Ground Transport 
Once the spherical waste form (9500 kg) has been fabricated and 
placed in ;:s primary container and flight radiation shield, it woulci be 
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IOrld"!d into <l transportation sh 'i p~ing cask for 
escort~d ship to the remote island launch site. 
launch site the cask would be off-loaded into 
Prp.~dratio~ Facility (ANPPF). 
travel by rail and then by 
Once the cask r~aches the 
an Advanced Nuclear Payload 
2.8.3 Payload Preparation at Launch Site 
The remote island located J\NPPF wi 11 ~rov ide i nterirn storaye capa-
bil ity for up to 18 shi~lded waste containers, which affords efficient 
~reparation for launches plus capacity for unplanned delays. During storage, 
additional radiation snit!ldiny, thermal control, monitorin~ and insj.lection of 
the waste container will be ~rovided. 
2.8.4 Prelaunch Activ i ties 
In ~r~paration for lau~ch of the nuclear waste into space ~n board a 
HLLV, three-95UO kg waste ~ayloads will be prepared (see FiJure 2-12). Each 
(includiny its own container and flight shield) will be integrated with a 
reentry vehlcle, a Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) and ar.' Orbit Transfer 
Vehicle (OTV). The three integrated payloads would then be placed in the 
cargo bay of the HlLV orbiter. 
... 1 
"= .-' 
', --_./ 
r 2.d 7 , 
10. j ~ 
.~ . J":- ----- - - - -
:' j : 1 1r1 IeflSl 0 fl~ ,jr~ , ., " I,!~~"'i 
FIGURE 2-12. HLLV LAUNCH CONFIGURATION WITH NUCLEAR 
WASTE PAYLOADS AND SPACE VEHICLES 
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2.8.S HLLV Booster Operations 
One HLLV will be rea~1ed for launch for a ~1vftn disposal 1II1ss10n. 
The HLLV is a fully reusable vertical takeoff. two-stage vehicle (see Figure 
2-13). The booster and orbiter stages have a c~non body diameter, wing and 
vertical stabilizer. however, the overlll length of the orbiter is S meters 
yreater than the booster. The vehicle yross liftoff mass is 7.1 m1ll1un kg. 
The HLLV booster is shown in the hndiny c:unf1yurat1on in Figure 
2-14. The vehicle 15 91.4 meters in len~th with a "I'lng span of 56 meters. 
The nominal bOd;' aiameter 15 12 meters. Thll! vehicle has a dry mass of 0.47 
million kg. Seven high pressure yas generator driven LOX/RP-l engines mounted 
in the aft fuselaye provide a nominal sea-level thrust of 10.2 m11110n Newtons 
(N) each. Ei vht turbojet engines are mounted on the upper port ion of the aft 
fuselage with a nominal thrust of 89.000 N each. 
The HLLV orbiter is depicted in Figure 2-1S. The vehicle 15 96.6 
meters lony with the same wing span. vertical he1yht, and nominal body 
d1 arneter as the booster. The orb1 ter employs four high-pressure staged 
combustion LOX/LH2 rocket engines with a nominal sea level thrust of 5.29 
million Newtons each. The cargo bay 15 located in the mid-fuselage in a 
manner siml1ar to the Space Shuttle Orb1tt!r and 15 about 27.4 meters long. 
The HLLV, with its 231,000 kg payload is launthed to a 487 km Circular orbit 
inclined 38 degrees to the equator. Once on orbit, the t:'ree payload 
confiyur~tions would be d!ployed from the HLLV orD1ter cargo bay. The thre\! 
rt!entry vihicles woL:1d be resnotl!ly relllCJved from the OTV/SOIS/Payload 
cunfiyurat10ns and loaded back into the HLLV orbiter cargo bay for reuse. 
,h .. ----t 
r-I00I''. I 
~----... -------
FIGURE 2-13. HlLV LAUNCH CONFIGURATION 
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2.8.6 Upper Stage Operations 
Operations of upper stages for the advanced concept are identical to 
those described in Section 2.3.6. The three OWlS employed during each 
mission would be recovered by the single HLlV orbiter • 
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3.0 NUCLEAR WASTE PAYLOAD CHARACTERIZATION 
The objective of the Nuclear Waste Payload Characterization Task was 
to define the commercial and defense nuclear waste payload in terms of \~aste 
fOI'm, waste mix, ~ontainment system requirements, container and shield defini-
tions, and waste processing and payload fabrication operations. 
The major goal of this activity \~as to identify a new waste form with 
properties appropriate for the accident and normal conditions identified for 
the disposal in space of both corllmercial and rlefense high-level wastes. 
Although commerci al and defense \'Iastes have been cons idered ; n prev; ous space 
disposal studies, a ne\,1 effort was made to define. in terms of the most recent 
information, the quantities and availability of each of these v/aste types. In 
addition, the composition and concentration of each waste type was reevaluated 
to update the radiation and heat source terms for the waste package. The data 
~;ere used for parar.Jetric studies of the radiation shield definition and ther-
J11al design for a range of waste payload sizes from a small RTG-size sphere to 
a large HLLV package. A 5.S MT sized payload '.:dS defined as a design basis 
for the Uprated Space Shuttle case. 
This section is composed of six suhser.tions. Section 3.1 discusses 
the efforts made to define a new waste form, the prese'lt state of technical 
development of that waste fOnTI, and its thermophysical properties. <)ection 
3.2 describes the updated information on the commercial and defense high-level 
... ,aste compositions and the quartities of these wastes projected to be avail-
able for space disposal. Sectio~ 3.3 discusses preliminary specifications for 
the waste package. Section 3.4 presents the results of the radiation shield-
ing, payload mass, and thermal analyses performed for the range of waste pack-
age SiZES. Section 3.5 presents a general discussion of the waste treatmElnt 
and packaging facility, ~/hich \'1111 be necessary for preparing the waste pay-
load for disposal in space. Section 3.6 is a list of references for Section 
3.0. 
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3.1 Waste Form Selection 
3.1.1 Waste Form Evaluation and Selection 
During the Phase I(3-1) and Phase II studies Qf(3-2) nuclear 
\'/aste disposal in space, a constraint was placed on waste form selection hy 
speCifying that waste form technology he available on an industrial scale by 
the early 1980's. This constraint limited the waste form selection to calcine 
or glass. Because of its higher waste loading and better thermal stability, 
calcine \'/as selected over glass during the Phase I and II studies. It \'/as 
recognize~ during these previous studies that calcine had problems of its own, 
i.e., it is easily dispersed and leached, and that it has poor thermal con-
duo::tivity. 
For the Phase III sturiy, the waste form technology-availability con-
straint vias shifted to the early 1990's. Recduse of this, \'1aste forms such as 
slJpercalcine, cermet, metal matrix with coated particles, glass ceramic, and 
titanate ceramic could be evaluated along with calcine Jnd glass for potential 
use as J waste fonn for space disposal. 
To insure propel' credib i 1 i ty a careful and obj ect i ve I'/aste forn 
evaluation and selection had to be undertak~n. The ~lan used to evaluate and 
sel ect the waste form for the current study cons i sted of: 
• Selecting v/aste form experts from nOE facilities in which Haste 
forms are actually being made and tester! 
• Providing the waste forr;] experts with: genera1 background infor-
flation on the space disposal concept; descriptions of the failure 
Inodes and accicent environments; and rreliminary waste fonn 
parameters considered to be important for the safe and rel iable 
performance of the disposal mission 
• Having the waste form experts visit 8Cl for a meeting to rjisctlsS 
and evaluate \'iaste forms for spi1ce di sposal 
• Obtaining concurrence among all parties involved ('IASA, prl, DOE 
experts, ONWI) on final waste form selection. 
The waste forlil evaluation and selec~ion plan was irJplel:1ented rluring 
July and ~ugust 1979. A meeting was held at qCl on July 19, 1979 to evaluate 
waste forms for the space disposal of commercial and defense high-level waste 
(HUn. Participants included (m,n, NASA, Bel, arid DOE-Richland Operations 
personnel and ~/aste form experts from Rattell e North\',est laboratori es, nak 
Ridge ~lational laboratories, Idaho Chel71ical Drocessing Plant, and Sandia 
laboratories. Duri ng that meeting, the fol1ol'/ing set of parameters \vas 
deteniline,j to t:le appl icahle to the space di sposal I'laste fortr. evallJation: 
L High waste loading - This is an ilnr()i'~ant parameter vlh~n con-
sidering the disposal of the larCje I~lJSS 0f Cor~111el'cial or def(~r1S2 
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HlI~. Waste fonns having high waste loadings l'Iil1 require fe\~er 
launches. Fe\'Ier launches not only lower operational costs but 
also yield 10\'Ier construction costs for dedicated launch facil-
ities. Rating: primary importance. 
2. High thermal conductivity - Commercial HL!.!, especially in waste 
forms having high waste loadings. generates a significant '1t1~n­
tity of heat. To prevent central r~gions from becoming exces-
sively hot, the I'laste form should possess a relatively high heat 
transfer coefficient. Similarly, upon unplanned reentry of an 
unprotected wdste package, the I'laste form should be capable of 
rapidly conducting heat dHay from the surface. Rat i ng: primary 
ir:lportance. 
3. Resistance to thermal shock - The waste form should be resistant 
to shattering which :nay be caused by thermal shock. This is a 
property that will help in achieving 101'1 <1ispersibility of the 
waste form; P.. g., duri ng impact of an unprotected package into 
the oceans. Rating: secondary importance. 
4. Thermochemical stability - In launch par! or reentry (lccir!ents, 
the waste form should remain chemically stable. It should not 
degrade, decompose, or otherwise be altered in its chemical form 
in such a way that a significant release of radionuclides occurs 
during such postulated accidents. Rating: primary importance. 
5. Resistance to leaching - :\ 10\,1 leach rate is important if the 
unprotected ~/aste form package impacts into water during an 
unplanned reentry. During a preorbital launch abort, however, 
the ''Iaste package \,/i11 reenter with reentry protection and pos-
sihlya floatation conar. l~hi1e leach rate is important, it is 
not as important as in terrestrial disposal where radionuclide 
transport by groundl'later is considered the most probable mech-
anism for loss of isolation. Rating: secondary il1portance. 
6. Toughness - Another aspect of dispersion resistance is l1aterial 
toughness. The I/aste form should I)e shatter anr! ahr.,sion resis-
tant upon impact, and should defor:n to absorh ilnpact. Retrieval 
of the \',aste fot:;] as a single piece rather than l1any fragmented 
parts is desirable. P.ating: prilT1ary importance. 
7. Applicability to both commercial (PW-4b) and defense (Hanford) 
HLW mixes - The waste form should be generally carable of 
accoll1odating both commercial and <1ef'ense HLH. Commercial 4U·! as 
defined in this study is the PW-4b mix (.,s discussed in Section 
3.2.1). This waste mix has a relatively small quantity of inert 
reprocessing chemicals and has., high concentration of '.vaste 
radionlJcl ides. Defense waste consirlererl for this study is the 
Hanford HU~, which has heen subjected to the pro("1oserl radionlJ-
clide removal process and I'/hich h.,s had additional inert 11ate-
rial removed. However, the Hanfard mh is considerably diluted 
by Zr02 and other inert materials associated with it. Ratinl): 
primary importance. 
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8. Fabrication - The waste form fabrication process should be 
available on the industrial scale by the mid-1990's. It should 
be capable of producing a relatively large shape (l-meter-diam-
eter sphere or "square" right circular cylinder) by remote 
processing in a rel iable fashion. Rating: primary importance. 
9. Economics and resource utilization - Waste fonn materials and 
fabrication processes sho.:ld not be prohibitively expensive. 
Also, waste fonn materials shoJld not severely deplete valuable 
raw materials. Since the cost of a booster launCh is expected 
to be the major part cf the total cost, waste form material and 
process costs will not be overly important. Rating: secondary 
importance. 
10. Resi stance to oxidation - Another aspect of di spers ion res i st-
ance is waste form resistance to oxidation. If an unplanned 
reentry of the unprotected waste package occurred, the surface 
of the waste form should not rapidly oxidize and break away f~om 
the main body of the waste package. Rating: secondary 
importance. 
Fo 11 owi n9 the determi nat ion of th@. important parameters for waste 
form eval uat ion, a matrix was developed to rate various HLt~ forms versus these 
ten parameters. The t/aste forms chosen for evaluation ~'Iere: borosi1 icate 
glass, hotpressed 5upercalcine, ORNL cermet, ICPP glass ceramic, Sandia titan-
ate ceramic, and metal matrix ''lith coated particles. Calcine was excluded 
from evaluation because it is highly dispersible and easily leachable. SVNROC 
\'ias excluded from evaluation because of its very low waste loading. Table 3-1 
presents the qualitative ratings (high, moderate, or low) as agreed to by the 
I'laste for:"! experts for the various waste forms for each of the ten paral11eters. 
TABLE 3-1. COMPARISON OF ADVANCED WASTE FORMS FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
MET~L 
ICPP SANDIA lORD· MATRIX 
OANL GLASS TITANATE SILICATE (COATED HOT·PAESSED 
CERMET CERAMIC CERAMIC GLASS PARTICLE I SUPERCALCINE 
HIGH WASTE LOADING M'" M M L L H 
HIGH THERMAL 
CONDUCTIVITY H L L L H L 
RESISTANCE TO 
THERMAL SHOCK H H H L H H 
THERMOCHEMICAL 
STAIILlTY (FAIR I· 14110 1100 1100 1100 1000'" 1100 
CATION TEMP., CI 
RESISTANCE TO 
LEACHING H H H H H 1\ 
TOUGHNES. H M M H M 
APPLICAIILlTY TO COM· 
MERCIAL (PW·4bl AND 
OEFEN.E (HANFOROI H L L L H L 
MIXE. 
FAIRICATION OF WASTE 
FORM INTO DESIRED M L l H M l 
SHAPE AND SIZE 
ECONOMICS M M M H l M 
RESISTANCE TO 
OXIDATION L H H H H 
-
NOTES; 'el H· HIGH. M - MODERATE. AND L -lOW. 
(bl COPPER. 
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An important part of the waste fonn evaluation was the detennination 
of the rel at ive importance of the parameters. After the waste fonn expert 
meeting, BCL personnel met and detennined (with concurrence frem the waste 
form experts) that the following parameters are of primary importance: high 
waste loading, high thennal conductivity, thennochemical stability, toughness, 
appl icabil ity to both waste mixes, and fabrication. Parameters of secondary 
importance are: resistance to thennal shock, resistance to leaching, econom-
ics, and resistance to oxidation. With respect to the paral~ters deemed to be 
of greatest importance, ORNL cennet (iron-nickel based) and meta; matrix 
(copper) with coated particles appear clearly superior. The ORNL cermet can 
achieve generally highe~ waste loadings and better thermochemical stability 
than metal matrix 'tith coated particles. Therefore, ORNL cermet was selected 
(with the concurrence of the waste fonn experts, NASA, ONWI and the BCl 
Project Team) as th~ reference waste form for use in the study. 
The only parameter in which cermet (iron-nickt~l based) or metal mat-
rix (copper) received a significantly lO\"ier rating than the ceramic-type other 
waste forms was for resistance to oxidation. However, since both cermet or 
metal matrix each have signlficantly higher thermal conductivity than the 
other waste forms, their surface temperature may not rise as high as that of 
the other waste fonns during an unplanned reentry. Currently, it is unclear 
what will actually happen to a \OIaste form \'1ith respect to rapid oxidation dur-
i~g a shallow reentry. Because of this uncertainty, the low rating of ce'rmet 
or metal matrix with respect to oxidation resistance should not be viewed \'1ith 
significant concern at this time. In any event, the waste fonn and container 
would likely be encased in a protective wrap to effectively preclude such an 
occurrence (see Section 4.3.4). 
3.1.2 Cermet Characterization 
ORNL cennet is a metallic appearing waste fonn in which the majority 
of the HU~ radionucl ides are unifonnly distributed as micron-sized particles 
of crystalline ceramic oXid~~, pluminosilicates, and/or titanates in a hydrc-
gen reducible r~tal matrix. t -3) The fnetal matrix is composed of chemically 
reducible metals and fission products already in the waste (Fe, Ni, Cu, Te, 
etc.) and reducible metal additives necessary to formulate a particular alloy 
cooposition. 
Cennet fabrication presently consists of four baSic steps.(3-3) 
First, the waste and additives are dissolved in molten urea. Next a calcina-
tion of the solution of waste plus additives is acc~npl ished utilizing a spray 
calciner. The resulting material ;nay then be compacted and formed into a 
desireble shape by a variety of processes (hot pressing, isostatic pressing, 
etc.). Finally, the fabricated shape is reduced and sintered in hydrogen. 
These fcur steps may require modification as the process is scaled up in size 
and as it is applied to fnbricating a waste form for space disposal. 
Reference concept cerll1et compos i t ions have been recommended by ORNL 
for beth commercial (PI~-4b) and defense (Hanford) HL~J and are presented in 
Table 3-2. The densities, waste loading'5, therlTlal conductivities, s~)ecific 
heats, and heat generation rates for com~rcial and defense HLW are presented 
in Table 3-3. 
BATTeLLE - COLUMBUS 
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TABLE 3-2. ORNL REFERENCE CERMET COMPOSITION FOR COMMERCIAL 
AND DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE 
Composition at Start of Form Processing 
Oxide 
Metal Additives (Fe, Ni, and Cu) 
Ti02, Si02 and A1203 
Total 
Composition After Reduction in Hydrogen 
Waste Oxides, Including Ti, 5i and Al 
Reduced Waste Metals 
r~etal Additives 
Total 
*Mote: Units in mass percent. 
Reference 
Commercial HLW 
Cermet (PW-4b), 
kg/MTHM 
4~.3 
3.5 6n 
34.8 
9.S 
25.2 
69.5" 
Reference 
Defense HLW 
Cennet (Hanford) , 
mass percent 
40.0 
52.2 
7.8 
Tmr.O* 
TABLE 3-3. REFERENCE CERMET CHARACTERISTICS (ESTIMATED) 
FOR COMMERCIAL AND DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE 
Characteristic 
Density, glcc 
Waste Loading, percent** 
Thermal Conductivity, ~J/m-C 
Specific Heat, cal/g-C 
Heat Generation, kW/MT 
Reference 
C omme rc i a 1 H l W 
Cermet 
(P~·J-4b ) 
6.7 
58.7 
14 
0.14 
19.2 
**Note: Calcine powder defined as 100 percent. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
Reference 
Defense HLW 
Cennet 
(Hanford) 
6.7 
40.0 
20.5 
0.20 
0.23 
I 
; ~ 
.~ 
, 
" .. 
I j 
I 
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Since any hydrogen-reducible metal can be \Ised for the metal additive 
in cermet fabrication, a brief assessm'!nt was conducted to determine the 'lia-
bility of a few alternatives. ORNL suggested Mo, Nb, and Ta as possible sub-
stitutes for Fe-Ni-Cu. Parameters considered 1n the aSiessment were resource 
availability, density. shielding, and heat transfer performance. The results 
of the assessment are summarized below. 
• Molybdenum (Mo) 
- Approximately 0.8% of present U.S. con~umption or 0.21-0.27~ 
estimated consumption by the year 2000\3-4,3-:>1 
- Density (and shielding) not much different than Fe, Ni 
- Heat transfer better than Fe, Ni 
• Niobium (Nb) 
of U. s. 
- Approximately 13~ of present U.S. CO!!SUmRtip," or 
estimated consumption by the yedr 2000\3-4,3-5) 
l.5-2.9"; of U.S. 
- Density (and shielding) not much different than Fe, Ni 
- Heat transfer better than Fe, Ni 
• Tantalum (Ta) 
- Approximately 29% of present U.S. ~onsump.tion or 8.3~ of U.S. 
estimated consumption by the year 2000{3-4,3-5) 
- Density (and shielding) significantly greater than Fe, Ni 
In addition. a brief shielding analysis was conducted USing the QAD 
computer code to determine the effect on the \'1aste fonn shield mass for th~ 
alternative metal additives. The results of the QAD shielding analysis(3-6) 
are shown in Table 3-4. The heavier (more dense) metal additives resulted in 
a greater overall waste fonn shield mass than the reference Fe-Ni-Cu case. 
ihis effect is to be expected since the uranium shield is attenuating radia·. 
tion which is generated primarily in the outermost portion of the largely 
self-shielt1ed cermet waste fonn. In other words. the addition of metal addi-
tives, more dense, and having a h~gher atomic number than Fe, Ni, or Cu, 
accomplishes very little with respect to J reduction in shielding requirements 
dnd creates a large penalty in paylo~d mass. 
SATTeL.L.E - COL.UMSUS 
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TABLE 3-4. EFFECT OF CERMET METAl PHASE ON SHIELDING DOSE 
-------_._.--......... ----.--.----. .... --_.----.-.-------........ -..---------
Cennet 
Concept 
Reference 
:\ 1 ternat e-l 
A 1 t ernat e-2 
Composition 
of 
Metal Phase 
55% Fe 
15~ Ni 
18% Cu 
13% Mo 
100% Mo 
100~ Ta 
Bulk Cenret Uran1 urn 
De ns 1 ty, Ma s s , ( a ) S hie 1 d Ma s s , (b) 
g/ee kg kg 
6.70 5500 4200 
7.72 6340 3910 
10.30 8460 3070 
Payload 
Total 
Mass,(c) 
kg 
9,700 
10.200 
11,530 
-
Notes: (a) Equ~l waste mass (3230 kg) per payload sphere, homogeneous 
mixture based on 5B.7~ waste loading for reference 
year old commercial waste. 
(b) OAD shielding code, dose at 1 meter from surface • 
2 ran/hour. 
(c) Includes only waste fonn and uraniLITI mass. 
case. 30 
If an increase in cermet metal additive density and an increase in 
atomic number has a negative effect on payload/shield mass, the use of lowel' 
density (usually a lower atomic number) additives may result in a payload/ 
shield mass reduction. However, it is not apparent that any metal having a 
Significantly lower density or atomic number than Fe would be compatible with 
the ORNL cermet fabrication process. If future shielding analysis indicates a 
mass savings benefit for metal additives lighter than Fe. a survey of cenne: 
fabrication process alternatives should be conducted. It is concluded that 
the Fe-Ni-Cu metal additive is the most viable cermet composition at this 
time. 
Finally. the cermet waste fonn may also be a viable waste form for 
waste mixp.s other than HlW, namely technetium and the transuranics {see 
Section 5.1). It is not clear what the waste loadings might be. especially 
for the transuranics which pose a critical ity concern. Additional study is 
needed on tlli s topi c. 
8ATTELLE - COLUM.UB 
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3.2 Waste Mix Oefinition 
A realistic evaluation of the thennophysical conditions ,)nd possible 
environnental impact for the waste fonn package during a space disposal mh-
sion required a fairly detailed composition definition of both commercial and 
defense H'-W mixes. 
3.2.1 Reference Commercial HlW Mix 
It is important that the commerc1.1l HLW mix used for the space dis-
posal mission concept be referenced easily and understood by members of the 
waste management comllllnity. Therefore, while the waste fonn experts met at 
BCl to select a waste form (sep. Section 3.1.1), they were asked to recommend a 
reference commercial HLW mix. (Theje experts, as well as others attending the 
meeting, agreed thl!t the PW-4b 3-7) mix would be the most appropr1.;:te com-
mercial HlW mix for space disposal studies. 
Several advantages accrue in choosing the PW-4b mix. It is one of 
four commercial HLW mixes ;sed by Battelle Northwest Laboratoi'1es for HLW form 
development, and is therefore easily referenced and well known to members of 
the waste management community. PW-4b corresponds to r@processed HlW of 
33,000 megawatt-days per ton burnup from an optimized reprocessing plant, and 
in general, represents the type of waste which would be generated from the 
General El ect ric Morri s Pl ant ~nd the proposed Exxon Pl ant. Furt"ennore, 
P\~-4b contains low quantities of inerts and reprocessing chemicals (Na, Fe, 
Gd), asslITIes 99.9 percent U and Pu ranoval, and has the l()ilest mass/MTtt1 
reprocessed. The result is a waste mix which can be incorporated into waste 
fonns such as cennet with relatively high waste loadings and which will 
require fewer launches for a given quantity of reprocessed jpert fuel. Table 
3-5 presellts the elemental composition of the PW-4b mix. (3-7) The rildionu-
clide composition was determineg as follows: (1) the ORNL Isotope Genp.ration 
and iJep1etion Cede (ORIGEN)(3- ) calculation was made for fuel with inithl 
enrichment of 3.2 wlo 23SU and a 33,000 MWD/T burnup, (2) the relative perM 
centages of the radi 0; sotopes for each e1 ement ; n PW-4b were detenni ned frOO! 
the ORIGEN printout for 10-year-old waste, (3) thl!se radioisotope percentages 
were multiplied by their respect,ve total elemental mass as give" by PW-4b 
elemental compOSition to derive the mass of each radioisotope. Table 3-6 
provides the radionuclide compositlon and activity of the reference PW-4b mho 
#-¥£'!N\ 
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TABLE 3-5. REFERENCE COMMERCIAL ELEMENTAL WASTE MIX COMPOSITION (PW-4b) 
Inerts 
Fission 
Products 
Constituent 
Na20 
Fe203 
Cr~03 
N1 
PZOa GdZ 3 
~~o 
YZ03 
Zr02 
MoOO TC
O 
7 
Ru b 
RhO 3 Pd 
A9~O Cd 
Source: ~eference 3-7. 
Amount, 
kg/MTHM 
1.511 
0.345 
0.141 
0.672 
0.354 
1.059 
0.598 
4.944 
5.176 
1.291 
2.972 
0.480 
1.483 
0.088 
0.097 
Amount, 
Canst ituent kg/MTHM 
Fiss ion T~O~ 0.725 Products cs~ 2.BBO {~ont ra.) Sa 1.567 
La003 l.lBO Ce 0 3.323 
Pr6 11 1.482 
NoZ03 4.522 
Pm203 0.123 
Smz03 0.924 
EuZ03 O.ZOO 
Gd203 0.137 
Actinides U30S 1.169 
Np02 0.865 
puo
O 
0.010 
Am2 3 0.181 
.CmZ03 0.040 
TOTAL 40.839 
An important consideration for the space disposal vf coml11t!rCial Yl\~ 
is the number of 1aunches required for disposal. Ret;ent es~i'''Cltes{3-9) pro-
ject J nucl~ar electric generation capacity of 200 GWe hy the year 20nO. Ta~l~ 
3-7 gives the projected nuclear capacity by year from 1979-200(). Based on 
this projf:ction it is possible to rroject the ~udntity of spent fuel dis-
chdrged from reactors and reprocesset1. It has heen assul:1ed that the first 
reprocessing plant begins operation in 1984 and attai~s full capacity (1500 
,'-1T!-l~/year) by 1985 (see Table 3-8), and that a second rep"ocessing ;,lant 
beg;lls operation in 1989 and attains full capacity (200() MTHr~/year) by 1991. 
A third plant would be on line i'1 1997, reachi'1!) a full capaci~y of 2000 
~HHr~/year by 199~. Table 3-8 prt!sents the annual spent fuel d1sc!1arge, annual 
processing capability, and unreprocessed spent fuel hacklog. 
Additiollal assumptions must ~e r.1ade regarding the cooling +:ir'~e nec-
essary ~etween discharge dnd proceSSing. It;s also necessdry t.O assume t"e 
length of time required betHeen rerroceSSing, Haste solicific~t~on, and 
launch. Two alternatives requi~e consideration: 
.",., 
, 
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TABLE 3-6. RAOIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) 
Nuc 11 de Payload(a) Oxide 
Payl oad( a) Mass. Nuc 11 de Mass. Activity. 
Isotope kg/MTHM Mass. kg kg/MTHM t1/MTHM Ac t 1 v f ty. C 1 
Rb-85 0.092 7.821 0.101 0 0 
Rb-87 0.232 18.360 0.253 1'.90E-5 1.50E-3 
rotaT o.m 26.181 D.m(Rb;?O) r.mft-! 1. 50E-~ 
Sr-88 0.406 32.129 0.480 0 0 
~r-90 0.492 38.935 0.579 6.95£+4 5.50£+6 
Total ~ 71.064 T':"m (S rO ) 6. 95E+'4" 5. 50£+6 
Y-89 0.471 37.273 0.598 0 0 
Y-90 <0.001 <0.079 <0.001 <6.97E+4 <5.52E+6 
fotal o.-m 37.352 ~(Y203) 6.97E+4 5.52E+6 
Zr-90 0.142 11.237 0.193 0 0 
Zr-91 0.587 46.453 0.793 0 0 
Zr-92 0.641 50.727 0.864 0 0 
Zr-93 0.715 56.583 0.961 1.83E+0 1.45£+2 
Zr-94 0.774 61.2~? 1.037 0 0 
Zr-96 0.822 65.050 1.096 0 0 
TOw !:'m" 291.302 ~(Zr02) 1.83[+0 1. 45E+2 
Mo-95 0.066 5.223 0.094 a a 
140-97 1.u60 83.885 1.590 a a 
Mo-98 1.140 90.216 1.626 r'\ 0 v 
Mo-lOO 1.260 99.712 1.866 0 n 
rotal- r.rrb 2'W-V3t' !:lib ( MoO 3 ) IT 'IT 
I Tc-99 0.976 77.237 1.291 1. 66£+1 1.31E+3 , i'O'taT 1J.l7b 77 .237 T."2"!fr ( T c 20 7 ) 1.66E+l 1.31E+3 
Ru-l00 0.061 4.827 0.080 0 0 i 
RIJ-I0l 0.B06 63.784 1.062 0 0 
Ru-!.1)2 0.808 63.942 1.061 a 0 
Ru-l04 0.588 46.532 0.769 0 0 
Total 2.m" 179.085 n72"( Ru0 2) IT 0 
Rh-103 0.389 30.784 0.480 0 0 
'i Tota1 -o.m 30.784 (f."4SO" (R h203 ) 0 "0" 
, I 
(a) For 5500 kg cermet payload. 
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TABLE 3-6. RADIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) (CONTINUED) 
Nuclide Payload(a) Oxide 
Payload(a) Mass, Nuclide Mass, Activity, 
Isotope kg/MTHM Mass, kg kg/MTHM C i /t1THM Activity, Ci 
~ -
Pd-104 0.197 15.590 0.257 0 0 
Pd-105 0.233 18.439 0.304 0 0 
Pd-106 0.366 28.964 0.476 0 0 
Pd-107 0.188 14.878 0.244 8.98E-2 7. 11E+O 
Pd-108 0.128 10.129 0.166 0 0 '!' 
Pd-110 0.027 2.137 0.035 0 0 
Total l.TI9 90.137 T.4S'2 (P dO ) 8.98E-2 7. 11E+O 
Ag-109 0.082 6.489 0.088 0 0 
Totar G.O'S2 0":4B9 ~(Ag20) IT 0 
Cd-110 0.043 3.403 0.049 0 0 
Cd-111 0.018 1.424 0.020 0 0 
Cc-ll2 0.009 0.712 0.011 0 0 
Cd-114 0.012 0.950 0.014 0 0 
Cd-1l6 0.003 0.237 0.004 0 0 
Total 0.085 6.i26 0.098(CdO) 0" 0 
Te-125 0.011 0.871 0.014 0 0 i 1 Te-125 0.138 10.921 0.173 0 0 1 Te-130 0.428 33.871 0.535 0 0 
Tota 1 o:m 45.663 o:722(Te02 ) "IT 0 1 
1 
Cs-133 1.200 94.964 1.257 0 0 'J J 
" Cs-134 0.007 0.554 0.007 8.55E+3 6.77£+5 
Cs-13fi 0.370 29.281 0.392 3.27E-1 2.59E+1 
Cs-137 1.160 91.799 1.224 1.01E+5 7.99E+6 
Total 2:m 216.598 '2.880 (Cs20) 1.1OE+5 8. 71E+6 
Ba-134 0.202 15.986 0.226 0 0 
Ba-136 0.020 1.583 0.022 0 0 
Ba-137 0.241 19.072 0.269 9.45E''4 7 .48E +6 
Ba-138 0.940 74.388 1.049 0 0 
Total 1.403 111.029 I:""5bO ( B aD ) 9.45E+4 7.43E+6 
La-139 1.260 99.712 1.480 0 0 
Tota' l.2"bO 9~.71~ T:"48O( La203 ) 0' 0" 
(c) For 5500 kg cermet payload. 
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TABLE 3-6. RADIONUCLIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) (CONTINUED) 
Isotope 
Ce-140 
Cs-142 
Total 
Pr-141 
Total 
Nd-142 
Nd-143 
Nd-144 
Nd-145 
Nd-146 
Nd-148 
Nd-150 
Total 
Pm-147 
Total 
Sm-147 
Sm-148 
Sm-149 
Sm-150 
Sm-151 
Sm-152 
Sm-154 
Total 
Eu-151 
Eu-153 
Eu-154 
Tota 1 
Gd-154 
Gd-155 
Gd-156 
Gd-lS8 
Gd-1.60 
Total 
Nuclide 
Mass, 
kg/MTHM 
1.420 
1.280 
2.'1mJ 
1.230 
r:-m 
0.022 
0.746 
1.270 
0.651 
0.665 
0.354 
0.171 
~ 
0.10G 
o:T06 
0.078 
0.087 
0.354 
0.191 
0.O2~ 
0.048 
0.019 
~ 
0.003 
0.137 
0.033 
0.173 
0.016 
0.005 
0.084 
0.012 
0.001 
G.Ti8 
Payload(a) 
Nuclide 
Mass, kg 
112.374 
101.295 
ID.669 
97.338 
97.338 
1.741 
59.036 
100.504 
51.518 
52.626 
28.014 
13.532 
306. 971 
8.388 
8.W 
6.173 
6.885 
28.014 
15.115 
1.662 
3.119 
1.504 
63.152 
O.2~7 
10.842 
2.612 
13.6 91 
1.266 
0.396 
6.647 
0.950 
0.079 
9.TI8 
(a) For 5500 kg cennet payload. 
Oxide 
Mass, 
kg/MTHM 
1.749 
1.574 
J.!2j(Ce02 ) 
:.482 
T:4S2(Pr6011 ) 
0.026 
0.871 
1.484 
0.759 
0.774 
0.411 
0.198 
DIT(Nd203) 
0.123 
U':lTI(Pm203 ) 
0.090 
0.101 
0.411 
0.221 
0.024 
0.055 
0.Ot2 
Q.924 (Sm203) 
0.004 
Ll.158 
0.038 
0.200( EuZ03) 
0.019 
0.006 
0.097 
0.014 
0.001 
o:TIi( Gd203) 
Act i vity, 
Ci/MTHM 
° 
° ()" 
0 
0" 
0 
a 
° 0 
0 
° 0 ()" 
9.82E+4 
9.82E+4 
° 
° 
° (I 
5.63E+2 
0 
0 
5.63E+2 
° 0 
4.78E+3 
4.78E+~ 
° 0 
0 
0 
0 
n-
BATTELLE: - CO \.JMBUS 
Payl oad( a) 
Activity, Ci 
0 
0 
0" 
0 
a 
a 
0 
° 0 
a 
0 
0 
0 
7. 77E+6 
7. 77E+6 
0 
° 0 
0 
'1.. 46E+4 
° 
° 4.46E+4 
G 
0 
3.78E+5 
3.78E+5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a 
O 
i -
.,...-.,._=~ .. ..--._ .... _~_~.~~.~~~_"" ... _"'¥!?Jt*r,_ ... ,r"--
- -
-_. ~- '.-- --~-- ~ 
~ , 
! j 
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TABLE 3-6. RADIONUClIDE COMPOSITION OF COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) (CONTI NUED ) J 
.1' 
I: 
Nuclide Payload(a) Oxide . ~ . 
Mass, Nuclide Mass, Activity, Payload(a) I Isotope kg/MTHM Mass, kg kg/MTHM Ci/MTHM Activity, Ci 
• .1 
U-235 0.008 0.633 0.010 1.81£-5 1.43E-3 
U-236 0.004 0.317 0.005 2.69E-4 2.13E-2 
U-238 0.979 77.475 1.154 3.26£-4 2.58E-2 
rotaT (f.99T 78.425 r.Tb'9"(U308) 6.13E-4 4.85E-2 : ! ! 
1 
~jp-2r 0.762 60.302 0.865 5.37E-1 4.25E-1 ] 
Tota o.m 60.302 Q."S05" ( N pO 2 ) 5.37E-l 4.25[-1 i 1 
Pu-239 0.005 0.396 0.006 3.22E-1 2.55E+1 
Pu-240 0.003 0.237 0.003 5.82E-1 4.61E+1 
Pu-241 0.001 0.079 0.001 9.80E+1 7.86E+3 
Totdl 0.009 o:7i2 o • 01 0 ( P uO 2 ) 9.89E+1 7.83E+3 
Am-241 0.129 10.209 0.142 4.41E+1 3.49E+4 
Am-243 0.035 2.770 0.039 6.83E+0 5.41E+2 
Total (f.1b4 12.979 o.TIT( Am20 3 ) 4" .48E +2 3.55E+4 
Cm-244 0.036 2.849 0.040 2.94E+3 2.33E+5 
Total 0':'016 2.849 0.040( Cm203) 2.94E+3 2.33E+5 
Reprocess-
ing Chem-
i ca 1 s 211.1 2.671 
Tota 1 s 30.777 2647.3 40.839 4.50E+5 3.57E+7 
( a) For 5500 kg cermet payload. 
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TABLE 3-7. PROJECTIQNS OF NUCLEAR ELECTRICAL GENERATING 
CAPACITy(3-9) 
Year( a) 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Annual 
Addit; on, 
GWe 
9.6 
12.9 
12.5 
13.8 
14.3 
16.0 
12.9 
12.8 
7.8 
9.1 
6.9 
5.6 
2.4 
1.2 
2.4 
1.5 
1.0 
1.0 
l.v 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
Notes: (a) DJta gi yen for year end. 
(b) Includes 52.3 GWe by the end of 
1978. 
Source: Reference 3-9. 
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Total 
Capacity, 
GWe 
61.9(b) 
74.8 
87.3 
101.1 
115.4 
131.4 
144.3 
157.1 
164.9 
174.0 
180.9 
186.5 
188.9 
190.1 
192.5 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
I 
1 
i 
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TABLE 3-8. PROJECTED SPENT FUEL DISCHARGED AND REPROCESSED 
Annual Unprocessed 
Annual Processing Spent Fuel 
Discharge, Capabi 1 i ty, Backlog, 
Year MTHt~ MTHM MTHM 
1979 1490 0 5,390* 
1980 1800 0 7,690 
1981 2100 0 9,790 
1982 2430 0 12,220 
1983 2770 0 14,990 
1984 3150 500 17,640 
1985 3460 1000 20,100 
1986 3770 1500 22,370 
1987 3960 1500 24,830 
1988 4180 1500 27,510 
1989 4340 2200 29,650 
1990 4480 2800 31,330 
1991 4530 3500 32,360 
1992 4560 3500 33,420 
1993 4620 3500 34,540 
1994 4660 J500 35,700 
1995 4680 3500 36,880 
1996 4700 3500 38,080 
1997 4730 4200 38,610 
1q98 4750 4800 38,560 
1999 4780 5500 37,840 
2000 4800 5500 37,140 
*~Iote: Includes about 4400 MTHM existing at the end of 1978. 
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Alternative 1- Assume that even though there is a considerable 
quantity of spent fuel, no credit will be given for prior cooling. 
Then assume that when reprocessing begins, 5 years is required 
bet\'1een processing and solidification and an additional 5 years is 
required between solidification and launch. 
Alternative 11- Assume that credit is given to prior cool ing of srent 
fuel •. '\ssurne waste is available for disposal 10 years after dis-
charge. I\!'sume solidification begins in the late 1980's (presently 
proposed schedule for ONWI for geologic disposal). 
For these two alternatives, the c;Jmulative processed backlog of spent fuel, 
the spent fuel available for annual disposal and the cumulative spent fuel 
di sposal are presented in Tab 1 e 3-9. Since it is reasonable to assume that 
credit will be given for spent fuel cooling prior to reprocessing, Alternative 
II is believed to be more realistic than Alternative 1. Alternative II is 
recommended f0r the reference space option scenario. 
TABLE 3-9. PRCJECTED WASTE AMOUNT FOR SPACE OISPOSAL 
Alternate 1 Alternate II 
Available Ava i I ab Ie 
Cumulative* for Cumulat ive for 
Processed Annual Cumulative Processed Annual CUlllulative 
Backlog Disposal Disposal Backloy Disposal Disposal 
1979 a a a 0 
1980 a a a 0 
1981 0 a a 0 
1982 0 a a 0 
1983 0 0 a a 
1984 500 0 500 a 
1985 1.500 a 1.500 0 
1986 3.UOO 0 3.000 a 
1987 4.5UO a 4.500 a 
1988 6.000 0 6.000 a 
1989 8,2UO U 2.310 5890 5.890 
1990 11,000 0 3.310 1800 7,690 
1991 14,5UO 0 4.710 2100 9,790 
1992 18,000 0 5.730 2430 12,220 
1993 21,~UO 0 6.510 2770 14,990 
1994 24,500 500 500 6,860 3150 18,140 
1995 27,OOU lUOO l,5UO 6,900 3460 21,600 
1996 29,000 1500 3.000 6.900 3~OO 25,100 
1997 31,700 1500 4.5UO 7.140 3960 29,060 
1998 34,950 1!;00 6,OUO 7,760 4180 33,240 
1999 37.530 2200 8.20U 8.920 4340 37,5130 
2000 39.530 2800 11.000 9.940 44tlO 42,060 
*Note: Data are in IHHM. 
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Finally, combining the information in the aforementioned trlb1es, the 
cumulative spent fuel discharged, the annual spent fuel av~i1ab1e for 
disposal, and the annual HW in cennE:t form available for space disposal are 
presented in Table 3-10. 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1935 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
( f~) 
"TABLE 3-10. PROJECTED NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION AND COMMERCIAL 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE AVAILABLE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Annual Nuclear 
Cumu1ative(a) 14aste Ava 11 ab 1 e 
Annual High-Level PW74, 
Waste in Cermet Form d 
Power, Wast r6) for Disposal, Available for Space GWe r-rrHM MTHM/yr Oi sposal, MT /yr 
61.9 5890(c) 0 0 
74.8 7690 0 0 
87.3 9790 0 0 
101.1 12,220 0 0 
115.4 14,990 0 0 
131.4 18,140 0 0 
144.3 21,600 0 0 
157.1 25,370 0 0 
164.9 29,330 0 0 
174.0 33,510 0 0 
180.9 37,850 5890(C) 410(e) 
186.5 42,330 1800 125 
188.9 46,860 2100 146 
190.1 51,420 2430 169 
192.5 56,040 2770 193 
194.0 60,700 3150 219 
195.0 65,380 3460 241 
196.0 70,080 3500 244 
197.0 74,810 3960 275 
198,0 79,560 4180 290 
199.0 84,340 4340 301 
200.0 89,140 4480 "'1"\ ,). ...., 
From: Y ate s, K. R., and Park, U. Y., "P,'ojections of Commercial 
Nuclear Capac,ty and Spent-Fuel Accumulation in the United 
States". Transact ion American Nucl ear Society, pp. 350-352 
(June 1979). 
MTHi1 is metric tons heavy metal. 
Includes 4400 MTHM PW-4b existing as of 1978. 
Assumes 40.8 kg/MT waste for space disposal dnd a cermet waste 
form loading of 58.7 ~ercent. 
Ccmputed by multiplying 5890 ;1THr1 by O. 0408 iH /i,1THi1 and d i vi d i n9 
by 0.587. 
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3.2.2 Reference Hanford Defense HLW Mix 
As described in the last year's study,(3-2) the Hanford site, lo-
cated near Richland, Washington, has been producing plutonium and other spe-
cial nuclear materials since 1944. Detailed info~ation was presented in last 
year's final report on the Hanford HLW mix. (3-2) For the purpose of this 
year's study, Rockwell Hanford was visited to discuss the possibili1ity of 
additional inert removal fron the Hanford waste, and to obtain updated infor-
mation on radionucl ide concentrations and on the radionucl ide removal process 
currently p1 anned. It was the conclusion of the Rock~l1 Hanford personnel 
that the chemistry suggested in last year's BCL studyl3-2) was still con-
sidered feasible and appropriate for the study reported here. No new chemical 
treatments were suggested. 
Updated radionucl ide removal runsheets were suppl ied by Rockwell 
Hanford along with ORIGEN c~nputer printouts of the radionuclide composition 
for present waste, future ~aste and a mixture of both. The radionuc1ide com-
position of the present waste is cLlrrently the most useful data for study 
purposes and is shown in Table 3-11. 
The majority of the Hanford ~LW, after being subjected to the radio-
nuclide removal process, is in the form of sludge. Sludge composition varies, 
depending on the reprocessing method from v/hich it was derived. There are 
five major sludges; these are: (1) bismuth phosphate sludge, (2) Redox sludge, 
(3) nickel-ferrocyanide-strontium sludge, (4) Purex shdge, and (5) zirconium 
sludge. 
The gross composition of the first four major Hanford sludges, which 
are amenable to dissolution, is shown below--showing the previous and updated 
values: 
Total Mass of Inerts 
(Excluding Zr02 sludge): 
Total Mass of Fission 
Products: 
Mass of Thorium Oxide: 
Total Mass of Uranium Oxide: 
Last Year's Study(3-2) 
(1978-1979), m 
15,082 
56 
15 
''',Q ;JU\.,.· 
16,061 
Current Study 
(1979-1980), MT 
14,488 
7 
15 
908 
15,418 
Mas~ estimates for zirconia sludge, which is not amenable to typical dis-
solution processes, are also presented for previous and updated and values: 
Total Mass of Zirconia Sludge: 
Total Mass of Waste after 
Rad i onuc 1 ide Rernova 1 : 
11978-1979)& MT 
31~, 
16,379 
a A T T r; L L. E - C '-l L lJ M a lJ 5 
(1979-1980), MT 
412 
15,330 
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TABLE 3-1l. DEFENSE WASTE MIX (HANFORD, WCF • 25) 
.1 RAD IONUCL IDE INVENTORY 
: 1 
Payload(a) Payload(a) Payload (a) ~ I Nuclide Nueli de Nue lide Nucl ide Mass, kg Nue 1 ide Mass, kg Nue 1 ide Mas s. kg 
- , 
I 
. 
I 
C-14 4.37E-03 U-232 8.50E-09 Te-125m 3.40E-08 . , 
N-14 1.0SE -05 U-233 1.30E -03 Te-125 2.34E-04 
Co-S9 7.02E-05 U-234 3.19E-03 Sn-126 2.97E-02 ~ 
Co-60 1.95E-OS U-235 1.83E-Ol Sb-126m 1.08E-11 .. 
Ni-S9 4.0SE-Ol U-236 1.48E-06 Sb-126 1.01E-08 
Ni -60 2.S2E-04 U-237 2.34E-13 Te-126 4.12E-06 
Ni-63 5.15E-02 U-238 2. 79E +01 1-129 3.56E+00 
Cu-63 8 .39E -03 Np-237 1.86E+00 Xe-129 2.89E-06 
Zr-93 2.32E-02 Np-239 6.42E-09 Cs-134 5.71E-09 
Nb-93m 1.34E-07 Pu-238 2.98E-04 Ba-134 4.90E-06 
Nb-93 8.00E-08 Pu-239 4.30E+00 Cs-135 2.67E+OO 
Sn-121m 8 .07E -07 Pu-240 2.94E-Ol Ba-135 1.23£-05 
Sb-121 1.61E-07 Pu-241 8.07E-03 Cs-137 1.96E+OO 
Sb-125 7.69E-I0 Pu-242 6.38E-03 Sa-137m 2.97E-07 
T~-125m 1.88E-l1 Am-241 1.61E-Ol Ba-137 1.15£+00 
Te-125 1.29E-07 Am-242m 2.43E-04 Ce-144 7.02E-16 
He-4 1.43E-01 Am-242 2.92E-09 Nd-144 3.84E-08 
Pb-207 4.8/E-11 Am-243 7.72E-03 Pm-147 6.73E-05 
Pb-208 6.38E-07 Cm-242 5.85E-07 Sm-147 1.33£-02 
Pb-209 2.06E-12 Cm-243 1. 75E-06 Sm-151 5.61E-Ol 
Pb-210 8.88E-12 Cm-244 1.00E-04 EIJ-151 9.70E-02 
Pb-212 6.52E-11 H-3 4.65E-06 5m-152 4.55£-05 
Bi-209 3.77E-08 Se-79 1.45E-01 Eu-152 2.92E-05 
Bi-2l2 6.21E-12 Br-79 3.09E-05 Gd-152 1.78E-05 
8i-213 4.97£-13 Sr-90 3.36E+00 Ed-154 2.62£ -03 
Ra-224 5.68E-I0 Y-90 8.74E-04 Gd-154 3 .60E -03 
Ra-225 2.38E-I0 Zr-90 2.15E+00 Ed-155 3.45E-07 
Ra-226 3.88E-09 Zr-93 3.33E+01 Gd-155 7.26£-04 
Ra-228 7.47E-08 Nb-93m 1.92E-04 I nerts 2.09E+0~ 
Ac-225 1.61E-10 Nb-93 1.15E-04 Total 2.20E+03 
Ac-227 2.40E-10 Tc-99 2.21E+01 
Ac-228 7.79E-12 Ru-99 1.44E-03 
Th-228 2.77E-I0 Ru-106 2.82E-13 
Th-229 1.09E-07 Pd-106 2. 76E-0 7 
Th-230 1.1SE-07 Pd-l07 1.48£+00 
Th-231 7.39E-13 ,.g- LO 7 2.92E-06 
Th-232 4. S 7E -0 1 Cd-113m 1.03E-04 
TJ" ?'VI I 11- .... .., , 4.00E-I0 Cd-I13 I_74t-07 
Pa-231 1.40E-06 I n-113 1. 74E-04 
Pa-233 6.42E-08 Sn-121m 2. 91E -05 
Pa-234m 5.43E-12 Sb-121 5.82E-06 
Pa-234 1.88[ -12 Sb-125 1.39E-06 
---.-
Note: ( a) For 5500 kg cermet payload. 
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Based on laboratory tests, it may be possible to dissolve the first 
four sludges in molten caustic. If such a dissolution is feasible on the 
industrial scale, Hanford estimates that 99 percent of the inert material 
could be removed. Also, since uranium and thorium could be recycled as reac-
tor fuels, it may be possible to remove 95 to 98 percent of those elements. 
The total mass of Hanford waste to be carried to space, assuming the 
chemistry described above, is given in Table 3-12 for both previous and up-
dated mass estimates. Overall, the mass of Hanford waste to be carried to 
space is nearly the same using updated infonnation rather than last year's 
estimates. The reference waste concentration factor (WCF) has also changed to 
25.5 (from 27.2) because of the updated informatlon, as shown in Table 3-12. 
TABLE 3-12. REFERENCE DEFENSE \~A$TE MIX INVENTORY (HANFORD HlW) 
FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Component 
Inert r"ater; d 1 
Fission Product Oxides 
Thorium (Th02) 
Uranium (U02) 
Isolated Products from 
Salt Cake and liquor 
Zirconium Sludge 
Total 
Waste Concentraction 
Factor{b) 
last Year's(StYdY (1978-1979) 3-2) Current Reference{a) (1979-1980) 
Metric Tons 
, ~ A 
J.:J .. 
66 
0.3-0.8 
21-52 
3-14 
0-318 
244.3-604.8 
27.2 
145 
7.2 
0.3-0.8 
21-51 
4 
0-412 
177.5-620 
25.5 
(a) Assumes same chemi stry as 1 ast year's study (Reference 3-2) 
(b) Based upon total masses of Hanford Waste of 16,379 and 15,830, 
respectively (from radionuclide removal process). 
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3.3 Containment Requirements Oefinition 
The space disposal option, heing conceptual t intrl')duces many unique 
and unforeseen situations. An example is the need to define containment re-
quirements and/or allowable 1 imits for the waste payload configurations con·· 
sidered for use during the various mission phases (see Section 2.5). Current 
federal regulations cover little beyond transportation aspects. Additional 
information that must be developed from follo\'l-on studies includes the hand-
ling, storage, transportation, anJ final disposition requirements for !'loth 
commerci al and defense HL\~. Thi s sect ion Ollt 1; nes and compl etes, as much as 
possible. the requirernents for containment of the high-level \",aste form during 
each phase of the space disposal mission. 
3.3.1 Bases 
The bases for defining the containment requirements are set forth 
here as (1) containment philosophy, (2) data application (the relationship 
between rcquir~ments and working limits. ano the prel iminary natllre of these 
requi rements). and (3) di rect ion of ~uture development. A glossary of t~;"ms 
is included to c1early establish their meaning in the context of the require-
ments that foll ow. 
3.3.1.1 Containment Philosophy 
Th~ ideal goal for containment m high-level waste material would he 
to (1) provide an absolute barrier between the wast~ and the environment. and 
(2) minimize th~ radiation exposure to hUlTI~ns under all normal and accide~t 
conditions. Various government regulations ~ave been developed and applied to 
current terrestrial transportation activities involvin~ radioactive materials, 
including irradiated nuclear fuel. A,s yet, no specific regulations apply spe-
cifically to handlinq. storing. transporting, etc., high-level waste. Conse-
1uently, the containment reqlJirement~ developed in this study a"e b~5ed on 
extending existing regulations; they cannot be considered final at this ~ime. 
Thpse containment requirements. whether or flat covered by exist'ng reQu 1ation, 
are applied first to meet current regulatior1s a 01'1 , seconrl, to Hlini;71ize hu,1an 
ex~osure to as low as reasonably achievab1e (ALARA). 
~ontainment requirements are presented in three independent catego-
ries: (1) specific parameters indicative of the response of various contain-
iTIent system3; (2) specific systems felr cor.taining the vlaste (waste f()m, 
containment vessels. etc.), and (3) various mission phases dur~n'l ~Ihich sr~­
::ific levels of "ontair!ment are required. Table 3-D list') t'1e comronents Of 
these categorit>s. The three levels containrlent requirerneJ"lts can he ;lseo1 t'l 
define dny aSDect of containment. 
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TABLE 3-13. SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Parameters Components Mi ss i on Phases 
• Thermal • Waste Fonn • Fabrication/Assembly 
• Mechanical 
• Chemical 
• Primary Container 
• Radiation Shield 
• Terrestrial Transport 
• Launch Site Handling 
• Nuclear • Impact Absorber • Launch to Earth Orbit 
• Ablation Shield • Orbit Transfer to Destination 
• Shipping Cask 
3.3.1.2 Data Application 
Becau,e of the general nature of the re1luirements, reference to spe-
cific designs and materials is limited to those previ ou51y identified as 
candidate or alternative bases for the space disposal option (see Section 2-1; 
Figure 2-1). Consequently, technical data is used minimally. Appendix C in-
cludes the known infonnation that meets the contai nment requirements for the 
reference concepts. These requi rements are i "tended to be used in various 
mission phase environment scenarios. 
3.3.1.3 Future Developments 
In this study, the requirements have been developed only to the 
extent needed to defi ne prel imi nary cJncepts for space di sposal (If high-l evel 
waste. In follow-on study efforts, as the concepts are translated into pre-
liminary designs, containment requirements will likely include future inter-
action with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other authorities to ensure 
acceptability of these requirements. 
3.3.1.4 Definition of Terms 
The following terms are defined in the co~text 0f the contain~ent re-
quirements as used in this section: 
Ablation Shield - a layer of protective car-bon/carbon mat~rial 
attached to the outside surface of the payload reentry vehicle. It 
is designed to reduce the heating effects during inadvertant 
d tITlOS pheri c reentry. 
Accident Conditions - as cc ,"asted to normal conditions, lore low in 
probabilit,J' and high ;n sev:rity. The correspording philosophy for 
, ·1 
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the containment barrier is to survive accidents with 10w Ct)nseqllences 
rather than rema i n 1 fi an operab 1 estate. 
ALARA - less than maximum allowable and as low as reasonably 
achievable. Federal regulations require this principle t~ be used in 
':'lost nuclear technology license applications. 
Barrier - any medium or mecha~l'is:r. by which either release of encap-
sulated radioactive waste material is retarded significantly or human 
access is restricted. Examples of barriers are: wast! form, primary 
container, and isolation. 
Cladding - a metal ~r ceramic covering of another material, used to 
improve certain prolJ~rties, such as I'esistance to chemical interac-
tion, and hazardous material containment. 
Containment - a condition in which a ~azardous material is isolated 
fl'om the environment to an acceptable rlegrep.. 
Criticality - a mea.;J,·e of the capability of sustaining a nllclear 
chain reaction in a package containing fissile nate~~d's. 
Decomposition - any significant change in ph)sical or chemical 
properties resulting in a reduction in rilechanical stren9th, etc. 
DOT - Department of Transportat ion~ regardi ng hail~l1 i n9 of nile 1 ear 
materials, Title 49 Of che Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 
173.389-173.399. 
Fabrication - that stage of ~he waste treatment proc~ss :~ ~hich the 
vJaste form is fabricated to its proper shape and pl )ced \Jithir') the 
primary container. 
Fracture Toughness - the measure of a mater'lal's ab il ity to absorb 
energy during ;:>lastic deformation; resistance to fracture. 
H1Qh-Level Wast~ - the waste product resulting from the first 
separation ~tep of Purex fuel reprocessing operations. 
Impact Absorber - t hat port ion of a nue 1 ear wa ~te rayload o.V ; ntended 
to be a sacrifici al energy absorber wh i1 e reouc fng 1rilpact ~orces 
transrJlitted to ':he payloaa. 
Laur...:h Site - the location on Earth's slJrfare fron \"hich the space 
dis~osal mlssions are laun~hed. 
Material Interaction - the behavior of materiJ'S in cont~ct wi~h each 
other where a significant change i:1 physical or chemical properties 
resul t. 
Normal Condit ions - (onti i t ions thct resul t fr'.)r1 nomd 1 1anrl1 ; ng and 
transporta!ion operations. ~o irreversible effects sh~ll result to 1 
contafnMen: Jarriel"' • 
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NPPF - Nucl~ar Pay10ad Preparat,on Facility; that launch site 
facility prt'viding interim storage, and remote handling operations 
for the waste payload from the time of receipt at the launch site 
until launch operations beg,n. 
;~RC :.. Nuclear Regulator.Y Commission; regarding transportation of 
nuclear materials, Title 10 of the Code of Federal ~egulations, Part 
71. 
Primary Container - the shell ~r vessel, adjacent to the high-level 
waste fom, thH provid~s containment th"oughotJt a1l mission pha!:es. 
Radiation Shield - that component of :he pay10ad package ~/hich is 
intended to reduce the nuclear radiation environment to acceptable 
l~vels. 
Reentry Vehicle (RV) - that component of the payload package intend~d 
to protect the payload contents duri~g an unplanned on-pad or ascent 
failure or reentry into the Earth's atmosphere. 
Rem - Roentgen Equivalent Man, a unit of radiation dose, which takes 
into a~count the ~elative biological effective~ess of radiation 
energy deposition. 
Shipping Package - a~ enclosure and i~s systems licensed to transport 
radioactive mater'ials (including high-level \'1aste). 
Storage - placement of high-level \'1aste packages in temporary 
isolation as an intermediate step to\,/arr1 remanent isolation. 
Up rated Space Shuttle - referl..nce launch vehicle for space disrosal 
option. 
3.3.2 Parameters 
Containment r~ql.Jirell1ents will ult imately take the form of specific 
lil~its for key parar'1eters. For the space disposal o~tion, the significant 
parameters can he grOllpetj ; nto four Major cat~<.iori es: (1) therma 1; (2) Mech-
aniea;; (3) chel71ical; and (4) nuclear. Within each category, nany specific 
parameters can be included as containment requirements. Only the major pa-
rameters are included here. In addition, items that shoul;j eventually be 
describe(1 as criteria are not r,entioned specifica"lly, hut rather, are under-
stood. Examrles of these criteria involve: waste packane inteqrity; ... taste 
isolation requirements; societal constraints; and safeguards. The cont31nmen· 
requirements 1i ven here are s;Jecific limi-;s for use in delir.~atin9 the objec-
tives of the criteria. 
As discussed earlier, containment ,'equlrelnent paraneters are ~lJ~ ()np 
dir:lensiofl of a threefold aprroach tn contain~ent. These par-ar'eters I'~U!)~ :~~ 
applied to snecific for:1S of -.:onta i nr:1ent, c1urint] si1ecific miso;ion ~hases. 
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Once thi s step is accompli shed. technical data may be suhst i tuted to obtai n 
working requirements (see Appe~dix C). 
3.3.2.1 Thermal 
Thermal requirements consider only limiting conditions which, irre-
spective of critical parameters in other areas, serve as upper bounds to 
determine permissible designs al'-j response. In interrelations with other 
major parameters, a single parameter is considered as the limiting requirement 
and, through its dep~ndence upon other parameters, in effect produces corre-
sponding limits. Thus parameters such as melting temperature will be indepe~· 
dent limits, while yield strength will be a function of temperature. 
The limiting thermal conditions for all forms of containment and mis-
sion phases should require that the containment barrier must not be altered in 
physical or chemical phase during operations that are not remote from the 
human environment. They must be defined in terms of probabilities. For the 
waste form, this implies a limit at the fabrication temperature; for metallic 
containment forms, this implies a creep limit. These limits are usually 
applied to normal conditions. For accident conditions, the temperature limit 
will be below the melting point for containment. (See Table 3-14.) 
COMPONENT 
WASTE FORM 
PRIMARY 
CONTAINER 
TABLE 3-14. THERMAL REQ'JIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENT OF 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE, SPACE DISPOSAL OPTION 
MISSION PHASE 
FABRICATION I TERRESTRIAL LAUNCH SITE LAUNCH TO 
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORT HANDLING EARTH ORBIT 
FABRICATIONI FABRICATION I FABRICATION I FABRICATIONI 
MELT TEMP.· MELT TEMP. MELT TEMP. MELT TEMP. 
CREEP/MELT CREEP/MELT CREEP/MELT CREEP/MELT 
TEMP. TEMP. TEMP. TEMP. 
FLIGHT RADIATION CREEP/MELT CREEP/MELT CREEP/MELT CREEP/MELT 
SHIELD TEMP. TEMP. TEMP. TEMP. 
IMPACT CREEP/MELT CREEP/MELT 
ABSORBER TEMP. TEMP. 
ABLATION CREEP/- CREEP/-
SHIELD TEMP. TEMP. 
SHIPPING DOT. NRC 
CASK REG. 
'NOTE: THE NORMAL LIMIT IS GIVEN FIRST; THE ACCIDENT LIMIT IS GIVEN SECOND. 
ORBIT 
TRANSFER TO 
DESTINATION 
FABRICATIONI 
MELT TEMP. 
CREEP/MELT 
TEMP. 
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3.3.2.2 Mechanical Strength 
For all normal mission phases, and containment barriers, the mechani-
cal strength must maintain stress and strain limits \'Iithin normal yield limits 
(standarrl O.2~ offset). For accident conditions, stress/strain 1 imits must 
not exceed ultimate strength requirements. Mechanical strength limits are 
assumed to be dependent on temperature and loading condition. In addi:ion, it 
is assumed that all containment barriers must also have slifficien; fracture 
toughness, fatigue endurance, ar.d buckling stability to withstand normal and 
accident conditions. (See Table 3-15.) ror accidents associat~o with reen-
try, mechanical integrity is not a feasible requirement. Rather,:l 1 irnit on 
the amount dispers@d will be imposed. 
TABLE 3-15. MECHANICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENT OF 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE, SPACE OISPOSAL OPTION 
MISSION PHASf 
-------. 
FABRICATIONI TERRESTRIAL LAVNCHSITE LAUNCH TO 
COMPONENT ASSEMBLY TRANSPORT HANDLING EARTHOMBIT 
YIELDI YIELDI YIelD I YIELD I 
WASTE FORM ULTIMATE· ULTIMATE ULTIMATE ULTIMATE 
PRIMARY YIELDI DOT. NRC YIELDI YIELDI 
CONTAINER ULTIM~TE REG, UlTIMATE ULTIMATE 
FLIGHT RADIATION YIELD I YIElDI YIELDI YIELD I 
SHIELD ULTIMATE ULTIMATE ULTIMATE ULTIMATE 
IMPACT 
ABSORBER YIElD/- YIELD/-
ABLATION YIELDI YIEl,DI 
SHIELD ULTIMATE ULTIMATE 
SHIPPING DOT. NRC 
CASK REG. 
'NOTE: THE N,)RMAL LIMIT IS GIVEN FIRST; THE ACCIDENT UMIT IS GIVEN SECONU. 
3.3.2.3 Chemical 
ORBIT 
TRANSFER TO 
DESTINATION 
Y~El.D/,-
LOW DISPERSION 
YIELD/-
Containment materials shal1 be COl.lpatlble \'/1th adjacent rnedid to the 
exterlt that no sig!1~ ficant detrlment~l chemical react ions OCCL.r. For condi-
tions not c,)Vered by existi!1g fcderz;l regulations, specific li:nits \'Jill he 
applied to th€ variou!" ct'n~aimnellt t·arriers and missiJr. pha::;es. (See Table 
3-16. ) 
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TABLE 3-16. CHEMICAL REQUIREI~ENTS FOR CONTAINMENT OF 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE. SPACE DISPOSAL OPTION 
MISSION PHASE 
FAIRICAllONI TERRESTRIAL LAUNCH SITE LAUNCH TO 
COMPONENT ASseMILY TRANSPORT HANDLING EARTHORIIT 
WASTE FORM TID TID TID TID 
SIMILAR SIMILAR SIMILAR 
PRIM MY TO DOT. DOT. NRC TO DOT. TO DOT. 
CONTAINER NRC REG. REG. NRC REG. NRC REG. 
SIMILAR SIMILAR SIMILAR SIMILAR 
FUGHT RADIATION TO DOT TO DOT. TO DOT. TO DOT. 
SHIELD NRC BEG. NRC REG. NRCREQ. NRC REG. 
SIMILAR SIMILAR 
IMPACT TO OOT. TODOT. 
AISORIER NRC REG. NRC REG. 
SIMILAR SIMILAR 
ABLATION TO DOT. TO DOT. 
SHIELD NRC REG. NRC REG. 
SHIPPING DOT. NRC 
CASK REG. 
3.3.2.4 Nuclear 
ORIIT 
TRANSFER TO 
DESTINATION 
TID 
TID 
The major nuclear requirements for the space disposal uption include 
limits on dispersion, criticality, and radiation pxposure. 
The accer.tabl~ amount of radioactive material that may be re1eased 
should be a fur.ction of the severity and frequency of the lo.;ding condition, 
keeping in mind ALARA criteria. Alloweble releases are expected to r~nge from 
near-zero, for normal conditions, to mini;r:al values for extremely severe acci-
dents. Values for certain mission phases already exist (see Section 3.3.4). 
All waste fom configurations (normal cnd accident) must rernain sub-
critical. Transportation lfcensing regulations have interpreted this reqlJire-
[:lent to medn that K-effective (iolean value plus three standard deviations) 
calculated using accepted teChniques, to be less t~an 0.95. The capability of 
the waste fo~m to remain subcraical shall not depend upon nctive. ext~rnal 
measures. 
Radiation exposure shall be controlled to limit the dose to ALARA 
levels. The established dose rate li,nits will be a function of expoSure 
ptobability and design constraints. Limits exist for cer-;;ain mission phases 
and waste packa.Jes. (See Table 3-17.) 
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TABLE 3-17. NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTAINMENT OF 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE, SPACE DISPOSAL OPTION 
MISSION PHASE 
FAIRICATIONI TERRESTRIAL LAUNCH SITE LAUNCH TO 
ASS EM II.Y TRANSPORT HAN DUNG EARTHORIIT 
SUI·CRITICAL SUI·CRITICAL SUI·CRITICAL IUI·CRITICAL 
IK..,<O.tll IK..,<O.8., IK..,<O.8., (K..,<O.8., 
ORIIT 
TAANSFERTO 
DESTINATION 
SUI·CRITICAL 
IK..,<O.8., 
NUCUDE NUCLIDE NUCUDE NUCLIDE NUCLIDE RELEASE: 
PRIMARY RELEASE: RELEASE: RELEASE: RELEASE: TID 
CONTAINER T!tD DOT. NRC REG. TID TID RADIATION DOSE: 
TID 
FLIGHT RACIATION 2.0 R/HR 2.0R/HR 2.0 R/HA 2.0 R/HA 
SHIELD @1M. @1M. @1M. @1M. 
IMrACT 
AISORIER TID TID 
A8LAT~ON 
SHIELD TID TID 
SHIPPING DOT. NRC 
CASK REG. 
3.3.3 Sontainment Component~ 
Containment components (referred to as "configurations" in Section 
2.5) cons"titute the barrier betweer the payload ond the extet'nal environt:1ent. 
OepE'!nding on the Irlission phase, the containment barrier ma.v be a single item 
(e.g., \'iuste primary contdiner) or multiple items (e.g., primary container, 
radic:tion 5hield, ;;:1pact absorber, etc.), ConsequentlY, a particu~ar compo-
r.ent may not be a iJart of containment in 011 mission phases. If it is not a 
part of the cor:tainrnenf: barrier, ther: the s.')ecific 1 imits for containrrent do 
n0t apply. 
3.3.3.1 Waste For~ 
The principal containment barrier for the space disposal option is 
the primary container. The waste form is required to minimize the possibility 
of nuclide release, not contain it. To meet these requirements, the waste 
form wi 11 st ill have 1 imit s for thermal, mechan ical, chemical, and nuc 1 ear 
parameters • 
For the ~!aste form, the maximum tempp.ratllre 1 imi: for normal conei-
tions is the fabrication temperature; for accident conditions the limit is the 
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melting temperature. Mechanical limits, when appl icable for containment, a"e 
yield (normal) and ultimate strengths or low dispersion (accident). Chemical 
limits are to be determined (TBD), and nuclear limits require a subcritical 
condition at all times. 
3.3.3.2 Primary Container 
The primary container, designed to enclose the waste form throughout 
all mission phases beyond fabrication, is also the rrimary containment bound-
ary. Depending on the mission phase, it may be the only containment barrier, 
or it may be one in a series with other external boundaries. 
The thermal limit for normal conditions is tre creep limit (e.g., Asr~E Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1). 3-10) For accident 
conditions, the melting temperature is the required limit. Mechanical limits 
~re yield (normal) and ultimate strengths or low dispersion (accident). Chem-
ical limits are coverel.! by existing federal regulations.(3-11) Nuclear dis-
persion limits are to be determined for conditions not regu1at~d. 
3.3.3.3 Radiation Shield 
The radiation shield for flight is designed to function during all 
mission phases through transfer to the final destination. Although the radia-
tion shield must meet containment requirements primarily for rad'iation expo-
sure, it will be supplemented with auxiliary shielding materials as needed 
during various mission phases. Fer mission phases requiring such shielding, 
1 imits for other types of requirements are necessary. For mechanical strength 
requirements, yield (normal) and ultimate (accident) limits apply. Thermal 
limits are creep (normal) and melting (accident). Chemical requirements \'1i1l 
be similar to those in existing federal regulations. 
Radiation exposure limits been assumed for conditions not covered by 
existing regulations. Conservative limits (such as those for transportation) 
have not been selected due to the sensitivity of the overall system design 
(payload/shield mass ratio)to the t:ose limits. Rather, the limits chosen 
reflect the fact that the waste pajload will be comparatively is:1lated frorl 
the gen~ral public throughout most of its lifetime. 
3.3.3.4 Reentry Vehicle 
The reentry vehicle, primarily the impact absorber and ablation 
shield, have similar containment requirerlent 1 il1its. For thema1 retllJire-
ments, the cr~~p (normal) and melt temperature (accident) arply. For mechan-
ical strength, yield (normal) and ultimate (accident) limits exist. Chemical 
and nuclear limits are minor factors, but largely rei~ain to be rietemined. 
Exceptions to these limits are that the impact absorher is designerl to ahsorh 
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mechanical energy during accidents and the ablation shield is desi9ned to 
reduce heating effects during possible reentry phases. 
3.3.3.5 Shipping Cask 
During Earth transport. the high-level waste package will b~ enclosed 
within Po shipping cask. Current federal regulations [10 CFR 71 (3-12), 49 
CFR 173l3-13 }] define the requirements for this component. which is expected 
to be similar to conventional designs. 
3.3.4 Mission Phases 
As described previously. the containment requirements are also a 
function of mission phases, and, more specifically, the conditions within each 
phase. The definition of mission phase as used for containment requirements 
is chronological, with no clear-cut boundaries between phases. Consequently, 
the requirements cannot be considered to be absolute standards, but rather, 
are to be applied to each phase in an overall manner. 
3.3.4.1 Fabrication/Assembly 
This phase tegins with the insertion of the waste form into the 
primary container, and ends \'Iith the beginning of transport of the flight-
shielded primary container out of the fabrication facilitv. During this phase. 
auxiliary cooling and additional shielding may be required. The primary con-
tainer is the principal containment harrier during this phase. 
3.3.4.2 Terrestrial Transport 
This phase begins at the time of loading of the waste container and 
shield into the shippin9 cask and ends with the unloading at the Nuclear 
Payload Preparation Facility (NPPF). Throughout this phase, active auxiliary 
coc1ing will be required to maintain thermal limits. At both ends of the 
phase, additional shielding may be t·equired. The requirements are defined for 
irradiated nuclear materials in existing regulations. ;hey are expected to be 
similar to regulations governing transport of processed waste. Hhile in the 
shipping cask, the cask vessel \'Ii11 be the principal containment barrier 
during transport. 
3.3.4.3 Launch Site Handling 
This phase, similar to th~ initial one, begins with the arrival of 
the shipping cask at the NPPF and ends with :hp. completion of transfer into 
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the launch vehicle. Auxiliary cooling, and possibly shielding, will be re-
quired during this phase. The principal containment barrier remains tM 
primary container. During this phase, the primary container will be installed 
in the Reentry Vehicle. The RV would then playa major protection role, if an 
accident were to occur. 
3.3.4.4 Launch to Earth Orbit 
ThiS phase begins with the loading of the waste payload into the 
launch vehicle, and ends after Earth orbi·t has been achieved. Auxiliary 
cooling may be required for most of this phase, with containment relying 
principally on the primary container. Accident conditions that might occur 
during this phase are among the most severe. The requirements during this 
phase allow for no release; namely no melting, no ultimate failure of the 
waste form, container, or radiation shield will be allowed. 
3.3.4.5 Orbit Transfer to Destination 
This mission phase commences with the removal of the waste payload 
(primary container) from the RV, and concludes with arrival at the final des-
tination. For the purpose of these requirements, this phase is not open-
ended. However, it is expected that conditions are steady at the conclusion 
of this phase. No auxiliary cooling is required; so~e auxiliary shielding may 
be required at the beginning of this phase. Containment requirements for this 
phase (and the long term) are expected to be less restrict i ve tha" those for 
near-term phases i nvol vi n9 greater chances of public exposure. The primary 
container and the waste fom provide the ultimate containment barrier for the 
waste. 
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3.4 Container, Shield. and Cooling Requirements Defin1tion 
The commercial and defense waste forms and mixes are described in 
Sect ions 3.1 and 3.2. The reference commercial (PW-4b) and Hanfo:"d defense 
wastes were evaluated for waste masses rangi ng from an RTG-type payload 
[approximately 1/3 the dicJTIeter of the 5.5 metric ton (MT) payload] up to a 
heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLVj capability (defined by a waste payload diam-
eter upper 1 imit of 3 meters due to ground transport constraints). Analyses 
were performed for three single spherical payloads with di ameters determined 
by the waste mass range defined above. pt the time the analyses were con-
ducted the reference waste fonn mass was 5.5 MT; the reference was changed to 
5 MT after continuing analyses by NASA/MSFC. 
A primary container wall was assumed to endose the cermet waste 
form. A radiation shield surrounding the container consists of depleted 
uY.::nium with an inner and outer cladding of stainless steel. The shielding 
thickness was determined as a function of payload waste form mass using stan-
dard shielding codes. For space flight, the shielded package is enclosed by a 
spherical honeycomb steel impact absorber and a thermal protection layer of 
insulation and ablation material. This analysis extends LO, but does not 
including, the impact absorber. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center performed 
the payload analysis for shells outside the radiation shield. 
ihe analyses reported here covers shielding requirements, thermal 
characteristics (temperature profiles and auxiliary cooling requirements) in 
deep space and earth environments, payload mass characteristics, and param-
etric dose rate as a function of distance from source and intervening wall 
thickness. 
The requirements (see Section 3.3) for each component of the refer-
ence payload concept were determined before the results presented in this 
section were evaluated. These evaluations can be used to further refine the 
space disposal payload concept~ into working designs in future efforts. 
3.4.1 Container Mass 
The proper thickness of the waste primary container can be determined 
by structural analysis of the container's response to various normal and acci-
dent environments. The container wall design is not believed to be a signifi-
cant parameter for shielding or thermal analyses. Structural analysis of all 
components of the package should be lncluded in fo11o\'I-on efforts. To begin 
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the shielding and thennal analyses, however, a representative thickness of 
1.27 cm (0.5 in.) was assumed over the entire range of payload waste ~sse$. 
Furthermore, in view of results presented in the Phase I study effort{J-1). 
the container material was assumed to be stainless steel. Analysis described 
in Section 4.3 indicated the need for a higher service temperature material 
for the container. however, the results of that analysis were not available 
until the end of this study··see Section 4.l.4. The resulting stainless steel 
container mass components are presented after shielding mass requirements have 
been determined (see Section 3.4.3). 
3.4.2 Shielding Analysis 
The shiel d1 ng analys is consisted of detenni ning the thickness of 
uranium required to reduce the gamma and neutron radiation dese rates to with-
in the desi;nated limits. This procedure began with development of a shield-
i n9 sour~e term for comlllerci a1 and Hanford waste mixes us i n9 the ORl'lEN 
code. (l-ts) This code predicts the generation of fission products andche 
transmutation of isotopes as a result of neutron reactions and radioactive 
decay. The input nuclide quantities were taken from Tables 3-6 and 3-11. The 
resulting gamma photon spectrulI1S for 10-year-old commercial (PW-4b) and 20-
year-old Hanford high-level waste are shown in Table 3-1B. 
Mean 
TABLE 3-18. COMMERCIAL (PW-4b, la-YEAR DECAY) AND 
HANFORD (WCF • 25, la-YEAR DECAY) 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE MIX PHOTON SPECTRUM 
ActivitX. Photons/sec-MT* 
Energy. MEV PW-4b Hanford (WCF • 25) 
0.30 2.75 £I5 5.29 El3 
0.63 6.58 £16 3.36 £14 
1.10 2.04 £15 2.86 El2 
1.55 1.53 £14 4.09 £11 
1.99 5.05 Ell 1.23 E10 
2.38 7.04 EO..s 9.18 E03 
2.75 3.28 E08 4.27 E03 
3.25 2.04 E08 2.65 E03 
3.70 1.31 E08 1. 71 E03 
4.22 8.26 E07 1.08 E03 
4.70 3.90 E07 5.09 E02 
5.25 2.46 E 0J 3.20 E02 
Neutron SourCt (neutronsl 
sec-MT) 5.37 E09 1.61 E05 
Decay Heat (kW/MT)* 19.3 0.23 
- --*Note: MT = metric ton of waste and additives in cermet waste form • 
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The neutron production, also determined by QR!GEN, is negligible for Hanford 
waste; it was included in shielding calculations of the commercial waste mix~ 
The neutron sourc.! tenn was input to the shielding code by assuming a U23~ 
fission spectrum. Roth camnercial and Hanford shielding results were computed 
using the ANISN(3-14) code. In addition to gamma and neutron source terms, 
the waste decay heat is also predicted by ORIGEN. These values (see Table 
3-18) are input to the thermal analysis. 
As stated above, the shield design was assumed to cons1st of depleted 
uranium, enclosed by 0.64 cm (0.25 in) thick inner and outer layer of stain-
less steel cladding. Sin~e ANISN is a one-dimensional code, the geOO1etry wa!l 
input in terms of radii for material boundaries. The sh~cld model consisted 
of the known waste dimension (for each of three payload sizes: 204, 5,500 and 
99,300 kg waste form mass), the stainless steel container wall, shield 
cladding thickness, and uranium thickness. Due to the proportionality of the 
results, the required uranium thickness for a given dose rate was detennined 
by interpolating the data fran the ANISN calculation. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 3-19 and in Figure 3-1. 
The shielding analyses show several interesting characteristics of 
shield design, particularly for ccxnmercial waste, since the neutron dose 
comronent is more significant. First. the phenomena of self-shielding of 
gamma rays is significant. The package materials, even the waste fonn itself, 
are effective gamma shielding materials. Consequently, only the gamma 
rad; 3t ion from the outer reg; on of thl! wa ste requi res shiel d; ng; the central 
portions are shielded by the outer package materials themselves. A measure of 
the effectiveness of self-shielding is demonstrated by the fact that as the 
waste radius increases, the surface gamma dose rate approaches a constant 
value. Thus, for waste sources in which the neutron dose is negligible (1.e •• 
Hanford waste). the surface dose rate is nearly constant over the range of 
waste masses considered. (Note that the dose rates in Table 3-19 and Figure 
3-1 are taken at 1 meter from the surface. and the dose rate at a distance 
increases in proportion to the prOjected area of the source.) 
TABLE 3-19. SUMMARY OF SPACE OISPOSAl SHIELDING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
COMMERCIAL (PW-4b) AND HANFORO (WCF • 25) WASTE 
Payload Waste Form Mass. kg 
204 5500 99,300 Type of 
Wnte 
Dose Rate 
rem/hour(a) 'rem~b) (rem4C) ( jd) 
'(hTJ n rrJ Ut em (remjb) (rem~C) ( jd) ) iiT n nr J Ut cm (rem~b) (rem~C) (jd) ) rrJ n nr-J Ut cm 
°W-4b 
PW.4b 
PW-4b 
Hanford 
Hanford 
Hanford 
0.5 
1.0 
Z.O 
D.S 
1.0 
2.0 
O.U 
0.61 
1.51 
0.5 
1.0 
2.0 
0.Z8 5.6 0.01 
0.39 4.8 0.09 
0.49 4.1 0.46 
1.86 0.5 
1.51 1.0 
1.18 2.0 
Notes: (a) Jose rate ti, 1 meter from surface of shield. 
(b) ,;411111<1 r'ad;!~ion component. 
(e) Neutr~~ radi.stion compon~nt. 
0.49 8.4 (e) 
0.91 7.2 0.02 
1.54 6.0 0.08 
Z.81 0.5 
2.44 ~.O 
2.06 Z.O 
(d) ~al'Jlated uranIum thicknesses. UtI includ~ consideratIon of the shielding 
dVlllable due to 2.54 ern stet:-l (shield lIner and waste contaIner). 
(el 'ess ~han O.OOS. 
0.50 10.9 
o.ga 9.6 
1.92 8.2 
3.41 
3.03 
2.67 
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FIGURE 3-1. DOSE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF URANIUM SHIELD THICKNESS 
Second, the neutrons emitted by ~he waste are highly energetic or 
"fast" neutrons. Effective self-shielding of fast ne~trons does not occur in 
the waste mater; al. Thus, the neutron dose rate at the surface of a \~aste 
payload increases as the radius incrp.ases. For the defense waste, the neutron 
radiation is suffjc:~~tly low that the thickness of the uranium required for 
shielding is controlled by the gamma source term. However, for' commercial 
high-level waste, the neutron radiation is much greater. For the small (204 
kg cermet) payload, the urani~m required for neutron shielding is 25 percent 
of the total required to meet the dose rate limit of 2 r~n/hr at 1 m. For the 
5500 kg cer'T1et payload, the uranium thickness needed for attenuating neutr-ons 
iss i gnificant ly greater than that requi red just for gamma rays. For the 
large (99,3JO kg cermet) payload the uranium needed for neutron shieldin9 
dominates the shielding thickness requirements (see Table 3-19). 
In this design, uranium is used as a shield material for both neutron 
and gamma r3diation although other materials are better suited for neutron 
shielding. To more efficiently shield the neutrons, it is necessary to 
moderate or deenergize the neutrons to lower (thermal) energy where they may 
be efficiently captured by the nucleii of many elements. Low-atomic-number 
elements are effective neutron moderators. Hydrogen, in the form of water or 
plastics, is the most common1y employed moderator. Metal hydrides have also 
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been used as moderators. The disadvantages of hydrogenous materials are that 
th~ have poor high temperature characteristics and tend to evaporate. 
dissociate. or decompose at the temperature of the waste package. Other light 
elements used as moderators include carbon (as graphite) and beryllium (either 
the metal or oxide). The moderator would need to be placed as a layer several 
centimeters thick around the outs1de of the waste and be surrounded by a thin 
layer of an efficient neutron-absorbing material such as cadmium or gadolinium 
or a thick layer of a le~s efffcient absorber such as steel. However. since a 
massive gamma shield will be required. it could aho -""sorb thermal neutrons. 
The difficulty in employing a separate neutr'on shield in the waste 
package is that the additional materials. particularly the nonmetals. present 
thermal and structural design problems. If it proves effective to do so, it 
is probable that an efficient neutron shield can be des 1gned for a specific 
sfze and type of waste utilizing materials incorporated into the waste matrix 
or gamma shield or utilizing external materials such as the auxiliary coolant 
in the shield or the graphite on the outside of the reentry vehicle. However, 
for the present st udy. it is not pract ica 1 to cons 1 der a specia 1 neut ron 
shield design. since it may only be beneficial for the very large commercial 
waste (PW-4b) packages, which have been shown unfeasible because of thermal 
considerations (see Section 3.4.1). 
The significant produc~ion of neutrons 1n commercial high-level waste 
offers the potential of neutr~~ activation of materials with which the 
neutrons may interact. Neutron activation is the term applied to the process 
of a free neutron bei ng absorbed in the nucl eus of an atom and transmut i ng 
that atom to an isotope of the original element with an additional unit of 
atomic mass. If the isotope is radioactive, as is often the case, then 
neutron activation is a source of additional radioactivity. An examination of 
the potential for neutron activation of r·;usable Cllmponents of the waste 
payload sue, as the gamma Shield or reentry vehicle sho\'IS that"" significant 
levels of radioactivity will be produced. 
3.4.3 Payload Mass 
The mass of the waste, primary container, and radiation shLid as a 
function of waste mass and dose rate is presentfd in Table 3-20 and 
~raphically in rigure 3-2 • 
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TABlE 3-20. WASTE FORM, CONTAINER AND SHIELD MASS CHARACTERISTICS (kG) FOR 
COMMERCIAL (PW·4b' AND HANFORD (WCF • 25) WASTE 
-
~onmerctll ,PW-4b l H.nf!i!E:! lfSiE • ~s 
OoSt Tot.l Tot.l 
R.t. For For 
P'11 0.4 At 1m, V,.;.ltT PrtAI.ry Ur'I'II",,:"! Shield" Ur,nlln Shtelded Sh. rem/llr f:.1"111 .) Conulner(b) Shttld(C) lUst. Sht.14:1(e) WISU 
Sm. I 1 O.S 204 SO 840 1,094 Z77 ~ll 
~phl!rt 1.0 204 SO 70S 9S9 Zl2 486 
2.0 2U4 SO 591 847 191 446 
upnttd 0.5 S,SOO 4lu 8,"iO \4,600 2,961 8,b9, 
SplC. 1.0 S,5CO 410 7,360 l.i. ~90 2,~96 S,l25 
• 5lluttl~ 2.0 S,SUO 430 6,10U 12,030 2,Z70 6,199 
H •• vy lIft U.S 99,300 2,920 6ij,600 170,820 22,548 124,770 
L.uncll 1.0 99,300 2,920 60,300 162,520 20,324 lZZ,S4u 
V.Mel. 2.0 99,300 2,920 Sl,SQO 151,720 18,Z!!8 120,450 
Not.l: (.) C.rmet. d.nsity of 6.7 Vice. 
(bJ 1.27 eM. st.lnl.ls st •• l. (e Miss Includ.s 0.64 c. Inner .nd out.r st.t"l.sl st •• l el.ddl 119· 
100 
- c-.. _11.'.-4, 
--- ............. ,wc'·n 
; 
1 ] 
~ 00 
"y'- ..... , ............ fIIIT 
FIGURE 3-2. CONTAINER AND SHIElD MASS AS A FUNCTION OF PAYLOAD HASTE FORM 
MASS FOR COMMERCIAL (PW-4b) AND HANFORD (WCF-25) HIGH-
LEVEL WASTE 
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3.4.4 Thermal Analysis 
In addition to shielding requirements, temperature 1 imits are 
important considerations in establishing conceptual payload designs. For 
example, desfgn trade-offs are necessary to compromise the conflicting goals 
of minimizing waste volume (by concentration) and minimizing dose rate and 
thermal requirements. The purpose of this study is to provide data that can 
be used to assess the importance of various parameters, and thereby evaluate 
trade-offs in designs. 
For the space disposal option, in addition to the thermal require-
ments stated in Section 3.3, a design constraint is that the final destination 
thermal equilibrium condition (by passive cooling) results in acceptable 
temperatures. Although this is not the most severe thermal condition for the 
\'Iaste package, the design philosophy must meet this criterion while relying on 
auxiliary cooling only for more severe, short-term conditions. Consequently, 
tile deep space environment was chosen as the design basis condition for the 
unshielded primary container. 
The thermal model used to describe the waste and primary container in 
deep space is defined in Appendix E. This model assumed spherical g -.I')metry, 
no gap between the waste and contai ner wall, radi at i on heat transfer 1:0 a 
blackbody at a temperature of 3 K, uniform internal decay heat generation, dnd 
neglected solar input. Property data used in the thermal calculations are 
shown in Table 3-21. 
TABLE 3-21. COMMERCIAL AND HANFORD HIGH-LEVEL WASTE 
HEAT TRANSFER INPUT PROPERTY DATA 
Primary Radiation 
Waste For;n(a) Container Shield Ins ul at i on 
Material ORNL cennet 304 SS Oepl eted 
urani urn 
Specific Heat, 0.163(b) 0.13 0.03 
W-hr/kg-C 
Conduct i vi ty. 14.0(C) 16.2 24.2 
w/m-C 
Del1s ity. g/tc 6.7 7.8 18.7 
Surface 0.95 
E,~i s 5 ; vity 
':otes: (a) Fron Tables 3-2 and 3-3. 
(b) Specific heat for Hanford waste form i~ 0.233 \'-hr/kg-C. 
(c) Conductivity for Hanford waste form ;520.0 W/m-C. 
(d) Bu 1 k dens ity for ho~eyc omb. 
Mi n-K 
0.21 
0.052 
0.32 
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Reentrx Vehicle 
Ablation 
FWPF 
carboni 
carbon 
0.17 
70.5 
1.9 
0.95 
Impact 
Absorber 
Steel 
honey-
comb 
0.13 
16.2 
0.78(d) 
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I 
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I 
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The temperatures of interest are the maximum temperature of the waste 
and the temperature of the container wall. For Hanford waste, the primary 
container temperature will be essentially the same as at the waste surface. 
The results of the thermal analysis are tabulated for the three waste form 
mass values in Table 3-22 and also given in Figure 3-3. 
TABLE 3-22. PAYLOAD WASTE AND CONTAINER TEMPERATURES FOR HANFORD AND COMMERCIAl 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE, UNSHIELDED CONTAINER IN SPACE (T~ = 3 K) 
Waste 
Mass,kg 
204 
5,500 
9;~b) 
Wast!! 
Radius, CI 
0.19 
0.58 
1.53 
0.70 
Comaerci ai, 
(PW-4bl 
Waste Waste 
Center Surface 
437 379 
1076 554 
4357 780 
514 335 
Tem?erature, c(a) 
Defense, Hanford 
(WCF • 25) 
Waste Waste 
Container Center Surface Container 
373 -64.5 -64.0 -64.0 
536 5.0 0.6 0.6 
732 104.0 74.0 14.0 
329 
Notes: (a) Temperature 11.i ts for .. aste and contai ner ..,11 are 1200 and 427 C. respect he 11 (see 
Appendh C) 
(b) Modified PW-4b w.ste Fo,. 
--19.3 W/kg (Col1lllercial PW-4b) 
----0.23 W/kg (Hanford. HeF = 25) 
04.6 W/kg (I'lodified PW-4b) 
Waste fabrication :i:,:, (~4~):-:L ______ _ 
te centt.>r I.Jaste surface 
Vias '. Waste cente' (787~:) 
IJaste center....... __ :-=-_--":. 
-~ -_ ... 
..__.- _ - - ~ - ;;;0 .7 
_ .... ...,. / 
-- - - - - Waste surface 
10 
Payload Waste Form Mass, MT 
FIGURE 3-3. TH1PERATURE AS A FUNCTION OF PAYLOAD WASTE FORM MASS 
FOR VARIOUS LOCATIONS, WITHOUT RADIATION 
SHIELD, SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
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Resu lts indicate that no thermal problems exi st for any waste 
payloads analyzed for the Hanford waste (concentrations up to WCF::25). For 
commercial (PW-4b) waste payloads with masses greater than about 8 MT, the 
waste temperature exceeds the normal 1 imit (waste fabrication temperature). 
For the container wall, the conservative temperature limit established is 
exceeded for cOI!lIllercial waste masses exceeding 700 kg. However, to ae:Meve 
acceptable temperatures,there are several design dPproaches, such as: (1) 
decreasing payload heat output; (2) increasing waste conductivity; and (3) 
changing waste form or container material to permit higher 1 imits. An 
attractive option is the removal of the "hottest" nuclides, therehy dect',~asing 
the heat output. This is believed to be the oest option, and is discussed in 
Appendix F. For example, if 90 percent of the strontium and cesium nuclides 
(and their daughters) were removed~ the decay heat load would decrease to 
about one-quarter its original value. (These radionuclides could be 
adequately handled by terrestrial disposal). Calculations for a 9.5 MT 
~'odified P\~-4b waste payload (see Appendix F) y;cld maximum waste center and 
surface temperatures of 514 and 335 C, respect i ve ly, for the deep space 
equilibrium condition. Both of these values are within the present thermal 
limits for a stainless steel container (see Figure 3-3). 
3.4.5 Auxiliary Cooling Analysis 
A design based on passive cooling in d sPace envi:'ollment will require 
acthe cooling to meet the same limits in an earth envirO:llllent. This is 
because of the 1 arge rad; at ion heat loss creat.ed by the low t2mperatures in 
space and the insulating effect of protection systems. The following analysis 
compares cooling requirements to meet waste foni1 or container thennal limits 
whi: e in an earth environment. The ana lys 1:; is performed for the same range 
of waste mdsses used in the thermal analysis (Section 3.4.4). Analyticd~ 
methods are shown in Appendix G for the wGste payload conSisting of waste 
form, primdry container, radiatior. shield, and reen:ry package. Since 
NASA/MSFC had not completed the ree'1try veh1cle design at the time of this 
writing, it was ~ssu~eJ that the design woulJ be similar to that used in the 
Phase 11 effort. \3-2) Therefore, the heat transfer ci1aracteristics of the 
reentry vehicle are included in Appendix G. N~gle(.ting changes in thermi11 
properties due to temperdture. the minimum cooling requ~reOlent:; as J function 
of waste mass dlld temperature difference dre f.ll'esented in Table 3-23 and 
Figure 3-4. Results are also included for the 9.S r'1i case with ~O percent 
removal of the Sr and Cs nuclides (Modifi~d P\~-4b). Since the larger 
cOlm,lerciJl waste form rllasses (99,300 kg) C;u not meet the passive cool i;lg 
criterion for space environment, they are excll'ded from auxiliar'Y cooling 
analysis. The Hanford waste decay heat is low enoJgh that temperJtures are 
within limits without auxiliary cooling (see Table 3-24). 
3ATTEL.L.E - COLUMBUS 
TABLE 3-23. MINIMUM AUXILIARY COOLING REQUIREMENTS (QAC) VS. MAXIMUM 
WASTE TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCE (AT) FROM NORMAl LIMIT FOR 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE IN EARTH ENVIRONMENT (T co ;r 21 C) . 
WITH REENTRY VEHICLE(a) , 
Waste Mass 2 kg 
204 5500 9500(b} 
Temperature QAC (kl.-I) QAc(kW) QAC{kl~) Seecific~tion AT{q AT{q 6T{q 
T~~aste = 1200 C O(cj 0.59 O(c) 93 O(c) 
TContaine~ = 427 C 716 2.72 255 98 594 
TWaste ... 600 C 500{C) 2.38 600 104 600 
TWaste = 900 C 300(C) 1.49 300 99 300 
Notes: (a) Commercial Waste (PW~4b); auxiliary cooling is not 
requi~'ed for Hanford (WCF = 25) waste mix under 
thesE conditions. AT· 1200 (assumed waste limit, 
normal conditions) - TWaste. Heat generation rates 
for the payload sizes given are 3.94, 106 and 44 KW, 
respectively. 
17.1 
33.1 
33.2 
25.2 
(b) Payload size for HLLV, 90 percent cesium and strontium 
removed from PW-4b (Modifi~d PW-4b). 
(c) Container temperature exceeds normal 1 imit (427 C, 
stainless steel). 
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TL • 1200C 
TW • Waste Temperature 
5500 kg 102 ~ ____ o-___ --o-
9600 kg lModified PW-4b) 
1 
FIGURE 3-4. MINIMUM AUXILIARY COOLING REQUIREMENTS VS. MAXIMUM WASTE 
TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCE (TL-TW) FROM NORMAL LIMIT, 
COMMERCIAL WASTE PW-4D), EARTH ENVIRONMENT (T ao :I 21 C), 
WITH REENTRY VEHICLE 
TABLE 3-24. PAYLOAD WASTE TEMPERATURES FOR HANFORD (WCF = 25) 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE, WITH SHIELD AND REENTRY 
VEHICLE, EARTH ENVIRONMENT (Tao = 21 C) 
Waste Mass, kg 
204 
5,500 
99,300 
Center 
38.6 
89.4 
256 
Temperature, C 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
Surface 
38.1 
89.1 
227 
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The cooling requirements are based on the assumption that direct 
cooling of the primary container is possible. If the radiation shield is to 
be cooled, the values in Table 3-23 and Figure 3-4 wi11 be higher. The 
auxil i ary cool i ng required is in the range of 15 - 69 percent of the heat 
generated for the 204 kg waste form mass, 88 - 98 percent for the 5500 kg 
waste form mass, and 39 -75 percent for the 9500 kg (using the Modified P\~-4b) 
waste form mass, dependi ng on the temperature margi n desi red. 
After auxiliary cooling is removed, the temperatures throughout the 
package will rise. For commercial waste, the waste and container temperatures 
will eventually reach and surpass their respective limits for even the lower 
masses (204 kg). As the temperature rises, the amount of heat transferred 
through the shield and reentry vehicle increases, resultlng in an asymptotic 
approach to equil ibrium, i.e., the rate of temperature increase is not 
constant, but diminishes with time. The instantaneous heatup rates (C/hr) as 
a function of temperature margin (difference between' normal operating 
tP.lllperature and temperature limit) and waste mass are shown in Table 3-25 and 
Figure 3-5. A comparison between the "instantaneous" heatup time (i.e., 
initial temperature difference divided by the corresponding rate of 
TABLE 3-25. RATE Or- TEMPERATURE INCREASE (T) VS MAXIMUM WASTE 
TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCE (AT) FROM NORMAL LIMIT, 
COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b), EARTH ENVIRONMENT, (T 00 '" 21C) WITH REENTRY VEHICLE 
WASTE MASS, kg(a) 
Des ign 204 5500 9500(b) 
• • . Condit ion AT(C) T(C/hr) AT(C) T(C/hr) AT(C) T(C/hr) 
TContainer = 427 C 716 82 255 109 594 21 
TWaste = 600 C 600 72 600 116 600 21 
TWaste = 900 C 300 45 300 110 300 16 
TWaste = 1200 C 0 18 0 103 0 11 
NOTES: (a) Cp = 0.163 \~-hr/kg-C (b) r10dified PW-4b waste (9~ Cs & Sr removed). 
temperature increase, see Figure 3-5) and a realistic time (accounting for 
variation of heat up rate with time) is shown in Table 3-26. Results indicate 
that, for a given waste concentration, the larger the waste mass, the shorter 
the heatup time. If extended heatup t illles are required it will be necessary 
to increase the temperature margin, that is, reduce the normal operating 
temperature, by increasing the auxiliary cooling. 
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1~ __________________ ~~5=5~00~k~g~ ____ -------<r-
1001"'1 
TL. • 1200 C 
TW· Waste Temperature 
100 700 
FIGURE 3-5. RATE OF TEMPERATURE INCREASE VS. MAXIMUM WASTE TEMPERATURE 
DIFFERENCE (TL-TW) FROM NORM~L LIMIT, COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b), EARTH ENVIRONMENT (Too = 21 C), WITH REENTRY VEHICLE 
TABLE 3-26. TIME REQUIRED FOR COMMERCIAL WASTE (PW-4b) PAYLOADS 
TO REACH UMIT TEMPERATURE (1200 C) STARTING WITH A 
600 C MARGIN 
Waste Mass, kg Initial Rate, hours Integrated Rate, hours 
204 8.3 
5,500 5.2 
9,500 (a) 28.6 
Note: (a) HLLV Payload, Modified PW-4b. 
3.4.6 Parametric Analysis of Dose Rate as a 
Function of Shielding Thickness and Distance 
15.4 
5.4 
38 
During orbital handling operation of the waste payload, e$pecially 
after the shield is removed, the cre\'I and other vital components will be 
exposed to radiation from the waste package. To assess the potential radia-
tion dose to personnel and equipment during this phase of the operation, the 
dose rate as a function of distance and thickness of intervening material was 
rleternined as a function of payload waste mass. For this study, various 
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thicknesses of aluminum were chosen. The ANISN(3-14) code was used with the 
various waste masses to determine the neutron and gamma dose rate for differ-
ent thicknesses of aluminum. The results are shown in Figures 3-6,3-7, ana 
3-8. Figures 3-6 and 3-7 show the dose rates for unshielded containers as a 
function of distance for commercial and Hanford waste, respectively. The 
curves in Figure 3-8 apply to both commercial and Hanford waste packages with 
the radiation shield, since they have been sized to a total dose rate of 2.0 
rem/hr at 1 meter from the surface. For commercial waste (PW-4b), the 99,300 
kg waste mass was not analyzed for dose-vs-distance behavior because of its 
unsuitability on a thermal basis. The curves in these three figures can be 
ext rapo 1 ated 1 i nearly on 1 og-l og paper for di stances greater than about 10 
meters, since beyond this point the dose rate is inversely proportional to the 
distance squared. Because of the resultant proportionality of results, a 
family of curves was not necessary to display the shielding effects of alumi-
num. Due to the peaked spectrum of both commercial and Hanford waste in the 
same energy range, the variation of the curves with aluminum thickness reduces 
to a single proportionality factor (for each thickn~ss) as: 
F .. e-mx 
where, 
F .. Dose rate factor 
m· Linear attenuation coefficient (cm- l ) 
x .. Material thickness, em. 
F~r aluminum, m • 0.12 cm-l , corresponding to the 2 MEV range. 
To illustrate the effect of distance, for the 5500 kg commercial 
waste mass payload, without radiation shield, a distance of about 1000 meters 
i3 required to reduce the dose rate to 2 rem/hr. If 2.5 cm of aluminum 
shielding were intervening, a distance of 860 meters would be required. By 
contrast, a bare container of 5500 kg Hanford waste (~CF • 25) would produce a 
d~se rate of 2 rem/hr at a distanCe of only 12 meters from the surface. It 
should be noted that because of the self-shielding effect of the waste form, 
waste payloads containing an outer shell of defense waste fonn and in inner 
sphere of canmerci a 1 waste coul d improve safety and reduce shi el di ng and 
coo1ing requirements. Another approach would be to mix the two wastes 
together. 
3.4.7 Conclusions 
This parametric evaluation of the nuclear and thermal effects of 
various sizes of commercial and defense high-level \'/aste is intended to 
denonstrate those combinations of design parameters that are feasible for the 
space disposal option. Overall, there do not appear to be any shielding or 
steady-state thermal limitations to even the larger payloads of Hanford waste. 
Ir. fact, none of the defense waste mass payloads examined required auxiliary 
~ooling in near-~arth environments. 
Commercial Haste (DW-4b), as produced in the manner described in 
Section 3.2, can be adequately shielded for ~11 waste masses studied. 
BATTELLE - COLUMIIUS 
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Without Radiation Shield 
204 kO (r a I9.3cm) 
Not.: Curves shown represent zero 
aluminum wall thickness. To obtain 
dose rate for other thicknesses of 
aluminum, multiply correspondino 
curve by foetor belOW: 
Aluminum Dose rote 
thickness, c:n foctor 
o 1.0 
Q~ .94 
I.e .89 
I.~ .84 
2.0 .79 
2.5 .74 
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FIGURE 3-6. 
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DOSE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE FROM PAYLOAD WITHOUT 
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Hanford wo.t. (WCF. 2S) 
without radiation thl.ld 
Not.: Curvil .hOwn r.pr ••• nt 
Ziro aluminum woll thlckne .. , To 
obtain do.. rat. for other 
thlckn ..... of olumlnum, multlplt 
corrllpondlno curv. by factor 
below: 
Aluminum 
thick",,,, em 
o 
05 
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2.0 
2.5 
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.79 
.74 
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DOSE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE FROM PAYLOAD WITHOUT 
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Commerciol or defenae "iq" lev,' 
waltl (WCF·25) with radiation 
shield 
Not.: Curv.. shown repr."nt Ziro 
aluminum woll thickn... To obtain 
dOse raf. for ot",r thiCkn ..... of 
alumi!\um. multiply corr •• pondin; 
curve by factor b,'ow: 
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FIGURE 3-8. DOSE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE FROM SHIELD SURFACE, 
COMMERCIAl OR HANfORD (WCF • 25) HIGH LEVEL WASiE WITH 
RADIATION SHIELD 
• AT T • L L. - CO ... U to- • U • 
. ~~ __ ..... __ ~ ______ ... iM"""".a&w--sm--·--------------~ -~  
!. 
- -~. -~---.~. ----.~----------~----.--------- ._--------, 
3-50 
However, constraints in allowable temperatures in the waste and reference 
container material severely limit the waste mass per payload. Assuming that 
certain nu~~ides can be removed from the PW-4b mix. it has been shown that a 
9500 kg Wi)st" mass can meet thermal requirements. wi~h a :ninimum amount of 
auxiliary cvQling required. 
1 
I 
1 
j 
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3.5 Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication System 
Current regulations(3-l5) prohibit the shipment of greater than 20 
curies of plutonium in any form other than a solid. In effect. this 
regulat10n requires that. for other than 5n.ll quantities, the liquid 
hIgh-level wastes produced at a fuel reprocessing plant Inust be converted to a 
~olid form prior to shipment from the site of origin. As 3 result. high-level 
waste trc!t.ment and patkaging facilities are generally considered to be a part 
of. or \'dji"cent to. the fuel reprocessing plant or waste storage facflities. 
FoJ". high-level waste from commercial power reactor fuel, the 
regulations(3-l6) allow storage of the waste as a liquid for a maximum of 5 
years and require solidification and shipment of the wastes to a reposito~ in 
a maximum of 10 years after generat 10n. Genen' ly. the plans for waste 
disposal are based on wastes which have been out of the reactor 10 years. as 
this allows a maximum time for fission product decay and results in a reduced 
h~at generation rate. 
The high-level liquid waste produced in a commercial reprocessing 
plant is planned to oe stored in large tanks in the fonn of nitric acid 
solutions. For w4stes planned for space disposal, the separatfon process 
should produce a nitrate solution with a minimum of diluents, as described in 
Section 3.1 and referred to as PW-4b. The storage tankS will be located near 
the reprocessing facility and positioned below grade level to utilize the 
earth for part of the shielding necessarY t~ reduce to an acceptabl! level the 
radiation emanating from the wastes. (J-17) The storage tanks will have 
submerged cool fn9 col1s to extract heat from the liquid waste to achieve 
acceptab le temperatures in the waste. The extracted heat wi 11 be di 55 i pated 
to the environment, probably by air-cooling towers. 
To initiate the treatmen~ process, the liquid waste will be pumped 
from the storage tank into remotely operated closed chemical processing 
equipment located in a shielded cell fac;tity. The treatment facilities for 
producing the waste form for spac, disposal will be ve~( similar to facilities 
in use for reprocessing defensel 3-lB J and commercial 3-151 spent fuel and 
s~ould be considered state-of-the-art technology. However, the specific 
process,-s employed for waste sol id1fication and packaging have only been 
demonstrated ; n laboratory or pit ot-plant-scal e systems and have not been 
utilized fn full-scale production facilities. 
All processes, from modilJir~ the waste composition through solidifi-
cation, packaging, decontaminatio:'; and inspection will be conducted in t~e 
waste treatment facilities. For the present disposal concept, there is 
incentive to separate the majority of the strontium and cesium from the waste 
to remove the major heat generation sources. The sol vent extraction and ion 
exchange processes. used for remov~l of the!'e p.letnents from defense wastes, 
provide a basis for this process. (3-16) The formation of the cerrnet from 
the liquid waste is carried out by coprecipitation of the ~/aste and metal 
additives from an urea solution, calcination of the/recipitate, and reduction 
of the meql phase by steps which have been d£'!l1onstrated on a laboratory 
seal e. (3-19 J The fabricat ion of the cermet waste form has been demonstrated 
-
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at ~NL on a hooratory scale utl1izing conventional powder metallurgy tech-
niques. However, fabrication of the cermet into large shapes, as required by 
the present disposal concept, is beyond the present state of the art and will 
require a significant development program. 
In the conceptual studies, the waste form is cons1dered to be in the 
confi9ur,,~ion of a large Illonolithic sphere. A monolithic waste fom is not a 
requirement, but, 11 a large configuration 15 composed of an assembly of 
smaller pieces, the interfaces between pieces must not sIgnificantly hinder 
the heat flow through the assembly. The fabrication of large shapes by poweler 
metallurgy techniques for waste disposal practices has some precp.dent. The ca-
pabi1ity to fabricate and hermetically ~eal a thick-walled corundum canister 
0.5 m diameUr and 2.5 m long by ~ot isostatic pressing of A1203 ~owder 
has been dellOnstrat~d in Sweden. (3-20) Fut ure studies Of cermet fabricat iol" 
may show that configurations other than spherical are warranted for 
consideration. 
The packag f ng of the waste is the f1 nol step in the waste packag~ 
assembly. The sphp.rical conta1n~r concept i~ unique and \~ill require develop-
lnent. If processes for the fabrication of large shapes by pOWder metallurgy 
are dev!loped, they could be utilized for fabricating the container, which 
could be a shen of the cermet metal phase, free of ,.dioact ive products, 
formed around the waste form. This would be highly desirable for the transfer 
of heat from thl:! waste through a continuous conductor. If the container is 
fabricated by the assembly and welding of sections of shell~ around the waste 
fOr!Tl. great care must be taken to assure good heat conduction U!rough the 
waste-form-container 1nterface. 
After closure, the surface of the container must be decontaminated 
prior to removal from the facility. Techniques used fOt' decontaminating large 
packages include wire brushing and washing. chemical etching. and e1ectropol-
ishing. Criteria for the !llowable surface conta~ination have not been estab-
lished; for packages for terrestri al di sposal. the proposed contami nat i on 
levels are in the order of 200 disintegrations per minute (dpm) for alpha 
emitters dnd 2.000 dpm for beta-gamma emitters. 
Prior to leaving the facility, the package must be thoroughly in-
spected to veri fy that the packag1 ng is free of 1 eaks and defects. and that 
the package is properly identifie~ by appropriate labeling. 
All of the above steps in the tr~atment and packaging will be con-
ducted in a shielded cell facility for which there is a large amount of expe-
rience to base the design and operation. The cell walls will be concrete sev-
eral fp.et thick. All operations will be conducted remotely. Operations will 
be viewed with video cameras and possibly through a few shielded wi ndows 
placed in the walls. The planning for maintenance of the equipment will be a 
dominant influence in the facility design. Although different approaches have 
proven effective. generally there are no plans for entry into the facility 
af .... !r it has begun operation. although some designs USP. a shielded crane cab 
for equipment removal. Some high-tnaintenan~o it~s. such as drive motors, may 
be located in MI equipnent gantry on one side of tne facility with drhe 
shafts penetrating the cell walls. Entrance to the gallery may be al1ow~d 
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after removal of high-radiation sources adjacent to the area. All process 
equipment is designed to be remotely disconnected from the system and removed 
from the facility for replac~ent or repair. 
The facility wi1 1 be designed a .. j operated to assure acceptably low 
radiation exposures to the work force and to the public during both normal and 
postul ated off-normal and accident conditions. The facil ity cells will be 
sealed and ventilated with a filtered system. The bottom of each cell will 
have a stainless steel liner to catch spills and allow flushing and draining. 
The facility will be divided into a series of cells to act as barriers to the 
spread of contamination within the facility. 
Once the waste is assembled into a massive form, it will be necessary 
to provide cool i n9 to assure the waste form temperatures remain acceptabl e. 
Storage of the packaged waste may be required for periods up to 5 years. 
Storage will require a separate facility, in which protection of the packages 
from earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, civil disturbances, and sabotage is 
provided. The storage facility must assure adequate cooling of the packages 
and secondary containment for any fail ed packages. Adjacent to the storage 
facility, a facility should be located for placement of each waste package in 
a flight-weight radiation shield and preparation of the shielded package for 
transport in a shipping cask to the space launching site. 
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4.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
Safety is probably the JllCiS!. ihijJortant factor in the developltlent of 
'liable concepts for the space disposal of nuclear wastes. Therefore, the 
safety aridlysis has b~en yiven appropriate emphasis in this Phase III study 
effort. The major objective of this Phase III Safety Assessl.lent was to define 
the major accid~nt enVl ronments and stcdy the response of the reference 
cOii1lil~rcial nuclear waste payloao to these accident environments, and to pre-
dict the de~ree of contai n!llent that mi ght be expect~. The response analysi s 
was limited in tilis revort to the fire and reentry environs. Payload response 
to tile 01 ast wa ve. shrapnel, and impact needs to be accompl i shed info 11 ow-on 
stud~es. Information ~enerated by this assessment was supplied to the .. ealth 
Effects Assessment Task (see Section 5.0). 
Section 4.1 briefly describes the literature review that was 
performed early in the study. The si!:lnificant findin!:ls ~Iere supplied to other 
task activities (se~ Sections 2.5,3.1,3.3,4.2,4.3, and 7.5). Ehiphasis was 
~1aced upon the review of the safety and testing aspects that relate to svace 
nuclear payloads, e.g •• Raoioisotope Thermal Generators (RTG). NASA/MSFC's 
~arall~l review was related to aspects of the RTG design. 
Section 4.2 aescribes the 1.lajor accident environments for the Uprated 
Space Shuttle and heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV). The accident envirorul1ents 
described include fireoal1, RP-l residual fire, blast, and shrapnel. Some of 
the aata yenerated for the Uprated Space Shuttle vehicle raay have appl ication 
toward the Space Shuttle accident environment definition. These investi~a­
~ions indicate tnat cOrJsic.ierably more work is necessary 1n dttelnptiny to 
conf-iaently prellict the shrapnel environ,llents that lIIight be expected frolil 
explodin~ propellant tanks. 
Section 4.3 describes the prelililinary analysis aea1in~ with the 
nuclear waste payload response to a few of the acciaent ~nvironments described 
in Section 4.2. as well as atmospheric reentry. Section 4.3.1 describes the 
illodifications maae to the BCL Reentry Thermal Analysis Code (RETAC) for this 
Jnalysis. Section 4.3.2 presents the results of the fire and reentry thermal 
response of the payload in different protection confi~uratiuns. Section 4.3.3 
t)utlines the expected release scenarios used to estililate ~iorla population dose 
(see Section 5.3.) Section 4.3.4 recolilmenas certain desi~n chan!;les to i.,j~rove 
tile reference concept. 
A brief aSSeSSJilent of the safety -ilJllJlications of eJllployiny a HLLV for 
nuclear waste disposal in space is :;Jiven in Section 4.4. The assessraent 
ind-icates that usiny the HLLV as a booster for til(:! space aisj.:.osal mission 
provides d si~nificant il,lproveillent in safety and viability. 
f{t!ferences for this Safety Assessment are ~iven in Section 4.5. 
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4.1 Safety Study Review 
Th~ obJect i ve of the BCl safety study revi ew was to i I1corporate 
ap~ro~ridte concepts, approaches ana testing prucedures for the RTG, General 
Purpose Heat Source (GPHS), ana previous nuclear waste aisfjosal stuaies into 
the current sPace opt i on safet) cons i derat ions and pr0':1 ram p 1 an~. (i~ASA/MSFC 
a 1 so cOllaucted an i naependent rev; ew of prey; ous stud i es; th~i r elilphas is \'Ias 
to relate tile "RTG" design dnd materials cholces to the space option 
~onceptl:dl aesiyns.) ApIJropriate information available from the BC~ safety 
revie\J WdS jJrovided to other st.udy activities: waste furlll definition (Section 
3.1). paylorld contain'llent requirement definition (Section 3.3); system safety 
aesi~n reyuireiliellts (Sectiol~ 2.5). accident environment definition dnd 
response ~Sections 4.2 ana 4.3); and the test lJlannin~ activity (Section 7.5). 
The sp~cific dctiltity areas aurin\; the revie\'I \~ere as follows: 
• Revie~1 safety and testil1:i a~pects of space nuclear pclyloaas 
• Include results in the overall conceiJt definition and test 
planl1in~ requireMents 
• Evaluate latest documents definin~ accident ellvironl,lents 
• Provide information related to RTG safety requirt:!ments to 
the contdi rUllent requi reillents defi ni t ion. 
Th~ documentiition revi~wed duriny the study has been placed into four 
I;laj or cate~ori es to a 11 ow for appropri ate discuss ion. These are: 
(1) KTG Related Reports 
(2) GPHS Rel~ted Reports 
(3) Nuclear Waste uisposal in Space Reports (1971-1974) 
(4) Acciaent Ellvironinent l)efinition and Payload Response 
Keports 
TfoJe si:jnif-jcant findinys or iteliis of dpparellt i;llportarH..:e to th~ :;if.lace 
option, contained in the r~~orts in the fuur cate~ories, dr~ briefly di~cussea 
b~low. Various aSiJt:!cts of the RTI.i and GPH$ Proyraills havt:! been used in this 
!)f.idC~ uisposal ol-ltion study, dS a result of tllis brief rt:!view. 
4.1.1 RTG Rt:!lated Report~ 
.--\ fe'vl uf thp. safety reports from past RTli jJro~rallis \Vere i.)riefly 
reVlel/ed. (4-1 thruuyh 4-5) I)nl.>' the sdfety aSjJects were eval uate(J ana only 
itelils that are of interest to this ~ro~raJil are ciscussed in the f:)llowin~ 
tJara~rclfJh!>. 
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In tile RTG saf~ty analyses of thl:! 60' s only accident occurrence 
jJrooabllities were exaillined. For significant envirOflll1ents, e.\:j., explo-
sive overpressurt:, a nOltlinal value \~aS usually dett!rlllined by consensus. Test 
proyrams were conducted simulating the selected environments, so that results 
of the tests constituted a dell1onstration of lIIeetiny or not meetin!:j the safety 
requireltlents. In the later safety analyses eiliphasis was placed on estimatiny 
~otal probabil Hies associated with a yiven conse4uence, e.g., exposure of a 
spec~fied nUlilber of people at a specified lung burden. Included were 
cons i derat ions of acc i dent occurrence prubab i1 it i es. env i rom,lent and response 
variabil ity, and uncertainties in ::;ource term lila9nitudes, Illeteorolo~ and 
l-lopulation density. Requirements now exist for parametric evaluation: the 
relevant question is not "will a particular confi~uration withstand a certain 
uv!:!rtJrt!ssure?" but "at what overpressurt! does it fail"? Also "What is the 
uncertainty in this result and Hhat is the ODservea failure distribution alllon<;; 
a nUlilber of identical, simulated confi~urations?" Analyses must no\~ consider 
the variauil ity or uncertainty in input quantities since these affect the 
~stililates of tht! accident environl,lents ana payload response. 
The Vik.in\:j safety repord 4- 3) pruvides useful information 
reyardiny the safety analysis proceaure, the type of tests performed, and tht! 
resul ts of those t~sts. Tile safety prucedure was described (IS havi n~ four 
odsic elements: (1) identification of failure Blodes; (2) definition of 
dccident environillents; ~3) prediction of the t-Iayload response; and (4) the 
analysiS of the conait1onal fuel release j..Jrobability. Fisure 4-1, t.lkell frOltj 
the Viking safety report, provides d su;,u"ary of the safety evaluation lo:;ic 
se\.iuellce. Also, it is useful to state thdt the safety analysis relJorts (SAR:» 
for RTG's usually cunsist of: (1) a referenct:: desi~n docUlllent; (2) an 
dccident liloael environillent; (3) I.lodels to identify source tt!rllls; dnd (4) a 
risk asseSSlllent. The tYlJes of te~ts tlldt were perforilled for the Vikin~ RTG 
systelll are listed below: 
• Vibrat ion • IlIIpact on liranite 
• Graphite Oxidation • Drup Tests 
• Blast OverlJressure • fteentry Heating (Pldsilia Tunnel) 
• Fra\:ililent Iillpact • Heat Transfer i~easureli1ents 
• Liquid ProlJellant Fire • F0rce drH.i r101lients ~ledsure"lents 
• Solid Propellant Fire 
In SU"lIliary, the Vikiny RTG fuel samiJle lias tested .lila d few of tht! results uf 
these tests are given below: 
• Survived a blast overt-lressure of 550 N/clol2 (80U psi) 
• FrdYlllents dre no serious thredt--dsSUI,les attelludt iUII by KTG 
sJtellite sU~lJort structure 
• The liquid prulJellent fir~btlll is nu proi.)It:!11l 
• Survived impdcts rdn~ill~ frulil 23 to lU7 fdls 
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FIGURE 4-1. SAFETY EVALUATION LOGIC SEQUENCE 
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• The solid propelhmt fire (at 21HO K for 10 fIIin) had tne 
potential for breaking open d fuel capsule. 
• Post-reentry impact contributed Illost to the likely release 
situat ions • 
The Viking safety report called for more in-depth methodS of ~redictinl:l the 
dynaulic structural response to blast, frayment and impact, as well as, better 
aefinition of prouabil ity distributions for environment 1,lagnitudes for a yiven 
acciaent. It goes on to state that the assiynment of a sinyle representative 
environment of an accidellt may be misleaain\;j, in that riSkS loay be hlisJudyed. 
In aduit ion to the RTG safety reports, (4-1 thr'Juyh 4-5), three 
other aocuments of importance wert:! reviewed.l 4- 6, 4-7 and 4-8) Reference 
4-6, "Uses of Radioactive (Nuclear) Materials by the Unit~d States of AI"erica 
for Space Power Generation", a workiny paper submitted by tne U.S.A. to the 
Unitea Nations Conllilittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, contains an 
e~cellent overview of the missions previously flown and the safety philosophy 
that has been ellltJloyed over the years. Table 4-1 sUliunarizes the space nuclear 
power systems launcheo by the U.S.A. from 1961 to 1977.(4-6) Table 4-2 
sUlTUildri zes the 1 ocat i on of all the 23~pu 1 aunchec into space by the U. S.A. 
uur; ny the same peri ode (4-6) Two items shoulc be noted here for compari son 
with the s!-,ace aisposal option: (l) Th~ Viking power source and others (see 
Table 4-2) employed a Pu02-Mo cerlilet as the fuel forln; and (2) the altlount of 
total Curies contemplated in one f,Jayloaa of PW-4b is an order of Inaynitude 
1 dryer than the total Curi es 1 aunched into space throu~h 1977 by the U. S. A. 
(see Table 4-2). References 4-7 ana 4-8, liThe Safety ~jJecification for the 
Plutonium-238 Developmental Heat Sources, NRA-3", and "Safety Heat Source 
Uesiyn Specification for Space A~plications". contained in Appendix A of the 
OVt:rall Sdfety Manual, were rl:!viewed and useo in the t:Jreparation of the 
Contdinlill:!nt Requirelilents lJefinition for the space disposal option (see Section 
3.3) dnd the space option Safety Requir~nents develotJed in Section 2.5. 
TABLE 4-2. DISPOSITION OF NUCLEAR SPACE ~~TERIAL 
THROUGH NOVEMBER 1977 BY THE U.S.A. 
Disposition 
Deep Space 
Oruit 
Lundr Surface 
Nars Surfdel:! 
Pacific Ocean 
Recoverl:!d 
Atl,losphere 
Sourel:!: ~eferl:!nee 4-b. 
Total 
QlAantity 23opu, 
Curies O~i 
580,000 (43) 
379,2UU l28) 
222,~1l0 (17) 
84,000 (6) 
44, SOO (3) 
34,4UO (2) 
17,000 P6 1.361.600 1 O} 
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TABLE 4-1. SUMMARY Of SPACE NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS 
LAUNCHED BY U.S.A. (1961-1971)(a) 
-----.--.-----------.----------~------..... ---------~-------------------------------
Fl i ght launch Launc~ 
Number Syst~(b) Mission Date Site c) 238pu Fuel Curies Disposition 
------- ---
I SNAP 3 j";-ans it 4-A 6/61 ETR Metal 1,800 In > 500 Year Orbit 
2 SNAP 3 rran5 it 4-6 11/61 ETR Metal .1,800 In > 1,000 Year Orbit 
3 SNAP 9A Transi t 4-BN-l 9/63 WTR Metal 17,000 In > 1,000 Year Orbit 
4 SNAP 9A Trans it 5 -BN-2 12/63 WTR Metal 17 ,OOl} In > 1,000 Year Orbit 
5 SNAP 9A Transit 5-6N-3 4/64 WTR Metal 17,000 Aborted Downrange, Burned 
Up on Reentry 
6 SNAP 19 Nimbus B-1 5/68 WTR Microspheres 34,400 Aborted at launch, 
Recovered From Ocean 
7 SNAP 19 Nimbus I II 4/69 WTR Hicrospheres 37,600 In '\.3,000 Year Orbi t 
8 SNAP 27 Apo11o-12 11/69 KSC/ETR Hi crospheres 44,500 Lunar Surface () 
9 SNAP 27 Apoll 0-13 4/70 KSC/ETR Hi crospheres 44,500 Aborted after Tli. d 
Deep Ocean Burial-
South Pacific 
10 SNAP 27 Apo 110-14 1/71 KSC/ETR Hicrospheres 44,500 Lunar Surface 
11 SNAP 27 Apoll 0-15 7/71 KSC/ETR Hicrospheres 44,500 Lunar Surface 
12 SNAP 27 Apo 110-16 4/72 KSC/ETR Hi c ros pheres 44,500 lunar Surface 
13 RTG Pioneer F (10) 3/72 CKAFS/ETR Cennet 80,000 Jupiter/Deep Space 
14 RTG Transit 9/72 VAFB/WTR Cennet 24,000 In < 1,000 Year Orbit 
15 SNAP 27 Apoll 0-17 12/72 KSC/ETR Microspheres 44,500 Lunar Surface 
16 RTG Pi oneer G (11) 4/73 CKAFS/ETR Cennet 80,000 Jupiter/Deep Space 
17 lES 8/9 3/76 CKAFS/ETR Oxide spher.es 280,000 In > 4,000 Year Orbit 
18 Viking-1 8/75 CKAFS/ETR Cennet 42.000 Ma rs Surf ace 
19 Viking-2 9/75 CKAFS/ETR Cennet 42,000 Mars Surface 
20 MJS-l (Voyager) 3/77 CKAFS/ETR Oxide spheres 210,000 Jupiter/Saturn/Deep Space 
21 MJS-2 (Voyager) 9/77 CKAfS/ETR Oxide spheres 210,000 Jupiter/Saturn/Deep Space 
-----_._------------_._------------------,----------------------------------- ---
Notes: (a) Source: Reference 4-6. 
(b) All systems launched were radioisotope power systems except SNAP lOA (SNAPSHOT), a reactor 
power system. It was launched 4/65 at WTR with 4.5 kg of 2350 fully enriched. It is currently 
in a ) 1,000 year orbit. 
(e) ETR = Eastern Test Range, Florida; WTR = Western Test Range, California; KSC = Kennedy Space 
Centerf Florida; a~d CKAFS = Cape Kennedy Air Force Station. (d) Trans- unar lngectlon. 
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As a result of th~ reVil!\i of yarious kTG safety studies. aVpro-
pria'~e data and ';nformation were l\Iaue Clvilildole,o the space aiSlJosal option 
stuay, and ill particular, to Sectiolls 2.5, 3.3, and 7.5. 
4.1.2 GPHS Related Reports 
For lIlost spac\! and terrestrial aplJlications of radioisotope-fueled 
heat sources, the heat source and the conversion systems to produce electrical 
j,lO\-Ier w~re desi!:lned for <l sjJecific mission or seri~s of IIlissions. To chan~e 
the total electrical power output within these power systems required addi-
tional integral numbers of cOF,lplete conversion systelos. which often resulted 
in Itlass and volume penalties. As design evolvea, considerable tilile ana money 
\'ierl::! spent on the aeve 1 opUlent ano qual ifi cat i on of each different heat source 
(see Taole 4-1). The rationale aevelopiny the General Purpose Heat Source 
(GPHS) was that til,le, IIloney. systelilS 1,Iass and volu,ue can be savee if a modular 
Il\::!at source can be developed and qualified to lileet the needs of existing dnd 
future systehls. The aevelopment has been yuided by safety testin~; with less 
eltllJhasis on analytical approaches. 
The current GPHS Pro~ralll ; s be i ny mana~ed by los Alamos Sc i en-
title Laboratory (LASL)~ LASL is also responsillle fo,- th~ fuel develop-
ment, system aesiyr:, and SOllie testin~. Battelle's Colt. .. s Laboratory (BCL) 
deve loped the plan for aerotn~rllla 1 test i n~ and is j)erforllii n~ tile aerother;lla 1 
analysis and de"elopin~ the heliulil vent. Oak. ~id~e Ndtional lctboratory (ORNL) 
is aevelopin:! tne fuel clddoiny, ana Mound producing tht! prilnar,)' contliinult!lIt 
snell (Ir cup). NASA/AllIes Research Center (ARC) is perfllrming th~ reentry 
testiny. The Applied Physics LaDoratury (AfJL) ana NUS Corporation are 
involved in sdfety studies.l4-9• 4-10. ano ~-11) 
One GPHS desiyn feature identified that has not been 4uantita-
tively evaluated for the nuclear wast\::! disposal mission is the heliwd vents to 
relieve He ..,ressure buildup. Apparently the iJrocluction of He frOln al..,ha 
t!lilitters has not oeen considered si\:jnificdllt in tht:! ~reviously studi~d hi;"h-
level wdste dis\Josal in space. It may very well be an ihlportant consideration 
for actinide payloads. Battt=l1e's Columbus Laboratories has oeen dev~lopin~ 
the He vents for the GPHS. 
To meet the prOJected needs of the various oynaltlic lind stat ic 
convers i on sys telllS ana !;\Ai de, the uPHS deve 1 o~JIIlent • GPHS des i ~n re4u i re-
ments have oeen developedl 4- 12 }. The ~riHlary static systelal considert!d \/3S 
the Selenide Isotopt! Gen~rator {SlGJ beiny d~veloped by Teledyne Ent!r:;iy 
Systems (TES) for the 1933 NASA International Solar-Polar Nission. This 
1,lission will ue a dual Jupitt!r swill~by oy two s;,>c!cecraft ldunched sililulta-
neouslj on the !)pace Trans~ortation Syster.1 (Space Shuttle, etc.) to an 
el iptlcal polar orl."t around the Sun. TtllS liIission is also s<.:ht!culeu to Ot: 
th~ first us~ of the liPHS. The Jyna,.lic systems that hdve oeen <.:onsio~reLi ar'~: 
the Brayton Isotope pl)\/~r Systelll tBIPS) beill:l develovell by AiResearchi tile 
Rankine Cycle TIJroine Isvtoj.J1::! Powt!r System (KIPS) b~in~ O~\lel0IJed by 
Sunllstrand; a Stirlln~ C'ycl~ Isotope Power S,}'stelll (SIPS) veill~ uevelo..,el.l iJy 
~ , 
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Uenera 1 Elect ri c (Gf) and Ph 11 i tJS Lauuratllrfes i ana a free pi stan St i rli n~ 
en~ine beiny u~velov~d by Mechanical Technolo~ Incor~orat~d (MTI). 
Except for tile SIPS. all missions applfcat~ons and dccident 
conditions considereu hav~ assumed sjJace launch. The preliminary accident 
environments fur the G?HS. defined b) Reference 4-7. include conslderatlon of 
blast overpressure. fra\:jHlents. solid propellent fire. impact. and reentry 
(includfn\:j ablation and thermal stress). Of the( fiv,e) lIlentioned. the first 
four must De consider~d as occurring in sequence. 4-12 In the GPHS desi\:jn, 
no credit is gi ven to the presence of auxillary equi phlent for protection. 
L)urin~ reentry, no lilore than one-half the minillluril thickness of the reentry 
melUbt!r is allo\'ied to ablate. {4-7} 
The GPHS is beiny desi~ned so that any cladCliny (comjJarable to the 
space option containerj deformation due to impact ;s insufficient to breach 
it. Currently. platinuUl (Pt-3003) ano iridium (Ir) dre the leadin~ cdndidates 
for tne claddin9 (refl:!rreCl to as clad in GPHS doculllents). Iridium loses some 
ductility (el,lbrittles) below about 101.10 C and do~s not deform well without the 
increased possilJiJity of crack1n\:l. This fileans that 1f Ir is to oe used, one 
",ust be concern~d not only with holdiny down th~ operating and the peak re-
entry temperdtures. but also must desiyn th~ lilodules so that the clad tempera-
ture f s allout 1000 C or hi ~her at impact. Pt-3008 does not see.TI to suff~r 
tlli s ihlpact eilibritt I ement at I ow \~liI.Pe.rature but aoes have a much lower 
o..,eratirr;l and reentry ran\:je than Ir. ( -12) 
The AVCO fine-weave. pi~rceci fabric (FWPF) 3-0 
cOlllposite nlaterial s~rves as r~~ntry and illlpact prutection. 
t~sting the impact of the IiPHS AVeO lIIaterj~1 .ano claddin~ to 
eoout 60 ~Vs dt t~h~erdtures around 1000 C.\4-1J} 
carbvn/carbon 
LASL has been 
velocities of 
The safetj' ~oa 1 for the GPHS is to have a sdf~ty index for d 11 vi al) 1 e 
acc i dent condi ti ons of 1 ess than 10-6 Ci. The sa fety index is defi ned as 
the prObability of Pu02 release times the dmount of respirable ~artic1es 
released. measured in Curies.(4-12) Thh could be the approach that should 
also ue tdken for the space option of nuclear waste aisposal. 
Proyress Reports prepar~d Illonthly by LA~L (frolll June 1977 t?ro~\Jll Au~ust 1979) for the GPHS pro~ralil. have also been briefly reviewed. ,4- J) 
Details of tile I.lateridls testing. aesi~n testin~. and the other activities uf 
the ~royralll are ~resente~. No oiscussion of th~se aetails is ~iven here~ the 
reader f s reft!rred to thes~ aOCUi.lents for' further i nformat ion. 
As a result of this review of GPHS safety uoculI.ents apprOllriate 
infonilatiun l'IdS suppl iea to other study activities. It was recofl~.Jended to 
NA~A/MSFe tndt the GPHS caroCin/carb')n AVc..O fille-weave. f,lierced fJbric reentry 
dna imjJact material be useu for the reentry vehicle. Also, it WdS recolj~.lend~d 
for usc as d therillal protection material 011 th~ outside of tht: .,;rhary con-
tainer (see Section 4.3.4). The 5df21:'/ index aplJroach usea tor the liPHS/RTG 
should be consider~a for use in payloaa r~sponse ~tul.lics for the sjJace option. 
The concept of sequential safety testin,:j in the liPHS "rid ~TG .,.rO\jrdllis havl:! 
oeen dp.., I jed to the sa fetj' rl:4U i r~ult!nt s for the s iJace QjJt i on. cl S tJrov hJ~a in 
-
J 
I 
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Section 2.5 of tnis rtport. It is recOllllllen"ed that for actinide waste 
~ayloads (to be cons1dertd in the nSdr future), th~ need for helium vents ue 
«!valuated. 
4.1.3 . Nuclear Waste Disposal in Space Reports (1971-1974) 
The safety relatelJ work performed priqr iQ 1974 for the nuclear wast! 
disposal 1n space option was briefly revi~wedl4- 4 throu~h 4-26) to ~valuate 
any procedures, conceptual Cles i 9ns, or sahty requl rell1ents that coul d prove 
useful Ilr interestinl:j for the current space option studies. The buh: of the 
work was part of the NASA/l~wis Research Center (LeRC) stud) activitj. Only 
items that are bel ieved to be of ~otential interest to the current study of 
the space <.1isposa I opt i on dre presented in the fo 11 owi ny para\:jl'aphs. 
Three stuCliesl4- 14 , 4-1S, and 4-16) performed. apparently 
indelJenaentlj of the NASA/LeRC activity. were briefly reviewed. In 1971 The 
Aerospace Corporation studied a space systelll for nuclear waste disposal. 
Interesting safety related aspects of that stuay were: (1) th~ rellioval of 
90sr and r37es froll1 the waste mix to reduce heatin~ problernsi (2) the use 
of dedicat~<.1 space launCh facilities for unn~nnea launches (their concept did 
not adequatel,)' shi~ld the waste); (3) the use of 4 payloaa ejection system 
(frolll the SjJace Shutt 1 e Caryo bay--on-orl> H. the,)' recommendea b 1 owi n\i off the 
car!:lo bay doors prillr to ejection to help protect the payload's reentry 
systelll). ana (4) initial disposal fli\ihts shoul<.1 be conducted with "fractional 
sized" jJayloads to increclse safety and confidence in the earl,)' pnases of a 
aisposal tJro~ralll. The l'iIT projecd4-1~) presented a "bullet tYIJf.!" IJdyload. 
~iscuss~d the safety iltlplicatiolls of its reentry. and dlso IJrovided son;e 
insiybts into the selection of a space disposal re~ion. The Bo~i"~ 
stuay (4-16) presented a slJheri cal wa ste packay i II~ concept. d ifft:!r~nt than 
that studied by others. The concept includea (1) a 1.2 OJ didmeter waste fonll. 
(2) a 2.5 cln lead radiation shield. and (3) a 0.83 III thick flotation IIlaterial 
witn a density of about 0.15 ~/cc. The implication here is that pa,)'loclCJ 
flotation, a minilllul.1 uallistic coefficient (lOass/area--the lower the value the 
lower the terillinal velocity). impact IJrotection. and fra~ment protection 
~haracterlstics shoula perhaps be integrated into one shell. 
Four documents related to iltliJact tests of 14r~e spher~~ (conducted at 
Sdndia) • ..,repared by Richard Puthoff. NASA/LeRC. were revi~~/elJ.(4-17 through 
4-j:!0) The most si'jnifiCdnt findin\is were. in a 322 :"/S (1055 ft/s) ililpact 
into concrete of a SOU ky (1119 lb) simulated reactor core sphere. no leaks or 
crack, were uiscovereo. tne concrete block was totally destro'y'~a. and the s).;h~r·~ was I.lefonned (aial,Jeter increase about 21 jlercent).(4-r9) A soil 
il,iPdCt test of a 2-foot-didlneter 1.lock-ulJ 1.lolJel of a redctor contail111lent vessel 
Systt:!111 is Ilesc;ri oed in Rt:!ference 4-2U. The test was conaucted at the Aeri a 1 
Cdole Facility. Sandia Laboratories. AlI)U4Uerl.jue. New,,,exico. The Inoael had a 
mass of 4UO k':l (88U lJounds). It impactea soil at 367 111/5 (dl0 ft/s) ano 
uurit:!u itself into the soil 4.0 .. I (b f~«!t--lneasur~d to th~ uottO •. 1 of tile 
s~hert:!J' The follouin~ ol)servations wt!re !.ldde frolll tht: results of this test: 
(lJ no le03ks wert~ Ilet~cted nor w.:re crucks obs~ned on the Iolooel; (2) a crdter 
1.5 1.1 (5 tt) in llial.18ter by 1.S III (5 ft) aee~ resultl.!d at 1lnpact. (3) con-
tain"lent v\!ssel oeforilidtion WdS not nedrl,)' as s~ver\! as ex;Jc:ri~nCl:!a 111 
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t~sts conduct~d un concr~ttl blocks; (4; failure w111 more 11kely occur frl.'tll 
lucal penetrations of rocks fn the soil i and (5) SOllie local aefonnat1ons du~\ 
to rocks in tne sol1 occur'red on the containment '!\!~~I!l wall. The lI1axiillU/11 
depth of these deformations was 0.91 Clll (U.36 in), measure<! by a depth .;.age 
frolil the edye of the 1ndentat10n. 
~est.1n9nO'lSf adapted a multic.1fmensfonal transient heat transfer 
analysis computer pro~raltl (ESATA - Executive Subroutines for Afterheat 
T~llIperature Anal/sis) to analyze the temperature and pres~ure response of a 
rallioactive nu~le4r waste Ilis~sal container followin~ impact on the Earth 
for NASA/LeRC.\4-23) The I::SATA pru~ram 1ncluded consfderat1on of cOhlJ)onent 
Iileltiny, L1H dissociation (part of neutron sh1eld 1n Lewis concept), the 
transport proj)erty variation, IJressure response and cuntainer creep stress 
builaup. This jJro~ralii was tailored to analyze both uncJeforilied and deformed 
waste oisposal containers with vary1ny de~rees of ~round burial. The actin1de 
waste d1sposal container aesi~n that was considered consisted of ;:oncentric 
spherical layers of tungsten shie1<.11n~, L1H shield1ng and a sta1nless steel 
cuntainer. Twenty-one cases were analyzed for post impact periods uf up to 23 
days. Variations were considerea 1n: the nu .... ear waste materia', power level, 
ran~ 1 n\:l frOll1 1.5 to 30 kW; rad 1 i of mater; a 15; ae~ree uf deforluat i on; oe~ree 
of uurfal j and soil properties. Constant power levt:1s were asswued durin:. the 
transient and the initial internal pressure 17.2 N/r.:1112 (25 psi) was based on 
rlt~lium release frOll1 alpha ettlittt!rs. Initial tem~ercltures rttflected the heat 
yeneration during reentry. No provision for venting was allowea. Ty~ical 
results of these analJses in~luoed: (1) the inteyr1ty of the waste cuntalners 
was lila 1 nta i ned for the part; a i burial of botn unaefor,ned And deforu,ed con-
tainers durin~ the transiti (2) cUh'plttte uurial of waste <.:ontainers with IIlore 
than 5 kW uf raaioactive waste material resulteo in creep stress ru~ture 
fQilur~s occurriny 4 to 1, aays aftcar imjJacti (3) at the time of ru~turt:t con-
!.liner te"I.,II:~rdtures were 1n the ran~e of 1120 to 1'70 C (25(,)0 to 2600 R) and 
the interllal pressure was about 80 N/cm2 (130 jJsi)i (4) hydro~en rel«!ase 
frOn! LiH dissociation was tile primary cause of the pressure increase; and (5) 
the resulta,.t tenltJerature reSlJonse of tne container was sensitive to suil 
pro~erties but not aepth of burial, other than partial burial. 
Physics International Company p~rfO','lileo two fra\:jlilent studies: one 
analyti;:al tone eXjJerirnC!ntal. (4-2'+ and 4-2~. To simuhte hijh velocity 
fra~llIents frO';1 ",ropellant tank e.cplosions, alulllinulII rods, 2-1nches, 4-inches, 
dnd b-illches lony, all with a 0.315-inch diallieter. wer«! impacted into 4 
!'i,uulateQ contain'.M!nt vessel at 1500 m/s. The velocity at wl'ich penetration 
occurred for the 1.59 ern (5/8 111) thick ~talnless steel spncre was on the 
order of 1350 111/5 (4400 ft/s) for the 4-dnd 6-inch aluminum roas. It wa~ 15~5 
fll/S (52UO ft/s) for the 2-inch rods. nle impact vulnerai)i1ity of a nuclear 
Wesstl:! contain,"ent vessel was studh!d usin'J the PISCES 2DL COlilput«!r cude 
a~velo~eQ by Physics International Com~any.l4-24) Th~ calculations in-
r:1udelJ: (1),j v~rification calculation of a 2-ft-didiil hollow sph~re ilnpact~d 
uy a ste~l ulock dt 122 111/5 (400 H/s); lZ) iwpact studies of a containr.ient 
confi~uration a:lJinst both hdrd and soft surfaces at velocit.ies frolll 119 I.I/S 
(39~ ft/5) to 322 ;45 (10~~ ft/s); alia (:$) rocket ca~in~ «.Ieuris il.lpacts intu a 
contaitullcnt confi~uration at 1500 :tl/S (500U ft/sj. ~ith one 1)0ssilJle e.(c.ejJ-
tion, the results showeu tnat the intt=yritJ of tile lewis :1uclectr ~d:ite 
containillent vess~l was ~ooa. Th~ lJuss1ble exce~tioll is thtt ilillJdct into a 
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notched concrete-steel bloct at 322 mls 
the most severe damage to the vessel; 
rtqufred. In generll, the a~llytfcll 
-------..... --.-~-- ... -
The work of thf NASAlL~f s Research Center was for,r.l b docu-
mented in BNWL 1900; Volume 4 by A. M. Platt and K.J. Schneider. (-261 Some 
of the noteworthy findings in this document have been emplo,ytd in the current 
study and some others should be investigated further in the space optfon 
study. The document includes some things of fnterest to the current study: 
(1) recommended the removal of Z44Cm to reduce the heat load in the payload; 
(2) noted that depleted uranium may not be satisfactory at high 
temperature--they "base 11 ned" tungsten for the gamma shield; and (3) 
considered neutrofl"absorbfng materials (poisons) for their "baseline" actinide 
waste mix to redu';e the problem of criticality. The current space option 
safety requfremer.cs (see Sections 2.5 and 3.3) have c~"!1deiid tne ·UfEty 
criteria" that '.lere developed by T. Dobry (DOE), et al., and documented in 
Reference 4-26. 
In summary, various works resulting from the LeRC study of nuclear 
waste disposal in space are considered valuable in the current study. It is 
rec~nded that, prior to any new work in related areas. critical in-depth 
reviews be conducted 0" past work $ !o establ ish what results and computer 
codes (espec1ally the Westinghouse ESA1A and Physics International PISCES 20l 
codes) are appropriate for future efforts. The conclusion that the larger and 
slower fragments (shrapnel) pose a greater pOtential for payload damage than 
t.he smaller high-speed fragments (see Reference 4-24) coupled with th~ results 
of Section 4.2.4 imply that I110re wertc is needed. It is r,cOnIIIended that 
experimental work btl conducted to determine the fragment velocity and size 
d1 stribut ions for expl odi ng propellant tanks. The Rocket Propuls ion 
Laboratory located at Edwards ArB represents an ideal location for such 
experiments. 
4.1.4 Accident Envfronment Def~ftion and Payload Response ~~~ 
Many documents pert.aining to accide.nt environment definition and 
pa,vload response were obtained{4-27 through 4-68). and we"e used:o develop 
the material in Sections 4.2, 4.3. 4.4 and 7.5 of this report. The n~ture of 
the detailed materi4l does not warrant discussion in this section; t~e reader 
should refer to the other sections of this report for related discussions. 
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4.2 Accident Environment Definition 
The System Safety Design Requirements for the reference space 
disposal conc~Dt (see Section 2.5), that have been developed as a part of this 
study, c~ll for the survivability of the nuclear waste payload in low-
probability iaunch pad accidents. Before the survivability (payload response) 
can be assessed, the worst-case credible accident environments must be 
defined. Although not done in this study, it is recommended that future 
efforts establish probability distribution for accident environments such that 
total risk estimates are realistic. This section describes the firs(t an!lJysis 
of the major accident environments for th~ Uprated Space Shuttle 4-69} and 
the heavy lift launch 'I'hicle (HllV) (4-70). Much of the accident environ-
ment data generated hI:::" arE' appl ied to: the prel imi nary accident response 
analysis (see Section 4.3); :.he HllV safety assessment (see Section 4.4); and 
the System Safety Desi~n Requirements contained in the Concept Definition 
Document for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Space (also see Section 2.5). The 
accident environ:'lents predicted in this section are associated with events 
that relate to on- or near-pad catastrophic launch vehicle failures. The 
categories of environments analyzed are: 
• Liquid Propellant Fireball 
• Liquid Propellant Residual Fire 
• Blast Wave Overpressure 
• Fragment or Shrapnel 
The RV response to the Uprated Space Shuttle firebal1, and residual fire and 
the atmospheric reentry of the RV and the primary container have been analyzed 
and are discussed in Section 4.3. Because of the limited scope of this study 
payload response to blast overpressure, fragment impact, and payload ground 
surface and ocean impact were not cond:Jcted. Future studies should analyze 
these event s. 
4.2.1 Liquid Propellant Fireball Environment 
Should the fully loaded, liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen/RP-1, Uprated 
Space Shuttle or HlLV explode on the launch pad, the nuclear waste payload 
could be exposed to a severe short-term thermal environment. This section 
describes the basic model used and the results of calculations dealing with 
this thermal environment for the Uprated Space Shuttle and HLLV. The basic 
fireball model is that of Bader.(4-27) The results presented provide 
estimates of fireball temperature and radiant heat flux as a function of time 
after the explosion. 
4.2.1.1 Fireball Model and Assumptions 
The Liquid-Propellant Rocket Abort Fire Model, developed by 
Bader(4-27) W1S used to calculate the thermal environment of the fireball 
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resulting from an on-pad booster vehicle explosion. The general assumptions 
of the model used here are as follows: 
• The rate of liquid propellant addition to the fireball is 
constant. 
• ,~ir entrainment into the fireball has been modeled, but is 
currently ignored, providing the worst case condition. Its 
inclusion would lead to lower temperatures and radiant heat 
fluxes. 
• Co~plete burnup of the liquid propellants is assumed, thus 
providing a worst case condition. 
• The fireball is an isothermal, homogeneous body 
spherical at all times. The isothermal, 
characteristic is based on the high degree of 
existing during the fireball formation. 
which is 
homogenous 
turbulence 
• The fireball radiates as a blackbody with an emissivity of 
1.0. 
• The time until 
time when all 
identical. 
the fireball 
the liquid 
lifts off the ground and the 
propellant is consumed are 
• Chemical equilibrium exists within the fireball. 
Figure 4-2 is a schematic defining the assumed fireball features and 
fireball development with time. The explosion begins at time t = O. All 
prope 11 ant is assumed to be consumed by t = tl i ftoff' The features of the 
modeled fireball stem and possible residual fire are also shown. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
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TIME .. 
t t Jl 1,5 
STEM = LIFTOFF 
LIFTOFF 
t = t 
STEM 
LIFTOFF 
FIGURE 4-2. MODELED FIREBALL DEVELOPMENT 
4.2.1.2 Thennochemicoll Analysis 
START OF 
MUSHROOM 
CLOUO 
Th~ thermochemical analysis described in the Phase II Final Technical 
~eport(4-71) for hydrogen and oxygen was modified to includE' RP-I (ass~lmed 
Upt'ated Space Shuttle and HLLV booster fuel) and nitrogen (added for air 
€ntrainment). For the combustion of hydrogen and hydrocarbons in air, the ten 
species that need to be considered are; H20, H2, 02, OH, 0, H, C02, 
CO, NO, N2' The chemical reactions are assumed to occur at constant 
pressure (free volume combustion). Ten species partial pressures and an 
equilibrium temperature are the unknowns. Therefore, eleven equations are 
needed to solve for eleven unknowns. Relationships involving mass, energy ana 
state conditions provide the basis for the calculation. 
Three elemental mole ratios (A, S, and C) and the relationship for 
the sum of part i al pressures (assumed equal to 1 atmosphere) for the H/O/C/N 
thermodynamic system are defined as follows: 
fl, ( 1 ) 
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Six more re~aticnships relating temperature (equilibrium 
constants) and partial pressures, given the equil ibrilJll chemical 
condition, can be written as follows: 
H + O;:! OH 
0, P02 
K (T' ~ = -P I P02 
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Finally, the heat of reactants must equal the heat of products to 
satisfy the equilibrium requirements; thus, we can write: 
o = hreactants - hproducts (11) 
The solution to the above set of eleven equations and eleven unknowns 
is obtained by the following procedure. For a given value of T and PO" 
the value of?H can be calculated by employing data in Table 4-3 whiCh 
determines the ~qui1ibrium constants. Once values of PH and Po have 
been determined, the partial prp.ssures of the eight other2 species ~an be 
calculated by using Equations 5 through 10. This calculation is performed for 
various values of Po ur.til Equation 4 is satisfied. Once this is 
accomplished, then the ~eat of products can be calculated for the given value 
of T. A computer program was developed with Bel resources to accomplish this 
tedious procedure. Table 4-4 presents the imoortant input parameters to the 
model, for the Space Shuttle, the Uprated Space ShlJttle, and the HllV. Data 
for the Space ShiJttle were taken from Reference 4-71. Data for the Uprated 
Space Shuttle and HlLV were derived from References 4-69 and 4-70. Heats of 
reactants, as shown in the Table 4-4, were calculated using data in Reference 
4-73. Figures 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5 provide the results of these calculations for 
each of the three vehicles. The fi reball equil ibri um temperatures for tl e 
three vehicles are then determined from Equation II, resulting in: 
Vehicle 
Space Shuttl e 
Uprated Space Shuttle 
HllV 
Fireball Equilibrium Temperature, K 
2991 
3057 
3058 
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TABLE 4-3. EQUILIBRIUM CONSTANT DATA FOR HYDROGEN/OXYGEN/CARBONI 
NITROGEN THERMODYNAMIC SYSTEM 
T,K L091OKpH2 L0910KpH20 L091OKp02 L0910KpOH L0910KpC02 L0910KpNO 
2000 5.5810 3.5405 0.3554 5.7389 2.88i9 -1.7017 
2100 5.0162 3.2277 5.7202 5. 1744 2.5366 -1.5891 
2200 4.5021 2.9428 5.1423 4.6696 2.2233 -1.4868 
2300 4.0317 2.6830 4.6143 4.2079 1. 9378 -1.3933 
2400 3.6004 2.4441 4. 1300 3.7842 1.6766 -1.3078 
2500 3.2027 2.2246 3.6842 3.3939 1.4367 -1.2291 
2600 2.8354 2.0217 3.2725 3.0331 1.2157 - 1 • 1565 
2700 2.4946 1.8341 2.8910 2.6986 1.0115 -1.0893 
2800 2.1781 1.6594 2.5367 2.3876 0.8221 -1.0270 
2900 1.8830 1.4969 2.2066 2.0978 0.6462 -0.9690 
3000 1.6069 1.3455 1.8984 1.8269 0.4823 -0.9150 
3100 1.3488 1.2033 1.6100 1.5733 0.3293 -0.8645 
3200 1.1066 1.0701 1.3395 1.3352 O. 1861 -0.8172 
3300 0.8787 0.9451 1.0853 1.1113 0.0518 "0.7728 
Source: Reference 4-72. 
Tables 4-5, 4-6 and 4-7 provide the heat of products data and species 
cOO1positions as a function of temperature for the three cases anaylzed 
here. 
TABLE 4-4. EQUILIBRIUM MODEL INPUT PARAMETERS 
Uprated Heavy 1. i ft 
Space Space Launch 
Parameters Shuttle Shuttle Vehicle 
Hydrogen, kg 102,500 102,500 341,000 
oxygen~ kg 609,600 1,413,034 4,812,105 
RP-1(a • kg 277 ,046 987,895 
A 0.3747 0.8685 0.8890 
8 0.0000 0.1942 0.2082 
C 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
hreactant 5, kcal/kg 213 194 194 
I_-
Note: (a) RP-1 ass lI11ed to be C12H24. 
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TABLE 4-5. HEAT OF PRODUCTS AND COMPOSITION DATA AS A FUNCTION OF 
TEMPERATURE FOR §!..ACE SHUTTLE HYDROGEN/OXYGEN FIREBALL 
PHZ 
T. K "P' C111,· •••••••••••• - ••••••••• -_ ••••••••• At",o •• ""' .... ······················_········ •••• 
2100 ·1'~. 2.U [.6 I.S~ ,., 5.67 [ •• 3.1. t·6 Z.SO [·1 1.'~ [·1 
ZZ~ ·m: 9.11 [., MO [·3 1.20 [.) 1.17 [·5 2.49 [·1 1.41 [·1 
2JOO ·1551 3.0'5 [.5 4.81 [·3 2.38 [·3 3.86 [·5 : •• 9 r·l 1.'4 [·1 
2"
'
!) .1 j~Z 9.Z~ [·s 7.83 r., 4.\4 [., 1.16 [ •• 2.40 r·l 1.40 £.1 
1500 .1414 l.5S [·4 \.74 [·2 7.M~ [.J J.14 [·4 ,.46 (.1 ~ .J3 [·1 
2t:OO .IZ61 6.46 £-4 1.IIY [·z 1.32 (·z 7.80 [-4 Z.46 [.1 7.21 £-1 
2700 ·1011 
Z8O!I .83~. 5 
2900 ·S4'~ •• 
1.51 [., z.ao [·l 2.11 [·1 1.11i E.' Z.45 [·1 7.113 [·1 
1.Z4 [., 4.,)4 [oZ l.lt [·z 3.61 [., l,46 [·1 6.i5 [.1 
6.42 ~.3 5.711 [·z 4.St [·z 6.U [., 2.49 [·1 6.36 E·l 
lOOO ·178.0 1.17 [·z 7.90 [.z 6.22 [·z 1.09 [·z 2.U E·l s.a. £·1 
3100 Z51.t 1.99 [·1 1.07 (.l 7." [.1 1.61 £., 2.~7 £·l 5.:0 [.1 
lZOO 739.6 3.1S [., 1.41 £·1 '.70 £., '.16 [02 l.U E·l '.41 £·1 
fIIIotl: •• 114 upon rNCUnt ."r." lIOiecul.r ,,'gilt 0' I' •• g. 
TABLE 4-6. HEAT OF PRODUCTS AND C(ltPOS IT I ON DATA AS A FUFCTION OF 
TEMPERATURE FOR UPRATED SPACE SHUmE HYDROGEN/OXYGEN/ 
RP-l FIREBAlL 
'0 'H PaM 'Oz 'HZ 'HzO 'c~z Pea 
T. K "p. ul/,- • ••••••• •• ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ·.4t",~r ... rfl.·.····· ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
2000 ·2258 2.21 (.4 l.30 (.'1 '.50 (.J 1.10 [·1 5.51 [ •• G.16 (.1 2.': [·1 9. ~7 (.4 
mo .2l76 •• ~1 [.1 1.0' [-4 7.13 [·1 1.10 [·1 I.IJ [.3 6.33 (·1 l.'~ [·1 2.1 ~ '·3 
:,CO .2nC4 8.86 l·4 2.6; [.4 1.0e [·1 1.09 E·I 2.11 [., ~.n r·1 2.43 (·1 .;.~O [.) 
Z:C:1 ·1917 1.6< [.J 0.05 [ •• 1.58 £-2 1.08 E-1 3.9) ~·l 6.13 [-I 2.33 £·1 e.,J/ ~·3 
Z4':0 .18S1 2.~Z E·J 1.30 £.J 1.23 (·l 1.0/ (·1 G.IS [.3 6.~4 ,·1 l.31 tel 1.4< E·Z 
2500 -1698 '.6S [.) 2.'iJ [·3 1.05 [·2 1.06 E·1 1.10 [·2 ~.Ol [·1 2.~0 [·1 Z.o £.( 
2600 ·1512 1." E.l 5.01 (.~ '.04 (·Z 1.1l' [·1 1.72 ~·2 S.lIJ (·1 1.04 [·1 1.;4 E·Z 
27/)0 
·IZse 1.15 [ •• 9.04 t·J 5.20 E·2 1.03 (·1 2.56 (.l 5.60 E·I I.J4 [·1 ~.~b £.~ 
Z1\'O .101' 1.72 (.! I.S) E.Z 6.SZ (·Z 1.01 [.1 3.63 E·2 5.19 l·1 1.60 £·1 l.;~ :.l 
Z'1lI) .725.6 2.49 [·2 2.S' (·2 7.~. [.Z 9.99 E·~ '.95 C·2 '.91 [·1 I.J. (·1 :I.5'} :-Z 
3000 .301.6 loSl [·2 3.99 [·2 9.40 E·l 9.11 E-Z 6 ••• £.Z 4.45 [.1 1.09 £·1 1.1~ [·1 
3100 .28.1ll· ... 19 [·2 6.01 [·Z 1.08 [·1 9.35 [.1 8.05 [·2 3.~l [·1 8.56 E·Z 1.11 [·1 
ll\1O 355.11 6.l~ (·2 '.69 [·2 1.19 [·1 8.81 (.l 9.66 £.Z 3.37 [·1 6.~J E·Z 1.43 E·I 
3300 751. if ~.14 EoZ 1.21 [·1 I.Z8 (·1 8.06 [., 1.11 [·1 2.78 [·1 4.84 £·l 1.51 E·1 
-Not.: "sid upon rltCunt IV.,. ..... I.eul.r .. ltIIt of 18.541 g. 
TABLE 4-7. HEAT OF PRODUCTS AND COMPOSITION DATA AS A FUNCTION OF 
TEMPERATURE FOR HLLV HYDROGEN/OXYGEN/RP-l FIREBALL 
Po PH POH PO~ Pill PIIZO reOZ PCO 
T. r hi" e.l/g- ... _ •••••••••..••••• -.-•• '"' ............... A :j:1'~iJh~rt' .... - .. _ ...... ----- _ ........................... 
ZOOO 
·ll3' 2.n E.' US £·5 4.41 (·3 1.12 £.1 5.35 E·: s.n (·1 Z .59 f.·1 1.1/ ,·3 
0:10·' .?! 5; 4.61 (.4 1.['3 ~ •• '.03 E·3 1.1! (·1 1.10 (·3 ~ .,'j (·1 Z ."R ~.: ,.,:1 £.) 
Z2~O .,:'0) e.n (·4 Z.5~ (.~ 1.('9 .·Z 1.11 t·, 1.11 C·J .j.: 5 l·1 ;:. 5~ t·1 :.~9 ,.) 
ZJO~ .115, 1.63 E·] ~.16 (.4 :.57 (·i 1.10 [.1 3.~? ~.3 ~.ln (·1 ~. 51 [·1 a.: z ,·3 
14,;0 ·18~4 Z.83 C·] I.~~ C·3 Z.ll (·z : • .,9 (.1 6.~6 •• 3 6.0: [.\ 1.·IZ (·1 ,. 'is i·Z 
Z5~1J .1·;~Z 4.11 (.] U~ i:·3 3.n (·z 1.01,.1 1.07 (.z 5.;)3 E·I l.3a [·1 l.':il E·Z 
Ztl~U .14 ;1 7.52 ,.) 4.",\ £.J •• ij i l·Z 1. ,'6 E. i 1.07 f·Z 5.11 [·1 Z .1 .. (·1 4.:': (.Z 
Z7(,J 
-1 ~ 701 \.16 (·2 8.9Z (.J 5.16 t·; 1.1~ (·1 2.43 [·l 5.40 (·1 1. iJ .·1 5.~.1 '·Z 
2~~~ .1r.: • \.13 ~·z l.S3 £·z G.4:, (./ 1.03 t·; 3.~4 E·Z ;.10 (·1 I. (,J E·l 7.J) t-Z 
,'Jr:l .:Z!.) ?50 (-2 2.51 E·l 1.81 [-l 1.0 I (·1 4.61 (·l •• ~c (·1 1.41 [·1 1.~O (·1 
JOJO ·393.4 J.SZ ~·Z 1.94 (·z 1.31 (·1 Q.JI £·1 6.l3 [·l 4. JIi (·1 1.15 (·1 1 •• 1 f·1 
1:00 .J~ •. 13 •• 80 E·Z 5. ~4 t·Z 1.0. E·l 9.401 t·! '.61 (·l 3.~5 £.\ 9.J: (·2 1.;,tJ 1·\ 
3~:O ,)39.6 6.l5 t·l d.~O [·z Lie (·1 d.rl1 (.z 9.46 E •• 3.3u E·; 6.111 E·~ 1.51 ~·l 
lJOO 727.7 a.12 [·2 :.20 (.1 1.;6 [ •• 8.~3 (·2 1.u9 E·. l.1l (.\ 5.09 '·2 1. S1 £·1 
'"Not-, ~ned upon rt.ct."t ••• rlg. ''IOlteuhr weight or \8.4115 g. 
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4.2.1.3 Calculations Employing Bader Model 
As indicated in Reference 4-27. the temperature relationship with ~.1. 
time needs to be detennined for two time periods: I ~ 
fi~ ~ < t < tffreball liftoff. 
firebill liftoff < t i tstem liftoff. ~L 
While heat is still being added to the fireball (0 ( t < 
tfireball liftoff). the change in internal enthalpy is equal to the rate 
change of chemical heat energy. less radhtion losses (see Equation 12). 
After all the fuel is consumed. the changa in internal enthalpy is due to 
radiation losses only (see Equation 13). 
where: 
4 d(Wh) 
R· h -£oAT • ~r-  
(dh ) 
- £oAT4 • (101 • Wb) + 
R 
£ 
o 
A 
T 
W 
• Constant rate of fuel addition 
• Emis s hi ty 
• Stephen-Boltzman Constant 
• Surface Area of Fi reball 
• Temperature 
• Weight of Fireball (Wb· Total 
of liquid Propellants) 
t • Time 
hr • Enthalpy/Unit Mass of Reactants 
hp • Enthalpy/Unit Mass of Produc;ts 
Wei ght 
(12) 
(13) 
Appendix H provides a more in-depth discussion of the model used 
here. From Appendix H. the following equB.tions for dT/dt were developed: 
(14) 
(15) 
where: 
rn. • Gas Constant 
P = Pressure 
- '\ 
. j 
\ 
\ 
J 
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The Bel computer cod~, previously mentioned, was used to integrate 
these equations by employing the 4th order Runge-Kutta-G111 Method. The 
resulting relationships between temp!rature and time, as well as heat flux and 
time, are provided in Figures 4-6, 4.7, and 4-8, respectively. These figures 
indicate that the extreme thermal env1ronment is expected to last less than 15 
seconds for all three vehicles. During actual conditions, a1r entrainment 
would be expected to lower the temperature and heat flux values. A residual 
ffre is assumej to occur and this is d1scussed in the next section. 
The predicted fireball diameters are a function of time, as given in 
Figure 4-9. The maximum predicted ftreball diameters for the three vehtcles 
agree fafrly well with experimental data, as represented by relationships 
given in Reference 4-32. See Appendix H for further details. 
4.2.2 Liquid Propellant Res1dual Fire Environment 
Residual fires that may occur after catastrophic launch vehicle 
failures can be categorized into three major types: (1) burn1ng liquid 
propellent fuel; (2) burning solid propellent; and (3) burning materials or 
pad r,lafed systems. The solid propellent fire was analyzed in last year's 
studyl4- 1) for the standard Space Shutt1@ vehicle. The thi rd type is 
current 1y beyond the scope of t"i s study and is expected not to be as im-
porta~t as the first two. The Hquid propellent residual fire is a focus of 
this year's study effort. 
4.2.2.1 ReSidual Fire Model and Assumptions 
liquid. propellent residu.sl fires have bf!en observed with the 
catastr(iPhic failures of Atlas launch vehicles (which utilize RP-l as a 
fuel). -27) Reference 4-32 indicates that residual fires are mostly 
expected to occur when high-boiling-poi"t liquid fuels are present (e.g •• 
RP-l). Also, Reference 4-32 indicates that residual fires involving RP-l for 
the Atlas have been observed to last up to or exceeding one hour. Modeling 
resldual fires for the vehicles considered here (Uprated Space Shuttle and 
HLLV), which employ R!l-l as a fuel, can be a very difficult and complex task. 
Four major questions need to be addressed: 
(1) How does one predict how much RP-l is consumed in the initial 
fireball and how much becomes available for the I;sidual fire? 
(2) What is the limit on the spread or thickness of the RP-l fuel 
pool on the ~round? 
(3) What is the burning rate of the RP-l pool? 
(4) What is the radiant heat flux that an object (n3y~oad) could see 
if it were in or near thp. residual fire? 
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To perfonn detail~d ~odelin9 of all the physical phenomena expected 
to play roles in !stablisning the answers to the above questions is beyond the 
scope of the current study. The approach assumed here, while 'iimplistic, 
allows one to evaluate the ~arameters that can be controllpd by de~ign (e.g., 
POQ 1 di ameter). 
An assumption that a~l of the RP-l is involved in the residual fire 
would lead to the worst-case situation. The approach taken here is to 
parameterize the amount of RP-l in the fire (from 0 to 100 percent) and the 
pool size. (The previous section assumed that all of the RP-l would be 
included in the "fireball",---also a conservative appr'Jact; from the fireball 
standpoint). The depth of liquid fuel in the pool, while in part is determined 
by the amour.t of fuel present, also ~s dependent upon the characteristics of 
the depressions or dykes present ai'ound the launch pad. The approach taken 
here is to parameter~z~ the diameter of a cylindrically shaped dyke at the 
pad. This a$sumption t:1so imp1 ies that the heat flux will remain constant 
w~th time. Th~ burn rate of RP-l has been ~a1c;jlated (see below) ignoring the 
effect of wind. The l'adiant heat flux has been calculated by assuming black 
body radiation and a temper3ture of 1366 K (2000 f) for the RP-l fire. 
4.2.2.2. Burn Rate 
Tne burn rate for RP-l was calculated by using the approach given in 
Reference 4·74. The b~rn rate of single component liquid fuels in large pools 
is giver> as: 
where: llHc = Net Heat of Combustion (Lower Va1ue) 
tHYAP = Heat of Vaporization at Normal Boil ing Point, Tb 
Cp = Heat Capacity 
The result~ $hown in Reference 4-74 indicate that the burn rate (V~ ) becomes 
cOllstal.t for pool d"i ameters greater than about 1.5 meters. The integ"'ated 
heat capacity in the aenominator of the above equation determines the 
temp\>,·.~i:ure dependence of the burni ng rate, normally about 1/2 percent per 
cegree centigrade variation of the initial liquid temperature, Ta. Dat.'! 
from References 4-75 and 4-76 were used to evaluat~ the above equation. A 
burn rate of 0.439 cm/mo[ n was cal cul ated for RP-l. Burn rates for vari ous 
other fuels are given below for comparisoll: 
Fuel 
Benzene 
Hexane 
Butane 
Hydrogen 
Va;, (cm/min)(4-74) 
0.600 
0.730 
0.790 
1.400 
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4.2.2.3 Parametric Results 
The liquid propellent residual fire environment was parameterized by 
assuming a radiant heat flux of 198 kW/m2, corresponding to a temperature of 
1366 K (2000 F)~ and a burn rate of 0.439 em/min for RP-l. Figure 4-10 
provides the estimated burn time, in minutes, for various RP-l pool d~pths, in 
cm. To have d fire last over 1 hour, assuming no wind, the RP-l pool depth 
would have to be greater than about 26 cm. Figures 4-11 and 4-12 provide 
est-imates of burn time as functions of the fraction of RP-1 in the residual 
fire and the diameter of acyl indrical dyke wall for both the Uprated Space 
Shuttle and the HlLV. Figure 4-11 indicates, for residual fires lasting less 
than 1 ho~r, that the dyked area of equal depth should be greater than 1,260 
m2 for the Uprated Space Shuttle. Figure 4-12 indicates, for residual fires 
lasting less than 1 hour, that the dyked area of equal depth should be greater 
than 4,540 m2 for the HllV. 
Because of the nature of possible residual fires, and because of the 
pad safety designs that would likely be employed. the following liquid 
propellent residual fire environment is recommended for use in payload 
response studies (see Section 4.3): 
• Fire Duration of 3600 seconds 
• Constant Heat Flux of 198 kl~/m2 
It is worth noting that this environment is much less severe than the solid 
propellent residual fires that have been prp.dicted for the Space 
Shuttle.(4-71} Figures 4-13, 4-14, and 4-15 provide the recommended 
combined fireball (see Section 4.2.1) and residual fire environments for the 
Space Shuttle (including the split motor solid propellant fire), the Uprated 
Space Shuttle, dnd the heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) which were used in the 
payload response analysis in Section 4.3.2. 
4.2.3 Blast Wave Overpressure Environment 
This section presents data for side-on and reflected overpressures 
dnd side-on and reflected impulses produced by explosions of the propellant 
tanks of interest here. The data generat~d \~ere not used in the 1 im; ted 
payload response analysis, but should be used in fut"'U"r'e efforts. Propel1~nt 
tanks can explode as a result of various on-pad or ascent accidents or 
malfunctions and can be destructed deliberately by linear-shaped distrtJct 
charges, should flight controllers determine that an off-course vehicle would 
endanyer the local population or ground features. Depending upon the event, 
varying degrees of exo1osive yield can result. The explosive yield is defined 
as percentage of TNT equivalent. For example, if a gi'ien liquid propellent 
tank explosion would produce a 100 percent yield, that means that the tot~l 
mass of propellents would produce the same effect as the same mass of TNT. 
Reference 4-45 suggests that the following explosive yields be considered for 
the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) blast hazard ana1ysi~: 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
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Explosion Event 
Destruct 
Percent Explosive Yield , 
On-pad, no destruct 
Fall ba ck 30 m 
High velocity impacts: 
350 m/s 
550 m/s 
20 
50 
100 
160 
Most recently, NASA/MSFC has recommended that a 10 percent yi el d be a$Sumed 
for a failure of the Shuttle ET intertank structure during ascent.\4-44) 
Also recol11T1endeci was that the resulting blast overpressure from an on-pad 
catastrophic failure, although at a higher estimated Yiel(d, }'I.ould produce 
similar overpressures as the 10 percent yield during accent. 4-44) 
Explosions of the propellent tanks are expected to produce mechanical 
environments that pose a hazar',j to payloads. For the nucl ear waste mission, a 
shock blast wave could damage the reentry vehicle (RV) such th~t it might not 
survive the ensuing fire environment (see Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Also, and 
probably more importantly, the blast wave will create moving fragments which 
could cause a breach of the nuclear waste containment (see Section 4.2.4 for 
discussion of the predicted fragment environments). 
Previous studies of explosion hazards for launch vehicles, carrying 
radioactive material, have assumed the center of explosion (CaE), for a given 
failure, to be at the pOint of firs~ POi~ntial mixing of the liquid fuel and 
liquid oxidizer. Last year's study(4-7 ) assumed the CaE for the standard 
Space Shuttle case was taken to be the center of the ET intertank structure 
between the 1 iquid hydrogen and 1 iquid oxygen tanks. The distance from the 
CaE to the nuclear waste payload surface was previously calculated to be 21.6 
m (70.8 ft). This distance was used for all of the Phase II calculations. 
Recent analysis indicates that the explosion center for the ET could be in 
different locations. Also, the position of the payload in the cargo bay can 
change with varying payload packaging assumptions. Due to these facts, a 
parametric approach is given here for all the vehicles of interest. 
Procedures outlined in "Workbook for Predicting Pressure Wave and 
Fragment Effects of Exp1 odi ng Propellent Tank s and Gas Storage Vessels", 
Reference 4-39. were used to cal culate the overpressure and impulse data. 
Propellant types and quantities used in the calculations are given below in 
Table 4-8. 
TABLE 4-8. INPUT DATA FOR BLAST WAVE ENVIRONMENT PREDICTIONS 
Vehicle/Tank 
Uprated Space Shutt1e/ET 
Uprated Space Shuttle/LRB 
HLLV Rooster 
OTV 
Prope llent Type 
Oxygen/Hydrogen 
Oxygen/RP.l 
Oxygen/Hydrogen/RP-l 
Oxygen/Hydrogen 
Quantity, kg 
712,100 
540,240 
3,669,900 
20,431 
I 
J 
.;.-
-, 
I 
1 
] 
I 1 
] 
~ ~ 
I 
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Overpressure and impulse curves for t~e confined by ground surface (CBGS) case 
were used (Figures 2-12, 2-13, 2-16, and 2-17 of Reference 4-39). Figures 
4-16 through 4-23 provide the results of the parameteric analysis for the four 
propellent tanks listed in Table 4-8. Side-on and reflected overpressures and 
impulses are predicted as a function of percent explosive yield (0.1 to 160) 
and distance (15, 20, 30, SO, and 100 m) from the COE to the point of 
f nterest. The break or bend that occurs in sorle of the curves is due to a 
discontinuity problem in the procedure outlined in Reference 4-39. Table 4-9 
provides a summary of the data presented in the figures. Data are given for 1 
and 10 percent yields with a COE assumed to be 20 m distant. These are the 
reference cases chosen for the safety design requirements {see Section 2.5 ano 
Reference 4-77} and future payload response analysis WOrk., NASA/MSFC has 
predicted side-on overpressures from 230 to 1380 N/c~ 4-44) for th. 
Space Shuttle ET. The value of 230 Nlcrrf. agrees well with the 250 Nlc~ 
value in Table 4-9; however, different COE's and percent yields were assumed. 
It is believed that the 10 percent yield case for liquid propellent tanks 
should be used until further research indicates a suitable and justified 
solution to the problem. 
TABLE 4-9. TYPICAL BLAST WAVE ENVIRONMENT VAlUE3(a) 
Propellant Tank 
OTV LRB 
Characteristic l%b 10~b 1~ lO~ 
Side-On Over- 6.3 
Pre~sure, NlcrnZ 
23 50 180 
Refl e('ted Over-
Pressure, ~/cm2 
16 82 220 1350 
Side-On Impulse, 
N-s/cml 
O.C 0.21 O.~S 1.5 
Reflected Impulse, 0.12 0.73 1.5 11 
N-s/crnZ 
Notes: (a) All data for distance of 20 m. 
(b) Percent yield, TNT equivalent. 
4.2.4 Fragment Environment 
Configurations 
ET 
1% 10% 
51 250 
230 1700 
0.45 2.0 
1.3 15 
HLLV 
a 10'; 
150 410 
1130 3050 
1.2 4.6 
8.7 35 
This section presents data on the fragment (or ~hrapnel) environment 
produced by exploding propellant tanks of interest here. The data generated 
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wer~ not used in the 1 irilited payload response analysis, but could be used in 
future studies. Considerable refinement of the fr'agment environment is still 
required beforp credibl~ predictions can be made. 
Predict~on of the fragment environment at the payload position 1n the 
cargo bay resulting from the explosion of propellants in a rocket boo~ter is 
an extl"emely cOOlplex problem. fhe fragmen~s of primary interest, but perhaps 
not exclusively, are believed to originate from the prop~l1ant tankage and 
associated ccmpont!r.t!t. The primary logic in this selection is, that being 
closest to the explos~on, these fragments wi1'l be accelerated to higher 
velocities (and thus present a grec:lter hazard to the payload) than fraqments 
derived froln structures and components more rerrote from the expl ('Ision. A 
second pragmatic reason is that the available data largely represent tankage 
fragments. 
A liquid propellent explosion follm/s some prior failure (e.g., 
bulkhead r'aptLire or gross tank failure, such as occurs in a vehicle on-pad 
fdll ba-;k). Before.in explosion Cdn occur, some mixing of the propellants 
must take place. It is generally asslJlled that. the yieid of the explosion, as 
calculated from the blast wave measured at an appreciable distance from the 
explosion, increases to some maximum as the time between initlal failure 
(start of mixing) dnd ignition/explosion increases. With the increase io time 
before ignition. more of the prorellents are mixed and can thus ccntribut~ to 
the explosive energy release. 
The observed-explosive yi~1ds tend to be relatively small. They are 
expressed as the ratio of the mass of TNT that waul d produce the observed 
blast wave to the total mas~ of propellents in the involved tanks. in tests, 
and derived from observations of actual failures. A still smaller fraction of 
the total available propellent quantity is involved in producing the observed 
explosion. (The "yield" is most affected by the energy released in the explo-
sion, a~j the energy of explosio~ of liquid propellants can be significantly 
greater than the energy of explosiun of the reference TNT.) 
Cons idering that prio:' damage must have occurred to the prope1lent 
tanks. that some time must have passed between the initial failure and the 
ex~'losion to permit !nixing of the propellenets, and that typically only a 
sinall fraction of the total propellent contributes to the explOSion, one might 
logically ask the following questions: 
• what is the condition and position of the propellent tanks 
{relative to t.he payload) at the time of the explosion? 
• Where does the actual explosion take place? 
• Where is the propellant that is not participating in the 
exp los ion? 
The ar!swers to these questions. which are not known for any general 
case, or for the most part, even in tests actually conducted, can have 
profound infll.!ences both on the generation of fragments from the tankage, and 
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on the fragment environment resulting at the payload. The tanks may be 
dfsplaced from their position in the intact vehicle. The explosion may take 
place near the zone of initial propellent contact, within a propellent tank 
after a period C:7 initial mixing, or at some other location, perhaps even 
outside the original tank envelope. Unreacted propellent between the 
explosion center and the tank wall may absorb a significant fraction of the 
energy of the explo~ion and greatly reduce the amplitude of the blast wave at 
the tank wall. Also, if a cell of mixing propellant explodes at the wall 
surface, one would expect a very high energy blast wave at the tank wall. 
In co"t~mplating the fragment environment at the payload location, we 
can ask an additional question: 
• What is the contribution of any structure between the propellent 
tanks and the payload (e.g., thg Shuttle Orbiter structure) in 
stopping fragments from the tank or in contributing additional 
fragments? 
Considering these problems, one is driv~1 to empirical relationships 
derived from tests, such as Project pyro{4-36. Even here, significant 
problems remain. Instrumentation was external to the explosion and typically 
at considerable distances. Thus, the "instrumental" data tell little about 
the details at the explosion site. Data on fragment velocities and sizes were 
obtained in ways that probably lead to o':arrepresentation of large fragments 
and intermediate velocities. The direction of initial fragment motion was not 
recorded. Finally, the data, probably reflecting the multiplicity of 
different situations occurring during the tests. do not appear to fit any 
well-defi ned pattern. Thus, they are diffi cult to interpret in terms of 
predicting a specified event. 
In the following sections, predictions of the fragment environment 
are made. To make these predictions it has been necessary to ignore the 
details discussed above and assume that the available empirical data can, in 
fact, be applied to the current problem. Some results are not particularly 
satisfying, and can be defended only on empirical grounds. 
4.2.4.1 Fragment Mean Velocity 
NASA. CR 134906 (4-39) analyzed the data from Project Pyro and con-
cluded that the mean fragment velocity from an explosion of L02/LH2 pro-
pellent tankage could be represented as: 
u = 73.96 yO.4296 
where, U is the mean fragment velocity. and Y is the explosive yield 
expressed as the ratio of equivalent TNT mass to total propellent mass, in 
percent. The data :-ailed to support any statistically significant effect of 
the absolute size of the explosive event. 
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Figyre 4-24 shows the relationship and the data quoted to support the 
correlation.l4~39) The correlation is identified as applying to L02/LH2 
propellents in the confined by missile (CBM) tests. In these tests, the 
failure leading to explosion was caused by cutting through the bulkhedds 
separating the two propellent tanks. The correlation seems to provide an 
approximate upper 1 imit for both L02/LH2 and L02/RP-l propellants in the 
CBM and confined by ground surface (CBGS) tests (the CBGS tests were tank drop 
tests), and is thereby adopted as the prediction for fragment mean velocities 
from all launch vehicle failures resulting in propellent explosions. 
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FIGURE 4-24. MEAN FRAGMENT VELOCITY AS A FUNCTION OF 
PERCENT EXPLOSIVE YIELD 
4.2.4.2 Fragment Velocity Distribution 
NASA CR 134538(4-38~J on the basis of data pooled from a number of 
tests, suggests using a log-I'ormal distribution of fragment velocities. The 
log-normal distribution is a very poor fit to the CBM data for both 
L02/LH2 and LC2/RP-l propellants. It is a fair fit for the CBGS data. 
Appendix I discusses the difference bd\'l'~en the normal and log-normal dis-
tribution for the present problem. 
Figure 4-25 plots the data on (norma;) probability paper. Ignoring 
the problem presented by the low velocity '~ans, the normal distribution is a 
good fit to the CBM data. If one assumes tha~ the curvature of the CBGS plots 
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reflect the behavior of the low velocity tail, the~ a line parallel to the CBM 
data through the high velocity points does not seem unreasonabl e. Thus, the 
prediction method chosen for the fragrrent velocity distributions is a nonnal 
distribution (with the low velocity tail ignored) with a standard deviation of 
145 m/s. The mean velocity is chosen fran Figure 4-24. 
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FIGURE 4-25. FRAGMENT VELOCITY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CBM AND 
GBGS FOR LOX/LH2 AND LOX/RP-l 
~.2.4.3 Fragment Size 
99.99 
D~td on fragment masses and projected areas are presented in ~ASA CR 
134538(4-38) for eight "events", of which five appear to be rel evant to the 
lau'lch vehicle explo~ion problem. The fragment mdSS data does not suggest any 
correlation. However, the frag~lent projected areas seem to suggest a very 
s impl e correl at ion. 
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Fi gure 4-26 15 a plot of the fragment projected are,! dfstribut ions 
from the five events. Thfs plot suggests that, at least as a rl!asonable upper 
bound, the mean fragment projected area and area distribution are independent 
of event parameters (Yitld and quantity of propellent involve,j). The mean 
projected area is 0.3 ~ and the dfstribution 15 log-normal with a standard 
deviation of 5.3. Although this selected combination has no dependence on 
yield, it seems logical that it should exist and some selected data sets do 
suggest such a dependence. 
It is suggested that the fragment mass be calculated by assuming the 
fragments to be sections of tank skin and multiplying the fragmerlt area by the 
areal density of the tank skins. 
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4.2.4.4 Fragment Flux 
No publfshed data provfde information on the initial directions of 
the fragments generated by propellent tank explosions. Two methods of 
calculatin~ the flux are possible. First, one could assume that the fragments 
are driven rad1ally outward from the "center of explosion ll (COE--if such a 
center exists), leading to a spherical distribution of fragments. Second, one 
coul d assume that the fragments are driven radi ally outward from the tank 
centerline, leading to a cylindrical distribution of fragments. 
The second case is known to be a good approximation for fragments 
produced by a cased. cylindrical high-explosive charge. For the launch 
vehfcle, one can envision such a distribution if fragmentation 1s caused by a 
blast or detonation wave propagating longitudinally through the .,ropellant 
tank. 
The spherical geometry would seem to be a reasonable approach if 
there were nothing (except air) between the COE and the fragmenting tank wall, 
but, in fact, th1s space is apt to be filled with propellent. Also, the 
concept of a COE does not seem particularly appropriate for the typically low 
yield propellent explosions found in practice. Consequently, the cylindrical 
geometry is assumed. 
(fragments/lnZ ) Figure 4-27 lllustrat~s the geometry. at the target area is given as: 
~ -l x ~ 
The fragment flux 
where A 1s the mean fragment area (O.3m2), DT is the tank diameter and S 
is the separation of the payload from the tank centerline • 
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F~gure 4-28 presents the results of calculation of the fragment flux 
for explosion of the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET). the Liquid Rocket 
Boosters (LRB) of the Uprated Space Shuttle. the booster of the Heavy Lift 
Launch Vehicle (HLLV), the Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV). and the Solar Orbit 
Insertion Stage (SOlS). To apply the fragment flux model to the OTV and SOlS, 
where the payload is mounted on the vehicle centerl1ne. and where multiple 
propellent tanks are used. S has been taken as the distance to the fntertank 
space. and DT was t,ken as the geometric mean tank diameter. 
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FIGURE 4-28. FRAGMENT FLUX AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE FROM TANK 
CENTERLINE FOR VARIOUS PROPELLANT TANKS OF INTEREST 
4.2.4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The preceding sections provide a definition of the fragment environ-
ment, mean fragment velocHy, velocity distributions. mean fragment size and 
size rlistribution, and fragment flux resulting from a launch vehi~le and upper 
stage explosions. The prediction methods are empirical, and it is rp.cognized 
that some aspects of the predictions are not in agreeme~t with onels intuitive 
expectations or are not theoretically defensible. The predictiO'1s are also, 
ina sense i ncompl ete, in that there are no cross correlations bebleen frag-
me~t size and fragment velocity. This is because there are no empirical data 
on such a corr~lation. A better experimental data set is required to properly 
characterize the fragment environment for exploding tanks (see the discussion 
at the end of Section 4.1.3). 
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In the Phase II Bel study(4-71), pred1ctions of the fragment 
environment were based In a much more restricted data set coupled with 
hypothesized fragment acceleration mechanisms. While providing, correlation 
between fragment size and fragment velocity, and fragment size and yield, the 
correlation predicted fraqment sizes and velocities for high yield explosions (>5 percent) which were respectively much smaller and much h~gher than have 
been observed experimentally. As the mechan1sms used in previous predictions 
do not appear defensible under crit.ical examination, the previous predictions 
have been abandoned and reDlaced by those above which are defensible on 
empirical grounds until new data are available, the predictions contained here 
should be used for payload response analysi~ in followon studies. 
I 
I 
~ 
• 
4-54 
4.3 Payload Response Analysis 
There is a wide range of accident payload response analyses which 
need to be evaluated for the space option of waste disposal. A limited 
response analysis was conducted in this study (see Section 4.3.2). Future 
safety studies need to include a more in-depth analysis of the mechanical 
environmental (imp3ct, earth surface impact, etc.). The nuclear waste payload 
can be subjected to several possible severe accident conditions, including an 
on-pad 12unch vehicle fire, or an inadvertent reentry following an orbital 
malfunction. In this section, the fire and reentry, thermal response analysis 
conducted during the Phase III effort for various waste payload configuraticns 
is documented. The major objectives of this effort were to determine the 
quantity of waste mass r~leased due to the thermal environments along and to 
recommend design modifications which would prevent the predicted releases. 
Heat transfer models are discussed first including a descriptic~ of 
overall model improvements that were made during the present study. The 
results of the thermal response analysis including a prediction of possible 
release of waste material are then presented. Finally, system modifications 
are suggested to prevent this predicted release. 
4.3.1 Aerothermal Analysis Models 
Analysis of the in-depth response of a material system to various 
accident environments w~s accomplished using a Battelle developed Reentry 
Thermal Analysis Code (RETAC) which is described briefly in Appendix J. The 
basic code input variables and methodologies are discussed in this section 
along with the improvements to the code which were incorporated for the 
present effort. 
4.3.1.1 Model Improvements 
The raodel u~ed in previous payload thermal respO'lse analyses (Phase 
I I --R~feren,-:e 4-71) produced only a fi rst-ord~r approx imat i on to the true 
solution of material temperature histories resuiting from various accident 
environments. Several second-order effects neglected in these early alialyses 
were: 
• Two-dimensional (i.e., 2-D) heating 
• Heat of fusir.n effects 
• Material removal during melting 
• Surface temperaturE limitations due to melti~g. 
The ad~ition of a 2-D (axisymmetric) he~ting model pr0v icted for more 
accurate dnalysis of stable vehicle (Le., nonspinning reen+,ry into the 
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Earth's atmosphere during th~ super~onic portion of the trajectory}. This 
stable case results in a greater degree of heat input near the vehicle forward 
stagnation region. A randomly spinning 1-D case was also examined where the 
heat is evenly distributed around the entire body surface. In effect, the 2-0 
option allowed for division of the vehicle into conical-shaped sectors start-
ing at the stagnation point and extending completely around to the rear stag-
nation zone. Also, the body was further subdivided into a series of 
concentric l~in9s at v~rious radii from the waste form centerline. 
Heat of fusion effects were modeled by ma~ing an appropriate increase 
in the specifi~ heat of the material over a specified temperature interval as 
its temperature exceeded the melting point. The product of specific heat 
increase and temperature interval was adjusted to equal the material latent 
heat of fusion value. This refinemert provided an energy sink for melting 
materials that were surrounded by other materials thJt had not melted. 
Metallic material removal during melting was also import;Jnt because 
it would be unrealistic to allow :nelted material to continue to absorb heat 
and remain in place beyond the point where it normally would have eroded away. 
In the revised code, after the melt temperature was exceeded, the surface of 
metall ic materials was allowed to recede at a rat.e dependent upon the net 
input heat flux. Thus, the surface recession rate, S, can be written a5 
where, ~f is the heat of f,· .. ·"n and P is the material density. The term 
qnet can be written dS: 
. . . . 
qn~t = qinput qrad qcond (2) 
It accounts for the reduction of the actual input heat flux, Qinput. by the 
ammount re-radiated by the body at the melting temperature, qrad. and the 
amount of heat corducted into the body (i.e. qcond)' 
A graphite ablation s!.!broutine already existed for the RETAC code. 
This subroutine has been updated to provide an accurate representat~on of 
graphic? mass loss as d function Of wall temperature and pressure. 
The final :nodel improvement was to provide for ~ method of limiting 
the surface temperature of a metallic material to its melting temperature. 
Thi:; I>/as dccomrlishec1 through a combination of the heat of fusion ac1dition and 
tn~ iIlel"c,ng surfac~ improvement described above. By removing surface material 
that had reached the melt i n9 temperature ina manner dependent on t:le input 
heat flux and the heat of fusion, the surface temperature was forced to remdin 
at the melting temperature. The surface temperature limitation was exempli-
fied in another \'/ay which was not evident at first. In the previous nOdel, 
the surface temperature was allowed to exceed the melt te,"'petature and attain 
an equi1ibrillr.l ',Ialue rlepending on the ciet.liled surface energy balance. This 
assul1'ption overe)timated the amount of surface ... e-radiation since lr'2.G (in 
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Equation 2) increases with the fourth power of surfdce temperature. Limiting 
the surface temperature implied that the net f1ux to the body was greater. 
Therefore, internal material was heated to higher temperatures. 
These model improvements described above provided for the r.lOst accu-
rate ca:culation to date of material response to accident environments. Any 
further improvements in the model would not be warranted until final designs 
were analyzed. In this case, perhaps some 3-D analysis would be appropriate 
because several geometric simplifications had to be mad~ to conform the real 
3-0 design to the 2-D, spherically symmetric 1 imits imposed in the current 
mOll': ~ • 
4.3.1.2 Model Descriptions 
The RETAC code provides a complex thermal response model for deter-
mlnlng the in-depth response of a material system to an external heat flux. 
Furthermore, internal heat generation is provided for as a code input. The 
external flux variation with time can be specified on input cards (e.g., to 
model a fire environment) or be calculated by the codes trajectory subroutines 
(the aerodynamic flux due to a vehicle reentering the Earth'~ atmosphere). A 
detailed surface energy balance is included to account for re-radiation, 
conduction, and surface mass loss effects. The conductivity, specific heat, 
heat of fusion, heat generation and density of various internal and surface 
material components are also input to the code to model the complex response 
of the material components to the input and internal heat fluxes. Variations 
of the ab ove materi a 1 propert i es with temperat ure are a 1 so inc 1 uded where 
appropriate. 
Geometric paramete!'s are inputed into the code to define various 
'naterial boundaries. This geometr';c defini';ion essentially divides the body 
into a series of nodal regions which interact with one another' as heat is 
transfel'red between the various nodes. An example of this complex nodal 
structure is shown in Figure 4-29. Note that for 2-dimensional (2-0) caicu-
lations the body ';s usually divided into five sectors defin~d by six input 
angles (e in Figure 4-29) where e = 0, 20. 40, 80, 120, and 180 degrees were 
used in the present study. The 3-0 shape of each sector is produced by 
rotation of the 2-D representation about the e ~ 0 axis (i.e., symmetry axis). 
For example, the conically shaped 3-0 representation of sector No.2 is shown 
crosshatched in Figure 4-29a. 
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(Q) Seclor Geometry 
(b) RlnQ Geometry 
Stctor Nc 
FIGURE 4-29. INTERNAL NODAL STRUCTURE USED TO MODEL THE 
TRANSIENT HEATING RESPONSE OF VARIOUS WASTE 
FORM MATERIAL CONFIGURATIONS 
The spheri ca 1 body is further subd i vi ded into a seri es of up to 10 
concentric rings (see Figure 4-29b). The various ring radii usually define 
spherical shell regions of the body such as the waste boundary, but several 
rings can also be used within a given material to better define the tem~era­
ture distribution within that material. The combination of rinqs and sectors 
define various nodal regions throughout the body. The location of the (sector 
= 2, ring = 2) node is shown in Figure 4-29b. It is one of the 20 nodal re-
gions shown in this figure. F0~ 2-D calculations, up to 50 nodal regions were 
used with a preponderance of nodes being located in the region of highest heat 
flux. For 1-D calculations such as a spinning reentry or a fire environment, 
only one sector from 00 to 1800 was used. Hence, the nodes reduced to a 
maximum of 10 concentric spherical shells. Regions of radiation gaps can also 
be conveniently defined usi ng the ri ng geometry. Heat transfer across a 
radiation gap is incorporated in the code and material emissivity is accounted 
for as an input variable. 
Another code input is the vehicle stability mode (i.e. randomly spin-
ning or stable at supersonic speeds). The vehicle may al so be allowed to 
randomly tumble at subsonic ~peed. For reentry cases, additional code inputs 
include the in;~3l velocity, altitude and flight path angle as well as the 
mass to area ratio (MIA) and the initial vehicle nose radius. 
The initial temperature distribution of each node (i.e., ring if the 
initial distribution is spherically symmetric) is an important code input. 
The temperature distribl'tions used in the present accident response analyses 
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are shown in Figure 4-30. Note that for the 5 MT PW-4b waste fonn, wall 
temperatures are lower than that of the Modified PW-4b material for the 
reentry vehicle due to the increased cooling required to maintain the waste 
fonn centerl i ne temperature below 600 C. However, for the unprotected 5 MT 
container, in a 5pace environment, the opposite is true, and initial surface 
reentry temperatures of the Modified PW-4b are lower than the original PI-I-4b 
waste mix. Also, note that a 9.5 MT waste form has a slightly higher reentry 
wall temperature than a 5 MT waste payload for the same Modified PW-4b waste 
mix. 
1000 
800 
U. 600 
~ ,. 
I 
e 
.. 
.... 400 
200 
(0) F'ully protected reenlrt 
vehicle 
(5MT waste form) 
...... 
........ 
(b) Unprotected container 
Modified PW-4b-95 MT 
. ~.------
'--
--_ .. _-..... .~ 
Modified -........ .. "-
.. ". PW-4b - 5MT 
.. 
...... 
Waste F'orm ROdius. em 
FIGURE 4-30. INITIAL WASTE FORM TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR 
THE REENTRY VEHICLE AND THE UNPROTECTED CONTAINER 
The reentry vehicle configuration (see reference concept - Section 
2.4) supporting a 5 ~H waste form payload is a complex material structure as 
shown in ~igure 4-31a. It can be seen from this filJure that the material 
cGnfiguration is not strictly 2-dimensional due to the presence of the honey-
comb impact dome structure. For thi s reason, the i n··depth thermal response of 
the reentry vehicle had to be modeled 111 a somewhat approximate manner. Two 
spherical, 2-D configurations utilized to model the reentry vehicle in Figure 
4-31a, are shown in Figure 4-31b. The frontside (i.e., flight path direction) 
of the body was modelea using a spherical shell of honeycomb material of the 
same mass as the impact dome structure. For the backsirle region, the model 
was ad~usted slJch that no honeycomb material was included. Ring structure for 
the ~ MT waste form reentry vehicle configuration is shown in Figure 4-31b. 
Note that 10 rings were used to model all the various material components. 
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Uranium radiGtlon l1li114 
5.8cm 
(a) Complex 3-D Reentry Vehicle (RV) 
. 
411'modtl--~f~ron~t~~~!!!~~411'model-baC" 
RIIICJNo. 
Front 
RlnCJ No 
(b) Simplified 2-D Models of Complex RV 
FIGURE 4-31. REENTRY VEHICLE MATERIAL DESCRIPTION AND 
CORRESPONDING MODELS USED IN THE PRESENT 
ACCIDENT RESPONSE ANALYSES 
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The specific ring radii for each model are given in Table 4-10. Also note, in 
Figure 4-31b that a 0.15 cm radiation gap was included in the thermal model. 
The sector model is not shown in Figure 4-3lb because it varied from case to 
case. For reentry vehicle entry into the Earth's atmosphere, a frontside 
model was used and five sectors with the 4n-geometry shown in Figure 4-29 were 
utilized. For vehicle response to the fire environment, only one sector (i.e. 
O-lBOO) was employed but both the frontside and hacks ide models were employed 
to calculate the in-depth temperature histories of the various materials. 
Ring 
~umber 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
TABLE 4-10. RING RADII VALUES OF THE NODAL REGIONS USED IN THE 
REENTRY VEHICLE THERMAL RESPONSE CALCULATIONS OF A 
5 MT WASTE FORM PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION 
Fronts ide Backside 
Model Model 
Inner Radius, Outer Radius, Inner Radius,' Outer Radius, 
cm cm cm crn 
0.00 25.40 0.00 25.40 
25.40 56.20 25.40 56.26 
56.26 57.53 56.26 57.53 
57.68 58.32 57.68 58.32 
58.32 64.16 58.32 63.40 
64.16 64.80 63.40 64.16 
64.80 81.05 64.16 64.80 
81.05 81.69 64.80 66.07 
81.69 84.23 66.07 67.51 
84.23 86.13 67.51 69.24 
The nodal model used to comput~ the thermal response of the waste 
form plus container is shown in Figure 4-32. Both 5000 kg and 9500 kg models 
are shown to scale in this figure. Eight rings were utilized with the 
majority of ri ngs bei ng located near the Guter surface ~~here the 1 argest 
temperature gradients ar2 ,.:xpected to occur. Radi i of the various ri ngs are 
also given in Figure 4-32 and as before, no sector geometry is specified in 
the figure since it varied according to the particul~r evert being examined. 
Another model that was used in the present stuc1y invol ved the 
presence of !.I spherical shell of AVeO Fine Weave Pierced Fabric (FWPF) 3-D 
graphite material on the outer surface of the container shell during reentry 
(thermal protection). This model is shown in Figure 4-33 where n~ne rings 
were employed to better define the near-surface in-depth temperature profile. 
Note that 0.89 cm of FWPF graphite ablator is shown in F11]ure 1-33. This 
amount was twice the recession loss for a stab1e reentry of the waste form 
plus container plus graphite aeroshell comoination. For a randomly spinning 
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S. S. container 
1.27cm 
--r--lI5-- RinQ No. 
(0) 5000 kQ Payload 
, 
I @: 
, 
, , 
30.48 " I 
40.64 ~50.80 I 
Radius ,em 60.96 
(bl 9500 kg Paylood 
67.'6/~/. 69.70//' 
70.33 
70.97 
S. S. container 
1.27 em 
FIGURE 4-32. NODAL MODELS USED TO COMPUTE THE THERMAL RESPONSE 
OF THE UNPROTECTED CONTAINER FOR THE 5 AND 9.5 MT 
WASTE FORM PAYLOADS 
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S. S. container 
1.21 cm 
Aveo FWPF graphite ablator 
O.89cm 
56.2C J 1 , 
56.11--1 J 
51.28 
51.53 
FIGURE 4-33. NODAL MODEL USED TO COMPUTE THE THERMAl 
RESPONSE OF A GRAPHITE PROTECTED CONTAINER 
FOR THE 5 MT WASTE FORM 
case, less graphite was required and this reduction was also properly modeled 
by appropriate changes in the radii of Rings 7, 8, and 9 (see Figure 4-31). 
The final nodal model used in the present accident response study was 
set up to represent a waste form, container, plus the uranium radiation shield 
configurations. This specific arrangement could result from a scenario where 
the ablation protection on the backside of the reentry vehicle is stripped 
away by f',ying debris. Ten rings were used in this model, as shown in Figure 
4-34, with four rings being located in the uranium to accurately predict the 
tempera~.ure distribution. The radii of the various rings including the 
presence of a 0.15 cm radiation gap are also shown in Figure 4-34. 
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S. S container 
shell 1.27 cm S.S. shell 0.69cm 
64. 16 -.J 
62.89 64.49 
64.80 
FIGU~E 4-34. NODAL MODEL USED TO COMPUTE THE THERMAL 
RESPONSE OF A CONTAINER PLUS URANIUM RADIATION 
SHIELD FOR THE 5 MT WASTE FORM 
4.3.2 Payload Thermal Analysis 
The models described in the previous section were used to predict the 
response of specific configurations to the various thermal environments, in-
cluding unplanned reentry into the Earth's atmosphere, as well as, an on-pad 
launch vehicle fire (see Figures 4-14 and 4-15). 
4.3.2.1 Payload Reentry With/Without Reentry Protection 
Var'ious types of low probability malfunctions that could occur might 
lead to the atmospheric reentry of the loaded reentry vehicle or an unprotect-
ed nuclear waste container. The RV may reenter after an emergency ejection 
from the Uprated Spare Shuttle cargo bay just prior to achieving orbit, or the 
unprotected container (having been removed and attached to the payload adapter 
of the OTV /S01S configUl"at ion) may reenter a. "er a grossly inaccurate OTV 
burn, coupled with other malfunctions. The a~."othermal responses of these 
configur3tions were characterized by using the RETAC computer code. ~aterial 
losses and re:;ultant shape changes were calculated during reentry for various 
posltions arou:1d the ~urfaces. The change in vehicle mass to area ratio 
(i.e., M/i\) due to this mass los:> was not accounted ~or in the trajp.ctory 
calculations; however, the r.ose radius was updated as material recession 
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proc!eded. ~ose-blunting effects due to this recession lowered the heat flux 
to th~ nose region somewhat, since this quantity is inversely proportional to 
the square root of nose radius. 
Both the RV and the unprotected contai ner were assumed to reenter 
the Earth's atmosphere at a velocity of 7620 mis, having a -1 degree f1 ight 
path angle, at an altitude of 91.4 km. These initial conditions were chosen 
to standardi ze the reentry analys is. They represent an orbi tal decay type 
trajectory which should provide the maximum heat input to the reentry body and 
hence the maximum in-depth temperature rise and surface mass loss. However, 
other trajt~ctory scenarios should te examined in future updated payload 
response studies to insure that this standard reentry assumptio~ is the most 
conservative case. 
The aerodynamically shaped reentry vehicle was assumed to enter in a 
stable mode. The material response analysis and recl-·',o;ion predictions for 
this case were computed using the frontside spnerical i:iudel shown in Figure 
4-31b. However. the actual vehicle mass, projected area, and nose radius were 
used in the reentry trajectory and heat flux calculations. The unprotected 
spherical container was assumed to enter in a stable mode, as well as in a 
randomly spinning condition. For the unprotected container case, the model 
shown in Figure 4-32 was used to predict the thermal response characteristics. 
A summary of the reentry parameters used in the present analyses is given in 
Table 4-11. The assumed drag coefficient curves used to calculate the 
ballistic coefficient for the two configurations are ShOPili 'in Figure 4-35. 
TABLE 4-11. INPUT '/ARIABLES FOR REENTRY ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS 
Payload Configuration 
U r. orot ect ed r (eent ry 
Parameter Cl !ltai ner Jehi cle 
Mass, kg 
Cross Sectional Area, m2 
Mas~/Area Ratio, kgimz 
Nose Radius, em 
Initial Velocity, m/s 
Initial Altitude, km 
Initial Flight Path Angle, degrees 
Drag Curve 
5401 14,913 
1.04 15.69 
5193 950.6 
57.53 60.96 
7620 7620 
91.4 91.4 
-1 -1 
-- see Figure 4-35 --
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2.0,.-----------------......., 
~ 1.0 Sphere 01 
c.~ 
o 
U 
0.00~-----~5------...... IO------"15 
mco - Mach Number 
FIGURE 4-35. DRAG COEFFICIENT CURVES USED TO CALCULATE BALLISTIC 
COEFFICIENT AS A FUNCTION OF VEHICLE MACH NUMBER 
DURING REENTRY 
Example results of reentry trajectory cdlcula'~ions for the t\'IO cases 
indicated in Table 4-11 are presented in Figures 4-36 and 4-37 wher~ stagna-
tion point heating rate, and vehicle velocity are ~'lotted as a function of 
time after reentry. 
For the reentry vehicle itself, the aerothermal analysis indicates 
that the l-inch-tnic:: layer of ~IN-r. insulation ic; suffici~nt to protect the 
il71pact dome structure, gamma-shield, and 5000 kg (5 ~T) waste form fror:1 
overheating during the reentry heating r .llse. In-depth material temperatures 
as well as the surface temperature at ,Ie stagnation point for this reentry 
case are shown ;Jlotted in Figure 1-38. Note, that little ternperat:Jre rise 
occurs in the internal structure of the vehicle during reentry. 
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FIGURE 4-36. VEHICLE STAGNATION POINT HEAT FLUX AS A FUNCTION 
OF TIME FOLLOWING ENTRY OF THE TWO BASIC REENTRY 
CONF IGURATIONS 
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FIGURE 4-37. VELOC!TY AS A FUNCTION Of REENTRY TIME FOR THE 
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1750 f\ 
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FIGURE 4-38. TEMPERATURE-TIME PLOTS FOR VARIOUS MATERIAL 
SURFACES AND NODAL REGIONS OF THE REENTRY VEHICLE (5000 KG PW-4b WASTE FORM PAYLOAD) DURING 
ATMOSPHERIC REENTRY 
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The impact velocity of the reentry vehicle is predicted to be 110.9 
m/s. The honeyconb steel impact dome is designed to cushion the waste form 
package to prevent gamma-shield rupture at impact. However. heat generated 
within the wdste form package will increase with time after impact. The 
material impact temperature shown in Figure 4-38 could be used as an initial 
condition to predict the thermal history of the reentry vehicle container 
after impact. This analysis was not performed in the present study, but 
system overheat problems would be expected to occur unless the Modified PW-4b 
waste mix or other "cooler" mixes are utilized. 
For an unprotected 5000 kg waste form surrounded ty only a 1.27 cm 
thick stainless steel container, the aerothermal analysis ind~rdtes that sev-
ere material recession is predicted to occur for the stable reentry mode. 
Calculations of this recession were performed for both stable and spinning 
reentry modes, as well as for two i nit i al temperature scenarios (see Tab le 
4-12). Initial temperatures for both the reference PL~-4b and Modified P\~-4b 
cases wer'e examined and it was found that the resultant recession \,/as quite 
sensitive to the initial material temperature values. The difference in 
internal heat generation, itself, was not an important factor in the calcula-
tion. Recession results for the above cases are given in Table 4-12. Note 
that only for the case of Modified PW-4b and a randomly spinning reentry, is a 
zero waste recess ion predicted. For all other cases, a varyi ng amount of 
waste material is expected to be dispersed into the Earth's atmosphere. 
TABLE 4-12. RECESSION RESULTS FOR REENTRY OF 
VARIOUS UNPROTECTED CONTAINER CASES 
Case Waste Mix(a) 
1 PW-4b 
? P\~-4b 
3 Modified PW-4b(b) 
4 Modified P~-4b(b) 
Reentry 
Mode 
Staple 
Spinning 
Staple 
Spinning 
Initial Waste 
Form Surface 
Temperature, K 
800 
800 
573 
573 
Total 
Recession, 
cm 
19.16 
1. 72 
14.09 
0.95 
I.~aste 
Recession, 
cm 
17.89 
0.45 
12.82 
0.00 
Note~: (a) ''';aste mix determined heating rat~ and initial temperature 
condition. 
(b) Modified PW-4b assumes 90 percent removal of Cs and Sr from t~e 
P\~-4b mix. 
A detailed aerothermal analysis was also completed for the Cdse of a 
Modified P\~-4b 5000 kg waste form. including a stainless steel container plus 
a 4rr shell of AVeO 3D Fine Weave Pierced Fabric (FWPF) ablation protection.* 
*Conceptually, the AVCO FWPF could be applied to the container by winding it 
I'/ith carbon fiber yarn, impregnating it with carboll fiber, then prorerly 
processing it to the desired properties. The internal heat generation of the 
waste form might very VIe 1 1 aid jn the fabrication rrocess. 
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It was found that 0.89 cm thickness of ablator was required to provide a 100 
percent margin of safety for ablator burn through during a stable reentry (a 
GPHS design requirement). However. the results of temperature calculations 
shown in Figure 4-39 indicate that the stainless steel container beneath the 
gr":'~ te ablation member completely melted over most of the fonc/ard portion of 
th~ .. aste form mass (see Figure 4-40). The waste form surface itself did not 
melt. but a question arises as to possible r~lease of waste material if the 
unsupported graphite aeroshell were to structurally fail during reentry. thus 
exposing the waste form directly to the reentry environment. 
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FIGU~E 4-39. TEMPERATURE-TIME PLOTS FOR VARIOUS MATERIAL 
SURFACES AND NODAL REGIONS OF THE 5000 KG WASTE 
FORM IN A GRAPHITE PROTECTED AEROSHELL DURING 
ATMOSPHERIC REENTRY 
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FIGURE 4-40. EXTENT OF MELTING OF THE STAINLESS STEEL CONTAINER 
UNDER THE GRAPHITE SHELL ABLATION MEMBER 
For the spinning reentry case, only 0.25 em of 30-FWPF graphite 
ablator thickness is required for 100 percent margin of safety on recession. 
Also, no container material melting is predicted to OCClJr. Therefore. the 
41T graphite protection, spinning reentry case will result in no predicted 
rel~ase of waste to the atmosphere for the initial temperature profiles chosen 
(see Table 4-12). 
In summary, some extra thermal protection of the waste form is 
required, other than the thin stainless steel container shell. to prevent 
severe recession of the waste form during a possible stable reentry. 
Furthermore, the addition of a 41T graphite ablation shell will reduce. but 
cannot guarantee a zero mass loss because the stainless steel container melts 
and may not structurally support the graphite material. Following a detailed 
structural analysis. it is very likely that some other type of higher melting 
point container material would be recommended to ensure that no waste release 
occurs. 
;mpact: velocity of the unprotected container is 365 m/s which is 
nearly four tim~s that of the reentry vehicle configurations. There is little 
impact protection offered by the stainless steel container or even an 
additional graphite ae:"oshell. The container impact on land is therefore 
expected to create a large crater with the high likelihood of structural 
damage. In any event, since no radiation protection would be available. a 
significant radiation hazard would exist in the impact region. unless the 
waste form is buried deep enough under the surface. The probability of traces 
of radioactivity being present in airborne material released from the crater 
zone should be examined. as well as the consequences of a possible breach due 
to me It down. 
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4.~2.2 On-Pad Launch Vehicle Pad Fire Analysis 
Three configurations were examined to determine the in-depth material 
response to an on-pad launch vehicle fire. The first two configurations 
elTtodied different orientations of the entire reentry vehicle. Both the 
backside dnd frontside model orientations given in Figure 4-31b were utilized 
to exam; ne the effects of the honeycorrb impact dome structure which exi sted 
only on the nose region of the reentry vehicle. The third configuration 
included the waste container and radiation shiel1 only and neglected the 
reentry protection and impact structure (see Figure 4-34). The latter case 
simulates the case where a possible fragment impact event would strip away the 
reentry vehicle ablation shield on the backside (no impact protection exists 
on the backside). 
Transient material response of these configurations w~s analyzed 
using the RETAC computer code. Input radiant heat flux from the fire is given 
in Figure 4-14. It should be noted that the total heat flux from the lfquid 
fire is significantly less than that of the worst-case solid propellant fire, 
us~d in pr~vious accident response analyses (Phase II study--Reference 4-71). 
This heat flux was assumed to be incident on the entire surface of the 
configuration being examined. Reradiation by the entire material surface was 
a1so included. For this reason the wall temperature approaches an equilibrium 
limit. In-depth temperature history calculations proceeded for 1 hour 
following the natural termination of the fire. This extended analysiS was 
performed to examine the possibility that auxillat·y cooling could not be 
applied to the waste form package until 1 hour after fire burnout. 
The heat of fusion of all material components was accounted for in 
the analysis and surface metallic material was removed as the melting 
temperature was reached and the heat of fusion supplied. For the cases where 
d graphite outer shell was present, it was assumed that no graphite material 
loss occurred. This is a good assumption for a fire environment because 
nearly all the available oxygen is removed by the combustion process. 
Therefore, during the fire, 1 ittle gr~phitE:' oxidation is expected. However. 
after the fire ceases, some oxidation may occur because the graphite surface 
is now hot and oxygen is available. An example of such a material loss event 
is that of a piece of charcoal after i'1itial he"!ting by an auxi11ary flame. 
This possibility of postfire graphite loss was not accounted for in the 
present analysis, since it was assumed that sufficient cooling would be 
supplied by the fire fighting equipment to lower the surface to below the 
oxidation t~mperature limit of approximately 1100 c. 
The in-depth thermal responses of various materit1l components of the 
reentry vehicle to the fire environment are shown in Figure 4-4l. Tempera-
tures for the P!~-4b and i~odified P!·J-4b 5000 kg-based reentry vehicles are 
given in this figure for comparison purposes to indicate the eff~cts of inital 
temperature distributions and internal heat generation on the overall mate-
rials thermal response. It shollld be noted that loss of coolant was also 
assumed to accompany the explosion/fire event stich that the contribution of 
internal heat would be included in the analysis. Wilen the results of Figure 
4-41 were compared to calculations that assum( coolant loss only. it showec1 
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that the internal heat generating term tends to dominate the external fire 
heat fl ux effect, especi ally for the waste form. This domi nance occurs 
because the MIN-K insulation material is excfllent for keeping the fire 
genera:ed heat from penetrating very far into the reentry vehicle surface. It 
also retards internally generated heat from escaping. Finally, the results in 
Figure 4-41 indicate that the PW-4b waste mix temperature increases rapidly 
with time due to the increased intarnal heat generation. Therefore, waste 
payload overheat problems are likely to occur unless auxPi~ry cooling is 
somehow app"ied to the configuration (see Section 3.4 for discussion of 
temperature rise rate). 
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FIGURE 4-41. TEMPERATURE-TIME PLOTS FOR THE WASTE SURFACE AND 
WASTE CENTERLINE AS A RESULT OF A LAUNCH VEHICLE 
FIRE FOR BOTH PW-4b AND MODIFIED PW-4b 5000 KG 
WASTE FORM PAYLOADS ENCLOSED IN THE REENTRY VEHICLE 
CONFIGURATION 
The thermal response of the reentry vehicle without impa,t and 
thermal protection systems shield (simulating the loss of TPS on the backside) 
to a launch pad fire environment is ~hown in Figures 4-42 and 4-43. In Figure 
4-42 results for the waste form response are shown, and in Figure 4-43, the 
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uranium radiation shield component temperatures are presented. Note, that 
when no thermal protection is present, the fire heat flux adds considerably to 
the temperature rise of the waste material. In fact. within 1 hour after the 
fire. the waste form temperatures approach a value indicative of the casp. of a 
6 hour coolant loss. Uranium temperature history data. shown in Figure 4-43. 
indicate that the outer stainless steel shell (i.e •• Node 9) remains well 
below the melting temperature. and that the temperature drops off initially 
after the fire burns out. However. if the analysis were extended to include a 
few more hours. the urani um radi at i on shi el d temperature ( i • e.. Nodes 5 
through 8) would increase. due to the internal heat generation. 
1400 
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u 
CII ::00 
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"" 10. 600 CII ~ 
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200 
0 I I I 
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FIGURE 4-42. TEMPERATURE-TIME PLOTS FOR THE WASTE FORM AS A 
RESULT OF AN ON-PAD LAUNCH VEHICLE FIRE FOP. PW-4b 
AND MODIFIED PW-4b 5000 KG WASTE FORMS SURROUNDED BY 
CONTAINER AND RADIATION SHIELD ONLY 
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FIGURE 4-43. TEMPERATURE-TIME ?LOTS FOR THE URANIUM RADIATION 
SHEIlD SURROUNDING A 5000 KG PW-4b WASTE FORM MIX 
AS A RESULT OF AN ON-PAD LAUNCH VEHICLE FIRE 
4.3.3 Release Predictions 
For an inadvertent reentry and an on-pad launch vehicle fire, the 
thermal analysis given in Sectio., 4.3.~ indicated that no waste form release 
is expected to occur for the fully protected reentry vehicle configuration. 
However, for an unprotected container, severe stagnaticn point recession was 
predi cted to occur duri ng stab 1 e-mode atmospheric reentry as di scussed in 
Section 4.3.2.1. The resultant change in waste form shape due to recession 
fol1owing a stable reentry is shown in Figure 4-44. Note that severe 
recession occurs on the entire forward portion of the body for the stahle 
reentry attitude. The percent mass loss accompaning this severe recession was 
computed using the recession radii obtained from Figure 4-44; the resultant 
percent of mass loss values are also shown in this figure. Note that 11.2 
percent of the 5000 kg waste form mass was predicted to be released into the 
atmosphere for the Modified P;·J-4b ~/aste form configurat ion. ,\ lso note, that 
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due to the expected higher initial temperatures, an additional 12.6 percent 
mass loss (23.8 percent total) was predicted to occur for the PW-4b waste 
payload. Much less release is predicted to occur for a randomly spinning 
unprotected container. Calculations for the spinning case indicate that the 
rel ease amounts to 2.4 percent of the f nitial 5000 kg payload for the PW-4b 
waste form and no release for the Modified PW-4b waste form. 
Ablat.d wast. shap. 
(Madlfl.d PW- 4 b) 
Original wast. Ihap. 
11.2 -t. mall lOll 
(Modifitd PW-4b) 
12,6 -t. additional mall lOll 
(PW- 4b) 
--+ - ---fiII!I~~ -
Flight path 
FIGURE 4-44. WASTE FORM SHAPE CHANGE FOLLOWING ATMOSPHERIC 
REENTRY OF AN UNPROTECTED 5000 kg WASTE MASS 
~aste release results for the 9500 kg Modified PW-4b waste form plus 
unprotected container also show a significant mass loss of 10.6 percent for 
the stable mode during inadvertent reentry and no release for the spinning 
case. This percent release is less than the smaller 5000 kg waste form but 
more material is actually released due to the larger" initial mass. These 
calculations l'ierl: performed in support of the preliminary HLLV safety 
assessment (see Section 4.4). 
A summary of mass rel eased into the Earth' s atmosphere due to the 
i.ladvertent "eentry of various unprotected containers is given in Table 4-13. 
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TABLE 4-13. WASTE MASS RELEASE DURING UNPROTECTED 
WASTE FORM PLUS CONTAINER REENTRY 
Initial 
Mass/ Waste Form I nitial Waste 
Are~ Waste: Wall FOrni Mass Percent kg/ Mix Temperature, K kg Released 
5193 PW-4b 800 5000 23.8 
5193 Modi fl ed PW-4b 573 5000 11.2 
5193 PW-4b 800 5000 2.4 
5193 Modified PW-4b 573 5000 0.0 
6622 Modified PW-4b 608 9500 10.6 
6622 Modi fi ed PW-4b 608 9500 0.0 
Note: (a) Iron/nickel-based cermet waste form. 
Mass 
Relened, 
kg 
1190 
560 
120 
0 
1007 
0 
The large disparity in waste mass loss due to randomly spinning and 
stable reentry indicates that some vehicle stability analysis would prove 
helpful in support of a more accurate assessment of unprotected waste form 
release during inadvertent reentries. It is likely that a strictly stable 
reentry produces a conservative release prediction. Also, a randomly spinning 
mode is not likely to or.~ur, but rather, spinning about some particular body 
axis such that an increased amount of nonuniform 3-0 ablation would occur. 
The actual waste mass release is likely to be between the limits given in 
Table 4-13. It should also be noted that aerodynamiC techniques to induce 
vehicle spinning could ~e utilized to reduce the amount of waste release. 
Due to these large predicted releases of waste mass, the case for a 
4'!f graphite ablation member surrounding the unprotected waste container was 
examined (see Figure 4-33). However, uncertainty as to the structural 
integrity of the stainless steel container shell, makes it impossible to 
predict waste form mass release at this time. It would be less than indicated 
in Figure 4-44 because of the protection afforded by the graphite member, but 
how much less, cannot be easily determined. 
Finally, with regard to the the PW-4b waste form. container. and 
radiation shield configuration as shown in Figure 4-34. no release is 
predicted to occur due to an on·pad launch vehicle fire provided that cooling 
is initiated within approximately 1 hour after fire burnout. This time limit 
\'1ould be significantly extended for the Modified PW-4b waste mix, because of 
the reduced internal heat generation rate. 
4.3.4 _Recommended Design Changes 
Based upon the release analysis given in the previous section, design 
changes can be suggested to improve the acc; dent response of the reference 
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waste payload configuration. In the CJse of the on-pad launch vehicle fire 
environment, no design changes are "ecomnended at this time, s1nce no release 
is nredicted. fo4owever, the Modified PW-4b cermet waste fonn will have a 
decreased probability of over heating due to loss of coolant, so, it is 
recOlTll1ended that this waste fonn mix be utl1ized based upon this safety 
concern. 
For an inadvertent reentry of the waste fonn plus container, it was 
found that large amounts (approximately 1 MT) of waste could be released into 
the Earth's atmosphere under certain conditions. Therefore, some design 
recommendations have been made. 
Sp.veral methods available to reduce the waste mass loss are indicated 
by the results shown in Table 4-13. These techniques are: 
• Aerodynamic devices to insure vehicle spinning during reentry 
• Reduction in initial surface temperature 
• Reduction in the vehicle ballistic coefficient 
• Addition of a reentry protection shell to the outside wall of the 
sphere 
• New container material 
Spi nni ng the vehie Ie distributes the heat and thereby reduces mass 
loss. Therefore, following a detailed ret"try stability analYSiS, methods 
could be devised to destabilize the unprotected spheric!! container. For ex-
ample, small protrubances and/or indentations properly p1a\.'ed around the vehi-
cle to disrupt sym~try could cause rotation of the was:e form about some 
particular body axis. This method may not eliminate mass le-ss, but it will 
dramatically reduce it. 
Results given in Table 4-13 indicate that waste mass loss is approxi-
mately proportional to the initial surface temperature squared. This depen-
dency occurs because more heat is required to raise the cool~r waste material 
to its melting temperature. The simplest method of reducing ttle waste form 
wall temperature would be to use the Modified PW-4b w.,ste mix whiCh has 90 
percent of the Cs and Sr removed. Smaller waste form payload sizes would also 
reduce surface temperature, somewhat. 
Further examination 0f Table 4-13 shows that waste release is roughly 
proportional to the vehicle ballistic coefficient squarerJ. This derendance 
arises because the total heat input to a reentry vehicle varies rJirectly with 
its ballistic coefficent. The simplest way to reduce the ballistic coef-
ficient is to reduce the payload ITlc1SS by reducing tile waste form radius, 
(i.e •• reduce the mass to area ratio). However, a more efficient way is to 
;nake the waste fonn hollow and maintain the same outside radius or even 
increase the outside radius to maintain the same mass. (The hollow sphere 
concept would also be advantageous during normal operation--thermal limi!s.) 
The mass to area ratios of a solid and hcdlow sphere are related to th~ir 
respective outside radii, Rs and Rh, by the following equatior;: 
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(16) 
where (M/A)s and (M/A)h are the mass to are~ ratfos (f.e., ballistic 
coefficient) for the solfd sphere and the hono .. sphere, respectively. To 
maintain constant waste payload mass, the fnside radius of the hollow sphere 
1 s given by: 
( 1 7) 
Gfven the fnitial sphere radius, Equations (16) and (17) can therefore be used 
to determine the dimensions of a hollow sphere of equal mass, once the desired 
fncrease in MIA is chosen. For example, to doub)e the MIA ratio [i.e., 
(M/A)s/(M/A)h • 1/2] for the 5000 kg waste form the initial solid sphere 
radiuS of 56.26 em should be incre.::sed to 79.56 cm and an insfde radius of 
68.79 cm should be used for the hollow sphere. This configuration is 
est imated to have a waste form rel ease of only 140 kg, f f the Modi f1 ed pw-lb 
waste mix fs assumed (f.e., 2.8 percent mass loss). 
It is shown 1n the Section 4.3.3 that addition of il graphite abla-
tion shell surrounding the container would likely produce a decrease in the 
waste mass release. However, quantifying the reduction is difficult because 
the container completely melted on the forward stagnation point region for a 
stable reentry mode. This container melting could pOSsibly cause structural 
failure of the graphite shell, thus negating some of it's mass loss reduction 
capability. Again, destabilization techniques would reduce, if not eliminatp., 
mass loss, because container melting was not predicted for a randomly spinning 
reentry stability mode. 
Another way to improve reliability of the ablation shell concept 
would be to replace the stainless steel container shell with another material 
that has a higher melting temperature. It could also be important that this 
new material ~ave thermal properties similar to those of stah"ess stp.e1. 
This latter restriction is desirahle to insure that substitution of the new 
material to eliminate the melting problem, would not cause some other problem 
to occur. 
Several candidate ceramic and metal 1 ic materials that could be used 
to replace the stainless steel ccntainer are given in Table 4-14. Also listP.d 
in this table are the melting temperature, specific heat, conductivity, 
density, and product of density and specific heat for these candidate high-
melting-point materials. ThE! propertie~. ~f stainless steel are also listed in 
Table 4-14 for comparison purposes. ;';;.ny of these materials have similar 
properties to those of stafnless steel. and could serve as the substitute 
container shell. Economics, manufacturing difficulty, and other factors would 
be instrumentdl in the final choice. 
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TABLE 4-14. CANDIDATE MATERIALS TO SUBSTITUTE FOR STAINLESS STEEL 
IN A HIGH MELTING POINT CONTAINER 
Heat Capacity-Cp Conduct hi ty 
at 400 C, Melting at 400 C, DenS~y, Cpt ~, 
Materi a1 ca1/g-C Pt., C W/cm-C 9/C cal/cml C 
Meta 15: 
SS 304 0.16 1450 0.2 7.8 1.25 
Niobium 0.01' 2700 0.5 8.6 0.60 
Tungsten 0.04 3650 1.2 19 0.76 
Zirconium 0.07 1850 0.2 6.5 0.46 
Tf tani um 0.13 1800 0.2 5.0 0.65 
'to1ybdenum 0.06 2800 0.12 9.9 0.59 
Cer!mics: 
Alumina 0.30 2000 0.10 3.6 1.08 
Zirconia 0.15 2700 0.02 5.6 0.84 
Sl1 icon Carbide 0.30 2700 0.33 3.2 0.96 
Berylli urn Oxide 0.45 2500 0.8-1.0 2.97 1.34 
Bo!"on Nitride 0.40 3200 0.42 2.25 0.90 
In summary, a series of design modifications are 4vailable to reduce 
and/or eliminate waste material release into the atmosphere during an inc1d-
vertent reentry of an unprotected container. The choice of the most appropri-
ate techniques/concepts should be evaluated during the detailed systems 
concepts stud1es that are expected during 1980. 
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4.4 Preliminary HLLV Safety Assessment 
The HLlV concept considered is a design proposed in Satellite Power 
System (SPS) studies. It is shown in Figure 2-13 and is described in Section 
2.8.5. Principal differences between the HLLV and reference concept, as ap-
plied to the waste disposal operation are summarized in Table 2-9 (also see 
Section 2.8). The HLLV could reduce disposal transportation costs from 
$8000/kg (value for Uprated Shuttle) to $2400/kg (see Section 4.4.2 for 
detail s). 
The HLLV rE'presents a moderate step forward in vehicle design 
(2-stages fully reusable) from the reference Uprated Space Shuttle concept, 
and assumes moderate improvements in some vehicle subsystems. From a safety 
standpOint, use of the HLLV should not be significantly different from use of 
the Uprated Space Shuttle. Flight operations and payload handling techniques 
would be very similar, and the overall reliability of the HLLV should be 
comparable to that of the Uprated Space Shuttle. However, the HllV is a much 
1 arger vehicle with greater payload capabil ity (231,000 kg versus 45,400 kg 
for the Uprated Space Shuttle). Hence, the potential for more severe accident 
environments {e.g., much more propellents involved in the expln~ion and 
ensuing fireball} exists, as does the potential for more serious con~ '~'Jences 
of protection system failure--larger HLLV waste packages have a higller re~'=ilse 
potential. 
This preliminary analysis discusses the hazard posed by the two most 
serious accident possibil Hies: on-pad or near-pad explosion and fire, and 
inadvertent reentry with an uprotected payload. 
4.4.1 On-Pad or Near-Pad Explosion/Fire 
The HLLV uses the same propellents (RP-l, hydrogen, oxygen) as does 
the Uprated Space Shuttle, and in approximately the same proportions. How-
ever, the HLLV requires over three times the total propellent load of the Up-
rated Shuttle. Thus, in the event of an on-pad or near-pad failure a larger 
explosion and fire environment could result. Table 4-15 compares typical 
on-pad accident environments of the HLLV and Uprated Space Shuttle, that have 
been compiled from data developed in Section 4.2. 
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TABLE 4-15. COMPARISON OF HllV AND UPRATEO SPACE SHUTTLE ON-PAD 
ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTS 
Environmenda} 
Fireball 
Initial Fireball Temperature, K 
Time to Fireball Liftoff, s 
Tine to Stem liftoff, s 
Heat Flux at Stem li ftoff, k~~/rn2 
P~sidual Fire 
Fire ~emperat~s" K 
Duratlon, sec 
Blast Wave(c} 
Side-on Overpressure, N/cm2 
Reflected Overpressure, N/cm2 
Side-on Impulse, N-s/cm2 
Reflect~d Impulse, N-s/cm2 
Fragments 
Mean Fragment Velocity, m/s 
Mean Fragment Size, m2 
Fragment Flux, number/m2 
Uprated Space 
Shuttle 
3057 
7.27 
10.9 
2470 
j366 600 
250 
1700 
2.0 
15.0 
200 
0.3 
0.8 
Notes: (a) Data from work performed in Sec~f:-·2. 
HlLV 
3058 
8.90 
13.4 
2700 
j356 600 
410 
3050 
4.6 
35.0 
250 
0.3 
0.9 
(b) Proper dike design is assumed to limit residual fires to 1 hour. 
(c) Assumes a di stance from COE of 20 meters dnd a 10 percent 
explosive yield for both cases. In reality, the percent yield is 
likely to be less for the HllV than the Uprated Space Shuttle. 
The data ill the tab 1 e (constructed from data inSect ion 4.2) i nd i-
cate that the accident environments for these two vehicles actually are 
pl"'edicted to be very similar. The blast wave environment for the HLLV is 
significantly higher; however, in reality this is not expected to he the case. 
The yield for the HlLV is expected to ~e lower than the yield for the Uprated 
Shuttle for a similar event. One can conclude, from revie\~ing these data, and 
with the assumption that the reentry vehicl~s are properly designed, such that 
adequate margin exists for surviving the on-pad accident, that there is lit-
tle difference in the overall risk. On the other hand, if the reentry 
vehicle/protection system does fail, the allloimt of radioact.ive material 
released in a single incident is potentially much greater for the HLLV (28,500 
kg) than for the Uprated Space Shuttle (5(100 kg) case. This fact is of 1 itt le 
concern; however, since proper design (and over.lll concept) can all hut 
eliminate the probability of such d release. 
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4.4.2 Inadvertent Reentry 
Each HLLV launch will orbit three OTV/SOIS/waste package configura-
t ions. Each waste/package contains a spherical 9,500 kg cermet waste fonn. 
Thus, failure of an DTV, following removal of the payload protection system 
could result in the reentry of a 9,500 kg waste mass. In the equivalent event 
for the Uprated Space Shuttle case, 5,000 kg of waste mass could reenter. For 
one event, the larger mass will result in a larger upper atmospheric release 
of radioactive material and would produce increased health effects. Assuming 
a similar unprotected \~aste package configurati<'ns and a nonspinning reentry 
mode, the reentry of the 9,500 kg HLLV waste package would result in the 
release of 1007 kg of waste, as compared to 560 kg for the 5,000 kg Uprated 
Space Shuttle package (s~e Section 4.3.3). This increased release for the HLLV 
would result in an 80 percent increase in total health effects. Therefore, 
the hazard potential for a single inadvertent reentry accident (assuming 
no-change in waste package des i gn) is greater for the HLLV than for the 
Uprated Space Shuttle. However, OTV reliability would be expected to be the 
same in both cases, and the HLLV option requires fewer OTV flights for the 
total program. Thus, the probability of a failure occurring is less for the 
HLLV option. The net result is that overall program risk and potential health 
effects can be expected to be approximately the same for both options. 
As noted, the above assessment assumes the HLLV option uses the same 
waste package design as the Uprated Space Shuttle. Under that assumption d 
significant savings in space Transportation cost is achieved. F.:ach HLLV 
mission (HLLV + 3 OTV'S + 3 SOIS's) costs $68 million (MSFC provided) and 
disposes of 3 x 9500 kg or 28,500 kg of waste. Each Uprated Space Shuttle 
mission (Uprated Space Shuttle + 1 OTV + 1 SOlS) costs $40 million (MSFC 
provided) and disposes of 5000 kg of waste. Thus, for the Uprated Space 
Shuttle, disposal costs S8000/kg, and for the HLLV, it costs $2400/kg. The 
HLLV cost is less than one-third the Shuttle cost. If risk becomes a more 
critical issue, then some (or all) of the transportation cost savings could be 
sacrificed to further reduce risks. Individual HLLV waste spheres could be 
made smaller and the weight saved could be used to increase protective 
packaging/shielding. For example, in the limiting case, where the HLLV waste 
spheres are reduced to the point where HLLV transportation cost equals Uprated 
Space Shuttle cost, the HLLV spheres could be encased in a 22 cm thick steel 
shell. This would significantly reduce the risk associated with all types of 
accidents. Therefore, it may be concluded that the HLLV option holds 
significant potential for reducing cost and/or reducing risk. 
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5.0 HEALTH EFFECTS ASSESSMENT 
The overall objective of the continuing Health Effects Assessment is 
to provide estimates of radiation doses and health effects from major space 
disposal accidents, where nuclear wastes are postulated to be released to the 
biosphere. An additional subobjective of this activity was to support the 
selection process for the nuclear waste mix composition for space disposal. 
The postul ated accidents prev; ously studi ed(5-1) were a catastro-
phic on-or near-pad booster failure and an upper atmospheric payload burnup. 
Estimates of individual and population doses ~nd health effects were based on 
the internal dose due to inhalation of radioactive aerosol for defense waste 
payloads. Studies conducted during this Phase III effort provide: (1) an 
assessment of various generalized indices for comparing the notential hazard 
associated with different nuclea" waste mixes (Section 5.1); (2) a critical 
review of methods available for dealing with the resuspension problem (Section 
5.2); and (3) an assessment of the upper atmospheric burnup of commercial 
waste payloads, by the estimation of the pote"tial world population dose, 
including the consideration of inhalation of resuspended fallout particles 
(Sec~ion 5.3). Analysis performed in Section 5.3 was based upon the use of 
Modified PW-4b waste mix (see Sections 3.2, 3.4 and Appendix F). 
The health effects assessment conducted in Section 5.3 is not 
intended to be used in comparisons with other waste disposal options or used 
in environmental assessments of the space option. Its sole purpose is to 
influence the design selection and operational alternatives, such that, a safe 
space disposal concept is evolved. 
. .,. 
, 
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5.1 Hazard Index Evaluation 
One of the problems assuciated with geologic disposal is the 
uncertai nty associ ated with waste package performance over long peri ods of 
time. Furthermore, radionucl ide transport from the geologic repository to 
:nan's environment is based on uncertain values of KO. the transport coef-
ficient. The AEGIS (Assessment of Effectiveness of Geologic Isolatfon 
Systems) Program is developing models for radionuclide transport ,;i;d 1'5 
experimentally attempting to determine the necessary KO values. It is 
bel i eved that space di sposal of the long-term hazardous or otherwi se noxi ous 
portions of high-level waste (HLW) could beneficially augment terrestrial 
disposal. 
To assess the possible risk/benefits derived fron space disposal. tw~ 
hazard mQdels were eval~t~d. The two models selected for study were 
ORIGEN(S-2) and AMRAW~A.l!:l-2) ORIGEN is an isotope generation and deple-
tion code which can calculat,i the quantity of air or water necessary to dilute 
each radionuclide ~or,tained in HLW to the m~ximum permissible concentration 
(MPC) dt various pOints in time. It does not account for geologic transport 
of radionuclices. their subsequent uptake in food chains, nor estimate the 
subsequent dose r.lte to individuals in the viCinity of the repository. In 
contrast, AMRAw-A has a source term-model similar to ORIGEN to calculate 
radionuclide concen1.rl1tions at various pOints in time, a release model which 
Simulates gec'o?ic trr.f'sport. an environmental model which simulates radio-
nuclide uptake 111 food chains. and can estimate the resultant dose rate to 
individuals in the vfcinity of the repository at various points in time. 
USing the °W-4b co/!'mercial HLW mix as input (see Section 3.2). 
several !.AUGEN cases were run to determine the most "hazardous" radionucl ides 
with re~;ect to dilution requirements for water and air (ignoring transport. 
uptake. dtC.). The most hazardous radionucl ides. as defined in this model. 
are these Io:hich require the 9t'p.at,est quantity of air or water to be diluted to 
the maximum ,)ermissible conct'ntr<ltion (MPC). Figure 5-1 presents the results 
of ORl'~EN cllculations for air' dilution. Included in Figure 5-1 are curves 
show;f'\,J tht' ";1' dilution r'!Qljired for the totll mass of radionuc:lides for 
spen~ fue~ "ncJ ft'}r PW-4b H!.W 1,1us structural materials. clddding. ai1d volatile 
fissi~r "HOI'duct;. ~ddit~Dnal curves show the reduction in air di lution 
resulti.'lg "rom: (l) t~rrestrial disposal of PW-4b HLW. plus the other 
radionuc;';',es ~I.sc,.ibt:d above; (2) space dhposal 99 percent of the actinides 
(Am. Cm, ~~J ~p); and (3) space disposal of the PW-4b HlW fraction, where only 
the structural materials, cladding. and volatile fission products remain on 
Earth. It is worth noting (assuming the ORIGE~ code) that space di!tPosal of 
~c or I contributes an insignificant reduc";ion in air dilu";ion requirements. 
It is also evid~nt that the space disposal of 99 percent of the Am. Cm. and ~p 
provides a lessening of the hazarc1 only to < 10,000 years, and that after 
10,000 years. actinide removal has little effect based on this Simple dilution 
hazard model • 
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FIGURE 5-1. POTENTIAL HAZARD INDEX (AIR) AS A FUNCTION 
OF TIME FOR COMMERCIAL ~ASTE (ORIGEN CODE) 
For water dilution, curves similar to those described above are shown 
in Figure 5-2. Again, space dislX)sal of 99 percent of Am, CrTl, and Np, only 
provides a sl ig,t lessening of the '-haz~rd" up to 10,000 years. The space 
disposal of the entire PW-4b HLW portion to space, -iltth terrestrial disposal 
of structural materials, claddin~. and volatile fission products, provides a 
more significant lessenil'\9 of t~t! !azard throughout the time period examined. 
Figure 5-3 depicts the lessening ,- naz~rd if Tc or 1 is sent to space and the 
remaining PW-4b radionuclides, structural ITlacerials, cladding, and vola~ile 
fission products remain on Earth. This dilution model indicates Tc and 1 
contribute insignificantly to the reduction in potential hazard. 
The conclusions which may be made with respect to the ORIGEN hazard 
analysis for commercial waste are: 
• The only mix which s;gnificantly lessens the hazard of terrestrial 
disposal is sending the entire HLW fraction tv space and keeping 
the structural materials, claddinlj. and volatile fission products 
on Earth. 
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• "Hazard" as defined in the ORIGEN model is a naive approach wnich 
should not be taken seriously; the model is overly simplistic and 
does not provide a realistic evaluation of the problem. 
5.1.2 Analysis Based Upon AMRAW-A Hazard Model 
The AMRAW-A model, developed for the USt:PA(5-3), represents an 
at~empt to mathematically model the radioactive source term, resultant trans-
port or release of radionuclides, their uptake in food chains, and subsequent 
dose rate to man in the vicinity of a repository. Even though many assump-
tions are required, AMRAW-A is much more realistic in defining the hazard 
associated with specific radionculides for terrestrial disposal. 
Although time and funding constraints did not permit actual implemen-
tation of the AMRA\~-A model on the (BC~}computer, a valuable example is pro-
vided in the AMRAW-A report itself. 5- The example is for HLW (with 99.5 
percent of U and Pu removed for recycle) stored in bedded salt at a specific 
site in New Mexico. Figure 5-4 presents the results of the AMRAW-A analysis 
fO.t' the example described above, showing the radionuclides which contribute 
most significantly to the dose rate versus time. 90S r and l37Cs contrib-
ute significantly to the dose rate for the first few hundred years and then 
decay away. Because of this relatively quick decay, engineered barriers 
should be able to sufficiently contain Sr and Cs, thus they are not suitable 
candidates for space disposal (see Appendix F). From approximately 500 years 
to 5000 yea rs after HLW emplacement, 241 Am and 243Am contri bute most s i g-
nificantly to dose rate. Since engineered barriers cannot presently demon-
~trate reliable containment for periods t.:p to 5000 years both 241Am and 
~43Am are candidates for space disQosal. From approximately 5000 years to 
about 900,000 years, 99Tc and 22fRa are the Inajor contributors to dose 
rate. If 99Tc can be effectively removed from HLW it is obviously a candi-
date for space di sposal • 226Ra is a daughter product of 238U and 234U, 
therefore it cannot be sent to space itself. However, if uranium can be more 
efficiently separated at the reprocessing plant and recycled, the quantity of 
uranium included in the HLW will be less. This will ultimately result in a 
reduction in the quantit~ of 226Ra generated. Finally, beginning at appro-
x i mate 1 y 900 ,000 years, 37Np becomes a major cont ri butor to the dose rate 
and is a candidate for space disposal. 
The conclusions which may be made with respect to the AMRAW-A 
analysis for commercial waste are: 
• A potential mix for space disposal, useful in effectively re-
ducing the h.:izard associated with terrestrial disposal, is the 
actinide fraction of HLW plus Tc. 
• AMRA\~-A represents a significantly more realistic assessment of 
the terrestrial disposal hazard and possible benefits of space 
disposal than ORIGEN. 
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• It is important to note that 1291, often considered as a major 
problem for terrestrial disposal, does not contribute significant-
ly to the dose rate for the time span shown. 
101~------------------------------------------------~ 
Source: Reference 5-3. 
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FIGURE 5-4. RESULTS FROM AMRAW-A MODEL 
In summary, the continuation of this type of analysis ~s vital to the 
proper selection of the nuciide mix for space disposal. The models, like the 
AMRAW-A or AEGIS codes, should be applied to space disposal option. The 
4-year Concept Definition and Evaluation Program Pl an developed during the 
course of this Phase III effort (see Section 7.2) emphasizes the importance of 
this activity. 
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5.2 Resuspen~ion Effects 
Assessment of the impact on world health of the accidental reentry 
and possible partial burrll.lp of a nuclear waste payload is based on a model 
designed to provide estimates of world population doses due to inhalation of 
particulate burnup debris (particles <10 ~m AMAO) into the upper atmosphere. 
One assumption upon which the model \fully described in Reference 5-1} was 
based is that inhalation of fallout particles descending into surface air will 
account for the principal component of world population dose. Inhalation of 
resuspended part icles was ignored as were the various modes of ext.ernal ex-
posure and the potential organ doses due to ingestion of food and water 
containing radioactive burnup debris. 
Numerous st~dies (some of which are cited below) have demonstrated 
that radioactive particles deposited on soil or other environmental surfaces 
are susceptible to resuspension by wind action and/or mechanical disturbance. 
~easure~ values of the resuspension factor, the ratio of air concentration 
(~Ci/m~ t~ soil deposition density (~Ci/m2) generally range from 10-3 
to 10-1 m-. Studies conducted in fallout fields at the Nevada Test Site 
and elsewhere indicate that the resuspension factor in relatively undisturbed 
environ"~nts decreases with time after deposition and tends to an asymptotic 
value of about 10-9 m- 1• Consequently, inhalation of resuspended parti-
cles could be a significant component of the world population dose due to a 
burnutJ accident. After the somewhat sustained period of fallout follO\~ing an 
upper atmospheric burnup (6-10 years approximately), resuspension could 
account for the total i nhal at ion dose. 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief review of alterna-
tive methods of dealing with the resuspension problem and a justification of 
the method selected to include the resuspension effect in the model used to 
estimate world population doses due to inhalation of burnup debris. 
5.2.1 Deposition Models 
Worldwide deposition of particulate burnuQ d~bris is based(5-1) on 
the HASL model of atmospher'ic transport.(5-4 and 5-5) During the fallout 
period, deposition exceeds resuspension. After the fallout period, it is 
redsonable to assume that resuspension and depOSition are approximately equal, 
if sampled over a sufficiently large area for a sufficiently long time. Under 
assumed steady-state conditions, radionuclide deposition velocities could be 
used to estimate air concentrations and radionuclide inhalation rates. 
The rate at which resuspended radioactive particles are ~edeposited 
on soil surfaces may be estir.lated as the psoduct of a deposition velocity 
(cm/day) and concentration in air (wCi/cm) to yield a deposition rate 
" having dimensions of lJCi/cm'--day. Given the deposition rate and the depo-
sition velocity, it would then be a simple .matter to calculate the air con-
centration and radionuclije inhulation rate. . 
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Deposition velocities ~asured under field conqitiQns have been 
r~pgrted by Van der Hoven(5-6), Sehmel, Sutter and Dana{5-7J, and Healy ~ - J. Pertipent wind-t4nn~l measurement$ h~ve been reported by Sehmel 
,5-7 and ~M8). Sehmen 5w9 ) and Healyl5-8) both present results of 
models used to predict deposition velocities. Healy's results indicate that 
deposition velocity is proportional to air velocity and strongly dependent on 
atmospheric stability. Sehmel's results indicate that deposition velocity 
increases as a nonlinear function of air velocity, exhibits a minimum value as 
a function of particle size, and is not strongly dependent on atmospheric 
stability. The minimum deposition velocity in Sehmel's data is generally in 
the particle diameter range between 0.01 and 1.0 ]Jrn. For particles >1 ]Jm, 
deposition velocity increases with increasing particle diameter; and for 
particles < 0.01 ]Jm, deposition velocity increases with decreasing particle 
diameter. Both Sehme1's and Healy's results indicate a strong dependence of 
deposition velocity on surface roughness. Application of either Sehmel's or 
Healy's deposition model would require detailed measurements of wind profiles 
and surface roughness worldwide. These data are not presently available. 
5.2.2 Resuspension Models 
The resuspension of radioactive soil particles is often expressed as 
the ratio of air concentration (]JCi/m3) to surface soil concentration 
().JCi/m2). Many such mea~urements have been made in the field at the Nevada 
Test }Site(5-11 and 5-12} and in the vicinity of Rocky Flats, Colorado 
(5-13. The meas~~ed values, most of them in the range from 10-5 to 
la-11m- I , are quite variable with respect to environmental conditions such 
as wind speed and direction, rainfall, mechanical disturbances, and the 
aerodynamic properties of soil surfaces and soil particles. 
Several studies(5-14, 5-15 and 5-16) have r~ported that the airl 
soil ratio decreases with time. Anspaugh, et al.(5-17) propose the fol~uw­
ing empirical expression, 
Ca/Cs = 10-4 exp (-K "1") + 10-9 m- 1 
\'1here 
Ca is the concentration in air ().JCi/m3), Cs is the concentration on surface soil (lJCi/m2), k = 0.15 days-1/2, 
and t is the time after deposition, days. 
Equation (l) w~s deriv"'d from experimental field data. It provides no 
fundamental understanding of tne resuspension process but merely describes it 
according to the followinS constraints based upon the data: (1) the apparent 
half-time of decrease during the first 10 weeks should approximate a value of 
5 weeks and should approximately double over the next 30 weeks; (2) the 
initial resuspension factor should be about 10-4 m- 1; and (3) the 
resuspension factor 17 years after tht': contaminating event (close-in fallout 
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from a nuclear explosion) should approximate 10.9 m- 1• W~i1p. Equation (1) 
is consistent with much of the data collected o"er the years at the Nevada 
Test Site, its applicability to other environmenta' circumstances has not been 
demonstrated. Its incorporation in the existing world population dose lI10del 
was considered but rejected because it would greatly complicate the mathemati-
cal analysis, thus increasing the probability of errors and I'lsult in a pro-
gram which, because of the time required, \\Ould be excessively expensive to 
run. 
Many attempts have been made (5-18, 5-19, and 5-20) to develop 
mathematical models which simulate or predict resuspension. Most of these are 
based on wind-erosion models de~eloped by Bagnold(5-21) and, as a function 
of wind speed, take the following fonn: 
Ca = K(U - Ur)3 Cs/U 
wl'tere U is the wind speed, m/s, Ur is a thre(shold wind S..~e.e.d, m/s, and K is 
a site-specific constant, 521m3• Others 5-22 and 5 ·23) have used a 
power-law expression as follows: 
Ca = KUn 
where K and n are constants derived from the data. SehmeJ an~ Orgi 11 (5-22) 
obtained the following empirical expression from Volchok's{5-13) data fitted 
to Equation (3): 
Ca = 5.26 E-32 U2•1 
The empirical value of about 2 for the exponent of wind speed is an indirect 
verification of Equation (2). Shinn and Anspaugh(5-23) found n :: 2.1 for 
dust flux at the Nevada Test Site; but for a plowed field in Texas. the same 
procedure gave n = 6.4. BCl examined Sehmel's(5-10) data for calcium 
molybdate resuspension near Hanford, Washington. and also arrived at a value 
of n::: 2. 
An enpirical fit of rnrk's(5-11) data to Equation (2) gave the 
following expression: 
CalC s = 3.35 E-25 (U-5.79 E6)3/U 
r~ork's data were based on air concentrations and wind speeds averaged over a 
24-hour peri ode Vo 1 chok' 5 (5-13) data were I-week averages and gave the 
following empirical expression: 
CalC s = 6.58 E-27 (U-2.51 E6)3/U 
Due to the scatter in both sets of data, both Equations (5) and (6) are rough 
approximations. The fact that Equation (5) predicts ratios about 50 times 
larger than those predicted by Equation (6) may be insignif~cant or it may be 
due to site-specific envi rorrnental differences between the Nevada Test Site 
(open shrub desert) and Rocky Flats, Colorado (semiarid grassland). 
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The empirical value of n::2, Equation (3), when derived for different 
tracers, different soils (provided the soils are undisturbed), and different 
climates, is an indirect confirmation of Equation (2). However, both K and 
tiT are functions of particle size, soil moisture, surface roughness, and 
perhaps the time period over which Ca and U are averaged. Attempts have been made to include particle size and other factors in theoretical treatments 
of resuspension, but none of the currently availJble theories adequately 
account for the variability of the data. Thus, K and UT must be treated, 
for the present, as empirical constants to be derived only from site-specific 
data sets. Consequently, no practical benefit appears to be derived from 
uSing Equation (2) in preference to Equation (3); but to use either equation 
for predictive purposes, site-specific measurements are required to obtain 
estimates of K, U, or n. 
5.2.3 Mass Loading 
In t~e ab~ence of data to implement either Equation (~) or Equation 
(3), Anspaugh(5-16} suggested that a mass loading factor of La = 100 
micrograms of S911 ..,Rer cubic rreter of air be used for predictive purposes. 
Anspaugh et al.t 5- l l} provide data which show that predicted air concentra-
tions based on La = 100 ~g/m3 are in good agreenent with measured air con-
centrations. Using data reported by the National Air Pollution Control 
Admi ni strat ion( 5-24) , Anspaugh( 5-16) showed that the annual mean mass 
loading for 217 urban stations in the United States was 102 ~g/m3 while the 
cooparable mean value for 30 rural stations was 38 ~g/m3. While standard 
deviations were not reported, the range of values for urban stations was 
33 ),lg/m3 at :;c. Petersburg, Florida, to 254 ~g/m3 at Steubenville, Ohio, 
in 1966; the values for rural areas ranged from 9 ),lg/m3 in White Pine 
County, Nevada, to 79 ),lg/m3 in Curry County, Oregon. 
Anspaugh et a1.(5-17) discuss the progress made toward development 
of a realistic model of the resuspension process but notes that "no such 
general model presently rxists". Included is a discussion of the mass-lo~~ing 
aBProach and a comparison of measured air concentrations of 239pu, 8U, 
K, 232Th, and natural uranium at various times and plqces. In all cases, 
tt'le predi cted ai r concentrat ions based on La= 100 1Jg/m3 were 1 arger than 
t.1e measured values. 
While recent work by Sehmel(5-25) indicates little experimental 
justification for the mass-19ading approach, the empiris;al results reported 
and interpreted by Anspaught 5- l6 } and Anspaugh et al.l 5- 17) are conducive 
to the conclusion that the use of La=lOO ),lg/m3 for predi,;tive purposes is 
a reasonable alternative and should prove to be conservative in most cases as 
jt is)greater than the National Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter. 
t5-Zb It should, of course, be noted that higher than averaqe wind 
velocities or mechanical disturbances, such as plO\O/ing,{5-23 and 5-27) car. 
cause the mass-loading factor to be tanporarily much higher than ~GO i.J~/m3. 
An implicit assumption of the mass-loading appro-Jc~ is that the 
specific activity of airborne particulates is the SJi~ as that of contam~nated 
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surface soil. For fresh deposits, this assumption may be invalid because the 
contaminated particles are more readl1y resuspended and have not had t1me to 
mix with the surface s011. In any case, the apparent specific activity of 
surface soil will be affected by the depth to which soil is sampled. At the 
Nevada Test Site, in an undi sturbed area contami n~ted about 20 years before 
the study was made, the specific activity of plutonium in soil sampled to a 
depth of 5 cm was about 2700 dpm/g while the specific activity of plutonium in 
particles recovered from all stages of high-volume cascade impactors was only 
890 dPm/.9( T~e measured mass 1 oadi ng for the cascade impactor sampl es was 
70 g/mJ 5-l6}. In this case, predicted air concentrations based on La 
= 100 glm3 and the assumption that soil and airborne particles have the 
same speclfic activity would have been conservatively high by a fact.~I· of 
4.33. 
5.2.4 Conclusions 
Finding M satisfactory model of the resuspension process and lacking 
an adequate data base for implementation of the empirical models currently 
availabl~~ we)have decided to use the mass loading approximat(ion ~uggested by Anspaughl~-l6 and further supported by Anspaugh et al. 5-17J, as pro-
viding a reasonable basis for approximating the effect of resuspension on the 
estimation of world population doses resulting from the accidental reentry 
burnuj) of a n:Jclear waste payload. The resulting method of using La = 100 
g/mJ, expressed as an equivalent resuspension factor, to estimate radio-
nuclide inhalation rates is described in the following section. The equiva-
lence of the mass load'jng factor and the resuspension factor is based on 
$tudi~s of plutonium-contaminated environments at the Nevada Test Site-
t5-28 }, where "surface soil" was defined a~ the top 5 crn and the bulk 
density of the soil was approximately 1 g/cmJ. In other words, the radil)-
activity per sRuare meter was associated with approximately 50 kg of soil (5 
em x 1 j.lg/cm3x 104 crr7-/rr7- = 50 kg/m2). Consequently, a mass 1 cadi n9 
factor of lO!) \.lgtm3 is equivalent to a resuspension factor of 100 
j.lg;m-3/50 kg'I11-- = 2 E-9 m- 1 which is just twice the lower 
asymptote of Equation (1). 
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5.3 Burnup Accident Analysis 
The accidental burn up of a portion of the nuclear \,/aste payload 
resulting from the atmospheric reentry of an unprotected container would pro-
duce warl dwide di stri but ion of small radioact ive part icl es. The purpose of 
this section is to provide an assessment of the impact on world health. such 
that. proper 5ystem design change~ and operational procedures are incorpor-
ated into the reference concept for nuclear waste disp:>sal (see Sections 2.3 
and 2.4). The results of this assessment are not intended to be used in 
comparisons \iith other waste disposal options or to be used in environmental 
assessments of the space option. 
The fall owi ng paragraphs provide an overvi ew of the model descri p-
t ion, new input data, and resul ts of the analysi s. 
5.3.1 Model Description 
The basic assumptions, general formulation, and mathematical devel-
opment of the model used to estimate world population doses due to the acci-
dental reentry and burnup in the upper atmosphere of a nuclear waste payload 
are described in Reference 5-1 and are not repeated here. However, the burnup 
accident assessment results for the i~odified PW-4b commercial waste mix are 
given here, and include estimates of both fallout and resuspension dose fac-
tors. The general design of the world population dose model has not changed; 
but metabolic parameters for three radionuclides not occurring in the other 
mixes studied have been added and the population data for equal-area latitude 
bands have been updated to reflect the estimated world population distribution 
in the year 1980. The procedure for calculating the resuspension dose factors 
is described below. 
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Figure 5-5 is a diagram of the modified HASL atmosp~eric transport 
model ~ho\,/ing t.he contribction of fallout (F) and of resuspension (R) to the 
radionuc1ide inhalation rate of an individual in equal-area latitude band k. 
In this model, A, B, and C are layers of atmosphere and S is the soil surface. 
A1'r is the amount (~Ci) of radionuclfde r injected into the atmosphere above 
2 km in latitude band i, and fik is the fraction of burnup debris injected 
in band i and deposited in band k. 
f i k Ai r .- ~ AS Ac Akr Skr Ckr Skr 
F I TR 
I 
I QJrk 
MAN 
FIGURE 5-5. CONTRIBUTION OF FAlLOUT (F) AND RESUSPENSION (R) TO 
RADIONUCLIDE (r) INHALATION RATE (QIrk) FOR AN 
INDIVIDUAL (1) IN EQUAL-AREA LATITUDE BAND k 
Ac 
The differential equations and initial values for compartmer,ts A, 
C, and 0 are: 
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(9) 
(10) 
Solving this system of differential equations yields the following for 
S"r(t): 
eXP[-(:\S+Ar)t] 
+ (\A-\a)(\c-\a){\s-A S) 
exp[-(\C+\r)t] eXP[-(\S+\r)t] l 
(\A-\C)(\S-AC)(AS-\C) + (\A-AS){\B-\S){\C-\s)~ 
(11 ) 
where !'kr{t) is the amount ( ei) of radionuclide r on the surface of 
equal-area latitude band k at time t, 
AA • X. n(2)1182.5 days 
AS II t n(2)/304.2 days 
~C • i 11(2)/30.42 days 
As :£ n(2}/104 days (Reference 5-21) 
'\r = t n(2)/T r days 
and Tr is the half-life of radionuclide r. 
The radionuclide inhalation rate due to resuspension, i.e., pathway R 
of Figure 5-5, is 
where K = (20m3/day)(2E-9m-1)/2.55E13m2 
20 m3 air/day is the inhalation rate for reference man, 
2E-9 m- 1 is the resuspension factor defined in Section 5.2.4, 
and 2.55E13 m2 is the area of latituae band k. i.e., 1/20th of the 
Earth's surface area based on an Earth r1l!an radius of 6371 km. 
(12 ) 
The equation for the radionuclide inhalation rate due to fallout, i.e., path-
way F of Figure 5-5. is gi'len i" Ap~endix G of Reference 5-1. The mathemat-
ical developnent of equations fOl inhalation doses dlie to resuspension is 
parallel to that of equations for inhalation doses due to fallout as explained 
in Appendix G of Reference 5-1. 
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5.3.2 New Input Data 
The quantities of radionuc11des contained in 1 kg of Modified PW-4b 
cOO1merc1al waste mix in cennet are listed in Table 5-1. Generalized dose 
factors represent the dose (rem) to an individual in equal-area latitude band 
k per microcurie (\.lCi) of radionuclide r falling in band k. F"r a given 
burnup case, a fraction of the waste mix, having a specified activ1ty median 
aerodynamic didllleter (AMAD), is injected in the upper atmosphere in latitude 
band i. The amount falling in band k is the product of the amount injected in 
band i, Ajr, and a distribution fraction, fib taken from Table 6-14 of 
Retarence 5-1. 
TABLE 5-1. RADIOACTIVITY IN 1 KILOGRAM (CERMET) OF MODIFIED* 
PW-4b COMMERCIAL WASTE MIX 
Recently developed Sky1ab hazard model population data were used to 
obtain updated estimates of world population with respect to equal-area lati-
tude bands. The results for 1980 are given in Table 5-2. The population data 
base includes estimates of population growth rates for various geopolitical 
units which penr;t estimation of future population size and distribution. Us-
in;' ~980 population data for 70-year dose calculatiofls may result in a slight 
unrj,~r'estimate of world health effects; but in view of the many uncertainties 
involved in such calculations, it does not seem worthwhile to extrapolate the 
population data beyond the current year. 
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TABlE 5-2. ESTIMATED WORLD POPULATION. 198O(a) 
Equal Area Estimated Equal Area 
Latitude Band Population, Latit:Jde Band 
k Lat.[bJ mi11i ons k Lat.l6~ 
1 64-900 N 33.3 11 0_6° S 
2 54-64° N 176.4 12 6-11 ° S 
3 44-54° N 459.2 13 11-17° S 
4 36-44° N 599.7 14 17-24° S 
5 30-36° N 763.1 15 24-30° S 
6 24-30° N 677.2 16 30-36° S 
7 17-24° N 473.7 17 36-44° S 
8 11_17° N 245.1 18 44-54° S 
':J 6-11 0 N 249.3 19 54-64° S 
10 0_6° N 100.7 ~O 64-90° S 
Notes: (a) B~sed on Bel-developed Skylab hlzard model data base. 
(b) Approximate boundaries. 
• 
Est imated 
Popul at 1 on. 
ml1 110ns 
90.6 
165.5 
51.9 
72.8 
56.4 
47.6 
10.2 
1.0 
0.1 
0.0 
Table 5-3 provides a listing of metaboliC parameters used in the cal-
culation of dose factors for four radionuclides found in waste mix PW-4b. 
which are not in the mix!;:s previously studied. The same parameters for the 
other radionuclides listed in Table 5-1 are gi-len in Table G-4 of Reference 
5-1. 
5.3.3 Results 
Dose factors for assumed AMAO vallies of 0.2, 1.0, and 5.0 \.JtTl are 
list£::I in Tables 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6 for the radionuclides in I~odified PW-4b 
commercial waste mix (Table 5-1). Each value listed is the S(II1 of a fanout 
dose factor and a re~uspens ion dose factor; the fonner is generally between 
two and three orders of magnitude larger than the latter. SHed on ., re~us­
pens ion factor of 2E-9 m- 1• resuspens ion accounts for less th~n 1 percent of 
the organ dose due to inhalation. ;.s the resuspension dose fac.:or is propor-
tional to the resuspension factor, an order of magnitude increase in the re-
suspension factor would be reflected by increases of less than 10 percent in 
the factors listed in Tables 5-4.5-5. and 5-6. 
The summation of population factors for each injection band (i • 
1.2 •••• 19) is given in Table 5-7 based on the population values in Table :,·2. 
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TABLE 5-3. METABOLIC PARAMETERS FOR DOSE FACTOR CAlCULATIONS <II 
-I 
"~. 
Radionucl ide Rb-87 Y-90 Sa-137m U-236 
Trans. Class i) Y W Y .. 
f j (GlT 8100d 1.0 10-4 1.0 10-4 
T r (days) 1 .8E13 2.68 0.002 8.7(9 
= • 
Total Body 45 14,000 65 100 -. 
Bone 0 18,000 65 31)0 
TN L i v~" 63 0 975 0 
K idne), 0 0 8.5 15 
ThyrOid 0 0 0 0 
Total Body 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Bone 0 0.75 0.7 0.11 
f'ZN liver 0.07 0 0.0006 a 
Kidney 0 0 0.0001 0.11 
Thyroid 0 0 0 0 
Total Body 0.09 0.89 0.59 47 
Bone 0 4.4 1.4 ~30 
E~ Liver 0.0 9 0 0.41 0 
Kidney 0 0 0.37 47 
Thyroid 0 0 0 0 
EN (Resp. Syst.) 0.09 0.89 0.41 47 
EG (Large Intestine) 0.09 0.89 0.34 0.45 
"Parameters for other radionuclides listed in Table 5-1 are 9 "!n in Table G-4 
of Reference 5-1. 
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TABLE 5-4. DOSE FACTORS (REM/~Ci FOR EACH NUCLIDE) FOP. AMAD OF 0.1 MICRONS 
Orqan 
Radio-
nucl ide Class NP TO P lM GIl Bone liVH Kidney 
1f1'-1" '1 ','l1t:-!II ".~'~qf-ZC 1.2;IE-1II ".1!3f>E-11 ... l!zsE-J'J fl. z. :"'&C:-I1 O. 
SIi-OJO w 1, f, .... ~ - 10; 'j.I"Zl-'· ".oolE-lo; I."I(.E -1" 2.61Z£-17 7..01H-ll D. D. 
Y-O'll) v 1,<;',',[-70 l.lfolf-i!' 2.'II"E-21 1.OHE-Zi! 1I.00hloE-n 3. "'lor -Z" D. 0). 
lP-~'H w ~,'I'If.[ -1' :.f>F.QE-l<J '1.31OE-11 Z.50;ZE-II> 2."HE-", l.lGlE-l6 1.730£ -11 l.IIGU-ll 
r(-OB 1/ I ... "n-If> ".Z'iH-1Q ". ")f>€ -if. l.l"]E-lo; 1.2(,0;[-11 Z.I ZII[-1'I 3.10;U-19 1.911E-1 q 
P( -10' v 1 ... ·.01-11 1.I01E-l~ foe ])'1E-1f> 1.11"0[-1" 1.1ZIo[-1II ro. 2.119lE-II) 2. ,'.101£-11 
(S -1 JIo n 1 ..... 0L-11 ~.'iZ1£-I'l 7.&5"E-11 1.7&9E-If> 1.,,;o2E-1'I ".011£-11 1.IU£-I" ".62 .. E-Il 
C~-I''i £1 Z. II,. ~'. - I" 'i.Or,OE-lC 'i.Jl~E-1lI 3.0;"bE-H ... 21tE-I'I 2."'HI[-17 2.o;O~t:-1I '1 ..... SE-III 
81-1 PH w j.~ <<.'£-'0 I.Z"'iE-,~,· 1.1HE-ll ' .. I .. SE-]1I 1.111£-]t 2.212£-]" 2.hQE-JI 2.C!DH-31 
C~-I 11 fl l.ll<'[-I' :-.'I'tl£-14 ).ltf>E-l1 Z.091E-If> 2.095[-111 1.0IM,-If> 1.""6E-Ib 0;,"""(-1' 
PH -1 .. I y 7. Z C~L-ll ... /I 'liE -1 'I 1.33IE-to; 1.IHE-l" 0;. ]1f,[-I" 3.'''0[-11 J ... 1"l-1II £.. f,OlE-l" 
5H-I'>1 v 1.1',1[-1' 'i.llf,E-l~ 1 • .,11E-1S '.Z'l"E-l" 0;.9"tE-1II 1. J',;2£ -If> 2.]ZZE-11 2. "Olj(-I I 
£Il-I'i" v 1.1 .. ~i-lO; l."ZJE-l' 1.SHE-l" 1.&"IIE-I] 9.0<'10£-11 1.'"0;£-1<; 1.79I1E-l& 1. 021E - 1 0; 
U-l1C; v , .'\':;1'- -I'. i. 'Z"£-lf Z.U7'E:-12 1.0;0'1£-11 7. "lIE-II 1.6"1£ -I" O. J.1I2I1E-IS 
l:-2Jfo y \.1.'1'-1" S."""E- H ?Ur.'!-12 '1. '1IoE-11 6 • .,Q7E-17 :',&"1£-110 D. J.'IUE-lo; 
"P-ZH y t ... n[ -1'. ".OQTE-if l. tllE-12 t.Ol1E-10 7. Z'ln-l1 Z ... :SIoE-11 2.10 at: -I Z 1.181f-ll 
11-;:' '" Y , • Ie .. (,: - I .. ;.)'iH-lh Z.OHE-lZ II.II""E-ll "']QQE-17 1.0;69E-'" '0. J.HU-tS 
p')-ll'l v .;. I , ~f_ - J It r·.'>'1 .. t:-IF. l.;;:;"E-12 1.O'lc;E-IO 1.73"E-11 J.HU -12 l ... 0; 2L -12 "."'H(-I) 
PIJ-Z'.( Y ... l' .. 1- -1 I. ".o;'l3£-l'. 1.Sr,O;::-12 1. U'lZE-IC 1.1J"~-11 J.]7"£-12 Z .0 .. n:-12 fo. h1<'£-13 
6H-Z"', v ~. " ~~, - t .. '.0 fo'iE -I r, :!.7tIE-12 lolHE-1O 1I.2HE-11 Z.OliOE -to! 2.1"1':-12 9. '''ll::-tJ 
"U-Z"1 y \.("1'-1' ".11'1 IIf -11 7.0H;:-10; 10.1 qbE -II, &. ~Ztl-lil ... C2Z£-11o I." IIi -1 .. '.~ll!(-IS 
AH-" , I. ('.Ji.--!" ' •• 'l!'lf-l~, 2.bL .. t:-ll 1.111tE-IC II.l HE-" 2.lll1~-12 2.1"2(-ll 9. '''1[-11 
C"'-z '" ,' • ., f4 Q -:-··l', , •• 1I0f,E-11 7,"111::-12 '>.lIaH-ll 7.1f>"E-11 II,,"3)E -u .] ,,,0;2'S-13 ... 3 .... [-1 .. 
Clo~s Translocalion Closs nOTE: NP ,. Nasopharyngeal HegiOil 
() = IJoy 10 = Tracheobronchial Region 
W = Week P = Pulmonary Lung Region 
Y = Year LM = Thoracic Lymph 
GIT = Lorge Intestine 
·'~"""'I ~ ~ 
-
Total Thy-
Body roid 
".'lIfoE-ll I. 
3.1l1£-1S ole 
'1."lZE-Z6 I. Ut 3.00lE-1II II. I 
I.S ll£-28 I. 
2 .... 3£-2. II. \0 
0;.'1'19[-11 O. 
•• 1100[-11 I. 
1.3.IE-3S iI. 
".llo;E-l1 I. 
1,"ISE-l11 I. 
"."SlE-lI •• I.UtE-'" '. 
'1.""U-16 O. 
1.016E-IS O. 
'1.6IoU-ll II. 
'I.2qSE-l(' 
•• I.U6E-U O. 
I. &l1E- U I). 
1.2IIS[-U I. 
1. 5l9E - IS Ii. 
1.216£-ll O. 
'i. ISlE-I" 0. 
1'.. '~-!'''' •. ''''''~.~:~'>,,~ .. ~~~:'!:'!~:::~-;.::.~~;::.. ... _~,_:,,' ~ .: " ..... ;iiOlIHP'W:zhtt! t"1:h ': "tUt ,)'±k!d 7~ ,.;;;;s:;:;;i-;""[lii';'iit,.W-;;;a;;j:'i;; ji;;;:=; i;;;;i;;;;::;tt;S&ij, ;;:;:;;;;ali , " 
TABLe 5-5. DOSE fACTORS (REM/~ CiFOR EACH NUCLIDE) FOR AMAD OF 1.0 MICRONS 
I 
., 
Organ 
., 
~ 
II Radio- Total Thy-
> fluc1 ide Class NP TB P lM GIl Bone liver Kidney Body raid ... 
... 
"1'-0" e • • 1\ (a'" - I , f •• ~'fni. -I' ... C c· .. .: -: ,\ l.', lJ E -11 ... ~h"(-la a. l.''>''i.-li O. 6.1I"1of.-ll O. m SIi-CIQ .. 1." ~~; - '" '.&11£-11 l.~r;H-tC; 1.71Sf-t~ '.l'l'.E-17 ~. :. .. \£ "'1] II. Il. ...1I9"[-1S II. r Y -li'li) y 1.'>"[-l'j --.:''IF:-Z1 l.t. t r;::-?l ... ""~E-B 1.":' it - 21 1.0'ftE·ZJ ... II • Z.'lISE-"'> o. r lQ-~lJ w 7. ''It,f -1', 1.l'"~-I'J 'i • .!!1€-11 1." U£-I' l.IJQ(-l" 1. 1\I'>f. -u. 1'''''"<:-17 l.~7H-lf 2.16ZE-1S O. <.n I m fC-Q11 w 1."BL-ltj F.!!'f-l C .!.S'I":-Jf> 7. CIIJE-lfo I.SS3£-17 Z.]5'l£-1') ] ... q 1: -1", ..... O .. f-ll) 1).")6E-ZO I. N 
PO-Il' 
" 
1 • I. -O:'lf -1 .. l.t'H-ll ".""€-lf> l.nHE-l" I.f."ft£-U C. 1.'''0£-1 0 ZolS"l-U 1. 'JHE- ZO O. 0 CS-I Y'. I' I • ) Q2f - 1 ff 1.'>/1'::-10) 1."UE-t1 Q.QZlof-11 !.ll'iE-H 
... " "9~ -17 '.3'; E -U. ...Uj[-iT 6.q21oE-17 I. 
n C'5-n, " 
?7n':-11 '.Cft~E-2t ?I),,,c;-111 1.-.l\<H-I' l.lC;IlE-JII l.ll"£ -11 l.I''''>i-ll I.EQU-lI '.I'IoE-16 o. 
0' -I ,," .. !.1"H-lJ I.CIoH-ll ".(1)'£- Jl 2. J2SE-H 1.1)f.1oE-11 It.'>OlE-] .. ... to., .. .: -.11 1.QfofoE-H Z.l1U-3S I. 0 C!-l" [\ l ..... ~!-I., 1.q~H-lq 1.,,,o;~-11 l.l'bf-l!. 1.(·toU-l1 1 • .?"Z£-lfo 1.f.9o?E-1f. ",""0(-11 ".S"ZE-11 O. r Pt4-1'" ~.qf..~i-l" 0..111£-19 ,. )4~i-lh I). HOE-Ie; I.J"3£-14 1.,.f.7(-1' l.!lD'ii.-lft Io.1So,f-U 9.lJOf-B I. e SI'-I'>1 v ~.qlD~-!f lo.nb~-lC: I.lOE-l~ ,..3
'
HE-I" 1.e; .... E-lll 1!.ISDE-ll 1.Io0~i-11 "o;l~E-l1 3.3""[-11 f. 
~ [u-,S" ¥ 1. HF-1" ~.illI?f-l· 1.9:'Ji-llo ,.. ZH£-13 1.11)0;[-1" 1.1'>0£-10; 1.6'Hi -If. h.2"·.£-lb 1.]110;[-11 D. u -z ,0; 1 .... o .. !"-11 ... 7""[-1~ I.Z .. QE-12 O;.ll"E-lI 9.'107£-11 <to IIf>'E -I C; O. l. J02£-10; ,>.911IE-lf. O. II 1/ -;> , ... 7.II"lE-lt ".8'UE-I f I.ZI1E-12 '>."SGE-ll ". to JSf-17 f). lIb 1£ -10; D. 2. ~"z[-IO; flo 1l0E-l" G. C 
.. p -1 " y It.lCJS~-I' c;.C9b£-lt l.lH~-IZ C;.folllf-ll 'J.lft'5[-11 1.II'ilE-11 2.IobCi-U 8. Sf.H -12 1.1l9£-1l D. 
III 11-7 n 7.1 (l;~ -:~ ..... ';>£-If 1.1;\£-12 ".'Jllfaf-ll 1I.0ltUf-1I 'l."JIIE-l'> II. Z.lSlf.-IS ,>.SQOE-16 D. 
PIJ-2 J I , .... ~ .. (-lt <;,"I1E-l f l.ltJH-12 fo.l"l£-l1 <J. "'&(-17 2. D .. 2£ -12 1.lHE-H 10.0]')£-1 , 'I.l'HE-llt O. 
"U-243 y \.'I<.Z£-IJ ". "I Of-If, 1. "'H-IZ ".lZlIf-ll 'J.' .... f-l' ... ~ Hf -, 2 1 ... H" -1 Z It./llIIE-11 'I. 12'1E-l1t D • 
• "-Zl" l.C;(.'f-l. t;.'f3b~-I' I.SJq:-12 ".J'>JE-ll 1. ""f>t -1& 1.ll Q [-12 1.z'J'I~-12 S .Q .. lE -11 1.ISIo(-l1t D. 
PII-~"1 1. q I.'~"'! f, ".ftII?£-I'J 1.1~lE-IS Z. ~S"E-lIo ''.If.l)[-tO 1."foIlE-l" b. Z 30" -I ~ ..... II ... E-l~ '1. I.l'JE-If> e. 
&"'-l~) i.J!lll-IJ -; .611tE-l ( 1."b"~-1l b. 2HE-1I I.UZE-lf. l.l'> 7£-lZ 1.Z'J.JE-1Z '>.'U l£-U 1.7I1lE-l1t D. 
Ctt ........ '. y ' ... l "If[ - 1 ~ <;.71H-I" I. !oJ IE-IZ ',Z';)£-l1 ~.'Jl<;t-t7 S.2f>l£-tl 2.lIlZ£-l$ OJ. 1I110E - I/o J.OfIlE-I" 
•• 
elms = T rol\~locolion elms NOlE: f'P Nosopharyogeol Hegion 
I> I>oy ro T rocheOOronchial Region 
W Week P Pulmonary LlJIlg Hegion 
Y Year LM = Thorocic Lymph 
GIT = Lorge Intestine 
.. _,. .. ,,'. ' • • .......... · .. ",i 
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TABLE 5-6. DOSE fACTORS (REM/~Ci fOR EACH NUCLIDE) fOR AMAD Of 5.0 MICRONS 
Organ 
III 
) Radio-
~ nuclide 
~ Class NP D P 
, ,., GIl Bone Liver Kidney 
.. ~p-o'" '1 1 • 0 llf - 1 f.. r •• II,..q[·,!o t.94f.[-u 1.291[-11 1.113E-11· U. ..... U~ -I' O. 
I"' SR-Ql~ .. ... ~ II', -: .. '>.t-OI~·I" I. l~)t. -I r; .1.71'H-lr; r;.r;bJE-17 . '.lOlE-ll , . D. 
I"' y. tl.O y t..t:l 1f-l'l '.fol][-ll 1.'J?lE-U 1.1'1'1[-2t Z.1JJE-21 1."'<;(-13 O. II. 
.. 
IP -0 11 w , • ~ "0' - I'. I.CZZr::-~'f 1.IoH[-t 1 (" I! H[ -I' S.ll.JE-tll So UbE-lf> 1.1ZH-11 J.11.,E-l1 
fC -o'n .. 1.~lSf-I" ... O .... r-l·, l.l~foE-lb I. JII1£-I& 2. bl 'IE -1'- l.blfE-lq Ij.UljE-lq 6. ''''1£ -19 
PC-'O' y J.'P;?; -1" II.D .. JI:-?J 1.I'b~-lf> ... 'Uo;E -1" l.8111E-ld O. ].11 1ft: -I q ].OU<;[-18 
e';-l J'. n '.(.Q~E -:" ?o;Z1t. ! ': , .. ~ .. f-18 ...1""£-11 Z."I2£-11 '."08E-17 2. DillE -If.' 6.f.9·'[-17 n e~-I:<; [l '.',[0[-11 '>. Of. Of: - Z ~ 1,"?'E-lI! '1.'>110£-1'1 .... h'>f-III ... 'tIlZE-l1 ... f.l r;£-17 1.71010(-11 
0 el-I"" .. 1." ';71 -l,) '1.1&1[-11 1 •. '.IE-lZ 1.IIZ£-B 1. ~1o"E-Sl '1.0 1qE -310 9.1llloi-H 7. 99h[ -.s7 
I"' e~ -1]1 0 ~. ~ If 5= .. J" !.qqz£-I-l 1I."n:-I" S. flZbE-lI ... 28'1[-11 1.'187£-16 Z.1'7£-1I. 1. (Z1(-16 
e PM-l/ol I .... 'H -I 'j '.hlC::-I'1 1.<;)"£-1" '.O'>lf-IS 1.:!'1f.,E-H 1.'t8"£-17 1.lo;"i-1II J. Sli 1E-1I 
~ Sl'-I,l y I. It .'11 ~ - 1" 1.nf.f-l< ... 'l.>:-lb 1.9<;1[-110 1.Z1r.£-lf S.13H -11 1I.1H1i-1II 'I. ,,~ .. (- 18 EU-l so, v 1.10 .. ··f -110 1.0<;'>(-1" 1. nO£-Ir; :!.OO;'i£-lJ 1.911 FE -Ih 1.H1E-If> 1.I"OE-11 ... LlIE-H. 
• u-? '" v ?C"]~-lc ".l~'i-l f 'i. 'JH E -1 J <'.S'>1£-I: l.t<o(,E-16 r .• I" 1<' -I r; , . 1."l'JE-l'i e "-~'f, y l.Cll7!-:l "'!"":-1 .. ~.lJCjf-13 2."0"£-11 1."ZO;[-I" h.lf.'E-l~ a • 1."'::E-l'> 
II I'IP-' JI y .! • I If· [_ .. ~ l ~. "?IIE-I f ~.1i'[-11 Z.11IE-ll l.o;'ilE-I& lo.flIE-ll .s.'t"i-lZ 1.1"IoE -11 tI-.!H v 1.'l)t'-12 '.1\116[-1 ( ' •• 'H~~-ll 2. '''H-II 1.]h1E-I~ 'i.1l9QE-lo; O. 1.3 .. '>[-10; 
. ,-?H ,. J',I.f-ll ' •• II\'1;;:-lf to •• "'E-l1 z. 'I J IE -Il 1.6 .. 6[-1" 1.ZQl£-12 1.1'1IL-I] l.So;U-l1 
PU-l/oC y l.P·;-11 lo.l"lIi-lf ~. nli-l J Z.Q1t"-ll 1. ""6[-1" 1.ZlIeE-1Z , • 111E-lJ Z. ~101E-ll 
."-'101 Y ?C;?~'-!: ".1 JJ~-!~ I.HE-l1 J.1I1H-ll 1. ",1[-li> 1.8*,)[-11 II • .!Hf-l,s 1.16H-ll 
PU-~"l '.l.(~-j·· ... 71.f..E-1Q C;.S~H-If t.IZH-I" 1."')1\£-1'1 1.I>2JE -110 ".IOIE-I" Z.o~H -10; 
.... - "!'., ? 11-r -1.; 1o.1\1"f-l" '.~IH-13 ~. QI!7E-ll 1.'~9l-I" 7."'foE-I] 8. nlll-ll .s. ' .. I;[-ll 
e t -, .... y ~. £. f, J ~ - !.' r., r''''.~-l t ".1DH-U 1.r,SJ~-1l l.blU-,f. J.I,JH -1:- 1. JIoM-iJ .s. JUlE-l" 
. --------
Clou T ronsiocol ion Clou NOTE: NP "' Nosophoryn!JCol Hegion 
f) rJoy /8 = Trocheobronchiol Region 
W Week p = Pulmonory lung Region 
Y = YeO( lM = Thoracic Lymph 
CIT = Lorge Intestine 
~ 
Total 
OoJy 
1.092E-11 
6.IUE-IS 
6.673E-ZS 
l.JJ9E-II 
•• "r;IE-19 
2.6IlE-21 
1.'IIE-16 
1.2"SE-11 
5."66E-lS 
1.15](-16 
, .S06E-19 
2.11eE-U 
...IlIE-11 
,s.1,seE-16 
J.I19E-16 
1.ll .. E-IZ 
)."q .. E-~6 
6.11'1E-'" 
6.162E-l" 
".9~ .. E-l" 
6.21"E -If. 
".86"E-l" 
Z.II'»E -I" 
,., '---I , 
Thy-
roid 
G • 
I. 
D. 
I. U1 I I. N 
I. 
I. 
O. 
I. 
I. 
I. 
I. 
•• I. 
O. 
II. 
II. 
O. 
Q. 
O. 
O. 
II. 
O • 
........ ..... 
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TABLE 5-7. SUMMATION OF POPULATION FACTORS FOR EACH INJECTION 
BAND BASED ON 1980 POPULATION 
Inject i on Inject i on 
Lat i tude Band 2rfikPk Latitude Band 2~fikPk ( i ) (i) L. 1 1 
1 4.68536E+08 11 1.70878E+08 
2 4.68518E+08 12 1.26086E+08 
3 4.67582£+08 13 9.20265E+07 
4 4.61132E+08 14 6.61382E+07 
5 4.6 7584£ +08 15 6.67407£+07 
6 4.24298£+08 16 3.43820£+07 
7 3.93752£+08 ' ~ 2.88125E+07 ! 
8 3.53866£+08 18 2. 79405E +0 7 
9 3.01842£+08 19 2.79405£+07 
10 2.31231£+08 
Table 5-3 provides a world population dose summary for a 1 kg burnup 
(above 21 km) of r~odified PW-4b \~aste mix in cennet fonn. The values given 
for different particle ~izes (AMAO), organs, and injection bands have units of 
lIlan rem/kg (cennet), and are based on the follow;rg fonnula for a given [Jarti-
cle size: 
'..Jh ere, 
Wni 
W
n
; • ~3 t:nrk Air ~o 
r=l ~ k=l 
is the world population dose (man-rem/kg of PI~-4b in cermet) to 
organ n due to a 1 kg burnup of r~odified P~~-4b waste mix in 
latitJtie band i, (see Table 5-8). 
is the lifetime (70-year) radiation dose (rem) to organ n of an 
individual mer:lber of the population (Pk) of equal-area latitude 
band k per)JCi of radionuclide r falling in band k, bdsed on 
inhalatio~ of radioactive particles falling through surface air dnd 
part icles resuspended from soil, rem/J:Ci. 
is the amount (J,..Ci) of radionuclide r initially injected in band i, 
see Tabl e 5-1. 
is thE" fraction of the material (particles 0.2 to 5.0 )Jill AMAD) 
injected in latitude band i, WhlCh falls in latitude band k, 5ee 
:able 6-14 of Reference 5-1. 
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Pk is the population (number of people) of band k. see Table 5-2. 
1(-20 
!:fikPk is the population factor for burnup injecth:l in band i, see 
K-l Tab 1 e 5- 7. 
5.3.4 Significant Results and Conclusions 
The population factors listed in Table 5-7 reflect two facts: (1) 
the population of the northern hemisphere is larger (see Table 5-2) than that 
of the southern hemisphere; and (2) the further north injection occurs, the 
greater the deposition in the northern hemisphere. The effect of this is 
shown also in Table 5-8, i.e., the further north the injection latitude, the 
greater the world population dose estimate. Except for the nasopharyngeal 
(NP) region and the gastrointestinal tract (GIT) , organ dose estimates (see 
Table 5-8) tend to decrease with increasing particle size (AMAD). Conse-
quently, the highest dose estimates, except for NP and GIT, are those given in 
the first line of Table 5-8. These values and the health effects risk 
factors(5-1), given in Table 5-9, coupled with the predicted releases for 
Modified PW-4b cermet payloads as given in Section 4.3.3, Table 4-12, are the 
basis for the range of possible health effects predicted ;11 Table 5-10. The 
results shown in Table 5-10 confinn the recommendations gi't~'i in Section 
4.3.4, that thermal reentry protection should be added to the container 
surface, and thdt the stainless steel container material be repl aced by a 
higher me lti ng poi nt all oy. 
Using the predicted 11.2 percent Modified P~oJ-4b payload burnup (see 
Tabl, 4-12 for d 5 MT cennet waste fonn) and AMAO = 0.2 \.1m, the maximum 
individual lifetime doses would be about 0.043 rem to the lungs, 0.016 ran to 
bone and 0.0011 ran to the total body. These est ima tes .ire we 11 below the 
annual dose-rate 1 imits for individual members of the public. 
The graphic display of results s~own in Figure 5-6 illustrates two 
important points; first, the risk is proportional to the amount of Modified 
P~oJ-4b in cermet form injected into the upper a tmosphere and second, the upper 
and lower bounds of risk ·3re strongly influenced by assumed particle siz~. 
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TABLE 5-9. HEALTH EFFECTS RISK FACTORS 
Type of Risk 
Cancer deaths from: 
Total body exposure 
lung Exposure 
Bone Exposure 
Thyroid Exposure 
Specific genetic effects 
to all generations from: 
Total Body Exposure 
SOurce: Reference 5-1. 
prediC~ed Incidence 
per 10 Man-Rem 
50 
5 
2 
3 
50 
TABLE 5-10. RANGES OF EXPECTED HEALTH EFFECTS FOR INADVERTENT PAYlOAD 
REENTRY BURNUP, AS PREDICTED BY PAYLOAD BREAKUP ANALYSIS (MODIFIED PW-4b IN CERMET) 
Releases, kg(a) 
1 1007 560 
Type of Ri sk 
Cancer deaths from: 
Total Body Exposure 0.0031 - 0.078 3-79 1-44 
Lung Exposure 0.0059 - 0.296 5-299 3-166 
Bone Exposure 0.0036 - 0.065 3-66 2-37 
Genet i c effects from: 
Tot3l Body Exposure 0.0031 - 0.r)78 3-79 1-44 
Notes: (a) See Section 4.3.3, iable 4-12, Table 5-8, and Table 5-9. 
(b) 9.5 MT Payload, stable reentry, no therma1 protection. 
(c) 5.0 MT Payload, stable reentry, no thermal protection. 
(d) 5.0 MT Payload, spinning reentry, no thermal protection. 
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FIGURE 5-6. PREDICTED WORLDWIDE HEALTH EFFECTS AS A FUNCTION 
OF UPPER ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE OF MODIFIED PW-4b 
IN CERMET FORM 
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6.0 LONG-TERM RISK ASSESSMENT* 
The disposal of n~clear waste products in space involves some level 
of attendant risk due to the small but finite chance of failure occurrences 
during the transport and placement sequence. A broad definition of fallure 
mechanisms includes natural catastrophic events after destination placement, 
such as meteoroid impact and fragmentation. in addition to the more obvi-
ous types of accidents or malfunction in the space vehicle transport system. 
Because of the serious potential consequences of failures, even if highly 
unlikely, ft is imperative that quantitative risk analyses be performed i" a 
careful and exhaustive manner. This will point the way toward risk reduction 
requirements as needed, provide a measure of confidence tn the concept via~il­
ity, and allow decision makers a risk perspective comparison of the space 
option with alternative disposal concepts. 
Safety risk may be separated into two categories on the basis of 
t tmel i ne consequences and response. Short-term ri sk, measured in hours or 
days, is associated with accidents occurring prior to deep space injection. 
Included in this category are the sequential phases of waste payload ground 
handling, launch, ascent to parking orbit, orbital operations, and the early 
phase of the injection bur~ while the payload is still bound to Earth's gravi-
tational field. long-term risk J measured in hundreds or thousand~ of years, 
COl'nmences after the payload has attained Earth-escape conditions. For the 
reference concept of a solar orbit destination, th1~ category encompasses 
deployment system (propulsion and control) failures which prevent the payload 
from achieving its stable orbit destination, ~nd accidental explosion or other 
fragmentation events (meteor encounters) which break up the payload and upset 
the long-term orbit stability. These failures or events could re£ult 1n the 
waste material being stray objects in planet-crossing orbits with subsequent 
future risk of reentry in Earth's biosphere. Some of the short-term safety 
problems are addressed in Sections 4.0 and 5.0 of this report. This section 
addresses two new aspects of the long-term problem which have been identified 
in previous studies of this kind (see References 6-1. 6-2 and 6-3). 
A key result of earlier studies is that it may b~ possible to attain 
acceptably low leve's of long-term r1sk only through the mechanism of 
retrieval and final disposal of failed payloads. Rescue mission capability is 
defined as the ability to send another propulsion system to rendezvous with 
the failed payload in orbit and to place it into the desired ~isposal orbit. 
Suppose, however, that the payload has fragmented, making rescue impossible. 
Sect; on 6.1 addresses the fragment at i on pr'ob 1 em and its consequences with t'l~ 
objective of describing the orbital evolution characteristics of small 
particles in solar orblt dnd the probability of ev~n~ual Earth reentry of this 
material. Section 6.2 then takes up the more lik.ely dispOSition of failure 
'Note: This section was prepared by "Science Applications. Incorporated. 
Scnaumbur9, Illinois. undl!r subcontract to Battelle's Cclumbus 
laboratories. 
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wherein the payload remains fntact and fs subject to rescue atttmpts. The 
objective here is to Drovide a technology assessment of the (critical) 
automated rendezvous and docking phase of the rescue missfon with emphasis on 
noncooperative oj'" only partially cooperative rendezvous due to fal1ure of 
cructal payload subsy~tems such as communications and attftude control. 
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6.1 Payload Breakup Effects 
Small remnant particles on t~e order the 1000 microns or less are 
subject to v!rfous nongravitatfonal forces in the space environment, such as 
solar radiation pressure and the electromagnetic field carried by the solar 
wind. PhYSical processes such as pttotofonization and surface erosion can 
induce changes in the state of mate'rial that enhance the nongravftational 
effects. The orbital evolutionary consequences for small particles are very 
different from those applying to objects influenced by gravitational forr.es 
alone. This subsection cons1ders: (1) the initial mass-sizp. distribution of 
small particles for different types of waste forms; (2) the characteristics of 
nongrav1tational forces and the orbital changes produced; and (3) the 
resulting mass-time distribution of material with focus on the fraction of 
i"it1al mass intercepted by Earth. 
6.1.1 Small Particle Mass D1stribution 
Although the reference waste form selected for the present study is 
the ORNl cennet. Other waste forms such as calcine powder have been 
considered in previous studies. Since the phYSical properties of calcine and 
cermet are very different, one would expect wide differences in the particle 
size di stribut'ions result fng from a payload breakup event. Both waste foms 
are treated 'jn the analysis. This allows a broader perspective of the 
evolutionary effects of breakup by defining two extrene boundary conditions 
representing weak material (calcin~) and strong materia' (cermet). 
It may be best to present first the derived particle dist.ributions 
for the two wa-::te fonns and then to discuss the conditions leading to these 
results. Figure 6-1 shows the cumulative mass distributions as a fun~tion of 
particle radius over the range 1 to 1000 microns. Note that the total mass in 
small-particle state may be less than or equ<!l to \.l'Ie total payload mass. 
depending on the waste fonn and the fragmen' 'n C'ondition--this will be 
clarified later. For calcine, the medun pa ,;.:1;: radius by mass is 6.5 
microns with 20 percent of the total nass residing in particles smaller than 
3.5 microns and 80 percent of the mass in particles smaller than 20 microns. 
The cen.let distribution. by contrast, h skewed toward largt;r particles. The 
medi an cermet radi us is 240 microns wHh 20 percent of the mass res i di ,'g in 
particles smaller than 40 microns and 80 percent of the mass in particles 
small er than 620 microns. 
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FIGURE 6-1. MASS DISTRIBUTION BY PARTICLE SIZE -
CALCINE AND CERMET WASTE FORMS 
6.1.1.1 Calcine Waste Form Fragmentation 
1000 
A simplifying assumption is made for calcine in keeping with the 
desire to represent an extreme boundary on payloi-ld breakup. Namely, whether 
the breakup was co1used by a propul sion system explosion or by a meteoroid 
impact, it is assumed that the container wall is completely fragmented and 
that the waste payload disintegrates and is totally released ~s a fine powder. 
Although the probability of fragmenting a calcine waste payload has not been 
evaluated quantitatively, it is estimated that this probability would be very 
small. The particle size distribution show:'! i(n Figure 6-1 was obtained from 
an earlier Battelle-Northwest data source 6-4) which reported on the 
physical properties of spray calcine. 
BATTELLE - co ... MBUS 
I 
I 
I 
] 
I 
.j 
.. 
6.1.1.2 Cermet Waste Form Fragmentation 
The solid cermet waste form should have n~chanical properties similar 
to an iron-nickel alloy. It is reasonahle to assume that the likely pay-
load response to a propulsion system eXi'lo:;'?n in deep space at worst, would 
be to deform the package with negligibh c' no release of waste material in 
small partic1es. An event of very low probability of occurrence (but having 
suffi ci ent energy to cause crateri ng or fragment at i on of the payload), is a 
high-speed impact by a meteoroid projectile. 
Fujiwara(6-5} conducted a series of experiments in which high ener-
gy proJect i1 es impacted basalt targets. It was found that the targ~t cata-
stroph~cally fragmented when the energy of the projectile relative to the 
target mass (Ep/Md exceeded 750 Joules/kg. Over a range of energy per 
unit mass less than this critical value only target cratering occurred. These 
results may be scaled to the cermet material which is approximately ten times 
stronger th~n basalt, i.e., the critical energy level for cermet is taken to 
be 7500 Joules/kg. Assuming a waste payload mass of 5000 kg and a typical im-
pact velocity of 17.5 km/s, a projectile mass greater than 0.24 kg is expected 
to result in catastrophic fragmentation of the payload. 
Another important result fr~m the above-mentioned experiments(6-5) 
is the characteristics of t~e frdcment size distribution produced in 
collisions. For particles less than 1 mm (1000 micrcns), the fraction of mass 
which IS smaller than a giver. size. b, can be approximated very well by a 
square-root distribution. 
M«b)/M«lmm) = (b/lmm)I/2 (1) 
This result is ap~arently independent of th2 sizes of the target and 
projectile. The distribution for larger fragments is sensitive to the ratio 
of projectile energy to target mass, but particles larger than 1 mm are not of 
concern in this analysis. The cermet parti~le distribution graphed in Figure 
6-1 is based on the above equation normalized to the size range 1 to 1000 
microns. 
The basalt impact experiments(6-:;) also give the fragmented 
fraction of the target mass less than a given size a" a funct-;on of the 
energy/mass ratio. These results can be used to find the absolute va1ue of 
M«1 mm) as cl function of projectile mass. Figure 6-2 shows this character-
istic for a target (payload) mass of 5000 kg and an imract velocity of 17.5 
~m/s; the increased strength or cermet relative to basalt has been accounted 
for by scaling. A cratering collision prodlJces less than 10 kg of small 
particles. A 0.24 kg projectile will fragment the target but JIlost of the 
fragments are large. As the projectile mass and impa~t energy increase beyond 
the critical value for fragmentation, an increasing fraction of the payload 
mc1SS becomes transformed into small particles. rn the limit, a 30 kg 
projectile causes the entire 5000 kg payload to be broken into small pi~ces. 
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'he discussion so far focuses on what happens if a meteoroid 
collision occurs. The remaining question is what is the probability of such 
an occurrence. Figure 6-3 shows the cumulative flux or collision frequency 
for pr'ojectiles with mass greater than m. The relationship F(>m) js.derived 
from the spatial density of interplanetary debris given by Wall(b-b) using 
17.5 km!s as the impact velocity and 1.0 m2 as the payload cross sestion 
area. The probdbility of a catastrophic collision is less than 5 x 10-' per 
y~ar, or J.005 in a million years. 
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lO-e Assumptions: 
Vp • 1.75 x 10~ m/s 
At :: 1 m2 
For Catastrophic Collisions: 
Ep/Mt • 7.5 x 103 Joules/kq 
Mt :: 5000 kg Cermet Waste Form 
10-9 I I 
10-2 
Projectile Mass, kg 
Icata-
stroph~c 
Call 1510"5 
~I -
Crat~g 
Co 11 i sions 
I 
FIGURE 6-3. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF IMPACTING PROJECTILES 
The production rJte of particles less than 1 mm is found by 
integrating the product of the differential collision freq~ency and the mass 
of particles produced. This rate is found to be 1.6 x 10- kg/year. If all 
sma11 particles immediately reencountered Earth due to nongravitational 
effects (which is certainly not the case), then this production rate is 
equi va 1 ent to a probabil ity of only 3 x 10-10/year that the ent i re waste 
payload returns to the Earth. Projectile masses between 1 and 100 kg account 
for over 90 percent of the total production. Thus, catastrophic coliisions 
dominate and cratering collisions contribute little to the ~roduction of small 
part":les. In any event, over a period of one million years, the probability 
of any significant amount of cermet waste returning to Earth is very sm<1l1. 
Keeping this perspective in mind, the next subsection addresses the manner in 
which small particles, under various orbit perturbing influences, could return 
to ':a rth. 
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6.1.2 Physical Effects on Small Particles in Solar Orbit 
Table 6-1 presents a fairly complete, qualitative description of the 
various perturbation sources affecting small particles, their basic charac-
teristics, and the orbit evolutionary consequences expected. Gravitational 
forces act on all bodies independent of size. The perturbing effects of these 
forces have been described in detail in previous analyses of long-term risk, 
but they are noted again here becQuse of their interaction \'Iith nongravita-
tiona1 force effects which al~e strongly dependent on particle size. In par-
ticular, the close planetary encounters which could arise as a result of the 
latter perturbations is one of the principal mechanisms for waste particle 
interception by Earth. 
Nongravitational forces fall lnto two main categories: (1) those 
','/hich are induced either directly or indirectly oy solar radiation pressure; 
and (2) those which are induced on a charged particle moving in the electro-
magnetic field carried by the solar ~I;nd. The momentum carried by the photon 
and corpuscular flux of solar radiation and solar wind produce a radially 
outward force on the orbiting particle. This direct force re:iults in orb~t 
perturbations that are generally negiigible except for particles on the order 
of 1 micron or less near the Sun. The indirect effect of solar radiation and 
wind pressure arises in two ways: (1) Poynting-Robert!ion drdg d-:ting on a 
moving particle as a result of the rendiated energy flux; and (2) Yarkovsk.y 
"drag" acting on a spinning particle as a result of asymmetric reradiation 
induced by thermal 1 Jg between the morni ng and eveni ng hemi spheres of the 
rotating particle. These two forces can act together or in orposite direc-
tions depending on \'Ihether the particle is spinning in a retrograde or 
prograde sense. Poynting-Robertson drag is generally the dominant of the two 
i ndi rect forces, exceot for 1 arge part icl es spi nni ng rapidly. The orbi t 
evolutionary consequence is then generally an inward spiral to the sun, the 
speed of which depends on particle size as will be described later. 
All dust particles take on some equilibrium electric pote~tial when 
in the space environment. This potentia: is further enhanced for radioactive 
particles. The Lorentz force induced on charged particles moving through the 
interplanetary magnetic field Cdn be a very significant perturbation source, 
but only on very small grains in the submicron size range. In the range 1 to 
10 microns, Lorentz and Poynting-Robertson forces nave comparable magnitudes 
although the orbital consequences uf each are very different. Because of the 
/'andornly fluctuating magnetic field, the Lorentz force phenomenon is best 
described s~atistically in the sense of a scattering or diffusion process. 
The final categorization in Table 6-1 refers to material changes 
rather than forces, although the two are not unrelated and can be strongly 
interactive in the case of very small particles. Surface ~rosion or sput-
~ering caused by solar wind iO!l~ takes place at a rate of approxirndtp.ly 1 
'A/year = 10-4 ll1icrons/year.(6-7j The eroded material will bn swept out 
I'lith the solar wind I'/hile the remaining !l1aterial, diminished in size, will be 
acted upon by the nongravitational lvrces in a sl igilt1y stronger manner than 
before. Another material change is caused by vaporization Of particles when 
very near the sun, e.g., in the final stages of a Poynting-Robertson spiral. 
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TABLE 6-1. SUMMARY Of PHYSICAL EffECTS ON SMAlL PARTICLES IN SOLAR ORBIT 
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The vaporized material will be swept out with the solar wind. Solar radiation 
ionization of very small particles and free molecules and atoms can also be 
expected to occ~r. All free gas will be carried away by the solar wind. and 
charged particles will be subject to electromagnetic effects as discussed 
before. 
The purpose in the following quantitative analysis is to gain some 
measure of understanding about this plethora of small particle phenomena. 
Fortunately. much of the recent work in the field of planetary science dealing 
with the nature and dynamics of interplanetary particles h3s direct 
application to this problem (see References 6-7. 6-8. and 6-9). 
6.1.2.1 Solar Raciation and Solar Wind Forces 
The solar radiation p'ressure acting on a perfectly absorbing body at 
1 A.U. distance is 4.5 x 10-2 N/cm2• and varies inversely with the square 
of the distance to the sun. The solar wind pressure under average solar 
activity conditions is 1.7 x 10-5 N/cm2• Each radiation and solar wind 
component contributes to the direct radial pressure. but the latter is more 
than three orders of magnitude smaller and can usually be neglected. The one 
exception here is particles that are much smaller than the wavelength of light 
{'VO.S micron}. In this case the particle becomes increasingly transparent to 
solar radiation pressure but not to solar wind pressure. 
The ratio of the radial acceleration (due to solar radiation or wind) 
to that of solar gravity is easily calculated and gives some insight to the 
magnitude of this direct perturbation force. This ratio which is independent 
of solar distance is listed below for several values of particle radius 
assuming a particle density of 4 g/cm3• 
Particle Radius. microns 
0.01 
0.1 
1 
10 
100 
Solar Radiation to Gravity Ratio 
_____ ...I.(A-Ir/Ag }----
1.0 x 10-1 
8.0 x 10- 1 
1. 5 x 10-1 
1.5 x 10-2 
1.5 x 10-3 
Since the radial acceleration acts in the opposite dire~tion of solar gravity, 
the result is an effective reduction in the gravity force seen by the parti-
cle. If the particle is released in a circular orbit at distance r, then 
immediately the orbit becomes elliptical ~ .. ith perihelion at r and aphelion at 
r/O - 2 Ar/Ag}. For example. a 1 micron particle released at r = 0.85 
A.U. would have an orbit aphelion distance of 1.214 A.U. A 10 micron particle 
would be perturbed into a 0.85 x 0.876 A.U. orbit. To sumro1arize, then, the 
di rect effect of sol ar radi at i on pressure is an instantaneous orbit 
perturbation of generally small magnitude except for particle sizes in the 
range 0.05 to 2 microns. 
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6.1.2.2 Poynting-Robertson Drag 
A particle moving 1n a circular orbit with velocity u will experience 
a tangendally backward acceleration as a result of the momentum loss as-
sociated with the reradiation of incident energy. Taking into account both 
the photon and corpuscular energy flux, the magnitude of this acceleration may 
be expressed as 
Apr a (U/C) • Arp + (u/vw)Asw (2) 
where Arp and Asw are the solar radiation and solar wind accelerations in 
the radial direction, c a 3 X 108 m/s is the velocity of light, and v • 4 
x 105 m/s is the solar wind velocity. It will be noted that a1thou9~ Asw 
is several orders of magnitude less than Arp , the larger coefficient (u/vw) makes ur> most of this deficit so that the solar wind component con-
tributes about 16 percent of the total Poynting-Robertson acceleration 
(actually a drag deceleration) • 
The above argument holds in the more general case of an initial el-
liptical orbit, and one can write the differential equations that govern the 
change in orbit semimajor axis, a, and eccentricity, e. 
de -k [ 5e J 
dt = ~~( l-e2)i72J 
k = 4.2 x 10-
4 
or p 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
where rp and P are the particle radius and density. The constant in 
Equation (5) is chosen such that the units for a and tare A.U. and years, and 
the uni~s for rp and P are microns and g/cm3• Examination of these 
equations shows that, for any initial conditions aO and eO, the 
Poynting-Robertson drag causes the orbit to spiral in toward the Sun and 
become more circular as it does so. Also, small low density particles spiral 
in at a higher rate. 
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When the initial eccentricity is small (eO < 0.1), which is the 
case of interest here, the solution to the above equations is very well 
approximated by the following expressions. 
a • aO(l - t/tF)1/2 
e = eO(a/aO)5/4 
tF • 595 a02 prp 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
where tF is the Poynting-Robertson lifetime in years. The normalized orbit 
decay time history is graphed in Figure 6-4, and Figure 6-5 shows the orbit 
decay lifetime as a function £f particle radius and density for aO = 0.85 
A.U. If the density is 4 g/cm , the lifetime of a 1 micron particle is only 
1720 years but a 1000 micron particle would orbit for 1.72 million years 
before reaching the sun. 
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FIGURE 6-4. ORBIT DECAY UNDER POYNTING-ROBERTSON DRAG FORCE FOR 
NEAR-CIRCULAR INITIAL ORBITS AND rp > 0.5 MICRON 
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FIGURE 6-5. PARTICLE LIFETIME UNDER POYNTING-ROBERTSON DRAG 
There is apparently little chance that a particle following a 
Poynting-Robertson ~piral will actually be absorbed by the sun. As it nears 
the close vicinity of the sun the material state changes due to sputtering, 
vaporization and photoionization become significant. These effects in combin-
ation wich the dramatically increased radiation pressure and electromagnetic 
forces should cause the material to be rapidly ejected outward within a 
relatively short time and should eventually escape the solar system. There 
exists some low probability that ejected material could be captured by Earth 
as it sweeps past t~e Earth's orbit. An upper bound on this probability can 
be calculated by assuming a charged particle state and a capture cross section 
equal to the Earth's mJgnetospher~ (63,800 km radius). Taking into account the 
probability that Earth will be located in the interception region at the time 
of 1 A.U. crossing, the canture probability (Pc) is given by the bounded 
expression: 
Pc • (5.75 x 10-8/tan i) i 1.35 x 10-4 (9 ) 
where i is the orbit inclination of the ejected material. If i = 1° then the 
capture probability is only 3 x 10-5• At i = 7°, which is the difference 
between7the solar equator dnd the eclipcic planes, the capture probability is 5 x 10- • 
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A second indirect effect of solar radiation pressure was noted 
earl i ere Thi sis the transverse reaction fCJrce termed the Yarkovsky effect 
which is induced in spinning particles because of the differential reradiation 
from the lightside and darkside hemispheres. For particles in retrograde 
spin, the Yarkovsky drag force adds to the Poynting-Robertson drag; for 
prograde spin this force acts in the opposite direction and is therefore a 
Unegative drag. U The magnftude of the Yarkovsky force depends upon the 
particle size, physical composition,* rate of spin, and orbital distance. The 
importance of this force is best described ", terms of its magnitude relative 
to Poynting-Robertson drag as shown in Figure 6-6 for ce~t particles. Two 
asymptotic regimes describe the main result. The sloping lines correspond to 
uslowu rotating bodies and the horizontal lines to ufast U rotating bodies, 
where the desilJnations slow and fast refer to the spin period as measured 
against the thermal penetration time; in fast rotation the thermal effect is 
confined to the surface layers of the particle. Although estimation of 
induced spin rates is beyond the scope of this study, we could at least bound 
the Yarkovsky effect by examining the maximum drag ratio as indicated by the 
dashed lines in Figure 6-6. For cermet particles, the maximum drag t'atio does 
not exceed unity until the particle radius is larger than 1000 microns. The 
equivalent particle size for calcine is 100 I'licrons. Since the actual drag 
ratio is likely to be much less than the maximum, the Yarkovsic.y effect is 
thought to be relatively unimportant compared to the Poynting-Robertson effect 
for the range of particle sizes considered here. Furthermore, one could 
reasonably argue that the long-tp.rm Yarkovsky force might average to near zero 
value due to precession of the spin axis produced by solar radiation pressure. 
6.1.2.3 Lorentz Scattering 
A particle in soiar orbit can take on an electric charge because of 
the combined effects of solar wind ions and electrons, photoionization, and 
alpha and beta emissions in the case of radioactive material. This charge is 
given by the expression 
q = (rp V/300) esu (10) 
where rp' is the particle radius in cm and V is the electric potential in 
volts. The potential of a small partj~le )from a radioactive waste package has 
recently been calculated by Williamst o-10 for specific particle sizes, dis-
tances from the sun, and ages of the reprocessed waste. This calculation as-
sumes the PW-4b reference wast~ mix and cermet form, and reprocessing 10 years 
after reactor removal. 
The equilibrium potential for ordinary, nonradioactive particles lies 
in the range 7 to 12 volts for all partlcl€ sizes and solar distances~ V in-
creases from 7 volts at a .. 0.1 A.V. to 12 volts at a .. 1 A.U. and remains 
constant beyond 1 A.u. Radioactive partJ~les have a higher equilibrium poten-
tial, especially at large va1lJes of fp and a, but this decreases with time 
* The~mal conductivity and specific heat 
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Note: Prograde spin giv@s neg&tive drag 
Retrograde spin gives positive drag 
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FIGURE 6-6. COMPARISON OF YARKOVSKY AND POYNTING-ROBERTSON DRAG FORC~5 
AT 0.85 A.U. SOLAR DISTANCE 
as the emission activity diminishes and eventually reaches the free spac~ 
potential. For example, ~t t • a, a 1 micron particle would take on poten-
tials of 12, 14 and 32 volts, respectively, if placed at distances of 1, 2 and 
5 A.U. Thp initial potential values of a 10 micron particle at these d'ls-
tances are !J. 48 and 350 volts. 
Figure 6-7 is a graphical restatement of Williams' data for cermet 
particles orb~ting the Sun at the nomina; storage orbit distance of 0.85 A.U. 
The equilibrium oGcential as a Function of time can be represented by the 
empirical equation 
V(t) • 11 volts + Vro exp (-t/30 years) ( 11 ) 
where 11 volts is the potential without radioactivity and Vro is the addi-
tional potential with radioactivity at t • 0. The decay constant of 30 years 
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corresponds to the half-lfves of 137es and 90S r ffssion 
are the primary sources of the radfoact1ve emissfons that 
equilibrfum potentfal. It should be noted that the Madif1eo 
(90 percent removal of 1~7Cs and 90S r) would only hast"n 
years) for decJy to the free s~ace potential of 11 volts. 
products, which 
cause a higher 
PW-4b waste ~i x 
the time «100 
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FiGURE 6-7. EQUILIBRIUM POTENTIAL OF SMAlL RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES (PW-4b CERMET) 
The electromag~etic lorentz forcp. per unit mass acting on a charged 
particle is given by 
S.I'. • (q/~) (y x ~) ( 12 ) 
.. 
-",',. 
I 
I 
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1 
1 
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where m • 4/3 r 3 is the particle mass, c is the velocity of light, v is 
ttle velocity vectgr, and B is the magnetic fi~ld vector. For this problem-the 
appropriate v is the addition of the solar wind lnd orbftal ~elocit1es and the 
appropriate! is the solar magnetic field. A simplified estimate of the mag-
nftude of the Lorentz acceleration can be made by considering the radial ve-
locity direction where the solar wind speed greatly dominates the orbital 
speed. Taking Q. 6.7 g/cmJ , V • 11 volts, and B • 3 x lp-S 9fUSS, the 
Lorentz acceleration is calculated from At • 5.23 x 10- 1/rp in cgs 
units. Hence, a
3 
1-mf~on particle (10-4 cm) wculd experienre an acceler-
ation of ~ x 10- cm/s; by comparison, the solar gravity at 0.85 A.U. is 
0.82 cm/s. The inverse-square relationship makes it obvious that only 
particles smaller than a few microns would be perturbed significantly by the 
Lorentz force, even if the equilibrium potential on larger particles 1s much 
higher than 11 volts. This implfts, as will be seen shortly, that radioactiv-
ity is of little fmportance in the orbit changes induced by electromagnetic 
effects. 
The solar magnetic field is three-dimensional and time-varying on a 
scale short compared to the orbit period. The fn-plane sector structure of 
the field changes sign on a time scale of several weeks while the out-of-plane 
structure due to turbulence in the solar wind changes sign on a time scale of 
days. Sfnce this situation ;s best described by a random force process, the 
eifect will be to randorr.ly scatter the orbit elements of the particle about 
their ~ean value. II' the absence of dny other forces, the mean elements are 
unaffectt1 and maintain their initial values .... The interaction with other 
forces is t~eate~ later. 
An approximate an.:ilytical theory for ~his scattering or diffusion 
process has been developed by Consolmagno.(6-9} The mean-square change i'l 
semimajor axis, eccentricity, and incllnat'on are determined by a set of 
complicated but manageable equations expressed in terms of the particles' 
initial orbit elements, siz~ and denSity, and electric potenthl. These 
equations are not to ~e repeated here, but it may be useful to give the 
reduced expressions for the spe~ial case of a circular orbit near the plane of 
the solar equ~tor. Taking Ii • 11 volts and transfc"lTling to a convenient set 
of units, the standard deviation or RMS (root mean square) value! of the 
changes in a, e and i are given by 
(] -a 
J e-
(4.76 x 10-2/rp2p )aoO.StO•S 
(1.69 x 10-2/rp2 p)ao-O.StO. S 
(4.Jl/rp2 fj )ao-O.StO. S 
A.U. 
jegrees 
(13 ) 
(14 ) 
(15 ) 
with the pa"~icle radius (rp ) in microns, density (p) in g/cm3, semill'!ajolo 
axis (aD) in A.U. and time (t) in year). For eXample, over a period of 100 
years, ~ I-micron particle of density 6.7 g/cm3 released in a 0.85 A.U., the 
cfr~ular orbit would experience a random perturbation of its orbit as measured 
* this ;s only a suppo~ition. 
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by RMS changes of 0.07 A.U. in semimajor axis, 0.03 in eccentricity and 7° in 
inclination. 
The amount of scattering is seen to be proportional to the square 
root of time and inversely proportional to the square of the particle size. 
Figure 6-8 shows the semimajor axis scattering as a function of these param-
eters. The solid lines are calculated from Equation (13) and apply to 
particles which are not radioactive or which are derived from waste more than 
100 years old. The dashed lines account for the radioactivity effect starting 
with newly processed waste at T = 0 dnd all l"·4,,g the equilibrium potential to 
decay as shown in Figure 6-7. For the assunJt.' initial orbit Clt 0.85 A.U., 
encounters with Earth or Venus are possible if the RMS ~a changes by more than 
0.04 A.U. Only very small particles with radii less than 10 microns diffuse 
to this stability limit in less than 1 million years. 7he charge con-
tribution due to radioactivity is seen to be of little consequence and can 
practically be ignored in the subsequent analysis. 
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FIGURE 6-8. LORENTZ SCATTERUG OF CHARGED DUST PAr.rrCLES 
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6.1.2.4 Combined Poynting-Robertson and lorentz Effects 
It is necessary to know both the mean orbital elements of particles 
subjected to the Poynting-Robertson effect and the RMS change in the same 
parameters due to lorentz scattering, to calculate the mass-time distribution 
of small particles that may be perturbed into Earth-crossing orbits and 
captured. Some insight concerning these competing forces may be gained by 
comparing Equations (8) and (13). Specifically, what is the limiting particle 
radius for which the RMS lorentz change in semimajor axis equals one-third of 
the total Po~nting-Robertson drift? The appropriate expression is ro.3/2 : 
3.48(cO/p )1/.... which, for aO = 0.85 A.U., and P = 6.7 g/cm"', is 
evaluated at rp = 1.15 microns. Hence, Poynting-Robertson drift can be 
expected to domi nate the mot ions in the inner so 1 ar system of a 11 sma 11 
particles larger than several microns, but lorentz scattering can maintain 
significant numbers of submicron- and micron-sized particles against loss by 
Poynting-Robertson orbit collapse. 
Figure 6-9 illustrates a snapshot time history of the combined effect 
of these two perturbing forces on semimajor axis. lorentz scattering is shown 
as a time-varying Gaussian-like spread about a time-varying mean value due to 
Poynting-Robertson drift. If the initial condition is a circular orbit at 
0.85 A.U., then eventually the di stribut ion spreads outward to cross the 
Earth's orbit which lies in the distance ran9~ 0.98 to 1.02 A.U. There exists 
some low probability of Earth capture (reentry) during the interval of time 
w;len a particle orbit is withln this 0.04 A.U. region. For any single par-
ticle, this time interval can be calculated by first determining the area 
(probability) of the Gaussian distribution encompassing this crossing region 
as a function of time, and then ~ntegrating this probability over the 
P0ynting-Robertson lifetime. Thi$ value of 6t associated with Earth crossing 
risk is then used to calculate the probability of Earth rt:!entry for that 
particle. Finally. the reentry probability is integrated over the size dis-
triblJcion of oarticles to determine the mass fraction of small particles 
expected to r':!turn to Earth. Orbit eccentricity chc;~es, not shown in tne 
simplified illustration of Figure 6-9, were accounted for in the computational 
procedure which generated the results described in the next subsection. 
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Sun Earth 
FIGURE 6-9, SNAPSHJT OF COMBINED EFFECTS DUE TO POYNTiNG-ROBERTSON 
DRIFT AND LORENTZ SCATTERING 
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6.1.3 Mass-Time Distributions and Earth Interception 
The evoluticnary distribution of small particle mass with time after 
payload br-eakup, and the fraction of total mass falling on each of the inner 
planets (Mercury, '!enus, and Earth) has been calculated for a set of eight 
different initial conditions. These eight cases derive fran combinations of 
the fo11o\'Iing conditions: 
(1) Calcine and Cennet \~aste Forms 
(2) Nominal Storage Orbits at 0.85 A.U. and 1.19 A.U. 
(3) Ci rcular and Ell i pt ica 1 Ini t i a 1 Orbit s. 
The two waste forms have very different particle size distributions if break-
up occurs; and therefore, one can expect different dispositions of the total 
mass in small particles. The 1.19 A.U. circular orbit between Earth and Mars 
hils been discussed in previous studies as a candidate destination. Results 
here show that the reference 0.85 A.U. destination was the better choice, at 
least fran the p~rspective of breakup effects. The circular initial orbit 
represents the case of payload breakup any tir.le after achi~ving the nominal 
stable orbit, whereas the elliptical initial orbit represents a breakup event 
occurring before or at the start of the ~ircularization propulsive maneuver. 
All initial orbits are assumed to be inclined by 1° relative to the ecliptic 
pl ane. 
Figure 6-10 shows the mass-t ime distriblltion of calcine small par-
ticles for initi&lly circular orbits at both 0.85 A.U. and 1.12 A.U. distance 
from the sun. As expected, the shape of the curves correlates closely with 
the calcine particle size t1istribution (see Figure 6-1). For the 0.85 A.U. 
case, the resulting disposition stated as a fraction of the t.otal initi(ll m~ss 
is as follows: (a) 0.001 percent falls on Earth; (b) 0.2 pei"Cent fc.l1s on 
Venus; (c) 0.01 percent falls on Mercury; and (d) 99.8 percent survives to the 
close vicinity of the sun. The mean time for the material return to Earth is 
about 800 yedrs after the ;Jayload breakup event. Of the particles surviving 
to the sun, 12 ~ercent of the mass drrives within 5000 years, 44 percent 
within 10,001) years, and 92 percent 1.'Iithin 100,000 year!, after p~yload bredk-
up. It is expected that the surviving mass will be ejected quickly to\'1ard the 
outer solar system by the solar wind and radiation pressure forces follol-ling 
vaporization, sputtering and/or photoionization. During the ejection process, 
which occurs at different times for individual particles, the procability of 
interception and capture of charged particles by the Earth's magnetcsphere is 
very small--less than three chances in a minion. FurtheilTlore, or.ly a 
fract ion of the captured ions woul d subsequently d ri ft into the atmosphere. 
Hence it appedrs that less than 0.0015 percent of the total mass of t1e "blown 
apart" calcine waste would ever return to Earth. This is only 75 grams for a 
500e kg payload and should be of little or no consequence. 
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FIGURE 6-10. DISPOSITION OF SMALL PARTICLE MASS DISTRIBUTION (CALCrNE WASTE FORM) UNDER POYNTING-ROBERTSON AND 
LORENTZ FORCES, INITIALLY CIRCULAR ORBITS INCLINED 
10 TO ECLIPTIC PLANE 
Curve B in Figure 6-10 applies to an initial circular orbit at 1.19 
A.U. In this case, because Earth's orbit is first crossed as the particles 
spiral inward, the material that could be expected to return to Earth in-
creases to 0.9 percent of the total mass. The mean time to Earth return is 
about 3000 years after the paylcad breakup event. Approximately the same mass 
fraction as before falls on Venus and Mercury, and almost 99 percent of the 
waste material would be eliminated. The median time of the Poynting-Robertson 
lifetime is 20.000 years, or twice as long as for the 0.85 A.U. case. 
Mass disposition results for cermet waste particles in initially 
circular orbits are shown in Figure 6-11. The distribution curves in this 
case are strongly biased toward much longer Poynting-Robertson lifetimes since 
most of the fragmented mass resides in larger particle sizes (see Figure 6-1). 
In other words, the orbital changes imposed on the cermet particle distribu-
tion take place on a timescale about two orders of magnitude longer than that 
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for the calcine particle distribution. This leaves more time for the material 
to be swept up by the planets and the higher mass fractions shown reflect this 
fact. The return to Earth is about 0.1 percent for the 0.85 A.U. orbit and 6.7 
percent for the 1.19 A.:.J. orbit. The mean time ~o Earth return is, respec-
tively, 100,000 years and 45,000 years after the payload breakup event. 
lOO 
A ! 
80 Initial Orbit 0.85 A.U 1.19 A.U • 
earth Co 11 ision o .120't 6.686::' 
Venus Coll ision 2.568% 2.871% 
Mercury Colli~ion 0.282:: 0.276: 
60 Survive to Sun* 97.030% 90.167% 
*Ejected by radiation pressure or with solar wind • 
Probability of subsequent capture into Earth's 
40 magnetosphere is 3 ~ 10-6 or less. 
20 
o ~ _________ ~ __ ~~ ________________________ ,-________________________ ~ ______________________ ~ 
FIGURE 6-11. 
10" 
Time to Solar Vicinity and Ejection, years 
DISPOSITION OF SMALL PARTICLE MASS DISTRIBUTION 
(CERMET WASTE FORM) UNDER POYNTING-ROBERTSON AND 
LORENTZ FORCES, INITIALLY CIRCULAR ORBITS INCLINED 
1° TO ECLIPTIC PLANE 
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Summary results for all eight cases, given in the table below, show 
the percentage of initial total waste mass (in small particle distribution) 
expected to return to Earth. 
Initial Orbit, Calcine Waste, Cennet Waste, 
A.U. ~ercent eercent 
0.85 x 0.85 0.001 0.120 
0.85 x 1.00 0.353 3.450 
1.19 x 1.19 0.905 6.686 
1.19 x 1.00 2.260 12.940 
A substantially higher return fraction results when the initial orbit at par-
ticle release is elliptical rather than circular. This is readily explained by 
the fact that the particles now start out in Earth-crossing orbits \'iith no 
time delay needed for Poynting-Robertson or Lorentz forces to perturb them 
there. The worst case result is for cermet waste in a 1.19 x 1.00 A.U. orbit 
whe~e the return fraction is 12.9 percent. 
As a pOint of reference, if the package does not break up into small 
pa~ticles, then: (a) no mass returns to Earth fran t'hestable 0.85 and 1.19 
A.U. circular orbits; and (b) the long-term (106 year) probability of intact 
payload return is 21 percent for the 0.85 x 1.0 A.U. orbit ar .. 1 15 percent for 
the 1.19 x 1.0 A.U. orbit. Hence, if the stable orbit is not attained because 
of deployment system fail ures and if there is no subsequent r-escue attempt, 
the risk is reduced if the payload does break up into small par"cicles. 
It is important to place the results of the small particle effects 
analysis in perspective. The mass return fraction associated \'iith a payload 
breakup event needs to be tagged with the probability of occurrence of such an 
event. For the reference waste cermet fonn, the threshold energy level of 
catastrophic fragmentation due to a 0.24 kg meteoriod impact would release 
only 0.2 percent of the total material in small particles. The probability of 
this threshold impact event is about 4E-09 per year. Complete fragmentation 
by a meteoriod mass of 30 kg is 6E-11 per year. 
The data shown below assume a 5000 kg cermet payload pl aced in the 
nominally stable 0.85 A.U. circular orbit. The data show the probable amount 
of mass return to Earth as a function of time under the condition of immediate 
total fragmentation. For times up to 0.1 million years after fragmentation 
(or launch), the probable mass return is only 0.017 kg. The maximum mass 
return is 6 kg (0.12 percent of 5000 kg), but this requires a time interval of 
3 mill ion years. 
Time After Fragmentation, Years 
103 
104 
105 
106 
3 x 106 
Probable Mass Return 
to Earth 2 kg 
0.014 
0.015 
0.017 
1.3 
6.0 (Maximum) 
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With the assumption of a 5000 kg cennet payload in a 0.85 A.U. 
circular orbit, the consequences of material release, distributed over time in 
orbit, are given below. An integrated release rate of 1.6E-06 kg/year applies 
in this case; i.e., the probable material release by lneteroid impact over 1 
million years is only 1.6 kg- Since the probable .Jnount of mass return to 
Earth is a small fraction of the mass released, this amount is quite 
negligible even up to several mil1;on years after launch. The probable 
maximum of 6 kg requires an interval of 3 billion years. 
Time After Fragmentation, Years 
2 x 103 
2 x 104 
2 x 105 
2 x 106 
3 x 109 
Prabable Mass Return 
to Earth, kg 
4.5 x 10-9 
4.8 x 10-8 
5.4 x 10. 7 
4.2 x 10.4 
6.0 (Maximum) 
Unless evidence to the contrary is uncovered, we would conclude that 
program planners need not be concerned about the risk associated with small 
particl~ release fran a cennet payload in solar orbit. A much more likely' 
failure event is that the payload would not achieve the desired orbit because 
of vehicle system malfunct ion. In such a case a rescue mi ssion coul d be 
attempted, and the chance of payload breakup during the relatively short time 
before rescue is virtually nil. 
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6.2 Rescue Mission Technology Assessment 
Rescue mission capability is defined as the ability to send another 
propulsion system to rendezvous and dock with a failed payload in orbit and to 
place it at the desired destination, or at least to prevent its imminent re-
entry. The rescue concept evolved in previous studies of the space disposal 
option when it became clear that acceptably low risk levels could probably not 
be achieved otherwise. Assuming that there is sufficient time to make as many 
rescue attempts as necessary to achieve success, what this concept offers is 
redundancy on a mission level rather than on a system design level. This 
relieves the almost impossible burden of desig~in0 the extremely high system 
reliability that would yield the equivalent low risk. 
There are three operational prerequisites to accompli!ih rescue. 
First, the payload must be intact, i.e., not have fragmented as a result of 
the failure mode. Second, the rescue vehicle must be adaptable to the situ-
dtion it encounters, i.e., have the capability of rendezvous and payload 
.·ecovery under all conceivable failur~ modes including passive and uncontrol-
lable targets. Third, the rescue operations must be accomplished in an auto-
nated mode, or with minlmal man-in-the-loop control, since it is unlikely that 
near future manned operations will extend to the high Earth orbits or solar 
orbics of concern here. Meeting these conditions will be a tall, but not 
impossible order. What will be required is careful pre-mission analyses of 
failure modes and responses, appropriate design of payload and rescue vehicle 
~ystems, and hardw&re technology readiness. 
A pt'eliminary ('xamination of the rescue problem WdS made qS Nrt of 
last year's y./ork on the space disposal option. eoth Earth orbiti 6- 11 ) and 
solar orbit(b-3) rescue regime~ were considered. 7hese analyses focused on 
the range of possible failure orbits, rendezvous phasing orbit requirements 
with rescue time/tN trades, and rescue propulsion stage requirements. This 
type of work should be an ongoing activity in conjunction with changes or 
mat~ration of re.ference disposal concepts and vehicle system definition, but 
will not be addressed further here. Another aspect of the previous effort was 
an initial assessment of the state of the art in automated rendezvous dnd 
docking techniques and sensors. It was concluded that such operations, whi1e 
not yet commonplace in the U.S. space program, are technically feasibly based 
on current technology if a coop~rative rendezvous mode can be assured, i.e., 
functional subsystems on the target vehlcle. In the absence of thlS, the 
problem was thought to be very difficult requiring certain advar.ces in design 
and hardware technology. 
The objective of the subtask discussed in this section is to provide 
a more ~etailed tech~ology assessment of tne (critical) automated rendezvous 
and docking phase of the rescue mission. Of particular interest is the case 
of noncooperative or only partially cooperative rendezvous due to failure of 
crucial payload vehicle subsystems slJch as communications and attitude con-
trol. The a~proach taken is to review and summarize the current status of the 
technology, including ongoing programs, as ascertained by a liter,3ture search 
and personal contact with NASA Jnd contractor staff members wor~;ng in this 
field. This infrrmation should provide a basis for new directives in 
supporting rpsearch and technology (SR&T) programs. 
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6.2.1 Rendezvous and Docking Operations 
The rescue mission can be divided into several phases: (1) launch; 
(2) orbit transfer. (3) terminal rendezvous; (4) stationkeeping/reconnais-
sance; {S} final cl"sure; and (6) docking or capture. These phases haie 
di st 1 nct ly di fferent requi rements with respect to eXl!cut i on times, propuls i 011. 
ground-based support and on-board sensors. Launch and orbit transfer require-
ments are closely linked to the spatial regime of rescue operations. i.e., 
Earth orbit or solar orbit. The remaining phases of interest here, beginning 
with terminal rendezvous, are also dependent on the operational regime but to 
a 1 esser extent. 
The terminal rendezvous phase oegins after the rescue vehicle is 
transferred to the near vicinity of the target vehicle* position. close enough 
for on-board sensor acquisition of the target. Orbital velocities of the two 
vehicles are nearly matched at this ~oint. Using the relative position and 
velocity information, the target v~hicle is then accurately guided to wichin 
about 100 meters from the target. Fundamental differences be~ween Earth orbit 
and solar orbit rescue are likely to have the greatest impact on design 
implementation for this phase of the rendezvousidocking o~erations. This 
arises because of the wide difference 1n target acquisition range required for 
the two cases. Orbit determinat.ion and guidance del ivery errors during tne 
transfer phase are measured against much longer baseline distances for solar 
orbit rescue. The problem 1s nl'lt too severe in the situation of cooperative 
rendezvous where it can be assumed that the target is radio-tracked from 
Earth-based installations and its ('Irbit accurately /1eterrnined. A target 
acquisition range of SO km, typical of Earth orbit operations, might have to 
be increased to 500 or 1000 km in solar orbit. This maximum range is still 
within the design range of RF rendezvous radars. In thE noncooperative mode, 
one of the worst case situations envisioned is loss of Earth-based trackir.g of 
the target due to transponder failure. Knowledge of the target's position 
must then rely on a prediction based on the last orbit determination fix, and 
the accuracy of this predi~tion degrades with time. If this failure occurs in 
solar orbit then target position uncertainty could increase to many thousands 
of kilometers by the time the rescue vehicle gets there. Unconventional means 
of target detection other than active RF radar tracking need to be considered. 
Assuming that the target can be Jcquired and that the terminal ren-
dezvo~s phase is accomplished, the next step is reconnaissance of the target 
to ascertain its phYSical state and determine its attitude motion. A v1deo (TV) sensor system would be most useful here. Pictures could be transmitted 
back to Earth initially, taking ful1 advantage of man's attributes of recog-
nition, correlation and decision. Alternatively, or in a complementary mode, 
the video signals and other attitude sensor inputs could ba processed on-board 
the target vehicle. This capability wiil likely be needed anyway during the 
final closure dnd docking phases when fast time response i!; important, f1~ces­
sitating autonomy from ground control. 
*The terms tar']et vehicle and payload are used synonomously. 
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Assuming that tne payload is intact as determined from inspection. a 
positive recovery decision would be made. The final closure and docking ma-
neuvers are greatly simplified if the target vehicle is in an axis-stabilized 
attitude and its docking structure intact. i.e •• cooperative. The rescue 
vehicle slowly approaches the target aligned with the proper docking orien-
tat i on. and uses sensor data ina feedback cont ro 1 mode unt il the dock i ng 
mechanism is activated and a secure latch obtained. Both 3-ax1s and 
~pin-stabilized configurations can be implemented in the cooperative or 
partfally cooperative modes. The main difficulty arises if the target is 
found to be in an uncontrollable tumbling state. especially if the tumbling 
rates are high. Appropriate responses to this possible situation. both in 
pre-mission design and operational flexibility, will be discussed. 
6.2.2 Synopsis of literature Review 
Twel ve contractor reports and conference papers dea 1 i ng with the 
subject of space rendezvous and dock i ng were revi ewed. The work reported 
covered the period 1971-79. and was performed by four different organizations 
encompassing university research and large aerospace companies. The nature of 
this work includes conceptual analyses. technology surveys, and systems engi-
neering. Applications include Earth orbit and interplanetary missions, manned 
and unmanned operations, and both cooperative and noncooperative flight modes. 
Altnough teleoperator control is the main subject in several cases, all re-
ports treat some aspects of automated systems. A brief summary of this work 
which follows is collated by some sensible combination of the organization or 
researcher performing the work and chronological sequence. The purpose here 
is to place the references "out front," and then use this material in the 
technology assessment presented in later subsections which are structured by 
subject matter, e.g., sensor req~irements and recovery/dockinS concepts. 
Kaplan at Pennsylvania State University has been largely responsible 
for setting the groundwork of conceptual analYSis and design for space systems 
capable of orbit rescue/retrieval of disabled, uncooperative vehicles. Much 
of this work deals with Space Shuttle or spac(! station operations where man is 
involv~d liD) thde conftirol loop--at hleast flrom a distance. One of the earliest 
papers t6 - Z i enti es some of t e prob em areas and operational aspects of 
retrieving passive satellites and orbiting debris, and describes a conceptual 
teleoperator package for remotely capturing and despinning objects of small to 
moderate size. InCluded also i~ a ftIathematical treatment of the attitude 
control problem. A second paper l6 -13 ) continued this type of analYSis but 
with application to large vehicles in a disabled state. Recovery techniques 
and devices involving external torque application and internal energy 
dissipation mechanisms are described. More detailed treatment of the above 
work perfgrf!d under 6 a1llp.SA grant can be found in the progress and fi na 1 
reports.{~ - and - 5) One energy dissipation method identified, 
internal mass motion, is the subject of a comprehensive analysis presented in 
iln AIM Journal article.{6-16) The complete equations of motion for an 
asymmetric rigid spacecraft containing a translatable mass are presented, and 
a~propriate control law and system parameters are select~d to minimize kinetic 
energy in transforming tumbling motion into a simplp. c;pin state. The final 
BATTELLE - COLUM8ua 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
! 
" 
6-29 
two p~pers in this series treat different methods of external torque 
appl1cJtion. Control and stability problems associated with ,.tellite capture 
by graop1er anns are presented in the first of these papers\6-17), whl1e the 
second(tI-18) considers a novel method for el iminating angular momentum by 
use of water sprays directed at the tumbling satellite. 
Martin Marietta Corporation has been active in this field since 1973 
performing work under several NASA contracts and in-house research programs. 
As part of a comprehensive study of the planned Mars sample return mission, a 
preliminary design analysis and technology assessment was conducted for JPL on 
the probl~s of automi:lted rendezvous and docki'1g of two spacecrdft in Mars 
orbit.(6-19) Th\! navigation, guidance, and control aspects of (cooperative) 
rendezvous and docking phases are treated in deta11, as well as thp. design 
requirements and error analysis of radar sensors. Another study for MSFC Is 
direct~ 3t rendezvous and docking operations of the Space Tug in Earth 
orbit. (6-20) A tot~l systems analysis approach is taken here to: (l) de-
fine the requirer:lents, methods, mechanisms, canponents, and subsystems of 
alternative concepts; (2) synthesize and recommend the best ~nual, automated, 
and hybrid systems; and (3) provide plans for s imul ation/demonstration test-
ing. Application emp~asis in the Tug docking study is on passive, cooperative 
spacecraft of various types, siles and orbital regimes. Another recent report 
is recommended as a reference source on most aspectt of automated rendp.zvous 
and docking problems with Q~plication to both Earth orbital and planetary 
rnissions.(o-21} This is a comprE'henshe survey and asseHment of the 
current state of the art, wi th emphasi s on sensors r'attaer than dock i ng 
mechanisms, and includes detailed descriptions of alternative sensor 
techniques and design configurations for both existing and proposed hardware. 
Northrop Serv1c~s, Inc. conducted a series of contracted studies for 
MSFC which addresst!d the problem of recovery of spinning satellites by thp. 
proposed Space Tug. Reference 6-22 includes an executive sl.mmary of the early 
study phases (postdoc~ing and soft-docking operations} and ~etailed document-
ation of the last phase of work (predocking operations). Postdocking analysis 
is concerned wif;h attitude control and stability of coupled bodies over t:he 
time interval between contact and target despfnning. The soft-docking 
analysis exalTiines the performance requirements for docking with dffferent 
spacecraft configurations, and evaluates several candidate docking mechanisms. 
The predocking analysis treats the final stages of target approach in terms of 
the requirements on chase vehicle ma"euvers, sensor information, and attitude 
control. Results of a 12-degree-of-freedom digital simulation are presented. 
The final reference(6-23) is a study ~erformed by the Essex 
Corporation for MSFC to develop concepts for satellite-retrieval devices 
employed by teleoperator systems to be ~sed in nominal Space Shuttle 
operations i" Earth orbit. The scope of work and emphasis 1S on the hardwc1re 
fiW!chani~rns c.f various types. Details of the physical configurations and 
mechanical operations are presented. 
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The references cited above comprise but. a representative sample of 
the work performed in the U.S. over the past decade. Many additional data 
sources can be found in the list of references and bibliography of these 
reports. These inciudp. literature translations from the Soviets who have 
demonstrated autonomous rendezvous and docking with their Kosmos-ser1es 
spaeecrdft. Another source not yet tapped is the (pOSSibly) claSsified work 
of U.S. milftary space projects. 
6.2.3 Rendezvous and Docking Sensors 
The rescue vehicle obviously needs a variety of on-board sensors and 
subsystems to implement gufdance and control functions during all phases of 
the rescue mission. Attitude and thrust vector control functions require 
components such as gyros, accelerometl~rs, celestial body sensors. momentum 
devices, thruster actuatClrs. and computation electronics. $i./.:h "!tandard" 
equi~ment 15 considered :'Iere as technologically avaf1.:ilJie, although it is 
recognized that the selection of the specific ~cr.figuration of components and 
their specifications is not a trivial engineering design problem. Attention 
wi 11 be focused instead on those sensors needed to implement the termi na 1 
renduvous and docking phases of the misslon. particularly when the target 
vehicle is disabled and not cooperative. 
Generic data types needed to determine the state of relative motion 
between rescue and target vehicles, and the physical a"j attitude state of the 
target are listed below: 
{I) Range 
(2) Range rate 
(3) Line-of-sight (lOS) angles 
(4) lOS rates 
(5) Video image. 
Range and angle rates are obtai ned either di rect ly as part of the sensor 
mechanization or derived by differentiation as part of the computational 
algorithm. Table 6-2 indicates possible sensor types that can provide the 
various data requirements. the applicable phases of operation, and whether 
noncooperative targets can be accommodated. 
An RF radar system is invariably included in a list of candidate 
rendezvous sensors because the basic technology is so well-developed and there 
have been numerous, flight-proven aerospace applications. Possitle implemen-
tations include pulse, pulse/doppler, and CW sensor modes. By appropriate 
design, the RF radar can be used to acquire the target at fairly long range 
and track the target duri n9 the rendezvous approach and closure phases with 
information provided on range, range rate, and lOS angles. Functional and 
cost-effective requirements for a unified sensor might dictate the use of a CW 
system which is not inherently limited at close range and therefore, could be 
employed for both rendezvous and docking operations. RF rendezvous radars are 
normally designed for cooperative mode operation where the target includes an 
active retroreflector (transponder) to turn around the S19n41, and the ant~~na 
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TABLE 6-2. RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING SENSOR REQUIREMENTS 
I:::,m OPERATIONAL PHA~E DATA LONG-RANG( TE"'INAl.I R(CONNAISSANCE 
ACQUI S ITI ON R(NOEZVOUS CLOSURE DOCKING 
~ 
Ire Ttl.lcoPt LOS I I Nt Nt 
RF bar 
PlnglJ! I I Ringe ~Itt I I I 
LOS Angles He Ne 
::CIIr,n1ng Lastr RoIdtr Ringe I I I I LOS Angles 
LIStr B.I. Illuminator Pltt.rn Recognition I I 
I"", (TY) I 1l1li91 L .' I I He NC NC 
NC • noncooperltiv. tlrgtt Iccommodltion 
response pattern is well definPd. Passive skin tracking of the target is also 
possible. but tt-ere are 1 in:ih.:10ns on maximum acquisition r!nge and tracking 
accuraCy depend, ng on the target's cross-sect ional area and ti1e radar power 
and anten~~ size. 
Characteristics of the rendezvous radar proposed in a Martin Marietta 
study(6-19} of a Mars sampl e return mi ssion are given in Tab·le 6-3. The de-
sign. based on technology used in the A~llo lunar Module r~ndezvous radar, is 
a un ified S-band PM/CW system wh icll serves a mul t i purpose funct ion for both 
rendezvous and docking. In the cooperative mode, it provides range, range 
rate. and angle data fran a maximum unambiguous range of 750 km down to a 
minimum docking range of 3 m. Otner RF radar systems that have been 
considered(6-21) fot' rendezvous/docking operations. pOHib1y with sOIf.e 
modification of existing hardware. including 7eledyne/Rya,,'s Viking Termindl 
Descent and Landing Radar (FM-CW phase monopulse). Cubic Corporations's 
CR-IOO/Electronic location Fi~der III (FM-C~ interferometer). and Hughe~' 
Integrated Radar and Commun~cation System (FM-CW amplitude rnonopulse). 
Scanning laser radar systems have also been proposed for Short-range 
applications «50 km). Nominally. corner reflectors are placed on the target 
to passively return the signal for acquisition and tracking purposes. Twc 
such devices have been under development in recent years. but neither has yet 
reached .l state of technol::>gy readiness for space rendezvous/docking opera-
tions. The more advanced of the two is a low-powered Ga/~s laser which could 
have applicat.ion in cooperative mode operations. Relative location of the 
target is determined by rneasuring the range and lOS angles. while' rates are 
I 
I 
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determined by differentiation. Range is found from the laser pulse propaga-
tion till1e from the transmitte.· to the target and back; resolution accuracy is 
about 10 cm. Target attitude information is determined by measuring the range 
and LOS angle to four retroreflectors mounted on the target in a known orien-
tation. A laser beamwidth of 0.1 deg is scanned over a 30-degree field-of-
view in the acquisition phase. Beam steering is accomplished by a piezo-
electric-driven mirror and an image dissection technique. The second device 
is a high-powered C02 laser whose development for MSFC was apparently 
stopped in 1974. A potential advantage of the C02 laser is noncooperative 
mode applicatio" due to its capability for skin-track ranging. It should be 
noted, however, that neither laser radar wC.s ever considered for the kind of 
long-range target acquisition function that might be required for 
noncooperative rendezvous in solar orbit. 
TABLE 6-3. RENDEZVOUS RF RADAR CHARACTERISTICS 
System Parameters 
Frequency • 
Rac1ar Type ••• · . 
Radar Mode. • • 
Modulation ••• 
. . . · . . . 
Radar Power •• 
Maximum Range • • • • 
· . . . 
. . . . . . 
M;nimu~ Range. • • • • ••• 
Radar Antenna • • • • • • • • • • 
Ang'e Track Method ••••• 
Transponder ?ower • • • ••• 
Transponder Antenna • 
Coherence Ratio 
Error Summary 
Range Error (Bias) •• 
Range Error (Random) 
R < 65 ~m . • • • • 
· . . . 
. . . 
R = 750 km. • • • • • • • • • • 
Range Rate Error (Bias) •• 
Range Rate Error (Ranriom) •••• 
Angle Error (Bias). • • •• 
Angl e Error (Random) 
R < 10 km • • • • • 
R = 750 km. • • • • 
S-Ba,ld 
CW 
Automatic 
PM (819 kc Subcarrier, 4 Minor Tones) 
0.3 W (Solid State) 
750 km 
3 m 
Traveling Wave Array 
Phase Monopul se 
0.15 W (Solid State) 
Cassegrcti n 
220/239 
3 m 
<3 m 
750 m 
5 cm/s 
5 cm/s 
1.5 mrad 
<0.05 mrad 
3.2 mrad 
T:-te possibility of uc::ing an IR sensor for long-range acquisition 
arises because the nuclear waste payload is inherently a "hot" body against 
the space background. The surface temperature of the reference 5000 kg cermet 
payload (PW-4b) is estimated tr:. be ?\bout SaG C. Calculations were made as 
Pdft of this study to determine if there is any merit to this sugge'5tion. 
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Results are given in Figure 6-12 which illustrates the trade-off between 
maximum acquisition range, target temperature, and IR sensor characteristics. 
The two IR systems considered are based on characteristics of the Infrared 
Astronomical Satellite (IRAS) and the Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility 
(SIRTF). Both are cooled telescopes as required for low background noise and 
low detector noise. SIRTF is the more capable system because of its lower 
noise equivalent power, longer integration time, and larger collector optics. 
Of course, thi s i nst rument is much too mass i ve to be inc 1 uded in the rescue 
vehicle payload. A sensor of similar design but with much smaller collector 
optics could possibly be carried into deep space. 
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One might first inquire as to whether these IR sensors could detect a 
wa~te payload from Earth orbit. The l;,,~:-:imum range for SIRTF varies from 1.5 x 
106 km (0.01 A.U.) to 4.5 x 106 km (1).03 A.U.) as the target temperature 
increases from 100 C to 400 C. The df~tection range for IRAS is about two 
orders of magnitude less, i.e., 12,000 to 37,000 km. Thus, while Earth-based 
IR detection of a payload in solar orbit is practically out of the question, a 
disabled payioad in Earth orbit m~ght be found given some rough knowladge of 
its location and sufficient time for searching a predetermined, finite area of 
the sky. For solar orbit rescue, the IR sensor would have to be carried 
on-board the rescue vehicle, but long search times could be afforded. A 
modified SIRTF-type sensor with 0.1 m optics could have an acquisition range 
of 150,000 to 450,000 km depending on the target temperature--far greater than 
R~ ~adars with practical limitations on transmitter power. IR detection seems 
to warrant further study with more detailed attention to target signature 
chara~teristics (relative to stellar background) and search methods. 
An optical sensor of some type could be very useful for short-range 
o~eration during target insp~ction and final closure to docking. Visual cues 
from the target are certainly possible in the cooperative or partially coop-
erative modes of operation. This could take the form of patterned lights 
(active) Qr patterned reflective strips (passive). One possible sensor 
concept {6-Z2) is a cant i r.uous 1 aser beam whi ch i 11 umi nates the refl ect i ve 
strips placed, for example, on the docking port. Estimation of the docking 
port orientation can be determined through analysis of the reflected signal 
whose magnitude is a function of the beam incidence angle. It is not known 
whe~her there has been any practical development of such a concept. 
Target imaging by standard vidicon systems or charge couple device 
(CCD) sensors currently being developed is another, and perhaps more 
practical, approach toward obtaining direct optical data. Illumination aid5, 
such as spotlights or strobe lighting provided by the rescue vehicle, might be 
necessary. Fr.ocessing of the images received for purposes of attitude 
determination and range computation is hardly a trivial job if done in a 
re,'1l-time auto,10mous mode of op~ration. However, high data rate computation 
could be performed by a dedicated video microprocessor integral with the 
sp.nsor subsystem. ihis allows the ~eneral purpose on-board digital computer 
to provide only a supervisory function to the video system while performing 
its main function of guidance dlgorithm evaluation a:id generation of commands 
to the vehicle attitude control system. Also, unlike planetary science TV 
pictures, full frame joe-solution is probably not required for purposes of 
docking control, leaving room for ddta compression techniques to be used. An 
automated video system of this type cannot be cl~ssified as existing 
technology, but some biisic work has been initiated (6-21) and shuuld 
probably be continued. 
6.2.4 Recovery (Docking) of Tumbling Vehicles 
Under 110minai or ideal conditions of space rescue operations, the 
nur:lear waste payload will still be attached to the SOIS propulsion stage 
thrOugh some type of dual docking structure interface. Attitude contrel, most 
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likely 3-axis stabilization, is assumed to be still functional and provided by 
the SOlS, even if its propulsion system has failed, e.g., in solar orL>it. 
Rescue in Earth orbit is mest likely caused by failure of the OTV stage; it is 
assumed that the failed OTV can be jettisoned. The rescue vehicle contains 
whatever new propulsion elements are necessary, proceeds to recover the 
payload via tile nominal docking mechanism, and goes about its business of 
completing the disposal mission. No particularly new technology problems are 
involved here since design of docking structures and mechanisms is a fairly 
evolved engineering practice at present. What happens, however, if the above 
ideal scenario does not occur and the payload (target vehicle) is not 
attitude-stabilized? Such failure mode events should be taken into account in 
the nomi na 1 des i gn of the recovery concept and dock i ng mechani sms in order to 
enhance the probability of successful rescue. 
T<1ble 6-4 lists several concepts suggested for accomplishing the 
recovery of spinning or tumbling vehicles. The various control techniques 
generally fall into two categories: (A) energy dissipation mechanisms and (8) 
external torque mechanisms. Energy dissipation refers to action taken by 
(active or passive) or on (external) the target vehicle causing a general 
t:.Jrnbling motion to be damped into a spin-stabilized motion from which capture 
or docking can then be implemented. Examples of dissipation mechanisms 
include: (1) internal linear mass motion (active method); (2) various types 
of fluid, mechanical, or structural dampers (passive method); and (3) viscous 
fluid sprays (external method). The second category, external torque 
concepts, involves action taken solely by the rescue vehicle to impl~ment cap-
ture or docking from a gtneral state of tum~ling motion. The two main examples 
in this case are: (1) a chase vehicle "glommer ll which senses and matches the 
target motion, docks in this configuration, and then detumbles; and (2) a 
chase vehicle "grappler" which senses the motion, grips and detumbles the 
target vehicle, and then captures or docks with it. 
In terms of engineering design requirements, the energy disSipation 
concepts impose a low-to-moderate burden on the target vehicle and a moderate-
to-high burden on the rescue vehicle. Note that the rescue vehicle must now 
have the capdbility to uock with a soin-stabilized target in addition to, or 
in place of, the nominal axis-stabilized docking maneuver. The external 
torque concepts place no burden on the target but a high burden on the rescue 
vehicle, especially if these maneuvers must be performed remotely in an auto-
mated mode. The judgement here is that the "glommer" techni que l'ioul d be i nor-
dinately complex unless the tumbling rates are very low. Not only is it dif-
ficult to accurately measure another body's attitude motion when the rates are 
high, but the si'llultaneous control of flight path and attitude motion during 
the docking closure maneuvers is also quite difficult. 
Detumbling by grappler arms or similar external torque devices has 
been under study in Space Shuttle-related programs. A number of different 
concepts have been proposed. Spt:ci al end effectors and mult ipl e de9rees of 
freedom are often required of the grappling mechanisms. Probably, no general 
procedure ;s best for all satellites. The design drivers are clearly the 
target's mass, dimensions and specific hardware configuration, and the type 
and rate of tumbling motion expected. The proposed Shuttle applications have 
mostly involved teleoperator systems in Earth orbit with Shuttle crew partici-
pation. Performing such a function remotely in solar orbit, where limitations 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
6-36 
surely exist on the size and weight of grapple mechanisms that can be brought 
there, would probably be very difficult. Perhaps the problem would be more 
tractable if the spherical waste pJyload were released from the SOlS stage. 
TABLE 6-4. CONCEPTS FOR RECOVERY (DOCKING) OF TUMBLING VEHICLES 
Momentum-Control Techniques 
A. Energy Disslpation Mechanisms 
Capture in ~pin-Stabilized Motion 
Active - Internal Mass Motion 
Passive - Fluid Ring Dampers 
Pendulum Dampers 
Spring-Mass Dampers 
Flexible Structures 
External - Viscous Fluid Sprays 
B. External Torque Mechanisms 
Capture in General Tumbling Motion 
Chase Vehicle "Glommer" 
Sense/Match Motiori 
- Hard Dock 
- Detumble 
Chase Vehicle: "Grappler" 
- Sense Motion 
- Grip/Detumble 
- Hard Dock 
Target Vehicle 
Burden 
Moderate 
Low 
None 
None 
None 
Rescue Vehicle 
Burden 
Moderate 
Moderat~ 
High 
High 
High 
A suggestion by R. Burns of MSFC bears further thought and analysis. 
Consider a rocket-powered harpoon, perhaps laser-guided, that is fired at some 
C.G. area on the target containing a guidance aid (reflector) and an impact 
pad. The induced translational motion will draw out the tether which is later 
pulled in to the rescue vehicle with the harpoon serving as an axle of rota-
tion and a docking probe. Residual angular momentum might then be dissipated 
against a friction pad cradle. The general idea of harpooning the target has 
been considered by others in "blue sky" discussions, but appare"tly no backup 
a,ialysis hcts been done to verify concept feasibility. 
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The external fluid spray mechanism(6-18) for energy dissipation 
seemed quite intriguing since action is safely taken "at a distance" on a 
generally noncooperative target. Based on laboratory experiments involving 
liquid jets exhausting into a vacuum, the idea here is to spray water at a 
tumbling object. Accumulation of water on the object forms into ice and the 
added mass absorbs angular momentum which is then carried away as the ice 
sublimes, thus slowing the object. Analytical investigation was applied to a 
range of target masses in low Earth orbits initially spinning at 30 rpm in 
ol"der to estimate the control response history and the mass of water required. 
Results showed that despin times for 98 percent reduction in angular momentum 
ranged from several minutes to several hours for satellite masses up to 800 
kg. and that the mass of water required ranged from several hUTldred to several 
thousand kilograms depending crucially on the water accumulation or sticking 
fraction. Thus, while this concept may be viable for despinning small 
satellites using large quantities of liquid apropos to Shuttle payload 
capability in Earth orbit, it does not appear to be vidble from a weight 
standpoint for our application of despinning large vehicles in interplanetary 
space. 
A movable mass control system on-board the target has been shown to 
be a viable energy dissipation concept. (6-16) The mass track should be 
placed as far as possible from the vehicle center of mass and oriented paral-
lel to the maximum inertia axis. Larger control masses and displacement 
amplitudes generally result in better performance. Tumbling motion can be 
stabilized into simple spin within a few hours using a control mass of about 1 
percent of the target vehicle mass. The main disadvantages of this method of 
energy diSSipation are the relatively complex control system required and the 
potential failure of active mechanisms. Since longer control time can be 
afforded in the present application, a simpler and more reliable approach 
might be the use of passive energy diSSipation devices such as fluid ring, 
pendulum or structural dampers which are automatically activated if the 
vehicle enters a state of tumbling motion. 
6.2.5 Assessment Summary/SR&T Reguir~ments 
The implementation of automated rendezvous and docking operations as 
would be required for rescue of disabled nuclear waste payloads can by no 
means be viewed as an easy problem. This technology is in its early stages. 
However, there is no need to prove "off-the-shelf" availability of such 
systems today. What 15 ~e~cied is reasonable confidence that this capabil-
ity can be develo~ed in the near future, and ~n implementation plan to assure 
this development. Automated rendezvous and docking technology win :;ure1y I)p 
an essential requirement to carry out planned programs in the coming Shuttle 
era and in planetary exploration. An optimistic view would hold that \~aste 
payload rescue will be the beneficiary of these preceding programs. On the 
other hand, depending on the timescale and relative urgency. it could be the 
driver for such developments. 
Cooperative, unmanned rendezvous between two spacecraft can be ac-
complished with current technology. The demonstration of this by the U.S. is 
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simply a matter of priorities, funding, and engineering design. Once this is 
accomplished there should be a steady progression to rendezvous and recovery 
of targets that have not been predesigned to aid these operations, i.e •• 
partially cooperative or noncooperative targets. 
If rescue capability is necessary in nuclear waste disposal, then it 
follows that cooperative rendezvous must not be relied on as the only mode of 
rescue operations. Fallback options must exist in the event of failure of 
target vehicle's communication link or attitude control capability. The fol-
lowing classification of rescue scenarios along with possible design criteria 
will place some perspective on the problem: 
Class 1 Rescue. Cooperative rendezvous and docking is the nomina1 
mode of operation and is reflected in the design of both rescue and target 
vehicles. Some level of redundancy is built in the target's ~~b~ystems to 3S-
sure high reliability of nominal function. 
Class 2 Rescue. Failure has occurred in the target's communications 
tracking link and/or 3-axis stabilization function. In the first hstance, 
the rescue vehicle employs a backup sensor mode during the terminal r~ndezvous 
phase to acquire the target at long range, e.g., IR or higher powered RF 
rad3r. Possibly the target can aid this search by automatically deploying 
dev'; ces or materi al to increase its RF target cross sect i on. In the second 
failure instance, the target automatically reverts to backup energy dis-
Sipation devices to convert tumbling motion into spin-stabili:ed motion. The 
rescue vehicle design accommodates docking with a spinning tdrget as a backup 
mode. The target vehicle likewise accommodates this mode by design. 
Class 3 Rescue. The targp.~ vehicle is completely noncooperative as 
a result of failure or absence of bdckup systems. The rescue vehicle is de-
signed to accommodate all possible c0ntingencies and st~ll capture the target. 
It is clear that each of these scenarios, ordered by increasing 
technical difficulty, will drive the design configuration of both rescue and 
target vehicle systems in different ways. Premature selection of fallback 
opt ions may even affect the vi ab; 1 ~ty of the ent; re rescue concept. Trade-
offs need to be made regarding questions of: (1) technology f~asibility and 
development risk; (2) cost implications; (3) system re1\abil'ity; and (4) 
rescue policy and ground rules related to acceptable level of ris~ of not 
succeeding. The data b.~se that would eventually allow such t:"ude-cff!: to be 
made needs to bt improved. It; s recommended that future study ac~ j '/i ty on 
the space disposal concept address this objective some place in H:e statement 
of work for both NASA in-house planning efforts and contracted systems 
engineering efforts. 
In specific areas of supporting research and technology, the fol-
lowing directions are indicated: 
1. Sensor Technology 
a. long-Range Target Acquisition Dev;ce--conc<:!Dtual design and 
ana lys i s of candi date sensors (e. g., IR or RF) that coul d locate 
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a passive target at ranges exceeding several thousand 
k i 1 ometers. 
Automated Video Trackers-·a phased development program to 
include data requirements definition, algorithm development, 
component design, laboratory breadboarding and testing, and 
flight tests. 
2. Docking/Capture Technology 
a. Energy DisSipation Mechanisms--a conceptual design study and 
analysis of candidate mechanisms (on-board target vehicle) for 
backup attitude control. Study input is current definition of 
waste payload/SOlS configuration. Study output is data base on 
derived system requirements, control response, estimated 
development cost and risk, and comparative evaluation. 
b. External Torque Mechanisms--study scope similar to above but 
confined to techniques and devices (on-board rescue vehicle) 
for capture of unstable targets. 
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7.0 PROGRAM PLANNING SUPPORT ANALYSIS 
The objecti've of the program planning support analysis (Tas~ 5) was to 
assist NASA/MSFC and ONWI in program planning and to provide appropriate input 
data for generating and continued updating specific working documents. 
Section 7.1 discusses the activity related to the preparation of the Concept 
~:~~ n~ i ~~ 2 D~;~~:;; t(hs:ewo~tfeJoenn:ei: -Jev~~~~~g S~~; 1 ~~ y;; ~ ::Og~~~S p r:~?r.~; 
for the space option. 
Section 7.3 discusses the "preferable" licensing I1pproach for space 
disposal of nuclear waste. This approach and specific areas of application of 
~ ;~:~:~~~ ::~:io~ev~i o)~~t b~!~, s on re~~~irl~!; s b;XPN~~i~~~~t I)~:t e;er~:nn;~~ 
review of JPl's work (Reference 7-4), recent discussions wit~ NRC personn~l, 
and rev1ew of the Interagency Review Group report on nuclear waste disposal. 
The discussion includes a projected systems development flow chart (updated 
from last year's report) illustrating the sequence and timing of various 
licensing events and their relation to other activities such as policy 
development and environmental impact assessments. 
Section 7.4 presents a discussion of the requirements for supporting 
research and technology (SR&T) for the space system. Five SR&T areas are S~Jm­
marized in terms of status, justification, technical plan, resource require-
ments and target schedule. The five SR&T areas are: (1) waste concentration 
processes; (2) waste partioning processes; (3) waste form thermal and mechani-
cal accident response; (4) remote automated rendezvous and docking; and (5) 
deep ocean recovery. Additional details reg,':'':;ing the SR&T related to rescue 
mission technology can be found in Section 6.? of this report. 
Section 7.5 discusses the anticipat'~d requirements for flight and 
system component testirJ. An approach to tesling is presented. along with a 
listing of specific suggested tests and schedule. Test activities have been 
broken down into two phases: (1) tests required to determine concept feasi-
bility (as outlined in the program plan) and those required to demonstrate the 
required safety prior to implementation of the space option for disposc!~ of 
nuclear waste. 
EJATT.LLE - COLUM .. ·.J. 
__ -""'IiI 
7-2 
7.1 Concept Definition Document 
The Concept Definition Working Group, made up of BCl, SAl, and NASA/ 
MSFC personnel, held meetings and telephone conferences throughout the study 
activity. The product of this ~nteraction is known as the Concept Definition 
Document (COD). It contains the "Reference" space option concept scenario 
upon which most of the conceptual and trade studies are based (see Section 
2.0). Othe;::-options within the space option have been considered, studied, 
and are listed in the COO. Working draft Concept Definition Documents were 
issued three times during the year (August 10, 1979; September 25, 1979; and 
January 23, 1980) under NASA/MSFC cover. The two significant format/content 
cllange~ in thi s document, over those generated duri n9 the Phase I I study, 
were: (1) the inclusion of a section discussing an advanced disposal concept, 
e~ loying the SPS-based heavy lift launch ~ehicle (HllV); and (2) the 
inclusion of a safety requirements Sefji!)(1. The significant changes to the 
reference c2ncept over last year's COD -5) are: 
• Waste Mix - commercial waste has replaced defense wast~ as the 
primary waste mix for spac~ disposal 
• Waste Form - The ORNl iron/nickel-based cermet matrix has replaced 
calcine powder 
• Launch Vehicle - For each mission, the single Uprated Space Shut-
tle has replaced the dual standard Spac! Shuttle Launch. 
The current COD is contained, fairly much int~ct, in Section 2.0 of this 
technical report. 
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7.2 Concept Oefinition an~ Evaluaticn Program Plan 
The act1vity reported htre 15 a continuation of the program planning 
activity that began during the Phase II study effort (see Appendix B. Volume 
III, of Reference 7-3). Seven different draft~ of a 4-y~ar ~rJgram plan for 
determining the feasibility of the space cption were prep~r~d by BCl for NASAl 
MSFC and ONWI. Early drafts considered frlfonnation from last year's study and 
new input from NASA/MSFC and ONWI (July 13. 1979 and August 24, 1979). The 
preliminary rough draft of the Concept Pro~ram Plan (CPP), dated August 24, 
1979, was reviewed and improved during September as several review meetings 
were hel d with a number of BCl staff members regardi ng the work breakdown 
structure for the proposed ~.udy activity and the contents of the task 
write-ups. Also, each individual estimated go~ernment manpower (including DOE 
laboratory support) and contracted research, based upon the description of the 
program. The resourCE: estimates from each individual were then discussed in 
group seSSions and general consensus was reached. Typical or average values 
were then used in the draft program plan that was provided to MSFC/ONWI on 
September 17,1979. After re\'iew of ONWI, MSFC, BCl, and the newly formed 
space disposal DOE/NASA Ad Hoc Coordinatin~ Group', the draft rlan was revised 
in mid-October. 
Review and discussions among the parties involved contfnued through 
November, December and January. On January 28, 1980, t~e eCl final revision 
was submitted to NASA/MSFC and ONWI. That draft identifi~d the following 
program obje~tives: 
• Risk - To idpntify and quantify the risk benefit~ that may be 
achieved through use of space disposal of ce.·t~in radio-
active wastes as an augmentation for geologic waste 
disposal • 
• lost - To establ ish the costs of the space disposal augmentation 
for a reference risk level. Also, to establish the 
incremental costs of risk imDI"~vemell~. 
The work breakdown structure for the January 28, 1980, plan is shown irt Figure 
7-1 and the overview of the schedule is provided in Figure 7-2. For other 
details concerning the plan the reader is referred to Reference 7-2. 
*Note: The purpose of thi~ group was to coordinate progrdm planning for the 
space option. The group is made up of per50nn~1 from ONWI. NASA/MSFC. 
Sandia. Savannah River Lahoratcries. NUS Corporation, Battelle North-
west laboratories. Applied PhysiCS laboratory and OOE/Headquar·ters. 
aATreLL. - COLUMaUIi 
.. --------....... ;....;...--~ ..... -...~-........ ~-....--------------
• ~ 
~ 
of 
• ,. 
,. I 
• 1.0 NUCLEAR WASTE I 2.0 SPACE 
~ L~Y~TEMS SYSTEMS 
,. 
c 
~ 
• c ~MlX SElECTION PAYlOAD 
• PROC(:;:;:~ TECHNOlOGY FLIGHT SUPPORT 
FORM F~ (CATION LHJNCH SITE 
TECHMOlOGY LAUNCH VEHICLE 
FACILITIES AND ORBIT TRAlCSfEP. 
GROOfI) TRANSPORT AND RESOJE 
SYSTEMS DESTINATIONS 
SPACE DISPOSAL 
PROGRAM 
3.0 DMSnC AND I 
I NTE RNA TI aNAL 
AfFAIRS 
fPa-ACCEPTABILITY INTERIATlONAl LAW 
MD TREATIES 
INT(RNATIONAL 
PROGRAM 
FEASIBILITY 
15.0 Pa~" I 
JWWiEf£NT 
rAF£TY COOAOIMATlON AND RELIABILITY All) COIO'ROl 
SAfEGUARDS REQUIREJI[ITS 
E IN I RClKITAl. DEn.nlDl 
ECm.OMIC STUDY IITEGlATlm. 
CC»4PAlATIVE COST 
AND RJSK ASSESSfl:NTS 
PROGRM EVAlUATIo. 
PLANNING 
FIGURE 7-1. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE FOR SPACE OPTION PROGRAM PLAN 
...., 
• 
.". 
I 'tQOO'" 
.x~t'tl£1 tH9 • 11.""'''';1':0-. 
!d,· ... ~.:: 
T 
• • 
, 
• 
_l 
~:.'* .... ~'1;. 
_ITIt "'" 
... IM S'SftM'5 Vlr.:r s,t~lM .,st.!Sft(~.~ k t_:.,:· 'nUM~,!'S , ...... u_
::ITtWUQ/rl.. 
.,'10111 
! Ai.fllMrr,tCCllltPf Ai. r' ..... '[ ca..t!ll~ \U.t~ .. tll,ftN'":VU ("'I~lItr""AItC 
-
\lItO'U .. 1."",,!t0> SflJDru i.IIC hALvA!i1olll ! .. Jt. "IGIo M£.,- wm ASlIlIIIIoTS I.tCIfTq.un IDOl) l~~S;'\ tOt futflll(_ S11m~ :Il0l1_1 lSIISMOT :~."s,\' IDOl I 
I I I I I 
1 
,,,f[W-tv! SJ;.t[ 
~~10". C~t~['~ 
i t 
~-
t r 
)(C£"![1t :JoII-:< XqltlTlI);tS 1~ 
ASSt SSM(:, ~ ~ 
r~.'·"'~1 
1 , , t t j 
.. _ ..... Gr",,'. 
_STltW 
IIICWi I"TDIS P4Ct S'STVtS UUS»I(\T .\."iW . '1':;~ "SSiSs-t·.~S I.TllfltAftQM4. 
1'lrtGtl~IOII "',alts 
i- f" 
L 
! I.STIII .. IOmao stS~ .. X"JIiITtOlt snltT '""!MIe 1"'-"''''' 
_ ... 
lTUlI11S ITUDIIS ,COfICEr.S f(ll W'" ASKS""" &(cr'TAlJLJ~. I 'UlTJI(' S!"';('j, ',a/-.SAI 'IKI"'" (DOli ("U' (lAX ':oASolI 1;)0;1: 
i I I I I 
[ 1 
"1"II!U:l 
CQftCt'll 
MCDIll' 'tI' .. KL[('!'IOM {)(it ~s&1 
r 1 
• 
t t , , 
r 
J 
... ) 
t [ 
~ 
"c.,tU.~·,T. !-AC· 'nnVtt~~s l DlltEs'!':c I~ IIICLtAI "STEWS \'Atl IY$!P\ ASStsW"· AI>: t!'lT["'!IOtiA~ !'-u.u.,.tO~. ,r"!~: ! "mllIO to"CIOTS "£'£U'D tDfCl'T~ Sn,(CT.:.stLI"ll "U:"f""·- _ ... '0IiIIC('~ '01 'vi!,,!' [ltYf~:;~.;~·1Ci .:.:;r'-':"l .. l·· "ILIJllfW¥ DIS:'" n::"'"lls NfL'-'''''. IXSfta Sl\,~I[~ XSl"'sr:.::y iA't'!) "S~C(,S/llt';~S 'IIUI"!·'· ,gol' lUi', ANt hA"t,:lr.Tlo:". i(» USt~IN( 'OIICt~· .:C£l :)0( to'!".: (OOt,,,,SA' 
l 
~ 
I 1 J 
1 
J lAst!. lilt cOtt:!"" ore' ... rR 1~2 • stU:-IOft 
-.e JO[.·tA~ 
I 
I 
T 
,_""'[10(". '!l~tsT:t INC tWCLUI SnT[M! s,ACt s.s'!'t"S ,'S1UP'{Oj't lJ¢ fIlIP'", ASSUSMI: .. TS :"~[''''·IC!''''L :,.rtG.A~!Oh A,'AII$ 
! usn'filE CO:'(['" 'It'Alr 5"51£111 Utv:IIO"ItTIeLAIIIO IAstLHtt COMet" XV[LO'M[fiI" HOGtM SMtTY lSSrs."TS IftTt.NATr~ 
onl'" STuOlts Msr~ S'!'uDItS 't.A"''':~fC[ '01 lASE!.!'" (OfIK[,T 5Tu.;ILS (DO( ) (/IISAl .tCo*[lIDA~:Oti (00l/ ... s,a1 Ii)O{) {OOI/"''''! 
I 1 J 
I l ~ ~tC(NI[' '.1Ij • -. 
I FIGURE 7-2. OVERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SPACE OPTION PROGRAM PLAN 
I BATTIILLIE - COLUMBUS 
1 
7-6 
7.3 licensing Requirements Definition 
The space augmentation of high-level waste (HlW) disposal will re-
quire thr development of new processes and construction of new facil Hies. 
These processes and facil ities will be used to retrieve the waste from its 
currrent storage location, prepare the waste mix for space disposal, prepare 
the waste form for packaging and shipping, prepare the waste payload fot' 
placement in the Uprated Space Shuttle vehicle (see Section 2.0), launch the 
~aste payload into Earth orbit, and transfer it to solar orbit usi"9 an CTVI 
SOlS. These activities can loyically be divided into two major syst~ms: (1) 
the retrieval, waste treatment, and waste form and payload fabrication system 
at the waste processing facility sites; and (2) the payload prejj·'trJtion and 
launch system at the launch site. 
The purpose of this discussion is to address the licensing and policy 
questions that must be answered before proceeding with the space disposal 
ortion. The discussion presents first a general conceptual outline of the 
problem and procedure. The specific licensing questions on specific s.vstems 
are then addressed. The criteria development requirement is discussed, as are 
the data requirements and the policy decisions that ~ust be addressed. 
The material contained in this section has been developed through a 
consideration of existing regulatory practices, likely futurE chdnges 1n these 
practices, and the unique naturp of 5pa~~ dlsposal. Discussions with appro-
priate personm:al at tlte United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis~ion and the 
·J~t Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) were most helpful.(7-6 and 7-7) Consider-
4bl~ use was made of the recent reports of the Interagency Review Grou~ (IRGI ~~d j~12;~e JPL report(7-4), and other recent publications (7-9.7- 0,7-1 
7.3.1 Overview 
The four primary areas of concern in developing the space disposal 
option are: 
(1) The development and construction of the waste '.:reatment and 
payload fabrication preparation facilities 
(2) The development and construction of the launch site facilities 
(3) The development of standards, criteria, and regulations for the 
space disposal option 
(4) The major policy decisions required to allow the space option to 
proceed. 
The interaction of these major areas is shown in Figure 7-3. The requirements 
for' environmental impact statements and NRC 1 icenses are included in the 
figure sin(~e_~n NRC license is expected to be required for all systems of HLW 
dispOSdl. -0) 
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Since NRC licensing is assumed to be required, the question of the 
type of 1 icense and the regul at ions requi red ; s addressed for each system. 
Since current regu 1 at ions may address a concept in one ma nner wh i1 e new or 
changing regulations may be different, the question of licensing is somewhat 
speculutive, but as many optiuns as possible will be covered in the 
discussion. 
Severa 1 major pol icy dec is ions wi 11 be requ i red at di fferent steps 
along the way. These becane points at which IIgo, no go" decisions are made. 
If a decision is made to continue investigation (expected at the end of 1983) 
of the space di sposal opt ion, a draft envi ronmental impact statement for the 
space disposal program will be required. At the same time, the develop-
ment of standards, criteria, and regulations can begin. The development of 
the standards, criteria, and regulations will be a continuing process during 
the development of the space option. The regulations will have an important 
impact on the licensing requirements for the overall system. 
Also, since the retrieval, concentration of defense waste, parti-
tioning of commercial waste, and preparation of the waste form will be re-
quired, research and development of techniques for these operations should 
proceed (see Sec4.ion 7.4). Retrieval, for example, will be required for any 
HLW di sposa 1 metnod requi ri n9 movement of the waste. The most novel or dif-
ferent part of the space option is the concentration requirement and perhaps 
even some chemical or isotopic partioning of the waste material. 
The ground transportation of the loaded waste containers from the 
payload fabrication facility to the launch site requires no special licenses 
or analysis beyond those required by current regulations. The shippir}9. co(1-
tainer can be built to the standard requirements given in 10 CFR 71.17-13J* 
Regulations such as 10 CFR 71 are constantly changing so the standard criteria 
may be different from those now in effect, although no major changes are 
anticipated. 
The launch site facilities present a totally new problem as far as 
regulation and criteria are concerned. This problem is discussed in the 
section on the launch site. 
7.3.2 Waste Treatment and Payload Fabrication Facilities 
The waste treatment and pay10ad fabrication facilities include the 
system for recovery of the wastes from storage. processi ng the waste, pre-
paring an acceptabl~ waste form, and loading the waste in a specified 
*Existing United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations are 
quoted frequently in this section. 10 CFR 71 refers to Part 71, Title 10, 
Code of Federal Regulations - Energy. Se~ Reference 7-13 for full title. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r 
i 
Il 
I 
[ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
7-9 
contain~r. This system would be very much like the systems anticipated to be 
usp.d in standard fuel reprocessing plants. Since these facilities must be 
; ntegra ted wi th each other, it is expected that they wi 11 be cant a ; ned ina 
single building or complex of buildings and be licensed as a single system. 
The criteria for the payload would be specified by the environmental and 
technological considerations of the disposal operation. 
The waste treatment and payload fabrication facil ities must have 
facilities for storage of loaded waste containers (payload). It is unlikely 
that the most efficient method of operation will produce the product at a rate 
identical to the shipping and ultimate disposal rate. These facilities are 
similar to the waste handling operations envisioned for the commercial fuel 
reprocessing plant. It is normally expected that the design, licensing and 
construction of such a plant would take 7 to 10 years. However, it should be 
noted that no licensed facility of this type is now in operation. 
Since the defense HLW is stored at ODE sites, it is expected that the 
w~ste treatment and payload fabrication facilities would be buil~ at the s1te 
where the waste is located. The facilities would be owned by onE and likely 
be operated by a DOE contractor. Currently, such DOE owned contractor oper-
ated facilities do not require NRC operating licenses or construction permits; 
however, this discussion is concerned with the types of licenses which may be 
required. Current discussion concerning the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant does 
not include licensing of the processing facility, only the repository. Re-
gardless, similiar types of documents are required for DOE facilities a~yway. 
The disposal of commercial HlW will require all the processing facil-
ities to have NRC licenses. Since current policy does not allow reprocessing, 
these plants would be special waste preparation facilities. 
7.3.2.1 NRC Licensing 
Since the waste treatment and payload fabrication facilities are much 
like a fuel reprocessing plant, such facilities could be licensed under regu-
lations written in 10 CFR 50.* Additional requirements not presently con-
tained in the regulations could be added as an additional A~pendix to 10 CFR 
50. Also, if safeguard requirements are needed, these are written in 10 CFR 
73. 
The facilities would go through the standard licensing process, with 
a construction permit first being obtained, and finally an operating license. 
80th preliminary and final safety analysis reports would be required and the 
appropriate reviews would be carried out by the NRC. Specific procedures 
would be dependent on the regulations in force at the time of application. 
*See footnote, page 7-8, or Reference 7-13. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBuS 
-
f j 
7-10 
7.3.2.2 Environmental Impact 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires that an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) be filed for major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment. These procedures 
are given in 10 CFR 51. It is expected that DOE would file an environmental 
report as part of thei r 1 icensi ng applicat ion. The envi ronmental impact 
statement would be prepared by NRC. 
7.3.2.3 Criteria 
Criteria for several parts of the waste processing system will have 
to be developed. These may include such items as allowable specific activity, 
payload container surface temperature, and heat flux, contents accountability 
requirement and many others. The criteria determined for the solidified waste 
will probably be determined by the requirements of the disposal system (see 
Sections 2.5 and 3.3). Specific criteria for the operations will include 
allowable gaseous releases, personal exposures, radiation dose limits of 
processing equipment, liquid radioactive release limits~ and others. 
Since several aspects of the system are not unique to the space dis-
posal option, the criteria for these aspects can be obtained from or developed 
in conjunction with the other options for HLW disposal. Unique aspects such 
as concentration to higher specific activities, and possibly chemical and/or 
isotopic separation, waste form, and containerization will require the 
development of criteria independent of other programs. 
The development of data required for statements of criteria will 
probably be carried out by contractors working on the space option, but the 
final criteria to be used in the system safety analysis will be specified by 
the NRC. 
7.3.3 Overland Shipment 
The overland shipment of the waste payload containers from the wa~te 
treo. .. nent and payload fabrication facilities to the launch site are not ad-
dressed in any detail here. Regulations for radioactive materials shipments 
currently exist and shipping containers and casks can be licensed under the 
applicable regulations, 10 CFR 71. Note, however, that the NRC does not 
currently license DOE casks, but DOE casks are built to NRC licensing 
requirements. It is expected that the NRC, sometime in the future, will 
license all shipping containers for radioactive materials. 
The development and licenSing of a shipping cask will take 3 to 5 
years. Although this type of license is standard, the changing regula-
tions are requiring new types of testing to prove the integrity of casks. 
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7.3.4 Launch Site Fa~i11t1es and Operations 
The launch site facilities include the Nuclear Payload Preparation 
Facility (NPPF) I a ground transport system, and launch vehicle systP.m in-
cluding the mission operations and recovery system. These facilities will be 
the same for defense or commercial HLW. The launch facilities are viewed as a 
site with a radioactive materials license and the launch system as a transport 
vehicle carrying a licensed transportation payload. 
The Interagency Review Group{7-8) has recommended that the NRC 
license all facilities for the long-term storage of radioactive waste. The 
question of the NRC licensing of a specified ~jdce 1n space must be addressed 
if that place is considered a facility for long-term storage! of radioactive 
waste. 
If a specific disposal site, such as the lunar surface, were selected 
as a space disposal site then the site would likely be licensed as any 
terrestrial site. However, it is expected that a solar orbit would not be 
licensed but specific criteria would be specified which the solar orbit would 
have to meet. 
As for the waste processing facility, the launch site will likely be 
owned by the government and the question of NRC licensing NASA facilities must 
also be addressed. To be consistent with the previous discussion, in this 
discussion it is assumed that the NRC may license NASA facilities. It must be 
assumed that NASA would apply similar criteria to launch site facilities and 
operations even if NRC licensing were not a question. 
7.3.4.1 Licensing 
The licensing of a facility for possession and handling of radio-
active material and the licensing of a container for shipping materials are 
the methods currently used in the regulationsM Operations at the NPPF are 
expected to be simpler than those carried out in many hot cells. The ground 
transport at the launch site could be allowed under the special nuclear mate-
rials license granted under 10 eFR 70. Containers used for launCh site ground 
tranllj)ort by a licensee do not have to be licensed if the container is not 
mo"ed on public roads or off the site. The licensee must, however, comply 
witn the radioactivity release and exposure regulations of 10 eFR 20. If the 
fissile and fertile material content is below allowable limits, a license 
could be obtained under 10 eFR 33 since all the material handled cou1d be 
considered by-product material. This licensing process is the same as is 
currently used for many radioactive materials operations including privately 
owned and operated hot cell facilities which can handle rather large quanti-
ties of spent fuel. The 10 CFR 70 license and 10 CFR 33 licenses specify the 
quantities of radionuclides the licensee may possess while the licensee must 
~lso comply with other health and safety regulations sur.h as 10 eFR 20, and 
safeguards regulations in 10 CFR 73. I-fowever, gvvernment owned radioactive 
material is handled under DOE regulations which are essentially parallel to 
the NRC regulations. 
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By looking at the launch vehi~1c as a simple transport vehicle, such 
as a plane or truck, the current procedure, as applied, would be to license 
the payload for shipment in the Shuttle. This type of procedure was followed 
for the PAT-1 (Plutonium Air Transport Package - see Section 7.5 for discuS-
sion). Obvious1y. a new set of design criteria would have to be set up so 
that the payload and its contents would perform as intended under anticipated 
accident conditions such as a launch accident or unplanned reentry. The 
payload could he licensed under 10 CFR 71, which would have been amended to 
satisfy the criteria for space transport. 
The licensing process would have to be examined closely since the 
types of licenses in~olved in this option normally do not involve t~e degree 
of public participation involved in 10 CFR 50 licenses. An extra effort would 
b~ needed regarding policy and environmental impact to assure public partici-
pation in the decision-making process, or the license proceeding would have to 
assure such participation. 
7.3.4.2 Environmental Impact 
An environmental report would be required for the handling of signif-
icant amounts of radioactive materials at the launch sit~. Also, the poten-
tial environmental impacts of the credible accidents during mission operat1ans 
would also have to be examined. The environmental impact statement \'tould oe 
prepared by the NRC based on the envi ronmenta 1 report fil ed by DOE/NASA as 
part 01 the li cense request. 
7.3.4.3 Criteria 
The criteria for the laun:h facility and operation could be a major 
factor in determining economic feasibility of the space option. These cri-
teria would likely include specific limits on allowed radioactive release due 
to accidents and limits on the variation of the ultimate solar orbit of the 
waste payload. The level of risk will surely be a very important factor. The 
criteria on missfon operations will have to be set up $0 that the consequences 
from most credible accidents will be extremely small. The entire concept may 
not be socially acceptable if any credible ~ccident has severe consequences. 
The possible impact of criteria on the d~~ign of system and mission 
operations should be examined early in the program so that potential design 
concepts can be examined. Therefore, criteria should be developed as soon as 
possible. 
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7.3.5 Major Policy Questions 
Several major policy decisi~n pofnts will occur during the develop-
ment of the space option. The first of these fs a decision to proceed with 
the research and development requfred for the space option. If this decfsion 
i s pos i t f ve, the resea reh requ f red to deve lop t he wast e treatment processes. 
waste forms. and payload fabrication should proceed. Also. the standards. 
criteria. and regulations should be drafted. In conjunction with this. a 
draft environmental fmpact statement for the program II'KJst be prepared. A 
conceptual study of the space opt i on shoul d be made as well as conceptual 
designs of the total payload syste," to be carrfed into space on board the 
launch vehicle. 
Based on the information obtained. the actual construction of waste 
treatment and payload facilities could begin. The preliminary design of NPPF 
could be prepared to comply with the criteria already set up. A final progr~ 
EIS on space isolation would be prepared and international issues would be 
identified and res~lved. The discussion and resolution of international ques-
tions is critical since final disposal would not be on U.S. territory. One 
solution may be to make space disposal operations an international venture; 
that is, to allow all nations to use this method for radioactive waste dis-
posal. Testing of systems such as reentry and rescue systems must be carried 
out. These tests would allow a quantification of risk and consequences. 
The next deCision would be to develop and test the com~1~te mission 
operation. Required launch site facility constructior. would begin and final 
testing be completed. These would lead to the final approval of routine space 
disposal operations. 
7.3.6 Test Progr~m Requirements 
The maj or goal of the test program (see Sect i on 7.5) wou 1 d be to 
quantify and minimize the risk involved in space disposal option. Severe 
accidents which could lead to potentially unacceptable consequences should be 
simulated using actual hardware to aid design and to show that the accident 
consequences are indeed known and acceptable. These may include such things 
as testing reentry and recovery of payloads. subjecting payload sy~tems to 
fires and explosions, and other credible aCCidents. The credib~lity of the 
space option will be dependent on the results of these tests. The specific 
requireme~ts for testing are described in more detail in Section 7.5. 
7.3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The isolation of HLW in space will require the development of two 
major systems; first, a facility for the recovery, waste proceSSing, waste 
form preparation, and fabrication of HU4 payloads, and second, ldunch site 
facilites (e.g., NPPF) and mission operations. These systems may be licensed 
in some manner by the NRC depending on government policy with respect to 
7-14 
defense wastes. All systems for the disposal of commercial waste are expected 
to be licensed by the NRC. The development of good standards, criteria, and 
regulations w111 playa key role in the develor>ment and use of the space 
option. While licensing may not be pacing item in the development of the 
space option the licensing process can be expected to lengthen the time 
expected to put the option into operation. Ffnally, a clear quantification 
and minimization of risk and consequences will be required. 
It should be possible to establish a program in such a manner that 
will lead to valL, technically sound and socially acceptable decisions con-
cerning the space option. 
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7.4 Supporting Research and Technology Requirements 
This section defines the required technology developments that will 
have to be undertaken as a part of the supporting research and technology 
(SR&T) program for space disposal of nuclear waste. Each of the d~velopments 
is summarized in terms of its status, Justification. technical plan. resource 
requirements. and target schedule. 
A distinction needs to be made between t~chnology developments and 
design problems. Many elements of the spacl! disposal system (OTV, SOlS. 
reentry vehicle, container, ejection system, etc.) do not currently exist, and 
would need to be designed, developed, and tested. iiowever. none of these 
developments would necessarily requirl! the creation of any new technology. As 
an example, the OTV would use hydrogen/oxygen liquid propellants. The 
technology for these propellants is well dev@loped and systems using them have 
been built and flown operationally (e.g., Centaur, Saturn-IVB). This 
discussion concentrates on those areas where such technology is not presently 
avai lable and needs to be developed as part of the overa'il program. 
It has oeen stated that space disposal of nuclear waste is primarily 
an engineering proolem, based largely on existing technology. This statement 
is substantiated by this discussion. Only five primary areas of technology 
development have been identified. rhe five areas are: 
• Waste concentration processes (defense waste) 
• Waste partitioning processes (commercial waste) 
• Waste form thermal and physical response 
• Remote automated rendezvous anrt docking 
• Deep ocean recovery. 
7.4.1 Waste Concentration Processes (Defense Waste) 
7.4.1.1 Status 
Defense nuclear waste exists in large '1ua tities of dilute l11aterhts 
in st,)rage at three d1ffer!nt sites in the United States. Prel im1nary 
treatmer.t processes have been defi ned for thE: Hanford wastes which woul d be 
suitable for terrestrial disposal, but which would not give ad~quate 
concentration for space disposa~. Processes for further concentration have 
been defined, but are based on laboratory scale experiments ~nd have not been 
verified itS applicable in the scale envisioned. Further def1nitlon and 
demonstratiO'1 of these pr"o~"sed processes is required. 
I 
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7.4.1.2 Justification 
The number of booster flights required to dispose of defense nuclear 
waste is directly related to the degree of concentration achievable. Unless 
adequate concentration can be achieved, the number of flights required may be 
prohibitive. It is expected that the cost of concentration wi11 increase in 
proport.ion t.o the degree of concentration required. Therefore, there is 
pNbably an intermediate level of concentration that mi~imizes overall cost 
\ see below). 
t Af""""2- To tal Co s t / /..--- Waste Concentration Cost 
Space Transportation Cost 
Waste Concentrltion Factor ~ 
Better understanding of the potential waste concentration processes dre 
required to determine this minimum cost point. 
7.4.1.3 Technical Plan 
Concentration prO"~f:sses need to be developed for Hanford, Savannah 
River, and Idaho defense waste. For Hanford waste, a process based on 
dissolution in molten caustic followed by treatment with nitric acid may be 
feasible and adequate for treatment of four of the five types of sludge stored 
there. The generally insolUble zirconium sludge may be soluble i~ mol:en 
caustic, and removal of significant amounts of inert materials t!ould require 
development of a new (not yet defined) concentration process. ~dequate 
concentration could probably be achieved if ? caustic/nitric acid concen-
tration process was df!veloped. Development OT' a process for the zirconium 
sludge would allow additional concentration and would provide a margin in case 
of problems with :he other p:-ocess. For Savannah River waste, a single 
pr(\~ess involvin9 s'Jccessive washing with caustic and oxalic acid has beer; 
pruposed and should be developed and demonstrated. For Idaho Falls waste, a 
~ethod for dissolving the calcined waste:. :1ust be developed. Dissolution 
chemistry has been under development at Idailo Falls, !!Ir,d a process involving 
dissolution with nitric acid and molten sodium bisulphate has been rroposed. 
This process or an alternative needs to be developed and demonstrated. 
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7.4.1.4 Resource Requirements 
Development and demonstration of the various concentration rrocesses 
descr1bed .bove are estimated to require significant commitment of resources. 
It is expected that approximately $ 1 M will be required to reach a point 
where deci sions regardf ng the feasibility of space df spoul of defense waste 
could be made with confidence. 
7.4.1.5 Target Schedule 
Because of the significance of achiev~~le concentration on the over-
all feas ibfl ity of spac:e di spoul of defense wai·e, concentration technology 
development should be initiated as soon as possible. The projected schedul~ 
fs as follows: 
ist Year 
S 100 K 
2nd Year 
S 200 K 
3rd Year 
S 400 K 
7.4.2 Waste Partitioning Processes (Commercial Waste) 
7.4.2.1 Statl!! 
4th Year 
S 300 K 
Partitioning of nuclear ~stes to separate critical radionuclfdes for 
spechl disposal, such as transmutation or space disposal, hellS been under 
study for some time. to1eti'lods of separation have been examined for el ements 
such as iodine, strontium, cesium, technetium, and the actinides and lInthi-
nides. Laboratory and pilot ~lant tests of these processes have been carried 
out to di fferent degrees of demonstrat fon. None of these processes can be 
considered fully developed. 
7.4.2.2 Justification 
The fundamental premi~e is that space disposal of nuclear waste can 
be used to suppl ement geol og; c di spoul by ranovi n9 part fcul arly trOIl~ 1 esollle 
radionucl ides from the biospiler!. The probl em radionucl ides are those that 
have one or more of the following characteri!tics 
(1) 
(Z) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Ve ry long 1 i fet fmes 
High radiotoxicity 
High mobility in release paths 
Rapid uptake into food cycles 
High short-term heating rates 
For space disposal to be teasi~le, and to aid in making proper choice of ra-
dionucl ides for space disposal, it must be demonstrated to what degree each 
~roblE!T1 radiol1uclide can be separated from tne high-level nuclear waste. 
~ -~. - -- ~5,r r fa • 
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7.4.2.3 Technical Plan 
The DOE progran on waste partitioning needs to be revitalized. 
Primary emphasis should be placed on methods for increasing the degree of 
recovery and on examining the feasibility of extending laboratory type 
processes to large seal e operations. Emphasi s al so needs to be pl aced on 
defining processes that are simple, of low risk, and reliable. 
7.4.2.4 Resource Requirements 
The resources required to develop partitioning technology to the 
pOint where decisions regarding space disposal can be made with confidence is 
difficult to estimate. It appears likely that the cost will be at least 
several mill ion dollars. For initial pl anning purposes, the cost over a 
4-year period has been estimated at $ 3 M, with a strong possibility that ad-
ditional resources could be required as the SR&T program progresses. 
7.4.2.5 Target Schedule 
The SR&T for the partioning process needs to proceed on an orderly 
schedul e, therefore, a somewhat uni fom spread of fundi ng over the 4-year 
period is proposed, with the awa reness that 1 ater year fundi ng coul d need to 
be increased over what is shown, as further information develops and particu-
lar problems are encountered. Thus, the projected schedule is as follows: 
1st Year 
S 5vu K 
2nd Year 
$ 500 K 
3rd Year 
$ 1000 K (+) 
7.4.3 Waste Form Thermal and Physical Response 
7.4.3.1 Status 
4th Year 
$ 1000 K (+) 
A preliminary evaluation of potential nuclear waste fonns has been 
accomplished and the reference form selected (cermet-- see Section 3.1). Some 
of the evaluated waste forms are well-developed, while others have received 
less attention. Further definition of the characteristics of cereain attrac-
tive waste fonns is required, pdrticularly regarding thennal and physical 
characteristics, such as di5persion and the formulation of inhalable particles 
under high temperature reentry environments, and land or ocean impact. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
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7.4.3.2 Justification 
Accident analyses indicate that the waste payload may be subjected to 
severe environments Which could lead to release of nuclear waste (see Section 
4.3). The health effects (see Section 5.3) of these accidents could be 
reduced significantly if the waste form were resistant to dispersion and 
contained a minimum amount of small inhalable particles. 
7.4.3.3 Technical Plan 
Waste forms with the desirable characteristics need to be developed 
and tested on a laboratory scale. The dispersion and particle fonnulation 
processes will need to be examined under three conditions: 
(1) Exposure to high temperature environments over an extendec1 
period, simulating on- or near-pad fires 
(2) Exposure to high-velocity, high-temperature gas flows, simulat-
ing reentry from orbit 
(3) Exposure to very high dynamic loads simulating land and water 
impact. 
In the first case, small samples of the waste forms need to be ex~osed direct-
ly to the thermal en'lironment, simulating waste in an exposed state due to 
container breachings from mechanical (e.g., fragment impact) or thennal (melt-
ing) causes. For the second case, small samples of the waste forms need to be 
exposed to high-speed, high-temperatur~ gas flows in a hypersonic tunnel with 
high stagnation temperature capabilities. For the third case, waste samples 
need to be subjected to high impact loads in a ballistic range against both 
water and solid (e.g., granite) targets. In each case, the waste melting 
and/or dispersion rates and the resulting particle size distributions need to 
be determined for each candidate waste form. 
7.4.3.4 Resource Requirements 
Funding of $ 200 K to $ 300 K would probably be required, for each of 
the three types of tests identified, depending upon the number of forms to be 
tested. 
7.4.3.5 Target Schedule 
Testing of the possible waste fonns needs to proceed relatively early 
in the program since the results of this testing will affect the environmental 
impact assessment, detennination of program risk, and will influence public 
and governmental confidence in the feasibility of space disposal. Because of 
the experimental nature of the progr~ns, peak expenditures are expected in the 
middle! of the program. The projected schedule, is shown below. 
BATTaLLE - COLUMBUS 
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1st Year 
$ 100 K 
2nd Year 
$ 250 K 
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3rd Year 
$ 250 K 
4th Year 
$ 200 K 
7.4.4 Remote Automated Rendezvous and Docking 
7.4.4.1 Status 
Various portions of the contingency plans (see Section 2.6) for space 
disposal of nuclpar waste would require a remote rendezvous and docking capa-
bility (e.g., rescue of a payload from an unplanned orbit). NASA has never 
conducted an automate~ rende~vous and docking. However, the Soviets have con-
ducted numerous automated dock i ngs in near-Earth orbits, and some proposed 
NASA planetary missions (e.g., Mars surface sample return) could require dis-
tant automated rendezvous and docking. Although some of the hardware elements 
required for this operation may already exist (e.g., transponders, aircraft-
type search radars) a complete demonstrated technology base does not exist. 
7.4.4.2 Justification 
Demonstrated system safety wi 11 be a key requi rement for obtai ni ng 
public acceptance of any nuclear waste disposal approach. For space disposal, 
the ability to work around unplanned events or accidents will be the key to 
such safety. A remote rendezvous and doc%ing capability will be an essential 
element of the space disposal safety appr0ac~. 
7.4.4.3 Technical Plan 
Current studies of remote rendezvous and docking for nuclear waste 
payload recovery (see Section 6.2) have identified three key problems: 
(1) Location of a passive waste payload in Earth or solar orbit 
(2) Determination of waste payload attitude and dynamic motion 
following coarse rendezvous 
(3) Reducing the angular momentu~ of tumbling, noncooperative waste 
payloads. 
Resolution of these problems will require four SR&T developments in two 
generic areas. These are: 
( 1 ) Sensors 
(a) Development of a long range target aquisition device (IR or RF) 
that could detect a passive payload at r~nges exceeding several 
thousand kilometers. 
(b) Development of an automated tracker that can process and analyze 
video images of the waste payload. 
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. tNnrfl r"tt"'liriitf'& ¥m . >P . -= -..... 
I 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
t[ 
l. 
L 
r .. 
f 
ol-. 
i 
1 
] 
I 
J 
1 
I 
I 
7-21 
(2) Docking/Capture Technolo~ 
(a) Development of passve angular momentll1l dampers to stabilize 
waste payloads with failed attitude control systems. 
(1) 
(b) Investigation of external torque application devices that could 
be carried by the rescue vehicle and used to reduce waste 
payload angular motions. 
7.4.4.4 Requirements 
The requirements in ~ach of the four SR&T areas are: 
Sensors 
(a) Conceptual design and analysis of candidate RF or IR sensors to 
indicate feasibility of long range aquisition. 
(b) Software development and laboratory assembly of microprocessor 
and other hardware elements to permit laboratory demonstration 
of approach feasibility. 
(2) Docking/Capture TechnoloUl 
Ca) Conceptual design, analySiS, and (where possible) laboratory 
demonstration of candidate approaches to indicate concept 
feasibility and to scope cost, mass and system perfonnance. 
(b) Same as I (a) above. 
It is difficult to project the resources that might ultimately be 
required for this area. Based on the perceived complexity of each task, the 
fJnding is projected as $ 300 K for I(a}, $ 800 K for l(b), $ 300 K for 2(a), 
and $ 500 K for 2(b), or a total of $ 1.9 M. 
7.4.4.5 Target Schedule 
The projected SR&T activities involving documentation should have 
expenditures during the middle of the program. Therefore, the projected 
funding is as shown below. 
SR&T Area 1st Year 
l(a) $ 75 K 
l(b) 100 K 
2(a) 75 K 
raffi1 100 K Tota $ 350 K 
2nd Year 
$ 75 K 
200 K 
75 K 
150 K 
$ 500 K 
3rd Year 
$ 75 K 
300 K 
75 K 
150 K S 600 k 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
4th Year 
$ 75 K 
200 K 
75 K 
100 K 
$ 450l( 
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7.4.5 Deep Ocean Recovery 
7.4.5.1 Status 
The ability to reach the deepest portions of the ocean floor has been 
demonstrated in undersea research programs. The ability to remove or recover 
objects from the ocean floor has been demonstrated as a part of undersea 
resource utilization and Naval undersea rescue programs. Therefore, the 
recovery of waste payloads from a known location in the ocean, following an 
aborted launch can be considered as an existing technology. However, develop-
ment of special subsmersible systems for this specific application might be 
required. The key technology requirement is to be able to locate the aborted 
payload relatively accurately and promptly. If such location is prompt and 
accurate, survi va 1 of the payload in the ocean envi ronment is reduced to a 
design problem of insuring adequate container strength to survive the pres-
sures encountered during impact and at maximum depths. Corrosion of the 
container should not be a problem if the recovery is prompt. 
7.4.5.2 Justification 
Acceptance of space disposal of nuclear wcste by the government and 
the publ ic will require Jemonstration of adequate safety during launch. A 
major part of this demonstration will be to show tlat nuclear waste payloads 
will survive and can be recovered safety following aborted launches or launch 
system acci dents. Recovery of a payload from the ocean floor will be a re-
quirement of this demonstration, and is an area requiring some specific SR&T 
act i v it i es • 
7.4.5.3 Technical Plan 
There is a current capabil ity to detect impact ing warheads through 
the DOD missle impact detection system. This system uses hydrophonic detec-
tion of a small detonation charge activated at impact, or failing that, 
detects the impact splash noise. This system has 1 imited range, and cannot 
detect impacts in arbitary locations. The feasibility of establish;ng J wider 
range net and the trade-offs involved in reducing the possible range of 
impacts through launch trajectory selection (e.g., equatorial launch site and 
zero-degree inclination parking orbit) need to be examined. Ary required 
increases in detector range and sensitivity n~ed to be identified. 
An impact detection system can provide a coarse indication of payload 
location. For recovery, a finer grid detection capability will probably also 
be required. An omnidirectional sonar beacon on board the payload may be 
required. Methods for providing such a bear.on in a failsafe mode (e.g., using 
a piezoe1ectric power beacon activated by the pressure at depth) need to be 
defined and demonstrated. 
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7.4.5.4 Requirements 
Examination of the use of a system similar to the missle impact 
detection system and identification of trade-offs and possible additional SR&T 
development is projected to require $ 200 K. The identification and demon-
stration of a possibly activated sonar beacon is projected to require $ 250 K, 
for a total funding of $ 450 K. 
7.4.5.5 Target Schedule 
The study of the detection net should be completed early so that any 
additional SR&T tasks identified can be undertaken. The beacon demonstration 
program should proceed over the full 4-year time span to allow proper testing. 
The project funding schedule is as shown below: 
Detection test 
Passive beacon 
1st Year 
$ 100 K 
50 K 
$ 150 K 
2nd Year 
$ 100 K 
75 K 
$ 175 K 
BATTIiLLIi - COLUMBUS 
3rd Year 
75 K 
$ is K 
4th Year 
50 K 
$ 50 K 
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7.5 Safety Test Requirements 
The unique nature of the space option for disposing of nuclear waste 
and the possible high concern over possible releases of nuclear waste material 
in the event of accidents (es~ecially launch accidents) is expected to lead to 
an extensive requirement for testing. Normal subsystem testing is not includ-
ed in the discussion that follows; only testing related to critical safety 
prob 1 ems is presented. Safety test i ng that is expected to be accampl i shed, 
prior to carrying out actual disposal missions, includes: (1) materials 
characterization tests; (2) scale model response tests; (3) full-scale 
ground-based subsystem response tests; (4) flight tests of specific hardware 
items; and (5) qualification flight tests of the entire space disposal 
miSSion, both small and large scale. This section documents the brief review 
of previous safety testing activities for nuclear payloads, identifies the 
types of accidents and environrrents that are possibl e, presents a discussion 
of existing facilities that could be employed for certain tests, and develops 
a preliminary two-phase plan for safety testing for the space option. 
7.5.1 Background 
Section 4.1 of this report briefly reviews the safety philosophy and 
type of tests that have been perfonned for space nuclear payloads. To sum-
marlZe, space nucl ear payloads (power sources) have been tested such that 
there is high confidence that the payload will survive an accident event 
without any major rellase of radioactive material. The following paragraphs 
briefly discuss the testing approaches for the NASA/Lewis ~esearch Center 
space option concept, Radioisotope Thermal- electric Generators (RTG's), 
General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS), and the Plutonium Accident Resistant 
Container (PARC). Emphasis has been placed on the latter, because it is most 
recent and because of the previous treatment of the others in Section 4.1. 
Ouring the space option studies of the early 1970's, LeRC perfQrmed 
ground impact and shrapnel tests for its spherical cont3inmant system (7-14 
through 7-18). Most of the impact tests (into concrete and soil) were con-
ducted at Sand) a Laboratories. The shrapnel tests were conducted by Physics 
Internationa1.\7-18) Results from these efforts indicate that a nuclear 
waste payload can be designed to survive the severe environments expected. 
The Viking safety report(l-19) provides useful information regard-
ing the safety analysis procedure, the type of tests perfonned, and the re-
sults of those tests. The typ~s of safety tests that were p~rformed for the 
Viking RTG system are listed below: 
• Vibration • Impact on granite 
• Graphite oxidation • Drop tests 
• Blast overpressure • Reentry heating (p10sma tunnel) 
• Fragment impact • Heat-transfer measurements 
• Liquid-propellant fire • Force and moments measurements 
• Solid-propellant fire 
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Also, safety tests for the space option for nuclear waste disposal are 
expected to include the above. The Viking safety report called for more 
in-depth methods of pre1icting the dynamic structural response to blast, 
fragment and impact, as well as, better definition of probability 
distributions for environment magilitudes for a giY~n accident. 
The preliminary accident environments (assumed for space launch) for 
the GPHS are defi ned by Reference 7-20 and inc 1 ude cons i derat i on of blast 
overpressure, fragments (shrapnel), solid propellent fire, 1mpact, and reentry 
(in:luding ~blation and thermal stress). Of the (jv.e ,",ent~oned, the first 
four must be considered as occurring in sequence. 7-21i Also, in theGi5HS 
design, no credlt is given to the presence of auxilia,'Y equipment for 
protection. During reentry, no more than one-half? tff min'imum ':hickness of 
the reentry protection member is allowed to ablate.{ - U) 
A recent United States Public law (94-79; August 9, 1975) restricts 
the air shipment of plutonium. This law reads, in part, that no plutonium 
(except for very small quantities of material in medical devices) may be air 
transported until the NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) " ••• has cer-
tified that a safe container has been developed and tested which will not 
rupture under crash and blast testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of 
a high-flying aircraft •••• " Although there were problems of translating 
the general 1 anguage of the 1 aw to technically meani ngful defi niti ons, very 
severe accident-modeling criteria wel-e developed by the NRC, \>/hich also 
engaged Sandi a laboratori ~s in the development of a transportation package 
that wl"uld acceptab'ty survive those new criteria. Both the new criteria and 
the new package were presented for approval to the Advi sory Committee for 
Reactor Safeguards and the Nat i ona(l Ac~,demy of Eng; neet'i n9 I s Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Air Transport of Plutonium. 7-22} 
The NRC criteria became a document defining those measures necessary 
to qualify and certify a package for the air transport of plutonium; this is 
referred to as the Qualification Criteria. The Qualification Criteria es-
sentially consists of a test prooram with supporting rationale and stringent 
acceptance standards. The rationale embodies a maximum credible accident ap-
proach, with very severe single-event accident elements applied sequentially 
to the same package. Also, certain individual tests are included as well as a 
requirement to conform to existiog regulations. 
That portion of the program performed at Sandia bears the acronym 
"PARe" for Plutonium Acc.ident Resistant Container. The PARe project resulted 
in the development o~ the PAT-1 (Plutonium Air Transportable) Package. The 
package was designed concurrently with and in response to the Qualification 
Criteria and survives the sequential and individual tests of both the new and 
old criteria and meets the applicable acceptance stlndards in each case. 
The Qualification Criteria are summarized in Tables 7-1 and 7-2; 
Table 7-1 defines the test program of ne~ sequential and individual test~, and 
also summarizes the tests of the existing regulations, 10 CFR 71.l -13) 
Table 7-2 summarizes ,.he acceptance criteria, essentially comprising three 
requirements: containment, shield~ng, and criticality. 
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In response to the Qualificati~n Criteria (see Table 7-1), a package 
was designed, analyzed, and developed. (7 -23) The resulti ng PAT -1 package is 
62 cm (24.5 in.) 00, 108 em (42.5 in.) in length, and weighs approximately 227 
kg (500 lb) when loaded. Externally, it resembles a 65-gallon commercial 
stainless steel process vessel. The PATel package comprises an AQ-l (Ai r 
Qualified r~del 1) overpack TB-l containment vessel, and PC-l product 
can. P-23) 
TABLE 7-1. QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR THE PLUTONIUM 
AIR TRANSPORT PACKAGE 
Type of Test 
Sequential Tests 
Impact' 
Crush 
Puncture 
Sl ash 
Fi re 
Submers ion 
Individual Tests 
Hydrostatic 
Terminal 
Velocity 
Free Fall 
10 CFR 71 Tests 
Nonna' 
Accide~t 
Criteria 
• 129 m/s (422 fps; 250 KTS) perpendicul ar to fl at 
unyielding target; most severe orientation 
• 310 kN (70,000 lb) through 5.1 cm (2 in.) wide steel 
bar; most severe location 
• 227 kg (SaO lb) steel probe dropped 3 m (10 ft); most 
severe location 
• 45 kg (lOa lb) steel angle dropped 46 m (150 ft); twice 
onto package tilted at 45 0 
• Engulfed in large JP-4 fire for 1 hour; left to self-
extinguish 
• Under 1 m (3 ft) of water for 8 hours 
• 4.1 MPa (600 psi) for 8 hours [411 m (1350 ft) depth] 
• Test required if terminal velocity is lIlore than 250 KTS 
• Heat, cold, pressure, vibration, water spray, 1.2-m (4 ft) drop, penetration, compression 
• 9-m (30 ft) drop, puncture, fire, submersion 
Source: Reference 7-22. 
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TABLE 7-2. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE PLUTOMIUM 
AIR TRANSPORT PACKAGE 
Requirement 
Plutonium Containment 
Shi el di ng 
Criticality 
Source: Reference 7-22. 
Criteria 
• Release must be < IAEA A2 weekly quantity fol-
lowing test sequence of new criteria 
• "No release" from double containment: following 
10 CFR 71 nonnal or accident conditions mea-
sured as a leak rate --ANSI N 14.5: 
10- 7cm3/s -- or as actual los~ of sur-
rogate: 1 ess than 10-8 g. by f1 uoriJ1let ry 
• Normal transport - 49 CFR 173 requires that 
external radiation be limited to: 10 mren/hr 
at 1 m (3 ft). and 200 mrem/hr at surface 
• Postaccident 10 CFR 71 requ: res that 
external radiation. following the melre severe 
tests of the new criteria. be limited to: 1000 
mrem/hr at 1 m (3 ft) 
• Undamaged single packages and large arrays 
must be subcritical per 10 CFR 71 
• Arrays of damaged packages "lust be su~critical 
per 10 CFR 71. foll owi ng th~ more sevl~re tests 
of the new criteria 
Table 7-3 summarizes the tests conducted at Sandia Laboratories and 
indicates that five PAT-1 packages were subjected to a similar sequential test 
series, with the initial impact tests oriented so as to encompass five 
different orientations of top, top corner, side. bottom corner, and :,ottom. 
The crush, puncture, slash. fire. and immersion tests that follow were 
essentially identical for all packages, with the application point uf each 
test being chosen to produce the most damagi ng cllmul ative effect on each 
package. Table 7-3 also includes the individual hydrostatic test required by 
the Qual ification Criteria, and high and low temperature engineering 
development impact tests, applied as the first test 1n a sequential series. 
Sefore the tests, each package was loaded with a finely divided surrogate 
U02 powder and helium gas. The results show that no uranium oxide escaged 
as indicated by a fluorimetric test with a detection capabil ity of 10-8g. 
Also, only very small helium leak rates were det~cted through the containment 
vessel seals. 
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TABLE 7-3. SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATION TESTS FOR THE PLUTONIUM 
AIR TRANSPORT PACKAGE {PAT-l} 
&I,. 
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Source: Reference 7-22. 
Based upon the above discussions and the consideration that NRC may 
eventually license the nuclear waste package for space disposal (see Section 
7.3), stringent safety criteria for the space option are expected. The safety 
criteria to be developed for the nuclear waste package for spdce disposal will 
depend upon the details of the miSSion, the type of launch vehicle employed, 
the waste mix and waste form. Preliminary safety requirements hr the space 
option are given in Sections 2.5 and 3.3 of this report. 
7.5.2 Accident Identification and Environment Definition 
The safety criteria to be de'/eloped for the space option must con-
sider the potential magnitude and probability of occurrence of accidents, 
Table 7-4 presents a listing of possible accidents that could occur during the 
total space disposal mission. The type of accidents considered today to be 
the most importar.t to insuring safety are: 
(1) On-pad Vehicle ExplOSion and Fire 
(2) In-flight Vehicle Explosion, Fire and Impact 
(3l Reentry of Payload 
(4) Ocean Impact of Payload 
(5) land Impact of Payload 
(6) loss of Active COO~~"q for Extended Periods 
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TABLE 7·~. Yl)EH.TJFlED ACCIDENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT otARACTERIlAPOH 
, 
---------------------------_ .. -.------------- .-._--- ---.. --~-------------- --------------_. 
Ground It.mel 1,·,:] A. c I .Ient .... V"It'.r:!e ;14,-Pad .md Ascent ticcidents Orbital C~rati~s Acccidents 
• ~hillping Contdiner/Ccr Oerd.ltnent • Vehicle r .. l1hJd/"l'oyer/l~r Collision • Accidental Ignition of Ejection Motors 
• Shiplli"'g fonlJiner Fln~ 
• (001 ing ~vstelll I di lure 
• Reentry Yehlc1~ rropellant rlre 
• Drop loaded Cont a i ner in rCI'Pf 
• Drop Lo.tded Reentry Vehicle in "I'l'l 
• fl'~ Veludty Y~:hici e : .... )dCt on land/Woller • loss of Payload Cooling 
• Orbiter ('""'iltt') on tdnd/Water • (olHsions Setwen Paylcad and A,.(· .1er 
Ibject 
• P,tJh!i;d ;)e-;cends ta Ocean rtoor ~fter Syst~ Failure - OTV/SOIS 
- Orbiter 
• Vehicle or Orbiler Collides with Another Aircraft - Spacecraft 
- Space Debr i s 
• Vehicle b"IOOes at Alt itude W/YO Cm.lnd Destruct - Meteors 
• Outs jde Intrusion (flying Veh;c!es. Naturdl) • ,"boo""al Ret?ntry of Reentry ~ehic1e • Critically Inacrdrate OTV 8ur~ 
(Direction/Duration) Resulting 
in Reentry • Trdns,Jortl'r Acu<1ent • R~enlry Vehicle IlIIJldCtS on lalld/Waler 
~urf dces After l ject ion r rOIl! Orbiter 
• Drop tOdde,1 Ret>ntry '1~hicle at!in RSS 
• Accidental Ignition of Pay'o~d Ejection ~lor(s) 
• Accidentdll nn-'·dd 'chIcle fJ:p'oslOn/llrc 
()urlnlj/After Propellanl to<lding _ Loss of Pdylodd (ooling 
• Accidj~nt.J1 Ignit ion of Lject ion "otor(s) 
• to!.'> of Pdylodd Coolin9 
Note: leo cor;siderdtion IS given in thi .. tdble to accident probability. Sa.e events listed are ext~ly 
unl il .. I,. while othen ~olll.1 be e«pected to occur dJring a sp.tce disposoll progrcl •• 
• OTV hplosion 
• SOlS Explosion 
• Ca..unications Fallure Resulting 
in Reentry 
• Pay'OtId Descends to Ocean floor 
• lunar (ollision 
• Rescue Mission Failure 
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For the rei~rence s~ace d1sposa l concept (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4) 
the severe environments for Events 1 through 3 are treated in Sections 4.2 and 
4.3 of this report; ocean envi ronment and aspects o~ c"ean recovery are 
discussed in Reference 7-3 and Section 7.4~ respecthely; terminal velocity 
for a reentering payload and soil and granite impact considerations for large 
spheres are briefly discussed in Sect10ns 4.3.2.1 and 4.1.3, respect1vely; and 
recovery time for a safe active cool1ng loss event is preunted in Sectfon 
3.4.~. 
7.5.3 Environmental Test Facilities 
Th1s section reviews some of the environmental test facl1 ities that 
appear to be apP'roRl"'iate fo. the space option Concept Definitfon and 
Evaluation Program(7-2) and a Space Optfon Development Program (a plan for 
which 1s expected to be prepared in 1983 or 1984). Most of the discussion 
p"esented fn this section 15 based upon a v1sit to ~andia laboratories in 
November 1979, interv1ews with Bel staff whQ have been 1nvolved in the 
RTG/GPHS Programs, and reviews of various other documents (see Section 4.1). 
For major large-scale environmental testing of the survivability of 
nuclear waste payloads, Sandh laboratories appears well suited. Reference 
7-24 presents the details of test facilities that can be used on a small and 
large scale to Simulate the environments listed below: 
• Acceleration • Vibration 
• Cl imat ic 
• Shock 
• Explosive 
• Reentry (simulation) 
• Impulse • Electromagnetic 
• Static loading • Underwater. 
Figure 7-4 prov1des a pictorial overview of the environmental test facilities 
at the Sandia Coyote Canyo., Test Complex. Other test facil it ies exist at 
Livermore California, and at Holloman AFB (35,OOO-ft tes~ track). 
The unique capabilities of interest at Sandia are the two rocket sled 
track facflities (2000 and 5000 feet long), the Aeria; Cable Facility, the 
Radiant Heating Fc'ci1ity. a~d the Blast Tunnel Facility. The rocket sleds 
($10 to $20 K per test) could ~': 'Ised to simulate impact on various types of 
surfc:ces (grani~e, soil, etc.!. but they could also be used for fraqment 
(shrapnel) penetration tests \at a much cheaper pel" test cost). Any 
reasonable velocity and acceleration can De generated. The large Aerial Cable 
Facility, as it currently exists, can accommodate up to roughly 500 kg at a 
velocity of the order of 300 mIse To go to a full-scale test of a nuclear 
waste container at terminal velocity, perhaps foul" new cabl~s would have to be 
installed, or it may even be possible to use fewer, but stronger Kevlon 
fiber/steei cables. The cost for this development hJS been estimated to be on 
the order of $1 M. This facility has been use~ previously to investigate a 
sphere1s impact on soil (set Section 4.1.3). The Radiant Heating Facility can 
be employed to simulate predicted thermal environment as a function of time, 
by i nputt i ng the proper heat f ng curve data. The heat i ng is accompli shed by 
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regulating the electrical power to radiant-heat emitters. The facility can 
deliver heat fluxes up to 4500 kW/m2(400 Btu/ft2-s) and has a rise-time to 
full power of 2 sccond~. The Blast Tunnel, with roughly a 2 m diameter at 
the exit could provide side-on overr"essures of about 200 N/cm2{300 psi). 
It is likely, that only slightly scaled down payloads could be tested with the 
current facility at this pressure level. 
Capabilities of interest that exist, but are not believed to be 
unique to Sandia, are: the Hquid fuel fire pits, facil ities for gt!nerating 
mavi ng fragtne(lts, ilnd the soundi ng rocket capabil ity for atmospheric reentry 
testing. 7-25) Although these type of tests require remote areas, it is 
believed that other laboratories do not have adequate space to carry out the 
tests. 
The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) is currently managing the 
General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) Program and has done a considerable amount 
of work for previous RTG programs. For the GPHS Program, LASL is simulating 
both the impact and solid propellant fire environments for the GPHS, which is 
assumed to be flown into space on the Space Shuttle vehicle (see References in 
Section 4-1). Tests are being performed with surrogate waste forms at various 
specified thennal conditions. Generally speaking, LASL has the facilities 
capable for smallfr scale testing. 
It is expected that full-scale flight tests or simulated tests in 
ground-based facil ities will be necessary for the space disposal mission. 
Historically, it has been possible to perform selective simulation tests in 
ground-based facil ities to provide the aerodynanic data necessary to verify 
and/or compare the aerodynamic performance of various designs. It is believed 
that three types of aerodynamic testing should be considered. They are: 
aerodynamic stability, aerodynamic heating, and ablation. The amount of 
testing required will depend on the data available for the particular payload 
geometries and materials being considered. Preliminary results of the trajec-
tory analyses such as those presented in Section 4.3 are useful in determining 
the flow regimes of importance and to determine the Simulated test conditions. 
Facilities are available to produce enviror111ents that closely simulate the 
flight conditions anticipated during reentry. Included in this category are 
wind tunnel, shock tunnel, rocket exhaust, and high-speed test track facH i-
ties. Eacn of these types of facilities normally have operating envelopes 
which correspond to portions of the reentry fl ight regimes of interest. 
Facilities needed for these types of tests exist at NASA/Ames Research Center, 
NASA Lan~ley Research Center, Edwards Air Force Base, Lockheed, Wright 
Patterson Air Force Base, ARO, Inc., and Sandia. 
7.5.4 Safety Tests Anticipated During 4-Year 
Space Option Study 
The safety rel ated test ing antic; pated duri ng the proposed 4-year 
Concept Definition and Evaluation Program is expected to involve only critical 
cooponents of the conceptual space di sposa 1 system. On ly those safety tests 
required to reduce the uncertainty in risk are appropriate during the 4-year 
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study program. The Draft Concept Def; n1 t i on and Eva 1 uat i on Program Pl an for 
Space Disposal of Nuclear Waste l7 -2). identifies areas of safety testing for 
the space disposal concept. During the fourth year, safety testing of 
"critical payload features" are to be performed (WBS.4.1. Safety. Reliability 
and Safeguards) for the baseline concept. It is difficult to predict in 
detail, what tests would be performed for "critical payload features", because 
the b3seline concept is yet to be defined and the system safety requirements 
have not been finalized. However, the launch and reentry aspects of the space 
disposal concept are not likely to change significantly between the reference 
concept (as defined in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of this report) and the baseline 
concept to be defined in the fourth year of the program. 
Risk associated with launch accidents. regardless of the type of 
nuclear waste that is disposed of in space. will be of utmost importance in 
determining feasibility. Certainty in payload survival is essential to the 
concept. Therefore. safety tests of protection system concepts, where 
material components are exposed to the expected sequential environments of the 
0;-'- or near-pad booster failure are likely to be performed. The sequential 
tests are envisioned to include consideration of the accident environments 
specified in Section 2.5.1.3 of this report. Protection systems that should 
be tested are only those that need a significant improvement in performance 
coofi dence 1 eve 1. Protect i on systems, in genera 1, inc 1 ude: therma 1 protec-
tion; insulation; impact shield; radiation shield; primary container; and the 
waste form itself. Scale-model testing of these system components appears to 
b~ appropriate. The phYSical and chemical characteristics of materials 
proposed for use in protect i on systems may a 1 so have to be determi ned to 
greater confidence level. 
Risk associated with inadvertent reentry of nuclear waste payloads. 
depending upon the baseline concept, is also expected to remain an important 
part of the space option risk. Aerodynamic heating, ablation and thermal 
shock tests. associ ated with worst-case reentry envi ronments (see Reference 
7-26), may be necessary for scale-model system concepts. Again, only tests 
that would resolve uncertainty in risk for the space option, should be 
condlJcted. In addition to the consideration of testing of payload protection 
systeni$, the response of the "basel i ne" surrogate waste form to reent ry 
environm~nts may also be required. The consequences of a reentry accident 
depends not only upon how much of the waste form might be released in the 
upper atmosphere, but also upon the particle size distribution. Because of 
the manner in which a waste form may be released (melting), an actual test 
involving a surrogate waste form may be the only way to obtain confidence in 
the health risk prediction. Tests to measure scale-model payload response 
include the use of hypersonic and supersonic wind tunnels. and the use of 
liquid rocket engine plume facilities (mostly for thermal shock). 
Should the risk/benefit analysis, conducted for the space option at 
the end of the 4-year study, indicate that the space system deserves further 
serious consideration, then additional safety testing will be required. The 
next section describes the testing anticipated for a development program. 
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7.5.5 Safety Testing for Development Program 
Three categories of tests are anticipated during the development 
program for the space option: ground-based tests, flight tests of specific 
items, and qualification flight tests. A number of specific tests for each 
category are identified below. Additional test items are expected to be 
identified as the program evolves. 
7.5.5.1 Ground-Based Tests 
As discussed in Sect;on 7.3, licensing Requirements, the primary 
licensing emphasis is expected to be on insuring the survivability of the 
container under a wide range of potential accident conditions. Most of these 
accident conditions can be simulated in ground tests; therefore, compliance 
cun be demonstrated thereby. Based on the data il'l Sections 2.5 and 4.2, 
ground tests to demonstr?te container survival is expected. Sequential 
testing is likely to be a requirement. The exact conditions under which tests 
would be conducted would likely be defined as-a-part of the licensing criteria 
process discussed in Section 7.3 and identified in Figure 7-3. The actual 
tests would be conducted during the period prior to the application for 
license from the NRC, and the test results would be included in the supporting 
data accompanying the license application. Additional tests might need to be 
conducted during the license application hearing period to resolve specific 
NRC concerns. 
Demonstrations of container survival during reentry will likely 
require actual flight test drops from the Shuttle Orbiter. The waste payload 
will be too large to allow reentry testin" under simulated upper atmospheric 
conditions in existing supersonic and hypersonic tunnels. However, prelimi-
nary testing of subscale payload models for various portions of the reentry 
environment can and should be conducted. Such tests would give preliminary 
evidence of payload survival and could be used to define the likely severest 
cases to allow actual flight tests to be reduc~d to the minimum needed. 
A second set of expected ground-based tests would involve the waste 
form rather than the containment systems. As previously indicated, resis-
tance to dispersion and the potential for formulation of inhalable particles 
are expected to be the major criteria for selection of the final waste form. 
An extensive set of tests is expected to be conducted as a part of this selec-
tion process, and to demonstrate that the final waste form has the desired 
characteristics. These tests will probably be conducted in a low-density, 
high-stagnation-temperature hypersonic or supersonic wind tunnel facility, 
with speCial facilities for collection of the portions of the waste form 
samples eroded by the gas flow. 
The third set of expected ground tests concerns the transportation 
and handling of the nuclear waste prior to launch. A number of potential 
accidents in the ground transportation dnd payload handling phase of disposal 
operations are identified in Table 7-4. It is expected that tests will be 
required to demonstrate payload intact survival under these various conditions 
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(~.g., ground transport delay combined with loss of primary cooling, dropping 
of the payload in the NPPF). Further, since the performance of the transport-
ing and payload handling crews will affect overall system safety, a series of 
special tests could be conducted to test operator awareness and preparation. 
7.5.5.2 Subsystem Flight Tests 
A number of specific subsystems will need to be flight tested sepa-
rately prior to an overall flight demonstration of the entire waste disposal 
system. Three subsystems are likely to receive specific attention: payload 
protection, payload cooling system operation, and remote rendezvous/doclring. 
Each of these is discussed below. 
The survival of the payload will need to be demonstrated under sev-
eral conditions. At present, it is expected that at least three flight tests 
would be required.* 
(1) Reentry of the payload plus reentry vehicle ft'om low Earth orbit 
(2) Reentry of waste container alone (no reentry vehicle but with 
some thermal protection) from low Earth orbit (shallow reentry 
simulating OTV failure shortly after ignition start)* 
(3) Same as (2), but with a steep reentry path Simulating a 
seriously misdirected OTV burn.* 
The third test would require attaching a velocity package (probably a large 
solid propellant motor) to the waste container to provide the simulated OTV 
velocity increment. The tests would be designed to demonstrate container sur-
vival and/or to detect any container breach and associated surrogate waste 
form dispersion. 
The consequences of a failure of the cooling system, while the waste 
payload is in the "insulated" reentry vehicle, have not yet been determined. 
Currently, it is antiCipated that internal ~"aste form mel:ing wo"ld occur for 
high-level waste pay1cads. Operational safety procedures and operational sub-
system reliability could be verified and carried out piggyback on other Space 
Shuttle missions. 
The third set of special flight tests would be of the remote ren-
dezvous and docking capabilities with an uncooperative mockup payload. This 
is discussed in detail in Sections 6.2 and 7.4. The OTV and a simulated pay-
load would be the primary test items. The tests would require only one 
Shuttle launch. The required rescue mission simulation would take place in 
low Earth orbit. Rendezvous and docking would likely use a man-in-the-loop 
system with continuous control. A simulated deep space rendezvous and docking 
would be carried out by employing an on-board autonomous system. Both capa-
bilities could be demonstrated in one flight test. 
*Note: Current referer.ce concept assumes protect i on removed at Earth orbi t; 
if protection is carried all the way to destination Item (2) would be 
eliminated from consideration and Item (3) I"ould be conducted for the 
reent ry VE'h i c 1 e. 
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7.5.5.3 Qualification Test Flights 
Prior to final operating license approval, it is expected that 
several qualification flight tests of the entire space disposal system will be 
required. The tests would be desianed to demonstrate the nominal disposal 
mission profile. Early tests could involve reduced waste form masseSi later, 
after confidence is gained "fully loaded" payloads could be used. It is 
likely that the disposal system will also have to demonstrate its ability to 
correct unexpected subsystem failures. In qualification flight tests, this 
would likely take the form of several planned simulated subsystem failures or 
anomalies. These failures would be known to the program test managers, but 
not to the flight control personnel responsible for conducting the test 
flight. Successful demonstration of the mission profile while overcoming the 
unexpected anomalies would be a major step in satisfying NRC and other regu-
latory requirements and in increasing public confidence in space disposal. 
7.5.6 Development Program Test Schedule 
The schedule for development testing should be correlated with the 
licensing and overall decision schedule shown in Figure 7-3. The primary test 
period will be during t~~ 7 to 10 year period following the decision to begin 
major development of the space-based waste disposal system. Some of the 
ground-based testing would need to occur prior to this period, and the quali-
f1cation flight tests would be conducted in the 3 to 5 year period of final 
de~~lopment prior to initiation of disposal operations. 
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8.\1 CONCLUSIONS 
This section summarizes a few of the general conclusions thcSt have 
been reached as a r~su1t of this Phase III study_ The conclusions listed 
below have been organized by task activity: 
Payload Characterization (Task 1) 
• The ORNL iron/nickel/copper-based cermet waste form has b~'m judged, at this point in time, to be the most suitable waste fon~ 
for the space disposal of high-level nuclear waste. 
• 90Sr and 137Cs contribute significantly to thl:! internal 
heating problems associated with the space disposal mission. 
• Proposed thermal limits for the waste form restrict the size of 
the cermet form to 8 to 9 MT per payload when cons i deri ng the 
PW-4b waste mix. 
• For commerical high-level waste, the neutron dose becomes sig-
nificant for large payloads (> 5 MT). 
• For an unshielded 5.5 MT commerical high-level waste payload, an 
operating distance of greater than 1 km is required to maintain a 
dose level to the crew of less than 2 rem/hour; the similiar 
ope rat i ng di stance for an unprotected defense waste payload is 
less than 20 meters. 
• Radiation shielding provided to the crew by Space Shuttle Orbiter 
structure is considered to be negligible. 
Safety Assessment (Task 2) 
• The on-pad catastrophic failure of an Uprated Space Shuttle (liquid rocket boosters replacing the solid rocket boosters) is 
likely to have significantly less severe thermal accident en-
vironments than the standard Space Shuttle. 
• Because of its very short duration (less than 15 seconds), the 
fireball resulting from the on-pad catastrophic failure of almost 
ar.y liquid propellant booster is considered to be virtually 
unimportant when compared to the possible long-term residual 
fires. 
• Because of the large uncertainty in the fragment (shrapnel) en-
vironment data base, caution must be taken in USing the d~ta. 
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t The simulated reentry of the reentry vehicle (RV) showeJ th~t the 
RV should survive with adequate marginsi the terminal velocity for 
the reference vehicle is 110 m/s. 
t Under certain reentry conditions it is likely that the unprotected 
stainless steel container wall will melt away and allow the 
release of the cennet waste f~rm material to the atmosphere. 
• If the thermally unprotected waste container .$ cool enough prior 
to reentry and is madt' to spin or rotate during reentry. no 
release of waste is expected. 
t For the case of an inadvertant reentry of the unprotected waste 
container (5 MT waste form) the predicted terminal velocfty 15 
excessive (365 mls.) 
I Calculations show that the thermal ~rotection provided by the re-
entry vehicle in the event of a catastrophic Uprated Space Shuttle 
vehicle failure is adequate. even If the thermal protection system 
and insulation were lost in the initial explosion. 
I For the same degree of payload protection. the total risk of a 
space disposal program carri ed out by the Hl.LV versus the Uprated 
Space Shuttle is approximately equal. 
I The use of a HLLV provides the opportunity to significantly in-
crease protection and decrease the event and total program risk 
for a similar launCh cost. 
Health Effects Assessment (Task 3) 
I The simplified ORIGEN dflution hazard index is not adequate to 
determine which radionuclides should be disposed o~n space. 
• Tile results from the pathway morlel assessment indic~te that Te and 
the actinides are appropriate for space disposal. 
• Resuspensforl of fallout particles does not contribute 
Significantly to the dose commitment resulting from an upper 
atmosphere release of small pdrticles. 
• The health effects resulting from a credible release scenario for 
a thennally unorotected conta li,~r are sign; ffcant. The 
consequences woulrl be worldwide; changes in the reference concept 
are necessary. 
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Long-Term Ris~ Assessment (Task 4) 
• For the reference container and cermet waste form; the probability 
of total fragmentation into small part1cles as a result of meteor-
oid impact 1s 6xlO-11 per year. 
• If small (less than 1000 microns) radioact1ve part1tles are re-
leased in the 0.85 A.U. c1rcular solar orbit as a result of a 
total payload fragmentation event (e.g., meteorid impact), the 
amount of waste form mass expected to return to the Earth over a 3 
million year reriod is a maximum of 6 kg. 
• If rescue capability is necessary in nuclear waste dhposal, then 
the design of both rescue vehicle and pay Jad vehicle systems must 
accommodate noncooperat i ve rendezvous and docki ng operat ions in 
addition to the nominal cooperative mode. 
• Although automated noncooperative rescue is not presently at a 
stage of technv~ogy readiness, preliminary work in this area gives 
reasonable confidence that this capability can be developed in the 
near future. 
Program Planning Support Analysis (Task 5) 
• An approach to the licensing of space disposal has bee~ de~eloped. 
It would likely involve N~C licensing of the waste processing and 
payload fabrication facilities, the Nuclear Payload Preparation 
Facil ity at KSC, nuclear waste payload, and possibly the space 
destination (if lunar surface). 
• Five SR&T development activities to support nuclear waste disposal 
in space are expected to be required. The~e are: defense waste 
concentration, commercidl waste partitioning, waste form thermai 
and physic!l response, remote automated rendezvou~ and docking, 
and deep ocean recovery. 
• A preliminary safety test plan for the space 0ption was developed. 
It considers materials characteriZdticn tests, scale model 
response tests, full scale ground tests, fl'ight tests and 
qualification flight tests. Only tests required to reduce 
uncertainty in risk are appropriate for the early testing phase. 
Details of the developm~nt testing are expected at the end of the 
proposed 4-year study. 
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9.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Prior to any development or implementation decisfon on space disposal 
of nuclear waste, important issues problems will have to be addressed by 00£ 
and NASA. Some specific progralflllltic and design recommendat10ns resultfng 
from the current Phase I II study are sUnlllarfzed below: 
Progra~tfc Recommendatfons 
• The Concept Definition and fvaluatfon Program Plan, that was 
developed as a part of this study effort, should be 1f!1plemented 
(DOE). * 
• Supporting research and technology (SR&T) efforts fn the ar!as of 
defense waste concentration (DOE), commercial waste partitioning (DOE), waste form thermal and phYSical response (DOE), remote 
automated rendezvous and docking (NASA), and deep ocean recovery 
(NASA) should be implemented. 
• Pathway hazard model work should be perfonned, to determine within 
the reasonable bounds. the radionucl ides which, if removed from 
the mined repository and shipped to space, provide the best 
long-tl!rm risk benefit. Preliminary indications are that 
technetium and the actinides should be considered for space 
dfsposa I (DOE). 
• The containment requirements and safety speCifications developed 
during this ttudy for the space disposal option should be updated 
and revised as new infonmation becomes available (DOE). 
• A safety index s imil ar to that used for radi oact i ve space power 
sources should be developed for the space option of nuclear waste 
dfsposa I (DOE). 
• An experimental program for fragmentation of propellant tanks is 
required to reduce uncertainty in all space nuclear payload safety 
assessments (NASA). 
• ORNL should continue to perform research on the cermet waste form (DOE) • 
• The techniques of separation of strontium and cesium from the 
P~-4b reference waste mix should be evalua:ed (DOE). 
• A study evaluating consequenc,s of an inadv~rtent loss of payload 
cooling for extended periods, eith,r on the ground or in space, 
should be conducted (NASA). 
-Note: Parenthetic notation after each recommendation indicates prime agency 
res pons i b 11 ity. 
9-2 
• There does not appear to be any;i;rong reason for program pl anners 
to be concerned about the risk associated with small particle 
release in solar orbit (NASA). 
Des f 9" Recannendat 10ns 
• Any future concepts for space disposal should consider the 
appl feat fan of carbon/carbon thermal reent ry protect 1 on for the 
contafner and waste fonn (NASA). 
• The stainless steel wall container material should be replaced 
with a material (e.g., Tf, Nb etc.) having high structural 
integrity and a higher melting point (NASA). 
• Provisions should be maGe to insure spinning of the unprotected 
waste container as a result of an inadvertant reentry (NASA). 
• The reference waste mix for space disposal shoul dine 1 ude the 
removal (~9OS) of cesium and strontium from PW-4b (DOE). 
• During mission operations, significant heat producing nuclear 
waste payloads should be ke!'t as cool as possible. this will 
likely reduce ttle consequences from a catastrophfc system failure (NASA). . 
• The concept of fntegrating defe·lse and commercial waste into a 
single payload to min1m1ze cooling and shielding requirements 
should be evaluated (NASA). 
• A detailed analysh needs to be performed for actinide payload 
concept s (DOE). 
• The fabrication of large waste forms, by employing various 
technologies. should be investigated further (DOE). 
• Continued study of employing adequate thermal. radiation, and 
impact protect ion systems for HLLIJ payloads. such that they are 
carried all the way to the final destination are warranted (NASA). 
• The design implications of keeping protection systems all the way 
to a particular space destination requires further study (~ASA). 
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APPENDIX A 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
angstroms 
att·, tudl! cont ro 1 system 
as low as reasonably achievable 
activity ~~dian aerodynamic diameter 
Advanced i".,..:lea" Paylo,1d :>reparation Facil ity 
Applied Phy~ics laboratory, Md • 
Ames ~esearch Center, NASA's 
astronomical unit 
atmospheres 
abort-to-orbi t 
abort- once-a round 
Battelle's Columbus Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio 
Brayton Isotope Power System 
Battelle-Northwest laboratories, Richland, Washington 
burnout mass 
burn rate 
degrees centigrade 
Concept Definition Document 
twice the energy per unit mass 
Canadian deuterium uranium reactor 
confined by ground surface tests 
confined by missile 
cub~c centimeters (cm3) 
center of gravity 
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CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
Ci Curies 
u C i mi cro-Curi es 
cm centimeters 
CaE center of explosion 
COR contracting officers representative 
CPIA Chemical Propulsion Information Agency 
CW continuous wave 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
DOT 
dpm 
EIS 
EOTV 
EPA 
ERDA 
ESATA 
esu 
ET 
EVA 
FM 
FWPF 
9 
gal 
G. r. 
GPHS 
G\4e 
U.S. Department of Transportation 
disintegrations per minute 
environmental impact statement 
Electric Orbit Transfer Vehicle (SPS's) 
Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.) 
U.S. Energy Research and Oevelopment Administration 
Executive Subroutines for Afterheat Temperature Analysis 
(West; ngh ouse) 
electrostatic units 
Space Shuttle's External Tank 
extravehicular activity in space 
frequency modulation 
fineweave piercerl fabric 
grams 
gallons (U.S.) 
gastrointestinal (tract) 
General Purpose Heat Source 
gigawatts electric 
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HARe 
He 
HllV 
HlW 
HTGR 
Hz 
rCRP 
IR 
IUS 
JSC 
K 
kg 
kJ 
km 
Human Affafrs Research Centers (Battelle) 
helium 
heavy lift launch vehicle 
h1~n-level waste 
high-temperature gas-cooled reactor 
Hertz 
rnternational Commission on Radiological Protection 
Infrared 
Inertial Upper Stage 
NASA's Johnson Space Center, Houston 
degrees Kel vin 
kil ogram 
kil~oule 
kilometer 
KSC Kennedy Space Center, rlorida 
k\~ kil owatt 
L 
lASl 
lCC 
leRC 
lK2 
lOS 
LOX 
LM 
LMFBR 
LRB 
lymph 
Los Alamos Scientific laboratory, Calffornia 
launch Control Center [Shuttle's at KSC) 
NASA's lewis Research Center, Cleveland 
1 iquid hydrJgen 
1 ine-of-sight 
liquid oxygen 
thoracic lymph 
liquid metal fast breeder reactor 
liqUid Rocket Booster (Uprated Shutcle) 
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LWR light water reactor 
m meters 
mm millimeters 
"'. 
j..I m mi crometers 
MB.O. mass at stage burn out ... 
Mp propellant mass 
mrem millirem 
m/s meters per second 
MLP Mobile Launch Platform (Shuttle's at ~~r) 
MT metric tons 
MTHM metric tons of heavy metal (uranium charge to the reactor) 
MMH monomethyl hydrazine 
MPC maximum permissible concentration 
MSFC NASAls Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama 
MWD/T megawatt days per ton 
N Newtons 
NC non-cooperative 
N/cm2 Newtons per square centimeter 
n. mi. nautical mile 
N204 nitrogen tetroxide 
NTO nitrogen tetroxide 
NASA ~ational Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NEP nuclear electric propulsion 
NPPF Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
OIF oxidizer to fuel ratio 
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OMS 
ONWI 
ORNl 
OTV 
P 
PAT 
Pl 
POTV 
rem 
RCS 
RETAC 
RF 
A-S 
Orbital Maneuvering System (Shuttle) 
Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (DOE's) 
Oak Ridge National laborato~, Tennessee 
Orbit Transfer Vehicle 
pulmonary 
plutonium air transport (package) 
payload 
Personnel Orbit Transfer Vehicle (SPS's) 
roentgen equivalent, man 
Reaction Control System (Shuttle) 
Reentry Thenmal Analysis Code (BCl's) 
radio frequency 
RP-l rocket propellant number 1 (kerosene) 
RSS 
RTG 
RTlS 
RV 
s 
SAl 
SAR 
SEP 
S.L. 
SOlS 
SPS 
SR&T 
SRR 
Rotating Service Structure (Shuttle) 
radioisotope thermal electric generator 
return-to-landing-site 
Reentry Vehicle 
seconds 
Science Applications, Inc., Schaumburg, Ill;nois 
Safety Analysis Report 
solar electric propulsion 
sea-level 
Solar Orbit Insertion Stage 
Space Pow~r Station 
supporting research and technology 
Solid Rocket Booster (Shuttle) 
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SS Space Shuttle 
SSME 
SSP 
STS 
T 
~T 
TB 
TBO 
v 
VAS 
VPF 
W 
'.4CF 
Space Shuttle Main Engine 
solar sail propulsion 
Space Transportation System 
rate of temperature change with time 
change in temperature 
tracheobronch i al 
to be determined 
change in velocity 
Vertical AssembOiy Building (Shuttle's at KSC) 
vertical Processing Facility 
watt 
waste concentration factor 
yr year 
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APPENDIX B 
METRIC/ENGLISH UNIT CONVERSION FACTORS 
To convert ; nto 
atmospheres (atm). • •• pounds per square inch (psi) •• 
atmospheres (atm). • pounds per square ft (psf) ••• 
multiply by 
14.70 
2116.8 
calories (cal) •• 
calories per gram 
(cal/g) ••••• 
. . . British thermal units (Btu) • • 3.9685 x 10-3 
British thermal units per 
•• pound (Btu/lb) ••••• 
centimeters (em) • • •• inches (in) • 
centimeters (cm) • feet (ft) •• 
centimeters (cm) ••. yards (yd) •••• • • 
cubic centimeters (cm3). cubic inches (in3) ••••• 
. . 
cubic meters (m3). cubic feet (ft3) •••••••• 
cubic meters (m3). gallons (gal) •• · . . . . . . 
degrees Centigrade (C). degrees Fahrenheit (F). 
degrees Kel vi n (K) • degrees Rankine (R) •••• 
grams (g). • • . . . pounds (lb) . . . 
kilograms (kg) ••••• pounds (lb) • 
kil ometers (km). 
kilometers (km). 
kilometers (km). 
kilowatts (kW) • 
meters (m) • 
meters (m) • 
meters (m) 
. . . . 
statute miles (mi). 
nautical miles (n.mi.). 
feet (ft) ••••••.•• 
Btu per hour (Btu/hr) • 
inches (in.) ••• 
feet (ft) • 
yards (yd). 
. . . 
· . . . . 
· . . 
*NOTE: Multiply by 1.8 and then add 32. 
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1.80 
0.3937 
3.281 x 10-2 
1.094 x 10-2 
0.0610 
35.32 
264.2 
1.8 C + 32* 
1.8 
2.205 x 10-3 
2.205 
0.6214 
0.540 
3281 
3413 
39.37 
3.231 
1.094 
10 convert 
meters per second (ml s) • 
metric tons (MT) • • 
metric tons (MT) 
· . 
micrometers 4.t m) . . · . 
Newtons (N). • • . . 
· 
• 
Newtons per cm2 (N/cm2). 
. - ~ 
" - 1<, ~ " • ", 
8-2 
into mult121X bX 
feet per second (ft/s) •• 
· . 
. 3.281 
pounds (lb) . . . . · . . · . . 2205 
tons (T) •• . . · . . 1.102 
meters (m). • 1.0 x 10-6 
pounds force (lbf). · . . · . . 0.221,8 
pounds per square inch (psi) •• 1.4504 
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APPENDIX C 
TECHNICAl DATA FOR CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS 
In the definition of contairrnent requirements (see Section 3.3), 
limits are in the form of generic hrms (e.g., melting tempefature. yield 
strength). Yo apply these limits to actual design configurations. it is 
necessary to define them in terms of specific data. Tables C ... l through C-3 
contain temperature. mechanical, and nuclear limit data for the curf'ent ref-
erence concept. Unknown information is no~ed as T80 (to be determined). Oct a 
for chemical limits are not available at this writing. As the reference con-
cept evolves, additional technical input for containment requirements should 
be developed and revised, as appropriate. 
TABLE C ... l. CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENT TEMPERATURE LIMITS, C 
MATERIAL 
CERMET 
(Fe-Ni) 
SS (304L) 
NIOBIUM,al 
TUNGSTEN,al 
GRAPHITE 
(ABLATION) 
URANIUM 
LEAD 
ALUMINUM 
FABRICATION 
1200 
TBD 
MELTING 
1450 
1460 
2420 
3430 
TBD 
11301d! 
326'111 
682'dl 
CREEP 
4271bl 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
_120'111 
3401111 
TBD 
0·10'111 
TBD 
TBD 
NOTES: (a) REQUIRE ADDITIONAL CLADDING TO OFFSET HIGH TEMPERATURE 
CHEMICAL INTERACTIONS 
(b) ASME CODE. SECTION III. APPENDIX III. PARAGRAPH 111-2110. 1974 
EDITION 
(e) NIL DUCTILIlY TRANSITION TEMPERATURE 
(d) MARK'S HANDBOOK, 7TH ED., 1967. P. 6-114 
, 
., 
C-2 
TABLE C-2. CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENT MECHANICAL LIMJTS(a). N/CM2 
MATERIAL YIELDI" ULTIMATEI., DYNAMIC 
SS (304L) 20,700Ie' 51,700le' TBD 
NIOIIUI\i 24,1001f1 31,000'''' T8D 
TUNGSTEN 12,400-413,8001.' TID 
ALUMINUM 28,000'·' 31,000'·' 700-8000 
(HONEYCOMB) 
URANIUM 17,000-31,0001•
' 
41,000-69,000'·' TBD 
LEAD 800-980'·' 1800-21001• , TID 
GRAPHI'TE raD TID TRD 
(AILATION) 
NOTES: (e) MECHANICAL STRENGTH IS A FUNCTION OF TEMPERATURE AND 
LOADING RATE 
(b) STATIC, ROOM TEMPERATURE 
(e) ASME CODE, 1974 ED., SECTION III, SUBSECTION NA, TABLE 1-1.2 
(d) MARK'S HANDBOOK, 7TH ED., 1987, P. 8-114 
(e) MARK'S HANDBOOK, 7TH ED., 1987, P. 6·10 
(f) METAL'S REFERENCE BOOK, 6TH ED., 1978, P. 1268 
TABLE C-3. CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENT NUCLEAR LIMITS 
MATERIAL CRITIC1~LlTY DISPERSION 
------------------.. -.- -------CERMET (Fe-Ni) K.ft<O.95 TBD 
SS (304L) TBD 
NIOBIUM TBD 
TUNGSTEN TBD 
J 
I 
1 
J 
I 
1 
J 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
-
L 
. . 
I 
1 
J 
I 
I 
1 
.i' _ _ _ 
~ , ... '- . - - ~~ ~ 
EFf',U5 r~ ,,£R~T METAL ON SHIELDING REQUIR£'MENlS 
~. 
"'t 
~ 
~ 
( 
[ 
[ 
l 
I 
I 
; ~ 
I 
• 
[ 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0-1 
APPENDIX 0 
EFFECTS OF CERMET METAL ON SHIELDING REQUIREMENTS 
The ORNL cermet waste form incorporates the radioactive w~ste within 
a metallic phase as a means '''f immob111zing the waste. The prime candidate 
for the meUll1c phase is an alloy similar to a Hastelloy, which is chiefly 
composed of -;"on. nickel. copper. and molybdenum. This waste form concept was 
compared to two others with different met~11ic phases to determine the effect 
on radht ion shiel d requ1 rements. The two opt ional metallic phases were 
molybdenum and tantalum. The comparison was made with the same source term (30 
year-old commercial waste) on an equal waste mass basis, u~1n9 the Los Alamos 
Scientific Laboratory QAD shielding code (LA-3572, April 1967). The QAO code 
is useful in predicting gamma dose rates. The neutron dos~ rate component was 
assumed to be constant for all cases. Although I more accurate method could 
be used to calculate dose rates, the use of QAD 15 believed adequate since 
only I compar;tfve assessment was necessary. 
Table 0-1 presents a summary of the waste form mass, 'shieldfnq mass, 
and their total for each cermet metal phase candidate. These results 
illustrate the effects of changing the metallic phase in the wlste form. By 
adding a higher density metal to the waste material the total waste form mass 
increases, because the waste Ihaterial requires the same volume of metallic 
phase, regardless of density. A higher density material is generally a more 
efficient gamma shield. Therefore, the self-shielding char~cterist;c of the 
metallic phase results in a smaller uranium shield requirement for the higher 
den~1ty metals. Nevertheless, the combined total mass of the cermet waste 
form and the uranium shield increases as the nletal phue density increases. 
From a standpoint of low payload ~ss, a more efficient w~ste fo~ will employ 
the lower density metallic phase. However. from the standpoint of an 
unshielded container radiat10n dose, a higher density cer..,et meta~ phase 
produces lower surface dose rates. 
TABLE 0-1. EFFECT OF CERMET METAL PHASE ON SHIELDING DOSE 
Composition 
of 
Metal Phase 
Reference S5~ Fe 
15~ Ni 
18~ Cu 
131. "'0 
Alternate-1 10~ Mo 
Alternate-2 100~ Ta 
Bulk 
Dens ity, 
~/cc 
.70 
7.72 
10.30 
Cem:t 
Mass \ a) • 
ssM 
6340 
8460 
Uranium 
Shield nass,(b) 
Uoo 
3910 
3070 
Payload 
Total 
Mass(C) , 
ka 
9,7~O 
10,200 
11,530 
NOTES: (a) Equal waste mass {3230 kg) per payload spherl!. homogeneous 
mixture based on 58.7~ waste loading for reference case, 
30 year-old commercial waste. 
(b) ~AO shil!lding code. dose at 1 m from surface • 2 r~~/hr. (c) Includes only waste form and uran;um mass. 
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APPENDIX E 
THERMAl MODEL FOR SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
This appendix describes t.he'lol1el used in the thermal analysh for 
the payload wastp fonn and contai ner, ina steady state space envi ronment. 
The model assumes conduction, convection, and radiation modes of heat transfer 
for spherical geometry. The waste form is the sole heat source; solar 
radiation was neglected (a secondary effect). The relationship bet",een the 
maximum waste temperature and the environment temperature is: 
Tw = ~Tw + ~Tc + ~Ts + Tao (E-l) 
where: Tw = Waste form temperature, 
~Tw = Waste form gradient = (qrw2)/(6kw), ceE-I) 
, 
ATe = Container gradient = (qrct)/(6kc), C 
6Ts = Space gradient = (qrcJ/(3hr ), C 
TO(! = Environment tP.ll1perat,; .. ~ = 3 K (deep space) 
q = Waste form vo1umetric heat generation, W/mJ 
rw = Waste form outer radius, ~ 
kw = Waste form conductivity, W/m-C 
rc = Container mean radius, m 
kc = Container conductivity, W/m-C 
hr = S~rfaee heat transfer coefficient, w/m2-c 
It was assumed that no gap exi sted between the waste form and 
container surfaces. Furthermore, the container gradient ( Te) is small in 
comparison with the other terms and is neglected. The remaining unknown 
variable in Equation E-1 ;s the surface heat transfer coefficient, hr. For 
a gray body in black surroundings, neglecting the space environment 
temperature (3K), this coefficient is approximately: 
hr~EoTs3 
where: t. = the container surface emissivity 
0 .. the Stephan-Sol tzmann constant. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
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Given the data in Tabtp. 3-21 and the above relationships, the waste 
center and surface temperatures for vari ous payload masses were cal cul ated 
(see Table 3-22). The assumption to neglect the container wa11 gradient 
results in an underestimate of less than 5 percent for the largest waste mass payload cemperature. 
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APPENDIX F 
MODIFIED PW-4b COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL WASTE MIX 
The heat generation rate for the reference commercial high-level 
waste mix (PW-4b) is sufficiently high to cause the waste fonn and container 
temperature limits to be exceeded for the large spherical payloads. Two 
reasonable \'iays of achieving a lower heat generation rate are: (1) remov~ the 
heat producing elements from the mix; and (2) allow the waste to decay to a 
level of lower activity, before disposing of the waste in space. Table F-1 
presents the results for these two scenarios. The Modified PW-4b waste mix 
has been chosen to redUCE the heat generation rate thus allowing acceptable 
temperatlJres for normal condi:ions in the 9.5 MT cermet waste ~orm payload 
being considered for the advanced space di.:iposal concept (see Section 2.8). 
Also, the use of this mix for the reference concept allows increased safety 
margins when loss of cooling occurs. 
The major heat sources in ten-year old high-level waste are 90S r • 
134Cs, 137Cs. and their deci:Y rroducts 90y. and' 137mSa• The proposed 
Modified waste mix considers the remol/al of 90 percent of the strontium and 
cesium from the liquid high-level waste in the initia1 waste treatment 
process. Removal of yttrium and barium is unnecessary because of their short 
half-lives. Removal of these elements to this degree will reduce the heat 
output of the high-level mix to 24 percent of that of the reference PW-4b mix. 
This reduced heat generation (4.63 W/kg) was used in the thermal nnalysis for 
the 9.5 MT waste form payload (see Section 3.4.5). 
The gamma source strength of the strontium and cesium nuclide decay 
chain was compared to the total contribution of the P\-J-4!:l waste. The effect 
of removing 90 percent of the strontium and cesium from PW-4b does not yield a 
proportional decrease in the gamma source strength. Rather, the modified 
source is only 65 percent less. Assuming this reduction in gamma source 
strength and maintaining the neutron source, the required uranium t~ickness 
for a 9.5 MT waste mass payload is about 6.3 em (includes the shieldin~; 
contribution from 2.54 em of steel) to reduce the dose rate to 2 rem/hr Ht 
1 m. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
TABLE F-1. PW-4b WASTE MIX HEAT REDUCTION CONSIDERATIONS 
_ .... .#.~ ___ o:L __ ""'_--'II. __ """",",.-. __ .s;c ____ .... _________ ~-____ .-...- __ ,,-_~ _________ ' ___ ~_.--..--____ -_____________ ~ 
Reference Remove Remove 
(Oisposdl After 90 Percent 99 Percent Oi s~ose After 
Isotope 10 Years) Sr & Cs Sr & Cs g-Yr 37.5 Yr 50 Yr 100 Yr 
-----
Watts Per MTHr~ 
m Sr-90 9141 9.1 0.9 63.8 -17.4 35.5 10.0 
J> Y-90 410 41 4.1 287 213 160 45.1 
of C$~134 90 9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
-t C5-137 165 16.5 1.6 117 89.1 66 21.4 
m Ba-137 371 37.1 3.7 263 200 148 48.2 ,.. 
,.. Pm-147 50.6 50.6 50.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
m Eu-154 39.3 39.3 39.3 9.8 3.1 0.0 0.0 ..., 
Am-241 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 • 
Cm-244 103 103 103 70(a) 50(a) 40 (a) 35( a) N n 
0 
,.. Total 1335 321 219 826.6 617.6 464 174.7 
c 
~ Percent of 
m 
c: 
Reference 100 24 J6 62 46 35 13 
II - ...... -.~ _ ... _----------- - ~..---.". _ ... _--- -=-- -----=-----,.---.----_._.,; -.-.-------------- .... --.------------~-------. ----
------
( a) [ s t i rna t ed 
_; - - - - ________ - ............ '--' ........................ I--
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APPENDIX G 
THERMAL MODEL FOR AUXILIARY C01LING 
Thi s Appendix describes a steady-state thermal model used for 
calculating the temperatures for the payload waste form, container, radiation 
shield, and reentry vehicle in an Earth environment. The model includes 
conduct ion, convect ion, and radi at ion heat transfer where appl icab le, and 
assumes a spherical geometry for all components. The model developed also 
includes consideration of gap temperature gradients. Auxiliary cooling is 
assumed to be available uniformly over the surface of the primary container. 
This model ~Jas applied in Section 3.4.5 to determine minimum auxiliary cooling 
requirements. No "ttempt at a cooling system 1esign is made. 
The relationship between the waste form center temperature and the 
waste form surface temperature is directly proportional to t~e decay heat: 
where Tw ,. ~~aste form center temperature 
Ts ,. Waste form surface temperature 
q = Waste form volumetric heat generation rate 
rw ,. Waste form radius 
kw = Waste form conductivity. 
(G-l) 
The total heat generated. qV (where V is the payload waste form volume). must 
be either transmitted through the payload system boundaries or actively be 
removed by means of auxiliary cooling. For conduction in spherical geometry. 
t'le heat trans ferred is gi ven by: (G-l) 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
G-2 
and for a thin shell, 
-2 ) 4'11'kr (TS - Too 
q • t 
For the high-level waste container problem here. therefore, we have: 
where Rc • Thermal resistance of container • (tc)/(rc2kc) 
Rc,gap • Thermal resistance of container/shield gap • 
(1/rc)2(t/k + l/h)gap 
Rs .. Thermal resistance of shield • (ts)/rs2ks) 
Rs,gap .. Thermal resistance of shield/reentry vehicle gap .. 
(1/rs)2(t/k + l/h)gap 
RR • Thermal resistance of reentry vehicle .. (tR)/rR2kR) 
Roo" Thermal resistance of Earth environment = 1/(rr2hoo) 
t • Material thickness 
k .. Material conductivity 
h = Surface heat transfer coefficient 
r = Radius. 
(G-2) 
The procedure used to calculate the auxiliary cool~ny requirements ~s 
as fo 11 ows: 
(1) Choose the desired waste form center or surface temperature. 
(2) Calculate Ts (or Tw) from Equation G-l. 
(3) Calculate the heat transferred through payload system to 
ambient, using Equation G-2. 
(4) Calculate auxiliary cooling (equals heat generated minus 
heat transferred to ambient). 
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G-3 
In thp. actual computations for Section 3.4.5, the thermal re-
sistances through the various metal walls (i.e., container, shield, and 
reentry vehicle) were neglected because they are small in comparison to the 
gaps, insulating materials. and ambient resistances. For the principal gaps 
assumed (between container and shield, and shield and reentry vehicle), the 
heat transfer is a Cumbination of conduction. and convection and radiation. 
The latter components were assumed to be constant. 14.2 w/m2-C. representing 
gap convection and radiation heat transfer, as previously determined in the 
Battelle Phase II Study. (G-2) The gap conductivity was assumed to be that 
of air, at a temperature of 315 C, equal to 0.043 W/m-C, with an assumed gap 
thickness of 0.15 cm. 
The reentry vehicle thermal resistance was assumed to consist of the 
insulation conductivity. A representative value of 0.035 W/m-C was assumed 
for MIN-K insulating material, having a thickness of 2.54 cm. The surface 
heat transfer coefficient (convection and radiation in air) was assumed from 
the Phase II effort (11.4 W/m2-C).(G-2) 
Since detailed designs are not required at this stage of the concept 
definition, representative values were assumed to determine the approximate 
temperatures fo;" the various payloads. Minor differences in detailed 
conceptual design infonnation will not affect the conclusions reached during 
this study. 
References 
G-1. Kreith, F •• Principles of Heat Transfer, 2nd p.d., International 
Textbook Co., Scrantun, ~a. (1967). 
G-2. Edgecorrbe, D. S., Rice. E. E., Miller, N. E., Yates, K. 
Conlon, R. J., "Evaluat~on of the Space DisPl)sal of 
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APPENDIX H 
CALCULATION OF FIREBALL TEMPERATURE, HEAT FLUX AND DIAMETER 
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APPENDIX H 
CALCULATION OF FIREBALL TEMPERATURE, HEAT FLUX AND DIAMETER 
This appendix describes the equations and data thcii~ were uud to 
calculate the fireball temperature and surface heat flux (as a fun~tion of 
time) resulting frOf11 postulated fireballs of the Space Shuttle, the Upratecf 
Space Shuttle. and HLlV t The results of these cal culat ions and many of the 
assumpt 10ns clre presented inSect ion 4.2. 1. The Rader ilL iqui d-Propell ant 
Rocket Abort Fire Model" (Reference H-l) was employed here, with modifications 
appropriate for the vehicles. Solutions to the fireball energy equatfon for 
the two time regiofls of interest (the time from ignition. t • 0. until the 
time the liquid propellants have all been consumed. t • tb. and the time, 
t • tb. until the fireball stem lifts off the ground, t • 1.5 x t!'l --see 
Figure 4-1) are presented below. Also, CI discussion of firebelll diameter is 
presented. 
Temperature and Heat Flux Calculations fnr t { tb 
The energy equation (Equation 10 of Reference H-l) ·;or ~ile fireball 
is derived by t:quating the rate of int'!rnal ene:"gy change and ~>:'.~nsion work 
of the fireball to the difference between the rate of en~rgy added oy fuel 
(propellant) addition and the rate of ~nergy 1055 by ratqation, as shown 
below: 
where: 
R • Constant ~ate of Fuel Addition 
hr • "reactants ~ Specific Enthalpy of Formation 
for propel~ants (defined as hin in Reference H-l) 
E: • Fireball EmissivHy 
o • Stefan-Boltzmann constant 
A • Fireball Surface Are~ 
(H-l) 
H-2 
T • ~ireball Temperature 
W • ~ass of Fireball (Wb • total mass of propelldnts) 
hp • hproducts • Specific Enthalpy of Formtt10n 
for Ffreball (defined as hfB in Reference H-l) 
t • time (def~ned as T in Reference H-l). 
Eq!,ation (H-l) CAn be rearranged as: 
dh 
Rhr • £cAT
4 
+ W ~ + hp ~ 
dW 1 R h ~ f ' ddf f but, t is equa to ,t e c(lnstant rate OT ue. ~ ton. 
rewrite Eqv~tion (H-l) as: 
(H-l) 
T~us, we car, 
(H-3) 
The surface aret of th~ fireball, A, can be expressed in terms of the 
density, p , rate of fuel additfon, R, and time, t. The surface area of the 
spherical fireball is defined as: 
A - ~~r2 (H-4) 
where r is the rad~us of the fir~ball. However. the denSity of the fireball 
at a"y given ti~ can be expressec as: 
Mass W Rt 
0- "-C3-r-J Volum! ! ~r ! ~r (H-S) 
Therefore, the radius of the fireball can be expres~ed as: 
(3Rt)'/3 r • 4~o (H-6) 
and thus the surface area of the fireball is: 
(3Rt,)'!./3 A • 4~ 41:'0 (H-7) 
Also, from the equation of state: 
p • ;61 T t (H -8) 
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where: 
P • Pressure 
~ • Gas Constant 
T • Temper~ture. 
H-3 
Equation (H-7) can be rewritten as: 
13RtIl\T)2/3 
A • 41r \"l7TP (H-9) 
Substftuting Equation (H-7) into Equatfon (H-3) and noting that R • Wit, we 
arr'ive at a first order, non-l1nedr differential equatfon: 
dT • r (h -h )- St2l3Tl4/31 fl][ 1 ' df .. r p J ~ t dhp/dT J • (H-IO) 
. (lM)2/3 R- l / l S • 4'!T(o m- (H-ll) 
The rel.,tfonshfps between hp and T for ttle Space Shuttle, Uprated 
S~ace Shuttle, and the HlLV propellants were presented in Section 4.2.1.2 of 
this r'~oort. The table below presents data calculated for hp and T. 
Vehi c1 e 
T.K Space Shuttl e Uprated Space Shuttle HlLV 
------- - - - - - ho, ca1/g .. - - - -
2000 -2258 -2234 
2100 -1844 -2176 -2154 
2200 -1752 -2084 -2063 
~:..lOO 
-1653 -1977 -1958 
2400 -1542 -1851 -1834 
2500 -1414 -1698 -1682 
2600 -1261 -1512 -1499 
2700 -1073 -1288 .. 1278 
2800 ·836.5 -1034 .. 1027 
2900 -540.6 .. 725.6 .. 722.3 
3000 -178.0 -391.6 -393.4 
3100 251.9 -28.88 -36.93 
3Z~:.J 739.6 355.0 339.6 
3300 751.4 727.7 
Note: These data are p10tted in Figures 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 of Section 
4.2.1.2. 
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These data \'Iere fi tted to fi fth order po lynomi al s of the fonn: 
hp = BO + BIT + B2T2 + B3T3 + B4T4 + B5T5 , 
with 
For hp, in units of cal/g, and T, in degrees K, the constants are as 
foll ows: 
Constant Space Shutt1 e Uprated Space Shlltt1 e HLLV 
BO +1.79040E+05 +6.86817E+03 +5.44953E+03 
B1 -3.65130E+02 -3.02094E+01 -2.73145E+Ol 
82 +2.91226E-Ol +3.34755E-02 +3.11942E-02 
B3 -1.14824E-04 -1.70831E-05 -1.62001E-05 
84 +2.23578E-08 +4.12726E-09 +3.95964E-09 
B5 -1.71028E-12 -3.74386E-13 -3.62049E-13 
The values of hr were computed using: (1) the heats of formation 
as gi ven in Reference H-2 for 1 i quid hydrogen and 1 i quid oxygen, at thei r 
normal boiling points; (2) RP-l, at 25 C; and (3) t'-~ propellant mole ratios 
particular to each ·vehicle. The values of hr for these assumptions are 
given in Table 4-3. 
To obtain the value of S (see Equation H-l1) we must first define 
certa in constants and determi ne the va 1 ue of R, the constant rate of fuel 
(propellant) addition. 
For a spherical Space Shuttle fireball under the influence of 
atmospheric pressure (P = 1.0 atm), the average density of the gases at the 
time of 1 iftoff (t = tb) can be approximated by assuming, for temperature, 
the value of 2991 K (see Section 4.2.1.2). Fran the equation of state, 
Equation (H-8), we have: 
p = _P = __ ---:::' ___ ..>...;( l,-,-.~O-,a;..;;.t=m),--___ _ 
,f\T 3 1 0.082 m -atm kg-ma e (2991 K) kg-mole K x 14.006 kg x 
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H-5 
Thus. 
o :II 0.05714 kg/m3 (0.003565 1bm/ft3) 
Frr>m Equation (H-6) and W :II R x t, the radius 
at the time of liftoff (t = tb) is given as: 
for the Space Shuttle fireball 
= ( 3 ) 1/3 W 1/3 
rb 4rrp b (H-14) 
rb = 1.61 Wb l / 3 (when Wb is in kg) 
or 
[rb = 4.063 Wb
1/ 3 (when Wb is in lb
m
)] 
R~ference H-l defines the relationship be'tween the time of liftoff, tb, and 
the fireball radius at that time, rbo This is given as: 
(
3rb)1/2 t z: -b 9 , (H-1S) 
\','here, 9 is the acceleration of gravity, 9.8 m/s2. After substItuting 
Equation (1i-14) into the above relationship we arrive at: 
tb = 0.702 Wb 1;6 (when Wb is in kg) 
or (H-16) 
[tb = 0.615 Wb 1/ 6 (when Wb is in lbm)] 
Since the constant rate of fuel (propellant) addition, R, is given as: 
W Wb R (kg/s) = !i = ~ = __ _ 
t tb 0.702 w
b
'/6 (H-17) 
We have: 
R = 1.425 Wb 5/ 6 (when \~b is in kg) 
or 
BATTE:LLE - COLUMBUS 
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For the case of the Space Shuttle, Wb = 7.12 E+05 kg (1.57 E+06 Ibm), we 
arrive at: 
R = 1.074 E +05 kg/s 
Yb = 144 m 
tb '" 6.63 s. 
Therefore, the Space Shuttle fireball is expected to lift off the 
ground at 6.63 seconds after the initial fire and is expected to have a 
diameter of apfJroximately 288 m. Reference H-l indicates that the time of 
stem 1 i ftoff (see Figure 4-1) i:) gi ven as 1.5 x tb; thus, the stem is 
expected to life off the grour.d at 9.95 seconds cfter the init'ial fire. The 
value of S is calculated using Equation (H-ll). 
Substituting in values for S, hr and using Equations (H-12) and 
(H-13) to substitute fo,. hp and (dhp/dT), Equation (H-IO) was then 
integrated numerically by computer using the Runge-Kutta-Gill method. 
BJttell'::'s IRKG and RKG R()utinec; Wf're employed. The resulting data are 
plotted in Figurps 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 of Section 4.2.1.2 for each vehicle. 
Temperature and Heat Flux Calculations for tb < t < 1.5 tb 
The energy equation used for t < tb (See EqJation H-l) is modified 
by the assumption that there is no more chemical heat added and the mass of 
the fireball is constant (W = Wb). This results in: 
(H-13) 
redrral~ging. dnd substituting using Equation (H-9) for A we arrive at: 
(H-l <'J) 
where: 
(IJ "") \ 1 •• ,. ~ I 
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By employing Equation (H-13), giving the relationship between dhp/dT and T, 
the value of 5· is determined. The values of 5 and 5· that were used in the 
calculations are given below, both in English and metric units. Also, other 
important parameters IJsed in the calculation are given. 
Parameter 
Metric Units 
English Units 
d1, ( 1 b f- ft) I 
(1bm-R) P,lbm/ft3 
Wb .lbm 
fb, ft 
tb,s 
tbx1.5,s 
S/o (ft2-s~)I (i bm-R 21) 
S· /0, ft2/( 1bm-R21_S2~) 
Space Shuttle 
0.00585 
0.05714 
0.712£+06 
144. 
6.630 
9.945 
3.31£-06 
4.98£-07 
110.33 
0.003565 
1.57E+06 
472. 
6.630 
9.945 
10.920E-03 
16.455E-04 
Space Shuttle 
0.00393 
0.08319 
1.79E+06 
173. 
7.267 
10.900 
1.92E-06 
2.64E-07 
74.12 
0.005190 
3.95E+06 
566. 
7.267 
10.900 
6.344E-03 
8.7292E-04 
HLLV 
0.00389 
0.08416 
6.14E+06 
259. 
8.902 
13.354 . 
1.35E-06 
1.52E-07 
73.27 
0.005251 
13.54E+06 
851. 
8.902 
13.354 
4.468E-03 
5.U186E-04 
Equation (H-19) was then integrated numerically by computer using the Runge-
Kutta-Gill method. The resulting data are shown in Figures 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 
in Section 4.2.1.2. 
Fireball Diameter 
The predicted fireball diametp.rs as a function of time for the three 
vehicles of interest are shown in Figure 4-8 of Section 4.2.1.2. These 
BATTELLf' - COLUMBUS 
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relationships were generated by evaluating the following equation (also see 
Equation 6) which relates the diameter of the fireball to the density and the 
mass of the fireball: 
(
3W ) 1/3 
d = 2xr = 2 4np (H-21 ) 
The values of density (assuming the molecular weight at the initial 
conditions), , and firebal1 mass, W, were calculated as a function of time. 
For values of time greater than tb, a constant value of fireball mass was 
used. A. decrease in fireball size for t > tb is due to the large amount of 
radiation being emitted ft'om the fireball, thus cooling it and increasing its 
density. 
Reference H-3 provides relationships between the maximum fireball 
diameter and total propellant for the propellant combi~ations considered here. 
These relationships were developed from experimenta1 data. The relationships, 
modified to reflect diameter in meters, are as follows: 
l02/ LH2 L02/RP-l 
d(m) = 4.390 Wbo.306 d(m) = 3.933 Wb 03.16 (when Wb is in kg) 
rd(ft) = 11.05 Wb 0.306 d(ft) = 10.05 Wb 0.316 (when Wb is in lb~ L J 
0-1-22) 
For the Space Shuttl e case, Wb = 7.12 E+05 kg, the predicted maximum 
J 
~ 1 
1 
I 
I 
t 
I 
fireball diameter, d, is 265 m. This value is shown in Figure 4-11 in Section 1 
4.2.1.2, and good agreement with the Bader Model is observed. The predicted 
fireball maximum diameters for the Uprated Space Shuttle and HLLV are, based I 
upon Equation H-22 for L02/RP-l, 372 and 549 m, respectively. The 
analytical Bader Model predicts sl ightly lower values than these. In looking I 
back to the data used to develop thE> correlations glven above(H-3), the 
predicted values are well within the data envelope. I 
I 
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APPENDIX I 
FRAGMENT VELOCITY DISTRIBUTION 
NASA CR-13453S(I-l) reports pooled data (data from several tests) 
for initial fragment velocities for the C8M (confined by missile) and CBGS 
(confined by ground surface, typically a drop test) for L02/LH2 and 
LOZ/RP-1 propellants in Table X (see Table 1-1). The report concludes that 
the data are best rep~esented by a log-normal distribution. NASA CR-
134906,(1-2) in Figures 4-46 (see Figure 1-1) and 4-47 (see Figure 1-2) 
shows a log-normal di~cribution for the CBM cases, with the correlation line 
passing through the appropri ate mean val ue. The data for the L02/lH2 CBM 
case from NASA CR-134538, Table X (Table 1-1), and the correlation line from 
NASA CR-134906 Figure 4-46 (Figure 1-1) are plotted in Figures 1-3 and 1-4. 
It is evident from Figure 1-3 that the data do not fit a log-normal 
distribution. Further, fitting these data to a log-normal distribution 
results in overestimating the fragment population in the high velocity tail 
and unc~restimating the population in the 10w velocity tail. In Figure 1-4, 
the data and correlation line are shown on (normal) probability paper. It is 
evident that the data from Table X (Table 1-1) fit the normal distribution to 
a quite good approximation (both the l02/LH2 and L02/RP-1 data are 
shown). Table 1-2 compares the normal and log-normal predictions for various 
velocity percentiles. As indicated, the use of the log-normal distribution 
predicts much higher velocities at the higher percentiles than the normal 
distribution. 
TABLE 1-2. COMPARISON OF NORMAL AND lOG-NORMAL VELOCITY DISTRIBUTIONS* 
Normal Log-Normal 
Velocity Velocity 
D i st ri b ut i on Di stribut ion 
Percent i 1 e ft7s mZs ft7s m7s 
10 50 15 180 55 
20 270 82 280 85 
50 670 200 650 200 
90 1280 390 2230 680 
95 1460 445 3200 975 
99 1780 543 6400 1950 
*Note: Data taken from Figures 1-3 and 1-4, for CBM. L02/LH2 tank 
expl os ions • 
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TABLE 1-1. PERCENTILES. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
FOR GROUPED VELOCITY DATA (fps) 
CBM CBM CBOS CBOS 
Percentile. L02/LHZ L02/RP-1 L02/LHZ LOZ/R.P- , 
-
-
10 105.8 Z90.0 170.0 160. 1 
20 228.6 414.3 219.2 262.3 
30 393.3 536.8 289.3 316.8 
40 541. 8 714.2 345. 1 364.9 
50 642.0 822.8 459.4 388.3 
60 821. 4 973.3 594.3 431. 2 
70 915.0 1096.3 728.8 498.5 
80 11 02. 7 1216.8 897.7 573.4 
90 1249.3 1405.6 1169. 9 790.5 
Estimated 
Mean * 6.464 6.713 6.129 5.962 
Estimated 
Standard 
Deviation * • 987" .6313 • 7715 .6387 
. 
* Log Normal Distribution, to base e. To convert to ips, take 
anti-logarithm 
-
Source: NASA CR 134538, Reference 1-1. 
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Ir't spite of the good fit of the available CBM data to a normal 
d~strfj)utiun, tne real distrfbutiol' cannot be normal. Thfs fs because the 
normal distribution hu tails extt:nding to + and - infinity, and as dt'ffned 
here, the velocities cannot be negative. The log-nonnal dfstribution, 1n 
which the logarithms of the variable are distributed normally, is free from 
this problem, as the 10gar1thm of zero is --, Hence the log-norma 1 df s-
tribution is convenient for, often chosen for, and often provides a good f1t 
to dfstr1but ions extendf ng from zero to +.. Either df stribut ion encounters 
the difficulty of producfng a very high velocfty tail extendfng to +.J while 
~hysfcally the fragment velocities must be limited to finite values (re~ated 
to the velocity of the detonatfon or blast wave caUSing the fragments). In 
practical application of the log-normal distributions, the tafl extending to 
+. is ignored, and this causes little trouble provided the population in the 
neglected tafl fs small. The same approach can be taken when using the normal 
distribution, and again, if the population in the negative tail is small, no 
serious problem is encountered. 
In the case here (Figure 1-4) the lines require that 5 to 10 percent 
of the fragments have negative velocitie~, a population that can hardly be 
considered small. Therefore, it is nec~ssary to consider the rl!lSon we \'Iish 
to fit the available data to a standard distribution. The reason is that we 
wish to manij)ulate the data in a convenient, compact form, and most im-
portantly that we wish to extrapolate the data into the high velocity region. 
In this respect, it is our opinion that ~Js1ng the log-normal distribution 
leads to a serious overestimation of the population in the high velocity tail. 
Even though the real distribution cannot be normal, the very good fit of the 
higher velocity populations to the normal distribution make it definitely 
preferable for extrapolating into the high velocity region. 
It shoul d a 1 so be noted that the method of securi ng the fragment 
velocity data (reductions from photographs) was undoubtedly selective. 
Probably only the larger fragments '-/ere observed. and it is possible that very 
slow frag,"ents were obscured by the fireball. smoke, and dust "ccompanying the 
explosion, and that very fast fragments might fan to appear on hlo frames, or 
mi g~t fa i1 to leave d r~ogn ; zab le image due to smeal'. 
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APPENDIX J 
REENTRY THERMAL ANALYSIS CODE (RETAC) 
The Reentry Thermal Analysis Code (RETAC) consi5ts of a family of 
subprograms primarily directed toward reentry heating which can be combined in 
various ways to best simulate the specific problem under consideration. It is 
being upgrilded al,nost continually both with improvements in existing 
subprograms and with the addition of new subprograms. Figure J-l shows a 
genera1 layout of the currently op~rational RETAC subprograms. They are, in 
general, di vided into four areas: env; ronment descri pt ion, thennochemica1 
response of materials, mechanical response of materials, and heat conduction. 
The heat conduction is coupled to the thermochemical and mechanical responses 
by moving boundary logic and a feedback of nose radius change and wall tem-
perature to the ael'oheating subroutine. Shape change feedback to :'he ground 
test environment and trajectory subprograms have been incorporated in certain 
cases. The link !)etween the environment and material response includes gas 
boundary-l ayer b1 od; ng effects and surface temperature. In addit ion to the 
subprograms shown, a special subprogram car. provide a simul ation of internal 
vapori zi ng reservoi rs with subsequent flow through a porous structure to the 
surface. 
It should be noted that not all possible combinations Jf subprograms 
have been run to date; in fact, some pr0gramming changes are generally 
necessary when a new combination is first run. However, these changes 
generally are minor and, as exp,-,'ience has been gained in the use of RETAC on 
various problems, they are proceeding quite smoothly. This is in line with 
the basic philosop~y of RETAC development which is to build a family of fairly 
simple subprograms which can then be combined i:1 a flexible manner to fit the 
specific problem. As nany direct interactions of pertinent ~henomena as 
possible are incC'rporateC:. To remain flexible, an explicit finhe difference 
method of solution is employed for :he heat conduction equathlli. 
Four alt~r"ate methods of calculating internal conduction are 
presently available. r~I'1tilayer, one-dimensional computations may be carried 
out with comblned series-arid-parallel heat flow paths to simulate certain two-
and even three-dimensional effects. While these techniques are still used for 
certai,l problems. they have definite limitation. Therefore, alternate 
approaches have been developed which are a general two-dimensional 
axi symmetri c subprogram and a three-dimens iona 1 (r, 6 ,z) subprogram. A 
two-dimensio'1al moving boundary scheme has been developeu to remove material 
and predict shape change. 
The aerodynamic heating subroutine is essentidlly the original 
subroutine dp.veloped for RTG reentry studies. Gas gap radiation has been 
added for superorbital c.onditions, however. The aerodynamic heating ~ub-
routine r.a1culates heating to the reentry body 011 the hasis of loca1 
properties (pressure, te'TIperature). configuration, and reentry mode. Either 
existing int.ernal (to the program) eCluatiol1s can be employed, or trajectory 
data supp 1 i ed from tne 3-degree-of-freedom or 6-degree-of-freedom cOinputer 
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prograln via punched-card input. In the aeroheating subprogram, heat tra:lsfer 
correlations covering free molecular theory, transition theory, and boundary 
layer theory are used. Coupling of the aeroheating calculations with the 
ablation and heat conduction analyses provides for calculation of the reentry 
shield surface temperature(s). Cooling of the reentry body during the latter 
portion of reentry is, therefore, automatically included in the analysis. 
The GRAPH ablation subroutine essentially uses the general aero-
thermal model, Hhich includes the reaction rate-controlled regime, the 
diffusion-controlled regime, and sublimation regime. The model includes 
continuous transitions betwee~ the regimes and also predicts when the 
transition occurs. It has also been modified for other oxidation processes 
such as tungsten oxidation. 
Another ablation model used in the program is a constant temperature 
phase change with mass removal. This can be used for surface melting or 
process€!s such as Teflon ablation. By allowing this model to simulate the 
pyrolysis boundary movement and gas evolution and combin~ng it with subprogram 
GRAPH at the surface of the carbon char, CHAR, a subprogram for charring 
ablators, has also been developed and ~sed. An alternate method for handling 
charring ablators is also available in which a pyrolysis zone is defined by 
specifying the properties including density as a function of temperature. The 
rate of gas evolution is obtained by determining the rate of change of the 
density of the material remaining. A time delay for the gases tc reach the 
surface can also be included. 
A general ized thermornechanical response model can be used in which 
the subroutine OXID calculates the mass loss in the reaction rate- or 
diffusion-controlled regimes and the phase change ablation model takes over 
\~hen a specified temperature is reached. This general ized model can ablate 
through layers of different materials. It can also be used in place of the 
GRAPH subroutine with sublimation handled in the phase change model. 
The FLOW subroutine calculates the flow through a porous structure 
from an arbitrary number of internal reservoi rs. The poros ity betw€~n each 
reservoir and various surface locations is specified as input. The subroutine 
calculates the pressure within each reservoir by vapor pressure and continuity 
relationships and then obtains the pressure differences to the various surface 
locations using the external pressure distribution. The changing distances 
between the reservoirs and the surface locations are also recalculated as the 
surface recedes. The final result is a distribution of ejected flol'l along the 
surface. The heat transfer between the flowing fluid and the porous matrix 
can be added to the energy equation in the conduction program. 
The liquid layer subprogram prc,vides a detailed description of the 
dynamics of a liquid layer on an axially symmetric reentry body surface. The 
1 iquid layer is coupled into the extetnal flow by shear and surface vapori-
zation. It is coupled to the solid body by the liquid injection rate and 
di stribut ion, surface temperature di stribut ion, and body shape. For 
parametric studies, this subprogram can be run separately from RETAC. 
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The mechanical response of materials is predicted by a subprogram 
STRESS in which any of a variety of m~dels can be used. This is then coupled 
with material removal logic by some assumed failure criterion. This material 
removal is then linked to the heat conduction by the same moving boundary 
logic that is used for thermomechanical material removal. At the present 
time, only one-dimensional stress subprograms have been linked directly with 
the heat conduct ion. However, two-dimensional thermal stress cal cul at ions 
have been made using two-dimensional temperature profiles generated by RETAC, 
so the extension to a two-dimensional linked model ;s relatively 
st ra i ght forwa rd. 
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